Chapter 5

William James on the Self and Personality: Clearing the Ground for Subsequent Theorists, Researchers, and Practitioners

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The fundamental basis of William James's psychology—the rock-bottom foundation on which it is constructed—is "the stream of thought" or "the stream of consciousness." The first and preeminent characteristic of our flowingly continuous experience of "thought" or "consciousness," James (1890/1983d) said, is that it is personal (pp. 220–224). Every thought, every psychological experience, is mine, or hers, or his, or yours. For this reason, he suggested, "the personal self rather than the thought [or consciousness] might be treated as the immediate datum in psychology" (p. 221). Indeed, James was strongly convinced that "no psychology . . . can question the existence of personal selves. The worst a psychology can do is so to interpret the nature of these selves as to rob them of their worth" (p. 221).

This issue of the worth of human selves was no trivial concern for James: It was critically important to him from early in his life right up to his death, and it was intertwined not only with his interests in mainstream psychology, but also with his interests in psychical research, the psychology of religion, pragmatism, pluralism, and radical empiricism. Fittingly, James's chapter on the self (Chapter 10) in his masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology, was one of the first chapters he began to conceptualize and the final chapter he completed. Or rather, it was the last chapter on which he worked, after postponing its final revision "to the very last, when my wisdom shall be at its unsurpassable climax!" (letter to G. Croom Robertson, 4 November 1888, in Perry, 1935, Vol. 2, p. 44). Yet, however great his wisdom, it was inadequate to the task: In James's own estimation, at least, this crucial chapter was never truly "finished," and he kept returning to the topic of the self and personality throughout the last two decades of his life.

*Due to their length, the footnotes in this chapter appear as endnotes.
Why was the self so important to James? What was the context within which he formulated his ideas about the self, personality, and related topics? What exactly was James’ psychology of the self and of personality, as he expressed it in his Principles, and what path did his thoughts on these topics subsequently take? Finally, what influences and echoes has this aspect of his psychology had over the years since it was first enunciated? These are the sort of questions that I want to address in the following chapter. In doing so, I hope to convey the centrality, importance, influence, and current relevance of James’s views.

THE CONTEXT OF JAMES’S PSYCHOLOGY

Virtually from the time of his birth on January 11, 1842, William James was surrounded by issues, claims, concerns, and debates about the human self. In this regard it is emblematic that before he was 3 months old the young “Willy” was visited and blessed by Ralph Waldo Emerson, the author of a recent, startling essay on “Self-Reliance” (1841/1983). In subsequent years, William would imbibe much of Emerson’s wisdom, which is to say, much of Emerson’s trust in the experience of “isolated” individuals. On the other hand, by the time William was 3 years old, his father had suffered a major spiritual crisis and had become convinced of “the nothingness of Selfhood.” From that point on, his father, Henry James Sr., dedicated his life to the development and propagation of a theology espousing the “redemption” of individual selves through their absorption and ablation in social life. Both of these ironic emphases—on the primacy of the individual by the famed transcendentalist and on the illusoriness and need for “social reformation” of individual selves by the amateur theologian, were to echo throughout William’s later writings, and throughout the works of his younger brother, the novelist Henry James Jr.

In addition to this dual heritage, which drew attention to the human self even as it raised questions about the self’s substantive reality and about its extended network of social relations, James had the privilege and responsibility of growing up and living during one of the most exciting and transformative periods in the history of psychology. During this period—from 1842 to 1910, to use the endpoints of James’s own life as markers—psychology moved from being a predominantly philosophical enterprise to being an increasingly scientific and clinical discipline. As one of the major figures involved in this transition, James incorporated philosophical, scientific, and clinical orientations into his system of thought.

Of course, James lived not only among New England transcendentalists, home-grown theologians, and American philosophers and psychologists. Due to his father’s unusual childrearing practices, James traveled frequently during his formative years and received much of his education in foreign countries, especially in Europe. Subsequently, he continued to enjoy transatlantic sojourns, so that he benefited throughout his life from firsthand acquaintance with virtually all of the major intellectual and cultural trends of his times, including increasing interest in Eastern thought (see, e.g., Taylor, 1986). Since these trends were necessarily related to the social and historical events of the day—advances in technology, changes in the material conditions of life, increases and shifts in population, social upheavals, the organization of labor, the rise of nationalist movements, the development of educational systems, the emergence of modern medical and psychiatric practice, the professionalization of social roles, and so on—James had occasion to notice and to comment on most of the challenges and opportunities offered by modern life. Many of these challenges and opportunities reinforced the concerns he had inherited regarding the appropriate relations between the individual and society.

However informative his social and historical context, however, James himself would have supposed that his own inner life—his own unique interests and personal concerns—also contributed importantly to the development of his psychological ideas, including especially his ideas about the self and personality (see, e.g., James, 1879/1978a, 1907/1975b, pp. 9–26). And so it did. The question of selfhood, posed so vigorously by Emerson and by his father, was raised even more compellingly by the stresses and strains that James experienced as he grew into manhood. Always sensitive and curious, he did not wear his experience lightly, even early on, and as a young man he more than earned the right to give his own daughter the following advice, many years later:

Now, my dear little girl, you have come to an age [13 years old] when the inward life develops and when some people (and on the whole those who have most of a destiny) find that all is not a bed of roses. Among other things there will be waves of terrible sadness, which last sometimes for days; and dissatisfaction with one’s self, and irritation at others, and anger at circumstances and stony insensitivity, etc., etc., which taken together form a melancholy. Now, painful as it is, this is sent to us for an enlightenment. . . . and we ought to earn a great many good things if we react on it rightly.

However, James continued,

many persons take a kind of sickly delight in hugging [this melancholy]. . . . That is the worst possible reaction on it. . . . we mustn’t submit to it an hour longer than we can help, but jump at every chance to attend to anything cheerful or comic or take part in anything active that will divert us from our mean, pining inward state of feeling. When it passes off, as I said, we know more than we did before. (letter to Margaret James, 26 May 1900, in H. James III, 1920, Vol. 2, p. 131)
These were hard-won insights that James was passing along, as anyone who has read his biography can attest (see Allen, 1967; Anderson, 1982; Fein

stein, 1984; Fullinwider, 1975; Perry, 1935). The bottom line, he noted, was that

the disease makes you think of yourself all the time; and the way out of it is

to keep as busy as we can thinking of things and of other people—no matter

what’s the matter with our self. (H. James, III, 1920, p. 132)

This was the crux of James’s own earlier torment—his need, in the late

1860s and early 1870s, to escape from the “tedious egotism” associated

with his own protracted period of melancholy—and his comments recapitulate

his realization, first reached at that earlier age, that he could escape from

debilitating self-obsession only by becoming busily preoccupied with “a


29, 32, 64). As we know, James found his “constructive passion” and escaped

from his melancholy when he turned his attention from his flagging

“commitment” to medicine to his more engaging interest in the newly

developing discipline of psychology. The context of this switch of vocations

suggests an unusually rich confluence of personal and professional factors,

and James’s subsequent focus on the nature and workings of the ego, self,

and personality does nothing to dispel this suggestion. It seems appropri

ate, therefore, to say a few more words about James’s early-life bout with

depression, about its causes, and about the conclusions that he drew from

it. This brief discussion should clarify some of the ways in which James’s

personal life seems to have contributed to his later psychological interests,

insights, and theories.

As background, it is important to note that even by the age of 16, before

he began to suffer from depression, James’s personal sense of worth was
derived largely from the very high expectations he held regarding the differen

te that he as an individual person would make in this world. “Which of

us,” he wrote to a youthful friend,

would wish to go through life without leaving a trace behind to mark his pas

sage. Who would prefer to live unknown to all but his immediate friends and

to be forgotten by all thirty years after his death. For what was life given to

us? Suppose we do nothing and die: we have swindled society. Nature, in

giving us birth, had saddled us with a debt which we must pay off some time

or other.

Later in the same letter he indicated the sort of trace he hoped to leave

behind:

If I followed my taste and did what was most agreeable to me, I’ll tell you

what I would do. I would get a microscope and go out into the country, into

the dear old woods and fields and ponds. There I would try to make as many

discoveries as possible. (letter to Edgar B. Van Winkle, 1 March 1858, in

Perry, 1948, pp. 52-53)

Though by a somewhat circuitous path, William did find his way, eventually,

into science. But when he entered the Lawrence Scientific School at

Harvard in the early 1860s, the scientific world into which he was initiated

was not as idyllic as he had imagined it would be. The very face of “dear

old” nature was just then being radically transformed by the scientists of

his day, especially those assuming the new Darwinian perspective, first

promulgated the year after his youthful letter (Darwin, 1859/1964). Instead

of going out into the countryside to study some aspect of living, purposeful

nature, James confronted a world increasingly portrayed as mechanistic,

materialistic, and driven by blind chance. Before long, in the later 1860s, he

had learned his lessons so well that he had come to fear “that we are Nature

through and through, that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of

our will happens save as the result of physical laws” (letter to Thomas W.


conclusion—to him a very dreadful one—conflicted with his fundamental de

sire to “make my nick, however small a one, in the raw stuff the race has

got to shape, and so assert my reality” (letter to Ward, January 1868, in H.

