Communication, Persuasion, and The Establishment of Academic Disciplines: The Case of American Psychology

David E. Leary

You must be satisfied if our account is as likely as any, remembering that both I and you...are merely human, and should not look for anything more than a likely story.

Plato, Timaeus, ca. 355 B.C.

In this essay I will analyze some of the rhetorical ventures of the so-called New Psychologists who at the turn of our century strove to institutionalize a new science and to create a new set of professional roles. My assumption is that their arguments were not fated to be successful. Had their major spokesmen not been so savvy and articulate, and their audiences so remarkably receptive, their arguments for the New Psychology, in and of themselves, would not have been so persuasive.

To illustrate this point, I shall survey the arguments put forth on behalf of the New Psychology and compare these arguments with the reality of psychology’s historical situation. More particularly, I shall try to tease apart the rhetorical fabric surrounding the birth of the New Psychology by focusing, one by one, on different strands of its discourse. There is nothing absolute about these strands: historical reality cannot be decomposed without overlap or remainder into just so many strings of argumentation. But for practical purposes it seems reasonable to focus separately, so far as possible, on (1) what persuaded the first generation
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of American psychologists to take an interest in the New Psychology; (II) the arguments these aspiring psychologists presented to university presidents and trustees to insure that they could pursue their interest within particularly institutional settings; (III) the arguments they put forth against the rights of other persons to engage in similar, competing pursuits; (IV) the arguments they laid before various administrators, officials, interest groups, and the general public to guarantee continued and even increased support; and (V) the arguments they presented in the form of theories and practices developed between approximately 1880 and 1920. In conclusion, I will suggest (VI) that all of these rhetorical contexts and activities help to explain why Americans have so often been persuaded and assuaged by modern psychology, and why the role of communication and persuasion in the establishment of academic disciplines deserves increased attention.

By focusing on these various rhetorical contexts, I hope to construct a likely story about the establishment of the New Psychology in the United States. At the same time, by focusing this story particularly upon William James, I hope to underscore—on the centenary of his magnificent Principles of Psychology (1890)—the central role that James played in the establishment of modern American psychology. However, it should be understood from the start that I will be using James as a representative of a larger set of individuals who constituted the first generation of modern American psychologists.

I

What could have persuaded anyone, in 1880, to pursue a career in the New Psychology? The term New Psychology had been around since at least 1845, but scientific psychology itself—a psychology in which measurement and experiment had an important place—was still more dream than reality. Still, it had been known for more than a decade that something distinctive was happening in Germany, and at least two Americans had already visited Germany and observed the nascent science.

The first of these was a young medical student who had been convalescing in Europe when it occurred to him—suffering as he was from a number of apparently nonsomatic illnesses—that “the border ground of physiology and psychology . . . would be as fruitful as any” for him to study. As a consequence, he decided to go to Heidelberg “because Helmholtz is there and a man named Wundt, from whom I think I may learn something of the physiology of the senses without too great bodily exertion.” Soon he was writing that he planned to continue studying “in a general psychological direction.” Although he was uncertain about the “practical application” to which this study might lead, he mused that it might earn him “a professorship of moral philosophy in some western academy,” if such positions were open to “men of a non-spiritualistic mould” (letters from William James in Perry 1935; vol. 1:254, 274, and 276).

It was then 1868, and this “non-spiritualistic” medical student—William James—was more than a decade away from fulfilling his self-proclaimed “vocation” to become a professor of philosophy. Before reaching that goal, James served for seven years as an instructor and assistant professor of physiology, inaugurated the teaching of the new “Physiological Psychology” at Harvard University, and saw his first graduate student in psychology, G. Stanley Hall, go to Germany to do postgraduate work in the new science.

These first steps led to others, and by the mid-1890s the New Psychology was bedecked with all the trappings of an established scientific discipline. There were laboratories, journals, professorships, graduate programs, a professional organization, and at least one clear case of the application of psychology to the solution of real-world problems. And besides all of these, there was James’s masterful textbook, The Principles of Psychology, certainly one of the major factors in the establishment of the New Psychology in America.

But to repeat our initial question, Why did James and others of his generation choose to pursue a vocation in the New Psychology? The answer for James is that the New Psychology offered an opportunity to resolve personal conflicts concerning science and religion, materialism and spiritualism, determinism and free will. In this as in so many other respects, James’s situation is emblematic and worthy of review.

