Methods Conference Paper Abstracts
Philosophy of Philosophy (John Pelet)
The purpose of this paper is to answer the question, "What is philosophy?" Such an answer must meet two constraints. The first is that it must distinguish philosophy from other fields. The second is that a definition should include everything that is philosophy while excluding everything that is not philosophy. The definition I wish to suggest is that philosophy is an argument in defense of an idea. Though this might not distinguish philosophy from all other fields, I will suggest that the evidence the philosopher uses in defense of his argument is unlike that of other areas. I will also argue that philosophy can be a purely mental activity. Lastly, I will discuss what philosophy is not. I will claim that philosophy is not dependent upon reaching truth or knowledge. It must simply put forth an idea or answer to a question that is reasonably supported and contributes to a greater understanding of some problem or question.
Determinism and the Death Penalty (Paul Bunch)
This paper analyzes an argument of Thomas W. Clark's in which he states that the death penalty is unjustified given "recent work in genetics, neuroscience, and behavioral psychology" which has demonstrated that human behavior is "is entirely shaped by biological and environmental influences and interactions." After a brief presentation of Clark's main points, it will be argued that (1) Clark's position is internally inconsistent and that (2) even if one is willing to suspend the conditions that result in the inconsistency, the argument still fails. The argument fails because a utilitarian justification of the death penalty can still be given, and I provide just such a justification.
You're Only Human (Andrew Duffy)
What is human nature? Is there human nature? Both Dale Jacquette and Joseph offer answers to these questions. Jacquette in his "Margolis on History and Culture" attacks Margolis' argument based on history and culture that there is no human nature in the sense of a fixed essence, if there is a human nature at all. Jacquette offers that human nature in the sense of a fixed essence should be strongly considered in light of regulative implications of a fixed human nature and in light of possibilities that Margolis' argument allows. However, in his argument Jacquette fails to reasonably show that human nature in the sense of a fixed essence is possible according to the possibilities Margolis' argument allows and should be seriously considered.
The Assumptions of Descartes' Cogito Ergo Sum (Jeff Piel)
Descartes wanted to see if he could justifiably come to know anything of the world if he started by assuming nothing - even by refusing himself the assumption of his own existence. " Cogito, ergo sum " is his most enticing contribution to philosophical thought. In an aphorism by Friedrich Nietzsche, an inexplicit attack against the Cartesian proof of the existence of the subject is leveled. This paper shows that while Nietzsche's criticism is very poignant, in the end one need only make a minor modification to Descartes' argument in order for Descartes to succeed. In this paper I first demonstrate that Nietzsche's criticism effectively shows that Descartes' " cogito, ergo sum " has two very important underlying assumptions - both of which are not justifiable. I suggest and justify a way of modifying the assumption so that one can in fact say that she or he exists as a subject which is an "I."
Beauvoir's Transcendence and Contemporary Women (Kerry McClung)
Beauvoir maintains that human existence is an ambiguous interplay between transcendence and immanence , yet men have been privileged with expressing transcendence through projects, whereas women have been forced into the repetitive and uncreative life of immanence. Beauvoir asserts two concrete demands necessary for Woman's reclamation of her subjectivity: woman must be allowed to transcend through her own free projects, and various changes in social structures must occur. Yet, there exists a severe limitation in Beauvoir's account of woman's situation. She offers women little guidance as to where to begin the work of transcendence beyond the previously mentioned demands. This paper aims to remove this limitation by first clarifying the terms transcendence and immanence and then offering guidance on how women can achieve Beauvoir's transcendence in contemporary society. I suggest Woman must take on the project of challenging and changing her cognitive processes as well as her evolved psychological tendencies which classify her as the objectified Other.
Can Strictly Rational Individuals Be Good Friends (Zachary Miller)
Sarah Stroud has recently argued that according to our intuitive picture of the good friend, there are situations in which friendship requires epistemic partiality. She goes on to argue that such epistemic partiality is inconsistent with any prevailing theory of epistemic rationality. My central claim is that the epistemic partiality required by friendship is consistent with a prevailing theory of epistemic rationality, namely evidentialism. I support this claim by first briefly outlining how
evidentialism can make sense of the epistemic partiality required by friendship. Second, I show that Stroud's argument against evidentialism's
ability to be fully consistent with the epistemic partiality required by friendship fails because it employs an unsupported premise. Third, I show
that when a correct analysis of our intuitive picture of the good friend is carried out, it becomes clear that the epistemic partiality required by friendship is fully consistent with evidentialism.