James, III, 1920, Vol. 1, p. 132). Desperately, virtually against all hope, he

clung to “the thought of my having a will” and, relatedly, to the thought

“of my belonging to a brotherhood of men,” for . . .

if we have to give up all hope of seeing into the purposes of God, or to give

up theoretically the idea of final causes, and of God anyhow as vain and lead

ing to nothing for us, we can, by our will, make the enjoyment of our broth

ers stand us in the stead of a final cause; and through a knowledge of the fact

that that enjoyment on the whole depends on what individuals accomplish,

lead a life so active, and so sustained by a clean conscience as not to need to

fret much. Individuals can add to the welfare of the race in a variety of ways.

You may . . . contribute your mite in any way to the mass of the work which

each generation subtracts from the task of the next; and you will come into

real relations with your brothers—with some of them at least. (H. James, III,

1920, 130-131)

This hope of entering into “real relations” with others mattered deeply to

James, who had come to believe that “everything we know and are is throu

gh men. We have no revelation but through man” (p. 131).

The echoes of this father’s doctrines are apparent in these reflections. So

too are James’s distinctive concerns about his own personal “salvation.”

Clearly, having a will and belonging to “a brotherhood of men” were criti

cal components of a practical philosophy of life that James needed for

moral support—to give him a purpose for living—in his time of crisis. It
was crucially important to him that he be, or at least that he could be, in "real relations" with others—in relationships in which he made a concrete, personal difference. In essence he reasoned that if anyone else, placed in his position in time and space, would act exactly as he would, then his own personal self and life, on the terms specified years before, would be meaningless. If that were the case, he concluded, he would rather forfeit his life—and his dark contemplation of suicide, over several seasons, bears painful testimony to the seriousness with which he pondered this entire matter.

Fortunately, James came to believe that he did have a will, he began to act on this belief, his mental state began to improve, and, in time, he made his mind on the course of human history. As we turn our attention to one aspect of his legacy, I hope it will not seem coincidental that he made his contribution, in good part, through the composition of a major psychological work that addresses the nature of the human self, that insists on the self's development and sustenance within a network of social relations, and that culminates in a chapter on the vital reality and importance of the human will. It should also seem less than surprising, after this brief review of the context of his thought, that James went on to focus on abnormal psychology (Taylor, 1982a), on the psychology of religion (James, 1902/1985), and on a new type of philosophy that espouses the centrality and worth of each individual's distinctive interests and point of view (James, 1907/1975b, 1909/1977, 1909/1975c, 1912/1976b).

JAMES'S CLASSIC CHAPTER ON THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF

When James began to think and read seriously about psychology, starting in the midst of his personal crisis in the late 1860s, he was attracted to recent works by the likes of Herbert Spencer (1855), Hermann Lotze (1856-1864/1888), Alexander Bain (1859), Wilhelm Wundt (1863-1864/1894), and Hippolyte Taine (1870/1875), to cite only a few individuals whose publications were relevant to his concerns about the self. His study also led him back to the classics of empiricism—to Locke's Essay (1690/19.2") and to Hume's Treatise (1739-1740/1978)—as well as to such classics from the rationalist tradition as Kant's Critique (1781/1965) and Hegel's Phenomenology (1807/1910). He familiarized himself, too, with the texts of mental and moral philosophy that were the main diet in the "psychology" courses offered in American colleges and universities—the texts, for instance, of James McCosh (1860/1882), Noah Porter (1868), and Mark Hopkins (1870)—and before long he became quite knowledgeable about his friend Charles Peirce's (1868/1966) critique of "intuitive self-consciousness" and about his friend Chauncey Wright's (1873/1877) perspective on "self-consciousness." In addition, his reading and thinking drew from the beginning upon the literature on spiritualism (e.g., Sargent, 1869) and upon clinical studies of hypnotism (e.g., Liébeault, 1866), and a decade later he was scrutinizing psychological research (e.g., Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886) and clinical studies of split personality (e.g., Janet, 1889). James also attended, by and large critically, to the views of James Ward (1883a, 1883b, 1886), Josiah Royce (1885), John Dewey (1887/1967), and George Trumball Ladd (1887). Thus, by the time he pulled together his own thoughts on "the consciousness of self," James had touched a great many bases and considered a wide variety of perspectives. Not surprisingly, his chapter reflects, amalgamates, and, in many respects, transcends these multiple points of view.

The two fundamental vantage points, or ways of approaching the self, that James (1890/1983) adopted in his classic chapter are the view of the self as knower (as a pure or transcendental I) and the view of the self as known (as an objective or empirical Me). In making this famous distinction between the I and the Me, James meant "nothing mysterious and unexampled": The terms "are at bottom only names of emphasis" (p. 324). But the emphases are significant, and on them James constructed a two-part chapter, the first part devoted to "the empirical self or Me" and the second part devoted to "the pure Ego" (or "soul"). This second part is divided, in turn, into a discussion of the sense and theories of personal identity and a review of the phenomena and implications of multiple personality. Within this compass and outline, James treated a vast array of issues and touched off many lines of later conceptual development.

From the very beginning of the chapter, James established that he was going to take a fresh approach to his subject. "In its widest possible sense," he wrote,

a man's Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account. (p. 279)

The explication James offered for this claim is telling: All these various things and persons are part of an individual's self insofar as they give that individual the same emotions (pp. 279-280). In pointing thus toward the emotional foundations of the self, James indicated right at the start that he was going to follow Bain (1859, chap. 7) and others in reaching beyond the old rationalist approach to "the soul" in order to ground his treatment of the human self on the experience and makeup of the whole person, emotional as well as intellectual.

As is well known, James based his wholistic treatment on an analysis of three different, but interrelated aspects of the empirical self: the Me viewed as material, the Me viewed as social, and the Me viewed as spiritual in nature. In articulating these different points of view, James did not mean to
suggest that the “material,” “social,” and “spiritual” perspectives reveal radically disjunctive or ontologically distinctive dimensions of the self. In describing the “material” aspect of the self, for instance, James was clearly not portraying anything like the materialistic or physiological foundations of the self, as one might expect. Instead, he argued that the body does not even provide the boundaries, much less the determinants, of this aspect of the self. In James’s view, the body is simply “the innermost part” of the spiritual self, and even within the body, “certain parts of the body seem more intimately ours than the rest” (p. 280). The key notion here, once again, is emotional feeling: Individuals feel the material dimensions of their selves, including those dimensions that extend beyond the borders of their bodies. These emotional feelings about particular material aspects of experience are quite distinctively personal, being aimed at things, persons, and experiences that are somehow uniquely “owned” and specially “ours.” James recognized, from his own experience, that even one’s own body may not be “owned” or experienced as part of one’s self at each and every moment, and that rarely if ever are all parts of the body experienced equally intimately, or as being equally “mine.” Furthermore, one’s clothes, family, home, and property may be just as central to one’s sense of self—and sometimes even more central—than one’s own body. As James put it with reference to members of one’s own immediate family:

> When they die, a part of our very selves is gone. If they do anything wrong, it is our shame. If they are insulted, our anger flashes forth as readily as if we stood in their place. (p. 280)

And regarding material possessions and productions, there are few individuals

> who would not feel personally annihilated if a life-long construction of their hands or brains—say an entomological collection or an extensive work in manuscript—were suddenly swept away. The miser feels similarly towards his gold. . . . [In such instances there is invariably] a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness. (p. 281)

Having thus extended the sphere of self-consciousness to include any and all personally owned aspects of material existence, James went on to discuss the distinctively social aspect of the self. Here too, James’s treatment defies easy presumptions. The social dimension of the self is not set against the material and spiritual dimensions, except as a matter of emphasis. After all, social relations begin and are sustained through material interactions with others, but soon come to involve such non-material factors as love, reputation, fame, and honor. In fact, the essence of the social aspect of self, James said, is “the recognition which [a person] gets from his [or her] mates” (p. 281). Such is our “innate propensity to get ourselves noticed, and noticed favorably, by our kind” that

> No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such a thing physically possible, than that one should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed by all the members thereof (p. 281)

The result of such ostracism, James said, would be “a kind of rage and impotent despair” in the face of which even cruel treatment by others—any form of human interaction—would be a relief (p. 281).