James’s first vocation was actually that of an artist, but after a brief period as an artist’s apprentice he switched his attention from art to science in the early 1860s. Soon thereafter, he came to feel oppressed by the vision of a completely determined world, and with the loss of all sense of free will and moral responsibility, he became depressed and seriously contemplated suicide. Still, he refused simply to turn his back on science. His respect for science was such, he reported, that he would feel “as if all value had departed from . . . life” if he had to forgo the possibility of becoming a scientist.

It was in this context that psychology, as a prospective science dealing with the operations of the mind (including, most notably, the human will), offered him hope of an eventual rapprochement between his scientific ideals and his personal need to overcome the feeling “that we are Nature through and through, that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens save as a result of physical laws” (letter
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Chapter 1: The Rise of American Psychology

1966: William James, the father of American psychology, passed away.

Chapter 2: The Development of American Psychology

1975: The American Psychological Association was founded.

Chapter 3: The Influence of American Psychology

1980: American psychology became a major force in the global community of psychology.

Chapter 4: The Future of American Psychology

1990: The American Psychological Association celebrates its 50th anniversary.

Appendix: The Evolution of American Psychology


References


of Philosophy. By 1880 he was an assistant professor of philosophy, regularly teaching courses in the New Psychology, enjoying a solid following of students, and working on his *Principles of Psychology*.

In order to institutionalize the New Psychology as a widely recognized academic discipline, however, the securing of an individual niche within an individual institution would hardly suffice. For the newly emerging discipline to become the legitimate voice for matters psychological, it soon became apparent that its proponents would have to discredit the credentials of those competing for the same positions in the job market and in the marketplace of theory and practice. For even as the New Psychologists were learning to speak the argot of nerves and reaction times, others were continuing to speak of souls and faculties and still others were waxing eloquent about spirits and trances, alternate selves and mind cures. If the New Psychologists were to become the acknowledged authorities on mind and action, they had to make certain that theirs was the language, and theirs the voices, that would be heard.

III

New languages grow out of old ones. Though often posed as a rejection of traditional philosophical psychology, the New Psychology was an outgrowth of the rational and empirical psychologies of the past, and its new language was essentially an emergent dialect of the old philosophical language, refurbished with a generous admixture of physiological terms. Whereas the "old psychologists" talked about souls and endeavored to explain human dynamics by reference to innate faculties, the New Psychologists simply put aside the concept of souls and tried to explain the same set of faculties by reference to more basic physiological and psychological processes. Through their language sounded different, it appropriated and mapped much the same territory covered by the earlier philosophical psychology. Still, not all mental and moral philosophers stepped aside cheerfully and promptly to make room for the new scientific psychologists. Furthermore, there were a number of aspects of the role of the mental and moral philosophers that the New Psychologists were wise enough not to claim as their own. Any direct handling of religious or moral issues, for instance, was studiously avoided by the new generation of psychologists, who as a group shared the disadvantage of being "yet smoothed-faced and generally quite inexperienced" (Baldwin 1894:382).

Even so, the transition from the old philosophical psychology to the newer scientific psychology was less radical than it may have seemed and certainly less radical than it has been portrayed by later historians and psychologists. In many ways, it was more like a changing of the guard than a palace revolution. The fresh troops had new uniforms and followed a revised code of conduct, but their major duty—at least in the early days—was much the same as that of the old guard: they kept their eye on the normal faculties of the average adult white male, presumed to be the prototype of psychological functioning. Although there were some changes in the ways they fulfilled this task, far more dramatic and interesting changes were beginning to occur as a result of a different confrontation—not between old and new psychologists but between the New Psychology and Psychical Research. It was largely through this confrontation that modern scientific psychology broadened its scope and extended its language to the point where it could tell likely stories about far more than the sensory, cognitive, and motor capacities of the average adult white male (see Leary 1980).