The Occulus Through Which We See Reality (George Baird)
One of the quests of human beings is the understanding of those internal workings that determine who we are. Not unlike many other subjects in
philosophy, despite all of the time spent addressing the “self,” very little has been agreed upon. For example, some might argue that over time one’s identity changes and so “who they are” changes. Whether this is just a misuse of wording or if we actually become a different person is a question that needs to be examined. The question we first need to answer is what the self is defined as and what is included in this definition. My idea of the self is that which is the reality one experiences that is created by the influences of all mental and physical happenings from a person’s past. Many others have defined it as something much more specific, but I shall show why these definitions are too acute and leave much of the “self” out.
Personal Identity and Strict Identity (Ryan Duffy)
The goal of my paper is to suggest that E. J Borowski's main argument in his essay "Identity and Personal Identity", which is that the identity of an object and the identity of a person should be considered separately and differently by using a different logic for each type of identity, does not result from his alternative view of identity. This alternate view of identity is diachronic identity, or "identity through time", in which the identity of both objects and person is consistent throughout stages of a dynamic process that can be considered "whole" or complete (484). Borowski holds that "it is a corollary of the general account of diachronic identity developed above that the more complex are the possible descriptions of some object, the more complex may be the conditions required for its identity through time", which leads to his distinction between personal and strict identity (496). I will offer examples of recent discoveries in cognitive science, such as those made in the field of artificial intelligence, to support that Borowski's diachronic account of identity and the corollary to this account do not necessitate the use of different logics between persons and non-persons. To use separate logics in the process of identification of something as either a person or non-person can rather be seen as an unnecessary demarcation in such a process.
Reformulating the Concept of Evil (Jack Bell)
In "The Concept of Evil," Marcus Singer attempts to clarify the concept of evil and define its nature. According to Singer's conception there are different levels or gradations of evil that are determined solely by the intentions of the agent causing the evil. However, this scheme allows for cases in which an individual who murders one million people with an intention less evil than an intention of another individual who murders one person must be called less evil. In this paper, I intend to solve this problem of categorizing the gradations of evil while still maintaining Singer's central tenets about the nature of evil, acts, persons, institutions and motives. First, I will examine Singer's conception of evil in and flesh out his scheme of the gradations of evil; secondly, I will articulate the problem; thirdly, I will attempt to solve the problem by reformulating the variables for determining the gradations of evil by positing a scheme that takes intentionality and the extent of one's actions into account; fourthly, I will defend my contention against objections.
An Acrimoniously Assaulted Analogy (Adrian Davidson)
My paper shows how Behe's mousetrap analogy is insufficient for advancing Intelligent Design. Strategically I focused on the weakness of his mousetrap analogy by showing how it was an inadequate comparison to a complex biological system. I demonstrate the inadequacy of the analogy by proving that a mousetrap can function with lesser parts; hence not qualifying as irreducibly complex. Demonstrating that Behe is unable to provide an adequate analogy for an irreducibly complex system, undermines his ability to provide a truly irreducibly complex system. Secondly, I attack the inductive strength of the mousetrap analogy by relying on Catalano's "fallacy of conclusion by analogy." Behe implies that biological systems are irreducibly complex with his analogy, but according to Catalano, one cannot use analogies as evidence for a conclusion. Thirdly, I attack how Behe fills a 'designer in the gaps' whenever there is a lack of knowledge or research to whether a biological organism is irreducibly complex.
...Except That Guy You Killed Wasn't Yourself (Will Kelly)
In his paper, "Time Travel and Changing the Past: (Or How to Kill Yourself and Live to Tell the Tale)", Geoff Goddu argues that "time travel [is not only] logically possible, but so is changing the past." He presents his model for time travel and "argue[s] that it coherently models changing the past." In this paper, I do not argue against the general possibility of time travel or changing the past, but I offer a critique of the model that Goddu presents. I argue that his model is not convincing enough in showing that the relevant past is changed when traveling into the past. To accomplish this, I begin by giving a summary of Goddu's argument, then I review his model, and finally I discuss his replies to general objections to this theory, specifically Objection III in his paper.
My goal is to identify the intuitions that create the sorities paradox and suggest that understanding the meaning of terms such as "heap" can keep us from becoming entangled in it. One version of the sorities paradox can be summarized as follows: (1) One grain of sand is not a heap of sand. (2) One grain of sand cannot be the difference between something that is not a heap of sand and something that is a heap of sand. (3) Therefore, for any n, n grains of sand is not a heap of sand. I argue the paradox arises because situations in which it is appropriate to use a vague term such as "heap" are situations that make the use of logical inference to derive (3) from (1) and (2) inappropriate. I then suggest that the word "heap" can be meaningful without being suitable for use in logical inferences.