As this example suggests, James recognized that the individual self has a vital need for “felt relations” with others. Following in his father’s footsteps and probably drawing on his own personal need for “real relations” with others (as expressed so poignantly in his letter to Thomas Ward in the late 1860s), he argued that it is within the context of such relations that the individual self is constituted. So important is this social dimension of selfhood, in fact, that James suggested (in a now . . . mous passage) that

> Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him. But as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups . . . . From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let one set of his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere; or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor, as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command. (pp. 281–282)

It is difficult to realize the remarkableness of this passage and of James’s sensitivity to the social dimension of self-consciousness. To do so, one must recall that earlier “psychological” texts of “mental and moral philosophy” treated the mind (or soul) as either an indivisible, autonomous unit or as an accretion of discrete, associated ideas. James was quite innovative in mapping the larger dimensions of the self, social as well as material. The self to him was neither autonomous nor simply a unity of internal elements. Although it enjoys a form of independence and wholeness, it is constructed over time and depends on functional relations with the objects and persons of the “external” world. It is in these latter relationships, James recognized, that the “club-opinions”—the norms and values—that constitute “one of the very strongest forces in life” are created and conveyed. The personal empowerment that comes from socialization to these opinions is not, in
James's analysis, the result of *remaking* a preexisting self into a social being, but of *creating* a self that is from the beginning social in nature.

If James redefined common-sense notions about the material and social aspects of the self, he similarly confounded expectations regarding his discussion of the "spiritual" (or subjective) dimension of inner experience. For one thing, he suggested that the experiential core of our spiritual being (our sense of being the subject of our own experience) is *physically* felt—in his own case, in such physiological experiences as "the opening and closing of the glottis" (p. 288)! For another, he recast the traditional "abstract" manner of speaking about the faculties of the self into a more "concrete view" of the "spiritual self" as either "the entire stream of our personal consciousness, or the present 'segment' or 'section' of that stream, according as we take a broader or narrower view" (p. 284). In this manner, he connected his discussion of the self with his discussion of the stream of thought, or consciousness, in the preceding chapter of the *Principles*, and he prepared the way for placing the self at very center of his psychology and philosophy.

As regards his definition of "the Spiritual Self, so far as it belongs to the Empirical Me," James stated that he meant this term to refer only to a person's "inner or subjective being . . . taken concretely." It was not to be confused with "the bare principle of personal Unity, or 'pure' Ego," that is to say, with the ultimate ontological nature of the self, which he would discuss later in the chapter (p. 283). Rather, to label one of the dimensions of the empirical self "spiritual" was simply to acknowledge that we are able "to think of subjectivity as such, to think ourselves as thinkers," an ability that James admitted to be both "momentous" and "rather mysterious" (p. 284).

"Now, what is *this* self of *all* the other selves?" James began to answer this question as most of his contemporaries would, but he quickly turned this typical beginning to his own ends:

[Others] would call it the *active* element in all consciousness. . . . It is what welcomes or rejects. It presides over the perception of sensations, and by giving or withholding its assent it influences the movements they tend to arouse. It is the home of interest,—not the pleasant or the painful, not even pleasure or pain, as such, but that within us to which pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the painful, speak. It is the source of effort and attention, and the place from which appear to emanate the fiat of the will. (p. 285)

Anyone who knows James's psychology will recognize in these few sentences an epitome of his most vital doctrines. Selectivity, interest, effort, attention, and will—these are the critically fundamental concepts in James's psychology, and they are rooted in the self, in that most highly personal and idiosyncratic aspect or segment of the stream of consciousness, in what James sometimes called, succinctly, "the Thinker."

About the ultimate nature of "the Thinker"—that is to say, about the ontological nature of the hypothetical "pure Ego"—James did not venture to conjecture, at least not in the *Principles*, even though he spent a considerable number of pages (27 pages, to be exact) reviewing the pertinent philosophical theories: the "soul theory" of the spiritualists; the associationist theory of Locke, Hume, and their followers; and the transcendental theory of Kant and the idealists. The purpose of James's critical review of these theories was not to resolve a metaphysical issue, but to arrive at an "empirical consensus" that members of each of these schools of thought would be able to accept. That consensus, he believed, was that "personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person, known by a passing subjective Thought" (p. 350). In other words, James's analysis of the literature on the self, and in particular the literature on the existence and nature of the transcendental ego, confirmed James's own conceptual distinction between the *I* (the "passing subjective Thought") and the *Me* (the "objective person"). However, in yet another innovative digression from traditional treatments of the self, James pointed out that the relation between these two aspects of the self, although real enough, "is only a loosely construed thing, an identity 'on the whole' " (p. 352). By reviewing the recently discovered phenomena of multiple personality, as studied by Edmund Gurney, F. W. H. Myers, Pierre Janet, and others, James demonstrated that there can be rather "grave" alterations, mutations, and multiplications of both the *I* and the *Me*—and of their relationship. Thus, by the time he arrived at the conclusion of his chapter on the self, he had made it clear that the unity of the self or personality—and hence of the stream of thought, or consciousness—can become quite deeply problematic.

This was an unexpected thesis with which to *end* a chapter on the self—the recognition that the unity of the self, and by implication the self's very existence is far from guaranteed. Beyond that, in summarizing the central thrust of the chapter, James suggested that if "the passing thought" is all that is ever directly and verifiably experienced, then the passing thought is the safest empirical foundation or starting point for our psychology of the self and indeed, for psychology as a whole. As he had said earlier in the chapter:

As psychologists, we need not be metaphysical at all. The phenomena are enough, the passing Thought itself is the only verifiable thinker, and its empirical connection with the brain-process is the ultimate known law. (p. 328)

This being the case, James concluded, "psychology need not look beyond." In the absence of any experience of a thinker apart from thoughts, we can do no better than to surmise, or at least to accept as a reasonable theoretical postulate, that "*thought is itself the thinker*" (p. 379).

Here, in James's hypothetical reduction of the thinker to the thought,
was the seed of John Dewey's (1940/1988) well known argument about "the vanishing subject in the psychology of William James." Here was the kernel of James's later (1904/1976a) questioning of the very nature and existence of "consciousness." Here, too, was the stimulus of many later analyses and debates about the nature of consciousness and the self in James's thought (e.g., Browning, 1975, 1980; Capek, 1953; Edie, 1973, 1987; Ehman, 1969; High & Woodward, 1980; Linschoten, 1968; McDermott, 1980/1986b; Myers, 1986; Shea, 1973; Wilshire, 1968). However, too often lost in these later developments and scholarly commentaries is something that James wrote earlier in the chapter, just before he suggested for the first time that thought is itself the thinker, C. S. James:

I find the notion of some sort of an anima mundi [or world-soul] thinking in all of us to be a more promising hypothesis, in spite of all its difficulties, than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls. (p. 328)

This quiet suggestion, reminiscent of his father's earlier doctrines, had to await future elaboration. When that elaboration began to take place in the later 1890s, it did not suggest that either "the subject" or "consciousness" had vanished from James's thought. Far from it: The self in its all-pervading stream of consciousness became a fundamental category of James's epistemology and metaphysics.13

James's Further Thoughts on the Self and Personality

James had much more to say about the self, both in his classic chapter on the self and in other parts of the Principles. Within the chapter on the self, for instance, he discussed self-feeling, self-seeking, the relations among the various aspects of the empirical self, and the nature of self-love. Mixed into these discussions is a great deal of wisdom about the facts and foibles of human nature. James's discussion of the importance and process of self-esteem and his analysis of the hierarchical relations among the various dimensions of self are but two well known examples.

In other chapters of the Principles, too, the self is clearly visible. In fact, no one has really understood James's Principles until she or he sees how the self underlies its entire breadth. In the chapters on habit, attention, conception, and will, for instance, and even in the chapter on the psychological grounds of the sense of "reality," the self is frequently and centrally implicated. "Reality," for instance, "means simply relation to our emotional and active life," so that "whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real" to us (p. 924). As a consequence,

with emotional reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher degree of reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn to WITH A WILL. These are our living realities; and not only these, but all the other things which are intimately connected with these. Reality, starting from our Ego, thus sheds itself from point to point—first, upon all objects which have an immediate sting of interest for our Ego in them, and next, upon the objects most continuously related with these. It only fails when the connecting thread is lost. A whole system may be real if it only hangs to our Ego by one immediately stinging term. (pp. 925–926)

Thus we see, in James's words, that the world of living realities is "anchored in the Ego, considered as an active and emotional term" (p. 926). Such anchoring, so vital to each and every person, is only one of the self's important functions according to James. Willing actions by attending to ideas that are interesting to us also depends on the selective and effortful functioning of our personal consciousness or self, and this willful behaving is what true, "strenuous" living—being an experiencing self and a responsible person—is all about for James, who provided the following blueprint for the construction of a worthwhile life:

Sow an action, & you reap a habit; sow a habit & you reap a character; sow a character and you reap a destiny.