Ironically, William James was in the vanguard of those interested in Psychical Research. As a corresponding member of the English Society for Psychological Research since its inception in 1882, he became a founding member of the American Society for Psychical Research (ASPR) in 1884, and in many ways he remained its central figure throughout the remainder of the century. James's interest in Psychical Research followed naturally from his earlier personal crisis, which had been precipitated by the specter of a completely materialistic and deterministic world. Like others in the Psychical Research movement, James had become critical of naively materialistic science, and he sought through Psychical Research to provide empirical support for "the dramatic probability" that some kind of transpersonal consciousness exists behind individual human consciousness (see James 1909). He sought this support in a variety of ways, but primarily through the study of what he called "exceptional mental states"—trances, mediumship, "veridical hallucinations" (visions), telepathy, subconscious phenomena, dual consciousness, alternate personality, automatic writing, and so on (see Taylor 1982). Right up to his death in 1910, James remained open, curious, and yet critical about these sorts of psychical phenomena, which fell outside the domain of traditional psychological research. Although he felt that there was some remarkable evidence in favor of his belief that there is more in the universe than isolated human minds and inert matter, he did not feel that the issue was definitively decided, and he granted that there was no compulsion to believe on the basis of what had been discovered to date. All he asked was that others remain open on the issue.

However, most of the New Psychologists had closed their minds, at least publicly, before the publication of his *Principles of Psychology*. Although many had been members of the ASPR in the 1880s, virtually
all but James had backed away from the Society by 1890. The reasons for this are complex and include the fact that the first half-decade of Psychological Research, conducted by respected scientists from a variety of disciplines, had produced no clear-cut evidence for the society’s most publicized concern, namely, the existence of a spirit world. But other factors concerning the institutionalization of the New Psychology were also at work.

For one thing, from its very beginning, Psychical Research attracted considerable public attention. At a time when the New Psychology was little known outside the world of academia, Psychical Research was being trumpeted in the daily press and in popular magazines, and it even received notice in scientific journals. This had the generally positive effect of bringing the study of psychological phenomena to public attention. (In fact, Psychical Research was the original concern of many who ended up among the first and second generation of New Psychologists.) At the same time, however, the popularity and visibility of Psychical Research made it a powerful contender in the marketplace of ideas, applications, and jobs. In fact, the ASPR was explicitly committed to “the systematic study of the laws of mental action,” not simply to “an exact study of that border-land of human experience” that was overlooked by both traditional and scientific psychology (ASPR 1885). Thus, the ASPR was the first professional organization in the United States committed to the support of psychological research of a general as well as specific nature, and membership in the ASPR was recognized, very early on, as the appropriate professional affiliation for psychologists. Perhaps it was not coincidental, then, that many of the New Psychologists began to leave the ASPR when it decided to “expand its scope” by appointing a Committee on Experimental Psychology in 1887 (Anonymous 1887). Rather than being totally subsumed under the banner of Psychical Research, the New Psychologists retreated from it.

Even in their retreat, however, the New Psychologists did not hesitate to use the public interest in Psychical Research to advance their own cause. For instance, G. Stanley Hall, who had been vice-president of the ASPR in 1885, turned some financial backing he had received through the association toward the establishment of his new American Journal of Psychology; and James McKeen Cattell did not scruple to seek a chair at the University of Pennsylvania that had been endowed with the intention of supporting the investigation of Psychical Research.

By 1890 the task facing the New Psychologists was quite apparent. If they wanted their own version of psychology to receive greater recognition and support, they had to discredit Psychical Research, set up an alternative professional organization, and appropriate the theoretical and practical concerns that made Psychical Research so popular.

This is exactly what they did: the New Psychologists, with a few exceptions such as James, turned away from Psychical Research, began to criticize it as unscientific, publicly ridiculed belief in psychic phenomena, and presented the New Psychology as the scientific psychology of the future. But an interesting thing happened: the New Psychology now presented to the public was considerably different from the New Psychology that had been presented before the emergence of Psychical Research. In addition to its prior focus on the states of mind and action typical of the average adult white male, the New Psychology now had things to say about atypical, nonadult, and nonmale states of mind and action. (It took considerably longer for psychologists to talk about nonwhite experience.) Indeed, the new Psychology even had things to say about nonconscious states of mind, which had previously been banned from the concerns of the new science. Furthermore, the things it had to say about these topics were remarkably similar to what Psychical Researchers had already said.

What had occurred, and what continued to occur throughout the 1890s, was a process of silent appropriation by which the vision and language of the New Psychology were radically enlarged. Although acknowledgments of this appropriation were rare (for obvious rhetorical reasons), the process did not escape the notice of everyone. William James, for instance, observed and commented on the “legitimation” that had been conferred upon “occultist phenomena” by means of their introduction into psychology “under newly found scientific titles” (James 1902:501). And as noted above, it was not only the phenomena of Psychical Research, but also its theories about these phenomena that made their way into the New Psychology.

