Methods Conference Paper Abstracts

Our Mind and the Number '3' (Po Huang)

Here are two challenges to mathematical Platonism. First, the worry that efficient causal relation between abstract and material objects violates the energy conservation principle. Second, there are no intelligible ways to conceive the efficient causal relation between abstract and material objects. In effect, both interpretations lead to mathematical Platonism being impossible. Benjamin Callard responds to these problems by proposing intelligible ways to conceive the efficient causal relation between abstract and material objects without violating the energy conservation principle. He argues that as long as there is a conceivable possibility that abstract and material objects are efficiently causally related, we are justified to believe that mathematical Platonism is true. In this paper, I will critique Callard’s solution to the problem of mathematical Platonism.

A Stronger Defense of Abortion(Olivia Pollock)

In “A Defense of Abortion,” Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that in some cases, abortion is morally permissible despite a fetus’s status as a person. I argue that although Thomson’s argument succeeds in defending some cases of abortion, a more robust defense is necessary to account for cases in which pregnancy is a) the result of a voluntary act, and b) does not threaten the mother’s life. Through a modification of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous violinist analogy, I argue that a woman's right to bodily autonomy extends to having an abortion in such cases, basing my argument on the importance of consent and autonomy in invasive bodily endeavors such as pregnancy.

An Extended Mind, Some Extensive Consequences (Gavin March)

In “The Extended Mind,” Andy Clark and David Chalmers propose a radical consequence of a functionalist definition of belief that beliefs need not be all in the head––that minds can be extended. I argue that the consequence of the extended mind is not as consistent as the singular mind bound by skull and flesh. I present a thought experiment analogous to Clark and Chalmers’s of a man and a notebook but instead involving a man and his assistant. In both cases, he refers to this external helper for memory and to recall important information. Clark and Chalmers argue that in both cases, the external information is the man’s belief. I then argue that the thought experiment shows this claim to be inconsistent with one’s ownership of their own beliefs and leads to consequences inconsistent with characteristics of minds and beliefs. Ultimately, I conclude that the thought experiment reveals meaningful differences between Clark and Chalmers’s extended mind and commonly-understood singular minds that mean they cannot be equated functionally, and thus that belief cannot be exported to the extended mind. It then follows that if mental states like belief cannot be functionally exported to the extended mind, the jump from singular minds to extended minds itself is ill-founded, and that Clark and Chalmers’s extended mind is an untenable conclusion.

Against Commerical Surrogacy (Yutong Jiang)

With the advancement of in vitro fertilization, surrogacy has emerged as a viable option for childbearing and becomes commercialized. However, I contend that commercial surrogacy is exploitative and increases gender inequality. In this article, I will argue that commercial surrogacy is morally impermissible and should be prohibited by law, independent of the attitudes of the two main parties involved in the act: the surrogate and the intended parents.

Free Will: A Critical Analysis of Doyle's Defense of Source Compatibilism (Kalindi Kapadia)

Can we be certain that we have free will, or are our choices shaped and predetermined by past conditions? This paper challenges Stuart Doyle's compatibilist defense, which argues against source incompatibilism, which is the view that external influences compromise free will by affecting an agent's desires and reasons. I demonstrate that Doyle's principal argument misinterprets the relevant scale in manipulation cases, which misrepresents how free will should be assessed in reality. This misunderstanding leads to a failure to refute source incompatibilism, thus weakening his compatibilist position. My critique of Doyle's argument results in the inability to refute source incompatibilism theories through his analysis, thereby undermining the strength of source compatibilism theories. However, by arguing that societal influences, when viewed as emergent properties within interactions at the agent scale, support the existence of free will by demonstrating that individual agency can coexist with deterministic structures. The paper further attempts to correct Doyle's misrepresentation of John Martin Fischer's compatibilism theory, emphasizing that while reasons may be influenced externally, the essential aspect of free will lies in the agent’s capacity to engage with and choose among these reasons. Thus, this study not only challenges Doyle's critique but also extends to the conversation of how free will in a deterministic universe can continue to exist, considering such challenges.

Utilitarianism or Kantianism? A Utilitarian approach to tackling problems during the COVID-19 Pandemic (Michael Jiang)

During the COVID-19 pandemic, all decision-makers in each country were striving to make the most rational choice to prevent death and effectively distribute the limited medical resources. Due to the scarce resources during this global pandemic, we could not apply egalitarianism to policymaking, such as ensuring nationwide vaccination and offering ventilators to all. In light of this, is utilitarianism the only “way out” to resolve scarcity problems and implement a lockdown policy to prevent death in contingent pandemics? Shall we consider deontological ethics, such as Kantian ethics to replace it if a utilitarian approach disregards individual freedom and moral obligation? My goal for this paper is to show that utilitarian approaches were predominantly applied during COVID-19 and examine the repercussions of using such philosophical ideas during the pandemic. At last, I shall provide a new hybrid approach that combines Kantianism and utilitarianism to tackle future contingent crises.