This pithy summary, written as a marginal notation in his copy of the Briefer Course (1892/1984, p. 448), provides a fitting digest of James's psychology and of his philosophy of life, especially as regards the self and personality. It also recapitulates the course of James's own personal development from his earlier melancholy and "tedious egotism," to his subsequent "asserting of his own reality" and hence his "leaving a trace" in the course of human history.14

However deeply the Principles and the abbreviated Briefer Course helped to etch James's "trace" as regards his psychological analyses of the self and personality, it is important to note that James did not cease to ruminate on these topics after the publication of these works. Following up on themes and issues raised in his chapter on the self and in an article on "The Hidden Self" (1890/1983e), James continued to focus on abnormal psychology and altered states of consciousness in his courses in the 1890s.15 One of the results was his delivery of an important series of lectures on "Exceptional Mental States" at the Lowell Institute in Boston in 1896 (recently reconstructed and published by Taylor, 1982a). In these lectures, James discussed dreams, hypnotism, automatism, hysteria, multiple personality, demonic possession, witchcraft, degeneration, and genius. One of his central conclusions was that "health [including particularly mental health] is a term of subjective appreciation, not of objective description." In other words, "it is a teleological term" which admits "no purely objec-

The fons et origo [source and origin] of all reality, whether from the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is ourselves. . . . As thinkers
tive standard" (Taylor, 1982a, p. 163). As a result, we should hold such labels lightly, and more importantly, "we should not be afraid of life" on account of "some single element of weakness" or unusualness (Taylor, 1982a, p. 164). If we or others are "exceptional," so be it:

A certain tolerance, a certain sympathy, a certain respect, and above all a certain lack of fear, seem to be the best attitude we can carry in our dealing with these regions of human nature. (Taylor 1982a, p. 165)

With characteristic openness toward—and even enthusiasm about—individual variation, James thus tried to nurture in his audience a "more positive attitude" toward their own and other selves.16

Not unrelated to his interest in "exceptional" phenomena and individuals, James continued to encourage psychical research throughout the 1890s and up to the time of his death in 1910 (see James, 1909/1986b; Leary, 1980b), and he began a serious study of the psychology of religion, leading up to his Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh in 1901–1902. These lectures, published as The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985), constitute James's other psychological masterpiece and provide a truly remarkable set of analyses that touch at many points on issues pertinent to the psychology of the self and personality. Extracting brilliant insights from his own experience as well as from the psychological literature and from autobiographical reports of religious persons, James shared in the Varieties his mature thoughts about the role of meaning in life, about "once-born" and "twice-born" characters, about "healthy-minded" and "sick-souled" personalities, about the "divided self" and the process by which personalities can be integrated or unified, about the significance and process of personal "conversion," about the nature and value of "sainthood," about "mysticism" and the loss or transcendence of "personality," and about the possible "fruits" of the religious orientation. Along the way, he addressed many other issues as well, so that it is clearly not without reason that James subtitled this work "A Study in Human Nature," and it is not surprising that many people, from every walk of life and from many different disciplines, have turned to this book over the past 90 years for insight and self-understanding.

In addition to these developments and publications, James (1985/1983e) wrote the entry on "Person and Personality" for the 1895 edition of Johnson's Universal Cyclopaedia. This entry is notable for its historical survey of past uses of these two terms and for its pointed use of "personality" in an unambiguously empirical, psychological sense. Prior to this time, "personality" was not so clearly a psychological term. Even the uses of "personality" in the Principles were usually glancing and by the way, generally restricted in reference to "multiple personality." Indeed, the significance of James's use of the term with a specifically psychological meaning in 1895 can be measured against the fact that it was not until the 1930s that the study of personality was formally established as a technical subject matter of scientific and academic psychology.

Characteristically, James made little of his personal role in adding weight to the empirical meaning and implications of the term. Noting that "in psychology 'personality' designates individuality, or what is called 'personal identity'" (p. 315), James (1895/1983e) surveyed various theories before suggesting that "recent psychology has, in the main, elaborated itself on Lockean lines," thus shifting the focus of attention to "the empirical self" (p. 318). Then, after reviewing the results of recent psychological and psychical research, especially research on hypnotized subjects, mediums, and multiple personalities, James concluded:

All these facts have brought the question of what is the unifying principle in personality to the front again. It is certain that one human body may be the home of many consciousnesses, and thus, in Locke's sense, of many persons. . . . It is clear already that the margins and outskirts of what we take to be our personality extend into unknown regions. Cures and organic effects, such as blisters, produced by hypnotic suggestion show this as regards our bodily processes; while the utterances of mediums and automatic writers reveal a widespread tendency, in men and women otherwise sane, to personifications of a determinate kind; and these again, though usually flimsy and incoherent in the extreme, do, as the present writer believes, occasionally show a knowledge of facts not possessed by the primary person. The significance and limits of these phenomena have yet to be understood, and psychology is but just beginning to recognize this investigation as an urgent task. (pp. 320-321)

I have already hinted about the direction taken by James as he strove to understand the implications of trance states, automatic writing, multiple personality, and so on—implications having to do with the "the margins and outskirts of what we take to be our personality," which James saw as extending into "unknown regions." As he commented in the Principles (1890/1983d), the existence of "some sort of an anima mundi [or world-soul] thinking in all of us" seemed to him to be "a more promising hypothesis . . . than that of a lot of absolutely individual souls" (p. 328), and a little further on in the same work, he revealed that his thinking about this "promising hypothesis" was further along than his earlier statement might have implied:

One great use of the Soul has always been to account for, and at the same time to guarantee, the closed individuality of each personal consciousness. . . . [But] it would be rash, in view of the phenomena of thought-transference, mesmeric influence and spirit-control, which are being alleged nowadays on better authority than ever before, to be too sure about that point. . . . The definitely closed nature of our personal consciousness is
probably an average statistical resultant of many conditions, but not an ele-
mental force or fact. (p. 331)

Then, much later in the Principles, James wrote:

The perfect object of belief would be a God or ‘Soul of the World,’ repre-
represented both optimistically and moralistically . . . and withal so definitely
conceived as to show us why our phenomenal experiences should be sent to us
by Him in just the very way in which they come. (pp. 944–945)

Although he had argued earlier in the Principles that metaphysics has no
place in the realm of empirical psychology, James mentioned the “Soul of
the World” [or anima mundi] in this context simply to indicate what would
be an ideal belief about ultimate reality if the psychology of belief (as he
understood it) were the only determining factor. Still, the passage reveals
more about James’s incipient belief-system than he may have intended. In
the years ahead, as his beliefs grew, he came to realize that he had been
wrong to try, and that he had inevitably failed, to banish metaphysics from
the Principles. In his first presidential address to the American Psychological
Association, James (1895/1978b) made a public confession in this re-
gard, admitting that “no conventional restrictions can keep metaphysical
and so-called epistemological inquiries out of the psychology-books” (p.
88). Since this is the case, he felt it incumbent upon him as a psychologist
as well as a philosopher to clarify his metaphysical beliefs. That is precisely
what he did in the final decade and a half of his life—he clarified his view
of ultimate reality, relying on psychological research and on the pragmatic
method of inquiry (see James, 1907/1975b; Suckiel, 1982).

As a consequence, a full understanding of James’s mature psychology of
the self and personality on his own terms necessarily involves an under-
standing of his metaphysical speculation about “the ultimate nature of
reality. Although this is not the place for a full-scale review of his metaphysics,
I hope it is clear why I will conclude this treatment of his thought with a
relatively succinct summary of his metaphysics.