At the same time that the New Psychologists were thus engaged in publicly discrediting and privately appropriating Psychical Research, G. Stanley Hall was organizing the American Psychological Association. This new organization, founded in 1892, was to serve an important role in the institutionalization of the New Psychology in America. From the beginning, it was presented not simply as an alternative professional association, but rather as the one and only organization whose conferral of membership certified individuals as psychologists in good standing. Together with their journals and various graduate programs, this gave the New Psychologists a decided advantage over their competitors. They had not only argued and maneuvered their way to center stage, they had also gained control of the stage door. Now, having improved their speech through the incorporation of many “new” terms, they were ready to present their pitch to the public, and especially to the administrators, officials, and various interest groups who could provide continued and even increased support for the New Psychology.
win their support, the New Psychologists had to keep in mind that actions speak louder than words—that the advantages of their new discipline and emerging profession would be presented most persuasively within the context of practical application.

IV

In 1890 William James published his classic *Principles of Psychology*, which was subsequently to play a major role in the establishment of the New Psychology as a respected scientific discipline in the United States. Two years later he noted that

we live surrounded by an enormous body of persons who are most definitely interested in the control of states of mind, and incessantly craving for a sort of psychological science which will teach them how to act. What every educator, every jail-warden, every doctor, every clergyman, every asylum-superintendent, asks of psychology is practical rules. Such men care little or nothing about the ultimate philosophic grounds of mental phenomena, but they do care immensely about improving the ideas, dispositions, and conduct of the particular individuals in their charge. (James 1892:148)

As usual, his comments were prophetic. At a time when the early proponents of the Progressive Movement were beginning to call for scientific technique, professional expertise, and efficient management in education, business, and government, many of the first and second generation of New Psychologists were eager to offer a practical psychology. In this context it was not long before James’s thoughtful appeal for attempts to apply psychology was drowned out by other New Psychologists making vociferous, but unsubstantiated claims of actual achievements.

The primary realm in which these assertions were made was the field of education. Indeed, in many ways the institutionalization of modern psychology depended upon developments in modern education. Between 1880 and 1920 the states not only passed and enforced compulsory attendance laws, they provided considerable financial support for an incredible expansion of the educational system in the United States. Between 1890 and 1918 alone, slightly more than one public high school was built every twenty-four hours, while enrollments increased sevenfold. This growth, reflected on the primary as well as secondary level, created a massive need for adequately trained teachers, and the New Psychologists were more than willing to offer their services in the training of teachers, even though their nascent science could presently provide to teachers, in James’s words, no more than “arrant bosh and humbug, in the main” (James 1898).

However much or little the New Psychologists were actually able to offer, there was a deep and persistent belief among educators that their association with psychologists would pay dividends. This belief may best be understood in the context of the educators’ own quest for professionalization, which depended upon the development of scientific and technical bases for educational expertise. In any case, as one well known psychologist described it, the situation was such that psychologists, on the one hand, were “forced to win a hearing by somewhat magnifying their own office,” while teachers, on the other, looked “more or less wonderingly toward the laboratory.” Not surprisingly, the “vast promises” of the New Psychologists left teachers (and others) “promise-crammed,” but no wiser (Royce 1898:88–89). Meanwhile the demand for—and the promise of—assistance had a detectable effect on the institutionalization of psychology and on the efforts of many psychologists: it is not by chance that twentieth-century American psychology came to be dominated by learning theory.

Besides educators, businessmen were naturally interested in getting ahead of their competition, and some of them stimulated the development of “business psychology” by requesting (for example) that psychologists determine the qualities that make a good typesetter and that they study the habit formations involved in learning telegraphy (e.g., Bryan and Harter 1899). By the early 1900s such demands from the world of business had escalated to the extent that a thriving new field of industrial psychology had evolved to stand beside the slightly older field of educational psychology. Similarly, the beginnings of clinical psychology can be traced to specific requests by the public that psychologists deal with this or that personal problem. For instance, the first Psychological Clinic resulted from a teacher’s challenge to a New Psychologist, that he prove his mettle by doing something to help a “chronic bad speller” (Witmer 1907). And further, the relationship between psychology and government can be traced to some very effective argumentation on the part of psychologists in the second decade of this century. Two illustrative instances occurred in 1917. One involved the establishment of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, which was to play an important role in the development of child psychology in America. The other involved the institution of psychological testing in the United States Army, which is commonly seen as a critical turning point in the development of public recognition and support for the New Psychology. 3

In sum, much rhetorical and political savvy went into the institutionalization and professionalization of the New Psychology. Key psychologists observed what was wanted and addressed their audiences accordingly. As they did so, the prospects for psychology vastly improved. By 1920, even though psychology was still far from fully established, it was
clear that psychologists had won a hearing, and they finally seemed to be on the verge of fulfilling the promises they had been making for almost four decades.

