Methods Conference Paper Abstracts
“Nothingness isn’t a Thing?” (Jorelle Montes)
“Nothingness”, as an object of existence is a difficult thing to imagine. Natural science tells us that there is no empirical evidence of nothingness. Language, however, inspires us to consider nothingness in another sense of existence, one that is subjective. In this paper, I will provide my perspective regarding claims of an existent “nothingness”, which I take to be a misguided claim. I will give a brief argument about what kind of existential quality (sense) describes the notion of “nothingness”, and eventually conclude that said quality is not substantial enough to claim that “nothingness” actually exists.
Rejection of 'Epistemology Naturalized' (Harris Cannon)
In our daily lives we use the fruits of the sciences and scientific discovery. Because of the value we place in science it could be desirable if our theory of knowledge had a foundation or belonged to a province of scientific inquiry. This is what WVO Quine attempted to do in his paper ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. This paper discusses in brief the argument as presented by Quine and then raises objections that are defeating of Quine’s conclusion that epistemology can
be subsumed by psychology. In rejecting Quine, this paper establishes epistemology as a unique province of inquiry that is not able to be subsumed by a descriptive science like psychology.
Trapped in the Chinese Room? (Jackson LeViness)
John Searle's Chinese Room Argument purports to show that if a machine could win the Turing Test, it would do so while understanding nothing. I shall argue that Searle fails to prove that the Turing test is insufficient for machine thought.
Ethics of Abortion (Maya Fouad)
The ethical issue of abortion has remained a widely debated topic across Western societies for years; however, neither side has been able to fully settle the dispute surrounding the moral permissibility of abortion. This paper examines the conservative argument presented by Peter Singer and his responses to common liberal objections, including Judith Jarvis Thomson’s feminist argument. The aim of this paper is to show that the response to the feminist argument
presented by Singer is insufficient, and the feminist claim that abortions are morally permissible in some cases holds.
A Refutation to Kant’s Impermissibility of Lying (Zachary Perkins)
Immanuel Kant asserts that we ought to never tell a lie no matter how inconsequential it seems. His philosophy is grounded in our existence as rational beings confined by laws of Reason, and if we are to lie, not only does it lead to irrational contradiction, but it also undermines our essential human quality of rationality. This philosophy manifests itself in Kant’s Categorical Imperative, but there seems to be room for lying when we evaluate the Humanity Formulation. This presents a threat to Kant’s moral theory as a entirety, because the purpose of his theory is to create universal moral normativity without exception. In this paper, I address this issue through a counterexample that involves lying to a stroke patient with temporarily altered-mental-status, strictly to help them regain autonomy lost due to the injury.
Can McDowell's account of "silencing" successfully distinguish virtue from continence and incontinence? (Abhi Ruparelia)
In a highly influential article, John McDowell argues that when a virtuous agent deliberates about a course of action, he does not see any conflict between the demands of virtue and other competing non-virtuous considerations. For the truly virtuous agent, the requirements of virtue do not outweigh or override competing considerations, but “silence” them. This conception of “silencing” stems from Aristotle but is also novel in the sense that McDowell takes silencing to be a perceptual capacity. My goal in this paper is to critically evaluate the notion of “silencing” as a requirement for virtue. I argue that the concept of “silencing,” as construed, is problematic because of the following concerns: a) the difference between silencing and overriding is not entirely clear, b) if we are to accept one interpretation of McDowell’s claims, we are forced to admit that the virtuous agent is not as praiseworthy for his actions as we traditionally understand him to be, and c) The condition of “silencing” is too high a requirement for attaining virtue; hence, it goes against the conventional account of virtue, as advertised by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics.
"Are you questioning my judgement?" From the Humean model, an argument for a more empathetic true judge (Anna Cheng)
Who has not been slighted by a snob? Yet sometimes, we also wonder if they're right. Hume attempts to address the puzzle of aesthetic taste in his essay Of the Standard of Taste. Hume argues that a group of true judges, those who are able to perfectly perceive and interpret the qualities of a work, ought to be able to come to an objective consensus about the aesthetic merit of any work. However, his model seems to require that the true judges be snobs who dismiss certain classes of objects, which nevertheless hold aesthetic value given Hume's assumptions. This paper argues for a modification of Hume's theory of true judges which resolve this conflict in his essay.
The Golden Rule (Carlin O'Neill)
Is the Golden Rule really that golden? In this paper, I will discuss whether or not the Golden Rule is a standard that people around the world should hold themselves too and act in accordance with. Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill both present their own qualms with the Golden Rule and through the lens of their philosophies and objections, the shortcomings of the Golden Rule become clearer.