From the mid-1890s at least, James began to speculate more and more
freely in his psychological seminars, playing with such notions as “point of
view” and “field” as alternatives to “self” and “ego” (see James, 1895–
1896/1988b, 1897–1898/1988c). The self, by whatever term it was called, re-
mained for James the “centre of knowledge & interest,” but he increasingly
emphasized the self’s connection with what lay “beyond the margin” of
consciousness. This speculation was reflected in various publications in the
1890s (e.g., James, 1895/1979b, 1898/1982b), and it culminated in The
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985), in which he asserted that

I cannot but think that the most important step forward that has occurred in
psychology since I have been a student of that science is the discovery, first

made in 1886, that, in certain subjects at least, there is not only the con-
sciousness of the ordinary field [of “vision” or “awareness”], with its usual
centre and margin, but an addition thereto in the shape of a set of memories,
thoughts, and feelings which are extra-marginal and outside of the primary
consciousness altogether, but yet must be classed as conscious facts of some
sort, able to reveal their presence by unmistakable signs. I call this the most
important step forward because . . . this discovery has revealed to us an en-
tirely unsuspected peculiarity in the constitution of human nature. . . . In
particular this discovery of a consciousness existing beyond the field, or sub-
liminally as Mr. Myers terms it, casts light on many phenomena of religious
biography. (p. 190)

The “Mr. Myers” to whom James referred was the same Frederic (or F. W.
H.) Myers whom he credited, in large part, with the 1886 discovery of this
new arena of psychological and metaphysical reality (Myers, 1886; see also
Gurney, Myers, & Podmore, 1886). As James (1901/1986a) had said in his
obituary notice on Myers:

Myers’s conception of the extensiveness of the Subliminal Self [as Myers
called the transmarginal extension of consciousness] quite overturns the clas-
sic notion of what the human mind consists in. The supraliminal region, as
Myers calls it, the classic-academic consciousness, which was once alone con-
sidered either by associationists or animists, figures in his theory as only a
small segment of the psychic spectrum. It is a special phase of mentality, tele-
ologically evolved for adaptation to our natural environment, and forms only
what he calls a ‘privileged case’ of personality. The outlying Subliminal, ac-
ccording to him, represents more fully our central and abiding being. . . . This
problem of Myers [regarding the subliminal region] still awaits us as the prob-
lem of far the deepest moment for our actual psychology, whether his own
suggestive solutions of certain parts of it be correct or not. (pp. 195–197)

Whether correct or not, James thought Myers’s conceptual framework
was very useful. Myers’s concept of “automatisms,” for instance, helped
make sense of many unusual phenomena—sensory and motor, emotional
and intellectual—that could be seen as “due to ‘uprushes’ into the ordinary
consciousness of energies originating in the subliminal parts of the mind”
(James, 1902/1985, p. 191). Such “uprushes” included mystical and reli-
gious experiences as well as the manifestations of multiple personality,
thought-transference, and so forth. To James, Myers’s hypothesis made ev-
everything fit, and it accounted for his earlier “obscurer feeling” that there
was “something more” underlyiing conscious experience (see footnote 10).
It even made sense of his own personal “observations” of “nitrous oxide
intoxication,” which had “forced” on his mind the conclusion that . . .

our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but
one special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the
filmiest of screens, there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are there in all their completeness. (James, 1902/1985, pp. 307-308)

As a result, James was convinced that...

no account of the universe in its totality can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. How to regard them is the question... [But] at any rate, they forbid a premature closing of our accounts with reality. (James, 1902/1985, p. 308)

Whatever explanation one might give, it was clear to James that when humans identify their “real being” with “the germinal higher part” of themselves, they become “conscious that this higher part is conterminous and continuous with a more of the same quality, which is operative in the universe” outside of themselves (p. 400). Looking to the broader significance of such an awareness, it seemed apparent that “the conscious person is continuous with a wider self through which saving experiences come” and “higher energies filter in” (pp. 405, 408, italics deleted).

James attempted throughout the last decade of his life, and especially in A Pluralistic Universe (1909/1977), to give clearer and clearer expression to his conviction that individual selves are part of a much larger “field,” a truly “cosmic consciousness.” He felt that such an hypothesis, developed by others (e.g., Bucke, 1901/1969) as well as by himself, does a better job than any other of “saving the phenomena,” including the “exceptional” phenomena of psychological experience. With an array of simple, naturalistic metaphors—comparing each of us to a “wavelet” in the “mother-sea” of consciousness or to a “tree” whose roots commence underground with those of the rest of the forest—James (1909/1977) gave graphic expression to his confidence that our “present field of consciousness is a centre surrounded by a fringe that shades insensibly into a subconscious more,” that “our full self is the whole field, with all those indefinitely radiating subconscious possibilities of increase that we can only feel without conceiving, and can hardly begin to analyze,” that “every bit of us at every moment is part and parcel of a wider self” (pp. 130–131). Waxing even more speculative, he even wondered:

May not we ourselves form the margin of some more really central self in things which is co-conscious with the whole of us? May not you and I be confluent in a higher consciousness, and confluent active there, tho we now know it not? (p. 131)

In essence, James was wondering whether the universe itself might not be a Self writ large, a sort of cosmic multiple personality, in which each individual self is a particular, irreplaceable “point of view.” The mere possibility of “a world wider than either physics or philistine ethics can imagine,” James said, can “take our breath away” with its promise of “another kind of happiness and power, based on giving up our own will and letting something higher work for us” (James, 1909/1977, p. 138).

Here at the end, once again, we can detect the echo of his father’s earlier doctrines, and just as plainly we can sense the open-minded curiosity, the intellectual vigor, and even the youthful zestfulness of the 67-year-old scientist and philosopher, one of whose final questions should give us pause:

When was not the science of the future stirred to its conquering activities by the little rebellious exceptions to the science of the present? (James, 1909/1986b, p. 375)

**ECHOES AND INFLUENCE**

The impact of William James on modern thought is well known, yet it still might surprise some to learn that Alfred North Whitehead, the noted logician, mathematician, philosopher, and historian of science, considered James to be one of the four major thinkers in the entire Western tradition, along with Plato, Aristotle, and Leibniz (see Whitehead, 1938, pp. 3–4). Similar and perhaps better known is the estimate of Edwin G. Boring, the eminent historian of psychology, who considered James to be one of the “four great men” in the history of psychology, the others being Darwin, Helmholtz, and Freud (see Boring, 1950, p. 743). Despite these accolades and the widespread awareness of James’s historical importance, however, it might not be superfluous to specify a few of the lines of James’s influence and to point out some of the echoes of his thought in subsequent developments in the psychology of the self and personality.

I should say at the start that it is not the case that James created the 20th-century study of the self and personality all by himself. I have already noted that the study of personality was not even formally established until the 1930s, although there were many earlier works that prefigured the founding texts of Gordon Allport (1937), Ross Stagner (1937), and Henry Murray (1938). When the psychology of personality did take off, however, it did so with frequent nods to James’s analyses of the self, habit, emotion, and instinct—and to James’s contention that psychology should study the whole person. (Kurt Lewin’s 1935 collection of articles on *A Dynamic Theory of Personality* deserves mention in this latter regard as well.) As for the psychology of the self, others besides James contributed in important ways to its establishment as an area of empirical study, which took place much earlier than that of personality, due in large part to the central place the self had enjoyed in earlier philosophical psychology. Josiah Royce and John...
Dewey, whose work was mentioned earlier (see footnote 8), did more than simply lend a hand to James in the advancement of this area of inquiry, as did James Mark Baldwin (1897), G. Stanley Hall (1898), and Mary Whiton Calkins (1900). But however independent their contributions, each acknowledged a debt to James.

Perhaps the most instructive example of how James served as a pushing-off point of future theory and practice is provided by the work of John B. Watson. Although he acknowledged that James was “the most brilliant psychologist the world has ever known” (p. 141), Watson (1924/1963) argued, as is well known, for a purely “objective” account of behavior and personality that rejected the use of any notion of consciousness or inner self (see especially chap. 12). Yet this behavioristic account was conceptualized and worked out in a very telling fashion: In place of the Jamesian “stream of consciousness” as the fundamental notion of psychology, Watson simply substituted his own notion of the “activity stream” (Watson, 1924/1963, pp. 137–139). Thus, even though his treatment seemed quite distinct because of its different focal content, the logical form of Watson’s account of individual development and dynamics was very similar to James’s. Indeed, by emphasizing behavioral habits rather than the cognitive self, he was simply working out a different aspect of James’s legacy.

Such individual instances of James’s influence are interesting, but perhaps not as useful given our present concerns as a more systematic review of the lines of development extending from specific aspects of James’s thought on the self and personality down to the present time. I would like, therefore, to point out some of the major stepping stones along these lines of development, particularly with regard to James’s treatment of the material, social, and spiritual dimensions of the self.