V

If the rapid growth of psychology in America was due to “conditions of the soil as well as to vitality of the germ,” as one early psychologist said (Cattell 1896:135), I have tried to point out how the first generations of New Psychologists took full advantage of these conditions in their efforts to gain recognition and support for their new discipline, even to the point of sometimes exaggerating its actual accomplishments and its immediate prospects. But however fertile the soil, the pronouncements made by the New Psychologists were shaped by intellectual premises as well as by social conditions and demands. The ultimate test of these premises—and hence of the new science and budding profession—lay in the degree to which the New Psychologists were able to articulate likely stories about mind and action. Insofar as they failed to bring these stories into systematic coherence with one another and with the practical activities of research and application, to that extent they would have failed on their own terms to bring the New Psychology to its desired state of perfection.

Ironically, at the very moment when their rhetoric of applicability had opened the door to their coveted goal, a tone of disappointment began to creep into the pronouncements of psychologists regarding the state of their discipline. James McKeen Cattell captured the mood when he regretfully admitted in 1917 that “our accomplishment falls far below what it might be and should be” (Cattell 1917:280). More than a decade later, in 1929, E. G. Boring reached the same conclusion (Boring 1929:658–661), and so have many others right up to our own time (e.g., Koch 1964). As each of these commentators has known, the failure of twentieth-century psychologists to achieve even a relative unanimity regarding theory and method has entailed a corresponding failure to establish disciplinary authority in psychology. After winning so many earlier battles—over personal crises, with college presidents and boards of trustees, against philosophers and Psychical Researchers, and for public opinion and support—the New Psychologists failed to complete their mission by putting the finishing touches on the discipline they had constructed.

Had he still been around in 1920, or even in 1990, William James would not have been surprised or particularly perturbed by this state of affairs, and there is good reason to think that his own philosophy of science was much more appropriate than the dogmatic view of science typical in his age and still espoused in our own (see Leary 1990b). The goal of presenting an argument that would end all argument was foreign to James’s temperament and, as he pointed out, it is foreign to the historical reality of science itself. Following in the steps of his beloved Ralph Waldo Emerson, James had come to agree that “science is nothing but the finding of analogy” and that the analogies of science—like the analogies underlying every other form of knowledge—are “fluxional” rather than “frozen” (Emerson 1863:55 and 463). A staunch empiricist, James insisted that there is always a new way to experience any reality and a new way to categorize any experience. To him, a creative genius in any field, in science as in the arts, is simply someone who has an unusual native talent for perceiving fresh analogies that have not yet occurred to others, but which when presented to others, are seen as revealing something salient about experience (James 1990; vol. 1:423–424, 529–530; vol. 2:109–110, 360–365).

Salience, James knew, is not something that is absolute or that can be judged once and for all. Even James’s well-known pragmatic criterion of truth is susceptible to variable interpretation: what works for one person may not work so well for someone else, given different fundamental concerns. In the end James felt that humans, including scientists, had to humbly accept the fact that the salience of the “spontaneous” creations of individuals will ultimately be judged by the “consensus” of their social or professional group (James 1990; vol. 1:192; 1907). The achievement of scientific consensus, from this point of view, depends on a significant degree upon the rhetorical power of any particular analogy, or rather, of any particular story based upon a given analogy. This power will draw upon the experiential sensitivities of the particular scientific community, but it will not be reducible in any simple or direct fashion to “the brute facts of the matter.” No analogy or likeness of reality is exactly identical with reality—or as Samuel Taylor Coleridge, another of James’s admired men, put it: “no likeness goes on allours” (Coleridge 1981). Therefore, no story developed from analogical premises can be definitive or final. As Timaeus told Socrates long ago, we should not expect more than a likely story in such matters.

