Publications and Data
"Measuring Military Effectiveness: Calculating Casualty Loss-Exchange Ratios for Multilateral Interstate Wars, 1816-1990." Kathryn McNabb Cochran and Stephen B. Long. Forthcoming in International Interactions 43:6 (December 2017).
In this paper, we introduce the Loss Exchange Ratio Database (LERD), which provides battle- and war-level loss exchange ratios for all multilateral interstate wars between 1816 and 1990, filling a major gap in existing data available for analysis by scholars interested in military effectiveness and war outcomes. While COW and PRIO provide data on total casualties for each combatant in interstate wars from 1816 to 2001, they do not provide data about who inflicted which casualties on whom, an important question when more than two combatant states are involved in a war. For wars involving more than two combatant states, the LERD uses secondary historical sources to calculate loss exchange ratios for battles for which there are casualties documented for each side, then aggregates those battle- level ratios to create war-level ratios for each pair of combatants. This paper then uses the LERD data to analyze the effect of regime type on military effectiveness to demonstrate the dataset’s potential to help answer important theoretical questions.
"A Winning Proposition? States' Military Effectiveness and the Reliability of Their Allies" (2015). Stephen B. Long. International Politics 52:3, pp. 335-348.
This paper explores the relationship between states' past military performance in interstate wars and the likelihood that their allies will come to their aid when the terms of their alliance require intervention. Following Leeds (2003), I argue that decisions to honor or violate alliances depend on changes that have occurred since the signing of the alliance and various factors that affect the expected costs of honoring the alliance. What I add to this approach is an exploration of whether and how a state's performance in prior interstate wars sends signals about its likely military effectiveness in the current war. I argue that superior records of military performance signal to allies that their potential costs for intervention will be lower than they would be with a less effective ally. I use an outcomes-based measure of military effectiveness to predict when states will violate or honor their alliances.
"Civil War Intervention and the Problem of Iraq" (2012). Stephen D. Biddle, Jeffrey Friedman, and Stephen B. Long. International Studies Quarterly 56:1, pp. 85-94.
In this paper, we attempt to inform foreign policy debates by providing a theoretical model of civil war intervention that contributes to the academic literature on the subject, while also creating policy-relevant empirical predictions. To do this, we create a new data set that merges information on both geopolitical and ethnic factors and use it to test a probit model of civil war intervention. Using the results of the analysis, we run a Monte Carlo simulation that allows us to make predictions for the special case of Iraq following an American withdrawal. We find that advocates of American withdrawal may be operating under optimistic assumptions that are not supported by empirical evidence.
"Bringing Cooperation Back In: A Fully Informed Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction" (2008). Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Andrew J. Enterline, and Stephen B. Long. Conflict Management and Peace Science 25:3, pp. 264-280.
Article (PDF)
In an earlier aritcle (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001), we develop a formal, dynamic model of the cooperative and conflictual dimensions central to interstate relationships. However, the empirical data employed as inputs into this model inform only the model's conflictual dimension. Here, we operationalize the conflictual and cooperative dimensions of the model, with the latter derived by inputting information on joint participation in inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) for the period 1965-2000. Doing so enables us to trace the joint cooperative-conflictual temporal trajectories of interstate dyads, in addition to capturing the degree and dynamism of these relationships. We demonstrate the flexibility and practicality of the model-derived empirical indicators of interstate interaction with an analysis of dyadic interstate conflict. Our dynamic approach to studying interstate relationships promises to facilitate fruitful contributions to several research agendas in comparative politics and international relations.
"Reputation, History, and War" (2007). Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Jacob D. Kathman, and Stephen B. Long. Journal of Peace Research 44:6, pp. 651-667.
Article (PDF)
This paper investigates the role of reputational history in the onset of interstate war. Scholars have recently identified the importance of separating the phenomena of conflict from the rare event of war, and have argued persuasively that the causes of war may diverge from the causes of lower levels of interstate violence. Here we build on earlier work concerning the role of reputation and history in the onset of militarized interstate disputes (Crescenzi and Enterline 2001, Crescenzi 2006) to examine the role these factors play in the onset of war. We argue that states in crises face competing pressures brought on by their dyadic history and the opponents' reputations. While historical conflict reveals private information regarding the credibility of state demands, this history also generates constraints upon the ability of governments to seek peaceful resolutions to the current crisis.
"Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look" (2004). Stephen D. Biddle and Stephen B. Long. Journal of Conflict Resolution 48:4 (August), pp. 525-546.
Article (PDF)
Why are democracies unusually successful in war? We find that superior human capital, harmonious civil-military relations, and Western cultural background are largely responsible. These traits correlate positively with democracy, and account for democracy’s apparent effectiveness bonus. This is either good news or bad news for democratic effectiveness theorists. Many believe that democracy causes these traits. If so, our findings strengthen democratic effectiveness theory by explicating its causal mechanism. But others see democracy as a consequence rather than a cause of such traits. If so, our findings challenge the thesis by identifying alternative causes of the effectiveness bonus previously attributed to democracy. Either way, the results show a powerful effect for unit level variables in military performance. In the process, these same results sharpen our understanding of military effectiveness in general, and the relationship between military performance and regime type in particular.
"Time Present and Time Past: Rivalry and the Duration of Interstate Wars, 1846-1985" (2003). Stephen B. Long. International Interactions 29:3 (July-September), pp. 215-236.
Article (PDF)
This article sits at the intersection of the rivalry, war duration, and bargaining literatures, suggesting that histories of armed conflict between states increase war duration through their effects on the selectorate and the wartime bargaining process. I argue that the historical relationship between two states plays an integral role in the duration of future conflict. Specifically, historical conflict between states intensifies the preference of national selectorates for military victory and narrows the range of negotiated settlements that leaders might pursue while still maintaining domestic political support. I employ Bennett and Stam’s (1996) ex ante data set and Crescenzi and Enterline’s (2001) International Interaction Score to provide an empirical test of the ability to generalize appropriately coded historical interaction to the topic of war duration. Contradicting earlier studies, the results of this analysis show that a properly operationalized measure of rivalry has significant and positive effects on war duration.