James’s ideas about “the material self” were picked up and developed in particular by Gordon Allport, who was perhaps the most “Jamesian” psychologist of his generation. In his discussion of “consciousness of self,” Allport (1937) noted how “clothing, ornamentation, and special grooming contribute their share to self-consciousness” (p. 164), and in his treatment of “extensions of the self,” he discussed how “possessions, friends, one’s own children, other children, cultural interests, abstract ideas, politics, hobbies, recreation, and most conspicuously of all, one’s work, all lead to the incorporation of interests once remote from the self into selfhood proper” (p. 217). In a later work, Allport (1961) further developed his discussion of the “bodily self,” and at the close of his overall analysis of “the evolving sense of self,” he noted that William James had been “well aware of additional aspects we have described” and that he had “anticipated our present more detailed analysis in terms of bodily sense, self-identity, self-esteem, self-image, self-extension, and propriate striving” (p. 127). Others have subsequently taken up matters pertinent to James’s “material self,” but not nearly so many as the topic seems to warrant. Interestingly, in one of the most fascinating and directly relevant of recent instances, Csikszentmihalyi and Rochberg-Halton’s *The Meaning of Things* (1981), the authors do not register any awareness of James’s contribution, even though they quote James, admirably, on the selectivity of psychic activity (p. 5).

Regarding “the social self,” there is much to say, although it cannot all be said here. The major force in promoting and developing James’s ideas along this line was George Herbert Mead. Acknowledging James’s priority, Mead actually was a “third generation” Jamesian, who was influenced by the “revisionist” approach of Charles Cooley (1902/1964), who was himself inspired by James. As Mead (1929–1930/1964) saw it:

> James recognized early the influence of the social environment upon the individual in the formation of the personality, [but] his psychological contribution to the social character of the self was rather in showing the spread of the self over its social environment than in the structure of the self through social interactions. The superiority of Cooley’s position lies in his freedom to find in consciousness a social process going on, within which the self and the others arise. (p. 300)

Although Mead’s reading of James is somewhat questionable, this passage highlights the way in which Cooley and Mead developed James’s original insight. Building up a theory of the self on the initiating notion of the communicative gesture, Mead (1934) helped to establish a strong and lasting tradition of the social psychology of the self. Although psychologists have not always taken sufficient advantage of this tradition, it has nonetheless had its impact on the psychological study of the self. One such impact was mediated by Jessie Taft (1933/1962), a former student of Mead, who helped in the 1930s to fan Carl Rogers’s (1961) then smoldering interest in the self. (In essence, Rogers’s mature psychological theory pivoted around the contrast between James’s “social self” and James’s “spiritual self,” although he did not seem to be aware of this fact.) And as is well known, Harry Stack Sullivan (1953) integrated Mead’s insights about the social nature of the self into his “interpersonal theory of psychiatry,” which has had its own impact on psychological theory and practice. Most recently, the kinds of theory and research contained in the collections edited by Suls (1982), Gergen and Davis (1985), and Berkowitz (1988), summarized in the review by Snyder and Ickes (1985), and integrated into the textbook by Aronoff and Wilson (1985) represent a strong resurgence of interest in the social dimensions of selfhood and personality.

As if to preserve a healthy “Jamesian” tension regarding current notions of the social contextualization of the self and the distinctive individuality of the self, the elation of some psychologists regarding “the rediscovery of self in social psychology” (Hales, 1985) has been countered by a reciprocal concern for the “whereabouts” of the *person* in personality research.
hierarchy of needs," which extend (he said) from the material through the social to the spiritual domain. Although Maslow acknowledged that his theory is “in the functionalist tradition of James and Dewey” (p. 15), he seemed not to be aware of how closely his scheme recapitulated James’s (1892/1984) earlier discussion of the various aspects of the self and of their place on “an hierarchical scale, with the bodily me at the bottom, the spiritual me at top, and the extra-corporeal material selves and the various social selves between” (p. 170).

The direct influence of James as regards the need to understand the various dimensions of the self as being in some sort of dynamic, integrated union is illustrated by the work of Lev S. Vygotsky. I choose this particular historical example because a great deal of attention is being devoted at the present time (for good reason) to Vygotsky’s distinctive program of research, with its attempt to understand the development of the human self within a complex matrix of both the material and social dimensions of existence. Little noticed in recent treatments of Vygotsky, however, has been his first publication, which foreshadows all of his later work on the social foundations of consciousness, ego, and self. In this article, Vygotsky (1925/1979) relied on James as a critical point of reference. Noting at the end that “it is crucial to point out the agreement between the conclusions I have drawn here and those of the brilliant analysis of consciousness made by William James,” Vygotsky wrote that “I should like to regard this as a partial confirmation of my ideas” (p. 32). Conversely, Vygotsky’s working out of a multidimensional approach to the self went a long way toward establishing one of the lines of potential development from James’s thought.

Much remains to be said about the influence and echoes of James’s hypothesis that the thought is the thinker, of his suggestion that “self” is a general term for a range of phenomena experienced by different persons and “on the whole,” in similar ways, of his articulation of the significance of the fact that the self can become divided and multiple, of his speculations concerning the relationship between individual selves and the larger context of reality, of his criticism of conceptual and diagnostic labels, of his tolerance of exceptionalness, of his defense of keeping philosophical perspectives alive and well within psychology, of his interest in altered states of consciousness, and so on and so forth. But given the limits of this chapter, I shall simply leave it to the industrious reader to fill in what I cannot possibly say here. I would only suggest that a review of the work of such disparate individuals as Albert Bandura (1978), Carl Jung (1921/1971), R. D. Laing (1961), Robert Jay Lifton (1970), Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius (1986), Thomas Natsoulas (1983), Oliver Sacks (1984), Edward Sampson (1985), Theodore Sarbin and George McKechnie (1986), and M. Brewster Smith (1978) would only begin to indicate the range of reverberations set off by James, along many of the lines suggested by the preceding list of issues and topics.
All in all, it seems more than fair to conclude that the influence of James's psychology of the self and personality has been steady and substantial, and that the echoes of his ideas have been loud and recurrent. Yet for all the echoes and influence, the potential of James's fertile thought does not seem to have been exhausted. As long as psychologists continue to carve up the human person in their attempt to grasp the pieces rather than understand the ensemble of human functioning, as long as theorists of different persuasions squabble about the relative merits of cognitive as opposed to behavioral as opposed to physiological accounts, as long as methods are used to limit and even to dictate the range of thoughtful speculation, as long as white adult males—and middle-class college sophomores—remain the prototypes of human nature, so long will it remain true, as George Mandler (1979) suggested a decade ago, that "too many of us have still not absorbed James's insights" (p. 744). But don't take my word for it: If there is any hope with which I end this chapter, it is that many readers will turn from it to James's Principles and begin to make up for lost time.

CONCLUSION

George Santayana (1933) once described John Locke as "a sort of William James of the seventeenth century" (p. 25). Turning Santayana's insightful comparison on its head, the preceding historical and conceptual analysis suggests that we might profitably think of James as a sort of John Locke of the 19th and 20th century—an "under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge," as Locke (1690/1959) too modestly described himself and his own historical role (Vol. 1, p. 14). And, of course, with the development of new knowledge comes the opportunity and inspiration of new practice. In fact, for James as for Locke, the ultimate purpose of science and philosophy "is not to know all things, but those [practical things] which concern our conduct" (Vol. 1, p. 31). Hopefully, in this chapter, I have provided sufficient insight into James's psychology so that readers will have begun to recognize and appreciate the ways in which James did clear the road to our current understanding and treatment of the human self and personality. I hope, too, that this chapter will have suggested some of the ways in which James's thought might still clear the road to additional future developments, developments that would secure for the self a place at the center of psychology, where James wished it to be.

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5. JAMES ON THE SELF AND PERSONALITY


NOTES

*Actually, since James believed that all other psychological phenomena must be analyzed out of the primordial stream of experience, it would be more precise to say that James's psychology was deconstructed from, rather than constructed upon, this stream. However, the use of "deconstruction" would probably confuse some contemporary readers, given recent uses of the term.

As regards the labeling of on-going mental life as either "the stream of thought" or "the stream of consciousness," suffice it to say that James used the later version in his Principles of Psychology (1890/1983d) and the second in the latter, abbreviated version of this work (1892/1984). He came to feel that the latter phrase was a more appropriate designation for the all-inclusive whole of mental life. However, he used the terms interchangeably, and they will be so used in this chapter.

*Indeed, the stream of thought or consciousness was so intimately and necessarily personal, from James's point of view, that he admitted in 1908 that "I still fail to see any great difference [between 'our saying 'Self' or saying 'dynamic entirety of experience,' etc.]." 'Self' and 'Stream' seem to me but two names for the same facts." That being the case, he
said, "I fully admit that the term 'Self' should have the right of way" (letter to Mary Whiton Calkins, 1 February 1908, in Scott, 1986, p. 464). On the equation of "self" and "stream," see also James (1909/1977, p. 111).