Many of the analogies and metaphors that have shaped the positions and oriented the theoretical arguments and practical activities of twentieth-century American psychologists were firmly established by 1920. Some are quite well known, though not all of them are recognized as analogical or metaphorical in nature. For instance, many realize that John B. Watson, generally regarded as the founder of modern behavioristic psychology, was speaking metaphorically when he said that all organisms, including humans, are “stimulus-response machines.” Or-
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possibility of redemption. In fact, upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that a great deal of twentieth-century psychological discourse and practice has incorporated religious motifs and imagery. Examples include William James's discussions of transliminal consciousness, Carl Rogers's postulation of the fundamental dignity of the individual, and B. F. Skinner's secularized contention that, in essence, "there but for the grace of the Environment go I." In this context, it is interesting to note that many Americans now turn to psychology rather than religion in times of need.

In addition to religion, psychologists have drawn their analogies and metaphors from a wide variety of cultural realms. James, for example, took many of his insightful analogies and metaphors from the domain of art, and he took his most fundamental concepts—the Darwinian metaphors of variation, selection, and function—from psychology's neighboring domain of biological science. (All psychological states, according to James, are the products of spontaneous variation and/or selection in terms of consequential functions.) Later "functionalists," including Skinner, have used the same set of metaphorical concepts, with varying but generally persuasive results—persuasive, that is, not only to the majority of American psychologists, who remain functionalistic in orientation, but also to the public that American psychology serves.

Other general features of American psychology are also reflective of the general culture from which it has arisen. This observation is particularly relevant to an understanding of the rhetorical power—and ultimately, the political significance—of contemporary psychology. For instance, when one reflects upon the high value that American society has placed on efficiency throughout this entire century, it seems more than coincidental that American psychologists have used metaphors of efficiency (e.g., regarding the leading of "integrated" and "productive" lives) at the very core of their thinking and rhetoric. Similarly, it is hardly surprising that American psychologists, situated within a capitalist society, have given metaphors of productivity and exchange a prominent place in their analyses of social behavior. And given the virtual obsession with technology in America, we could have expected American psychologists to base their cognitive and perceptual theories upon cybernetic, holographic, signal detection, and other technical analogs.

In these and in many other instances, American psychologists have drawn their inspiration from their surrounding culture, basing their disciplinary and professional work upon analogies and metaphors that are familiar to themselves and their audiences. Clearly, this has aided communication of their psychological insights, made their theories more
persuasive, and helped to establish the legitimacy of psychology as a discipline and profession. Conversely, it has served to confirm—to give scientific legitimacy—to cultural values and arrangements, some of which may be more deserving of critical review than passive confirmation.  

VI

In the last few paragraphs, I have pointed at developments in psychology extending beyond the 1920s up to the present day. These developments have been based upon the foundation—and rhetorical practices—established by the first generation of New Psychologists. In closing, it seems appropriate to suggest that the various topics covered in this essay might help explain why so many Americans since the 1920s have been persuaded and assured by psychology—why, in other words, so many people have found the theories of psychology to be likely, and its practices to be reasonable. Recapitulating these topics in the order in which they were treated, section by section, in this essay, I would suggest that Americans have been persuaded and assured by modern psychology in large part because psychology’s stories have addressed their experience and tried to resolve their personal problems; because modern academia and other social institutions have conferred their blessing upon the discipline; because people have learned—and wanted—to believe the claims of science; and because the stories themselves have been constructed around familiar cultural categories, analogies, and metaphors.

None of these factors should be taken to indicate that the claims and practices of psychology are necessarily false. They do suggest, however, that increased attention to the role of communication and persuasion in the establishment and maintenance of modern American psychology—not to mention other academic disciplines—is warranted.

Notes

1. Much of the material in this essay is drawn, adapted, and revised, with permission, from an article of mine (Leary 1987) that appeared in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, and from the introductory chapter (pp. 1–78) in Metaphors in the History of Psychology (Leary 1990a).
2. I give considerable attention to two other founders of modern American psychology—G. Stanley Hall and James McKeen Cattell—in Leary 1987.
3. I discuss these instances in Leary 1987:324–325.
4. I discuss these matters at greater length in Leary 1990a:51–53.

References

James, William. 1898. Letter to James McKeen Cattell (4 May 1898). In the James McKeen Cattell Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.