James did not fully appreciate the extent of Emerson's influence until he re-read Emerson's works in preparation for an address on the centenary of Emerson's birth (James, 1903/1982c). Regarding Emerson's influence on James, see McDermott (1980/1986a).

Although he continued to distance himself publicly from his father's philosophical and theological positions, the impact of these positions on William's thought is apparent in William's introduction to his father's "literary remainings" (see James, 1884/1982a). Regarding the personal crisis and theology of Henry James Sr., and his relation to his famous sons, see Matthiessen (1947, Br. 1), Moseley (1975), and Perry (1935, Vol. 1, chap. 2). His basic theology is perhaps most succinctly conveyed in Henry James Sr. (1876).

The resolution—or rather, the lifelong sustenance—of this paradoxical set of coordinates with respect to selfhood may have set the pattern for all of James's thought. At least, he tended in all aspects of his thought to seek novel positions that integrated or superseded, rather than selecting among, traditional dichotomies. In this case he learned since early childhood that the self was both central and ephemeral, both deeply personal and intimately related to others. As we shall see, these became vital tensions in his psychology of the self. As for his brother Henry, the following passage suggests a family-wide connoisseurship of the self-in-context:

When you've lived as long as I you'll see that every human being has his shell and that you must take the shell into account. By the shell I mean the whole envelope of circumstances. There's no such thing as an isolated man or woman; we're each of us made up of some cluster of appurtenances. What shall we call our "self"? Where does it begin? Where does it end? It overflows into everything that belongs to us—and then it flows back again. I know a large part of myself is in the clothes I choose to wear. I've a great respect for things! One's self—for other people—is one's expression of one's self; and one's house, one's furniture, one's garments, the book: one reads, the company one keeps—these things are all expressive [of the self]. (H. James, Jr., 1881/1967, p. 201)

It is relevant to note that Henry was not alone in bringing the novel to bear, more and more explicitly and exclusively, upon the human self, especially the self in its social milieu. Among the contemporaries with whom he and William were quite familiar, were Balzac, Dickens, G. Eliot, Howells, Flaubert, Tolstoy, and Zola, to name only a few.

Regarding the transition from psychology of a philosophical to a scientific discipline, see Albrecht (1960), Evans (1984), Leary (1987), Morawski (1988), and O'Donnell (1985). The literature on the transition to a more clinically oriented discipline, especially in reference to the development of William James's thought, is much less satisfactory. Eugene Taylor (1982a, 1982b, chap. 2 in this volume) is among those currently addressing this shortcoming. In the meantime, some of the relevant background can be derived from Burnham (1967), Gifford (1978), Hale (1971a, 1971b), Marx (1968), and Ross (1978), and from Ellenberger's (1970) treatment of Janet (chap. 6). The history of psychological research, which I have discussed elsewhere (Leary, 1980b), is also relevant to this historical topic.

It is not by chance that two of the three longest chapters in The Principles of Psychology (1890/1983d) are the chapters on "The Consciousness of Self" (101 pages) and "Will" (96 pages). The longest chapter is James's technical and detailed discussion of the "Perception of Space" (137 pages), the topic on which he had cut his scientific teeth many years before (James, 1879/1983a). All other chapters average 37 pages in length, with the fourth longest being the concluding chapter, "Necessary Truths and the Effects of Experience" (66 pages). In the abbreviated version of the Principles (James, 1892/1984), "Will" (37 pages) and "Self" (33 pages) are the longest chapters, and "The Perception of Space" is exactly average in length (31 pages), as compared to all the other chapters.

To James, these works by Ward, Royce, Dewey, and Ladd all reflected, so far as their analysis of the self was concerned, a misplaced commitment to idealist and quasi-idealist modes of thought. Even Dewey (1887/1967), after seeming to move toward a rejection of absolute self-consciousness (Dewey, 1886/1969), "sovereily disappointed" James by "trying to mediate between the bare miraculous self and the concrete particulars of individual mental lives." "It's no use," James said; such an approach merely takes "all the edge and definitiveness away from the particulars" (letter to G. Croom Robertson, ca. 1887, in Perry, 1935, Vol. 2, p. 516). James wrote this as he worked on his own chapter on the self. Dewey (1887/1967), by the way, defined psychology as "the science of the facts or phenomena of self" (p. 7). No matter how "introspective" or how "objective" its methods, he said, "the ultimate appeal [of psychology] is to self-consciousness" (p. 16). Regarding James's reflections on Royce, Dewey, and Ward, see Perry (1935, Vol. 1, chap. 50, Vol. 2, chaps. 81 & 88, respectively). Royce's views on the self are more fully treated in Cotton (1954). As a close friend, Harvard colleague, and philosophical opponent, Royce served, through his critique of "the detached individual" and his repeated call for "loyalty, the devotion of the self to the interests of the community" (see, e.g., Royce, 1916), to keep James mindful of the social relations of the self. For critical reviews of Dewey's (1887/1967) and Ladd's (1887) doctrines of the self, by a former student of James who was similarly bothered by their idealist nature, see Hall (1888). Ladd's later (1918) work on personality revealed little movement away from his earlier idealism, whereas Dewey (1922/1983) progressively transformed his absolute idealism into what might be called a social naturalism: Individual conduct, like the individual self, is necessarily social in nature, according to the later Dewey. Altogether, the general legacy of the idealist approach to the self is obvious: It reinforced the theme of the social relations of the self, the same theme emphasized earlier by Henry James Sr. (1876) and elaborated later by George Herbert Mead (1934). One of James's contributions, foreshadowing Mead, was to emphasize the empirical nature and temporal development of the self's social relations.

The following discussion is based on Chapter 10, "The Consciousness of Self," in James (1890/1983d). For clarity's sake, however, I will occasionally use terms from Chapter 12, "The Self," in James's (1892/1984) abbreviated textbook. For example, "the self as known" and "the self as known" are phrases from the later work. In no instance, however, do the terms I have borrowed from the Briefer Course change James's original meaning.

Although James (1890/1983d) admitted that "what I say in [this regard] will be likely to meet with opposition if generalized (as indeed it may be in part inapplicable to other individuals)" (p. 286), he reported that his own introspection revealed that the "constant play of furtherings and hindrances in my thinking" is always accompanied by "some bodily process, for the most part taking place within the head," whereas it is difficult for me to detect in the activity any purely spiritual element at all" (pp. 286–287). Thus, in one person at least, the 'Self of selves,' when carefully examined, is found to consist mainly of the collection of these peculiar motions in the head or between the head and throat. I do not for a moment say that this is all it consists of. . . . But I feel quite sure that these cephalic motions are the portions of my innermost activity of which I am most distinctly aware. If the dim portions which I cannot yet define should prove to be like unto these distinct portions in me, and I like other men, it would follow that our entire feeling of spiritual activity, or what commonly passes by that name, is really a feeling of bodily activities whose exact nature is by most men overlooked. (p. 288)

This sensibility to the physical dimensions of subjectivity was highly refined in James, so much so that his own personal sense of self was intimately related to physical manifestations. For instance, in a letter to his wife soon after their marriage in 1878, James wrote:

I have often thought that the best way to define a man's character would be to seek out the particular mental or moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: "This is the real me!". . . . This characteristic attitude in me al-
ways involves an element of active tension, of holding my own, as it were... which translates itself physically by a kind of stinging pain inside my breast-bone (don't smile at this—it is to me an essential element of the whole thing), and which, although it is a mere mood or emotion to which I can give no form in words, authenticates itself to me as the deepest principle of all active and theoretic determination which I possess. (in H. James, III, 1920, Vol. I, pp. 199-200)

It is interesting to note that the word “sting” and the epithet “stingless” were often used by James. It is also important to underline the fact that James did not wish to reduce subjectivity to its physical correlates, although he sometimes seemed close to doing so. “Over and above these [cephalic movements],” James (1890/1983d) noted, “there is an obscurer feeling of something more” (p. 293). Although he did not discuss this “obscurer feeling” in the Principles, he addressed the “something more,” with particular reference to nature of the self, in his later work, as we shall see.

Actually, James questioned the nature and existence of “consciousness” as a distinctive ontological state, as opposed to a merely cognitive function, many years before the publication of the Principles, and he shared his questions with his students in the 1880s and 1890s, well before giving formal expression to his thoughts in James (1904/1976a).

As regards James’s equation of thought and thinker, about which a lot of ink has been spilled, it should be noted that this formula is simply a different way of expressing James’s original, fundamental premise that consciousness (thought) is first and foremost personal (self-ish) in nature. As he told Mary Whiton Calkins in 1908, “self” is merely a different—and better—term for the stream of thought or consciousness (see footnote 2). Self, on this account, is implicit within psychological phenomena. If this somewhat indirect voucher for the self makes self more a quality experienced than a substance known, that seems to be what James intended, at least as regards the empirical self. Just as “the question ‘what is the truth?’ is no real question” because “the whole notion of the truth is an abstraction from the fact of truths in the plural, a mere useful summarizing phrase like the Latin Language or the Law” (James, 1907/1975b, pp. 115-116), so too the self is simply a general name (James implied) for a variety of personal experiences. This approach to the self is certainly in keeping with James’s pluralism and pragmatism. The key question about the self, as about anything else, for the pragmatist is not “what?” but “so what?” To the “so what?” question, James’s answer was expressed most succinctly by the list of self-referent and self-originating thoughts, emotions, and behaviors discussed in the Principles: self-feeling, self-seeking, and self-love, which are bound up with selectivity, interest, effort, attention, and will. An elaboration of these various terms and processes must be left to other chapters and occasions, but it is relevant to note that they constitute the teleological purpose, final cause, or raison d’être of the self.

As regards the need for the self or ego to create thoughts by unifying supposedly elemental, discrete, and disparate ideas, James was skeptical from at least the early 1880s. In an important article in 1884, in which he argued for the a priori continuity and connectedness of the stream of consciousness, James (1884/1933b) pointed out that “there is no need of an agent [i.e., an ego] to relate together what never was separate” (p. 167). However, he did feel, even then, that the self or ego was a central feature of the on-going stream of consciousness: How are your feelings “cognized” by me different from my feelings “cognized” by me? My own feelings are characterized by James, by “a difference of intimacy, of warmth, of continuity, similar to the difference between a sense-perception and something merely imagined—which seems to point to a special content in each several stream of consciousness, for which Ego is perhaps the best specific name” (p. 167).

As is well known, the stream of consciousness would become the “pure experience” of James’s later philosophy (see, e.g., James, 1912/1976b, pp. 21-44). From this “neutral stuff,” James maintained, both the subjective and objective dimensions of experience are extracted by the analytic mind. The fact that James took the self to be a fundamental category of reality is reflected in his statement that “the great continua of time, space, and the self envelope every-thing, betwixt them, and flow together without interfering” (p. 46). As regards James’s philosophy, Suckling’s (1982) critical review reveals that “the teleological subject— with his needs, desires, and interests—plays an indisputably central role in determining the character of the pragmatic world-view” (p. 14).

The foregoing account of James’s views on the self, drawing primarily on his chapter on “The Consciousness of Self,” inadequately conveys his convictions regarding the relevance of willing and choosing—of making decisions—in the development of the self. As James (1890/1983d) noted in the preceding chapter of the Principles, when someone decides to commit a crime, choose a profession, accept an office, or marry a particular person—in a word, when someone has to “choose which interest out of several, equally coercive, shall become supreme,” the decision is actually between “several equally possible future Characters” or “selves” (p. 276; see also James, 1878/1988a, p. 27). A decision, once made, begins to establish habits that eventually come to rule the day:

Whether a young man enters business or the ministry may depend on a decision which has to be made before a certain day. He takes the place offered in the counting-house, and is committed. Little by little, the habits, the knowledge, of the other career, which once lay so near, cease to be reckoned even among his possibilities. At first, he may sometimes doubt whether the self he murdered in that decisive hour might not have been the better of the two; but with the years such questions themselves expire, and the old alternative ego, once so vivid, fades into something less substantial than a dream. (James, 1880/1979a, p. 171)

Substitute a decision between art and science for the one between business and the ministry in this passage, and biographical foundations of James’s comments are unmistakable. Regarding James’s ideal of “the strenuous life,” the life that continually reaches for the “higher interest” and the “morally good,” see Browning (1975, 1980).

James’s students in the 1890s included many who were influenced by his views on consciousness and the self—for instance, Mary Whiton Calkins, later to be an active proponent and leader in “self-psychology,” Gertrude Stein, who was to use stream-of-consciousness and other Jamesian techniques and insights in her literary writing, and W. E. B. Du Bois, whose famous investigations of “black consciousness” followed from James’s belief that differences in individual consciousness (and by extension, group consciousness) are worthy of attention and admiration. Among the activities associated with James’s seminars were trips to asylums to observe mental patients, and there is little doubt that many of his students were exposed to exhibitions of the trance states and other phenomena associated with mediums. It is also relevant to note that James (1894/1987a) took very early note of Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud’s pioneering work on hysteria, and that some of James’s students—for instance, Edmund B. Delabarre—followed his example in experimenting with chemically induced altered states of consciousness. James’s psychological seminars of 1895-1896 and 1897-1898 are particularly worthy of mention because of their focus on the self (see James, 1895-1996/1988b, 1897-1898/1988c). So too is his 1890 seminar in which, according to her own (1930) recollection, Mary Whiton Calkins received her introduction to psychology while sitting “at either side of a library fire” with the author of the just-published Principles of Psychology (p. 31).

James’s use of “exceptional mental states” rather than the “abnormal mental states” reflects his Darwinian belief that individual variation is a simple fact of nature. On James’s “darwinizing” of psychology, see Richards (1987). Judgments about whether or not such variations are “good” should depend, James thought, not on comparisons to some “norm,” statistical or otherwise, but on the practical results or fruits of these variations. The same welcoming attitude toward individual differences underlies James’s analysis of religious personalities (James, 1902/1985), his criticism of our typical “blindness” to the dignity and worth of strangers (James, 1899/1983b), and his thoughts on what makes life significant (James, 1899/1983b). As regards the misuse of diagnostic labels, James (1895/1987b) noted that writers on pathology tend to “use the descriptive names of symptoms merely as an antiseptic for giving objective au-
5. JAMES ON THE SELF AND PERSONALITY

The meaning of personality with its limits and its laws, forms a problem which until quite recently had to be discussed almost exclusively by logical and metaphysical methods. Within the past dozen years, however, an immense amount of new empirical material has been injected into the question by the observations which the "recognition" by science of the hypnotic state set in motion. Many of these observations are pathological: fixed ideas, hysterical attacks, insane delusions, mediunmistic phenomena, etc. And altogether, although they are far from having solved the problem of personality, they must be admitted to have transformed its outward shape. What are the limits of the consciousness of a human being? Is "self" consciousness only a part of the whole consciousness? Are there many "selves" dissociated from one another? What is the medium of synthesis in a growth of associated ideas? How can certain systems of ideas be cut off as forgotten? Is personality a product, and not a principle? Such are the questions now being forced to the front—questions which were asked for the first time with some sense of their concrete import, and questions which it will require a great amount of further work, both of observation and of analysis, to answer adequately. (pp. 325–326)

In such a brief treatment, I have not very adequately explained James's (1909/1986b) belief that "there is a continuum of cosmic consciousness, against which our individuality builds but accidental fences, and into which our several minds plunge as into a mother-sea or reservoir" (p. 374), and I have not even begun to discuss James's related ideas regarding an alternative mode of conceptualizing brain function—as being "permissive" or "transmissive" rather than "productive" with respect to consciousness or thought (see James, 1898/1982b). Regarding these and other matters pertaining to the "wider self" and its implications, see Fontinell (1986). Finally, it is interesting to note that James's teen-age interest in "going out into the country, into the dear old woods and fields and ponds" (Perr., 1948, p. 53) is reflected in his late-life metaphoric imagery for consciousness and the self. The metaphors James used, like those used by others, were not merely random (see Leary, 1990; Osowski, 1986).

Watson's "rejection" of Freud followed the same basic plot—what was barred entry at the front door was admitted without much ado through the back door (see, e.g., Watson, 1916).

It is interesting to note that in 1947 one of Allport's main competitors for this distinction, Gardner Murphy, also published a pioneering textbook on personality in which the self received focal attention. Clearly, Jamesians are prone to be interested in the self and personality.


James acknowledged Locke's priority and influence in this regard. In fact, James referred to Locke's analysis of "personal identity" as the first and exemplary instance of the application of the pragmatic method (see James, 1898/1975a), and in the margins of his own copy of Locke's Essay, James reiterated his debt by writing "practicalism" next to a passage in which Locke claims that it does not really matter of what kind of substance the self is composed (see Burkhardt, 1981, p. 1347). Regarding Locke's concerns about conduct or morality, which he (1690/1959) considered "the proper science and business of mankind" (Vol. 2, p. 351), see Leary (1980a). It is interesting to note that both Locke and James were motivated by a desire to resolve problems having to do with religion and morality (see Locke, 1690/1959, Vol. 1, pp. xvi–xvii).