INTRODUCTION

Perspectives on Individualism, Collectivism, and the Greater Good

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It has been called "the master problem" of social life: What is the connection between the individual and the collective, including groups, organizations, communities, and society itself? Healthy adult human beings can survive apart from other members of the species, yet across individuals, societies, and eras, humans consistently seek inclusion in the collective, where they must balance their personal needs and desires against the demands and requirements of their groups. Some never sink too deeply into the larger collective, for they remain individualists who are so self-reliant that they refuse to rely on others or concern themselves with others' outcomes. Other people, in contrast, put the collective's interests before their own personal needs, sacrificing personal gain for what is often called "the greater good."

Many problems in modern life can be traced, at least in part, to the basic issue of the tension between the individual and the greater good. Leaders must make choices that will yield benefits for the constituents, but in most cases these choices will leave some members of the collective unsatisfied. In the political arena, those who occupy different positions on the liberal-conservative continuum have very different views on the rights of individuals, and the rights of the collective. In business, questions of corporate responsibility arise in debates over shareholder rights and responsibility to the community where the corporation is

located. In educational settings teachers must continually strive to meet the needs of the entire group of learners, realizing that their focus may leave some learners struggling and others unchallenged. Policymakers must continually struggle to keep their ultimate ends in view as they balance the welfare of the good of all against the rights and wishes of individuals. Members of groups, including couples, families, teams, and even gangs, must weigh their own personal needs against those of the group as a whole. At every turn the variations in individual perspectives on human rights and potentials, contrasting philosophies on social justice and political structure, and even debates over the best solutions to pressing social problems reflect this vital tension between the one and the many.

A Multidisciplinary Perspective on Individualism and Collectivism

The current volume, in seeking to understand the origins and implications of an individualistic and a collective perspective on human affairs, turns to the collective for guidance; in this case, the collective of many disciplines rather than only one. Its chapters draw together conceptual insights and empirical observations from a wide range of disciplines; fields as different as psychology, anthropology, history, philosophy, political science, and biology examine key questions about the individual-collective connection. Each chapter offers its own unique, but informative, perspective, and so they could be sequenced in any order. The arrangement that we selected is somewhat arbitrary then, starting as it does with biological and psychological approaches, shifting toward more historical and interpersonal perspectives, before concluding with analyses of practical implications.

Sarah Brosnan, a primatologist, begins the analysis by drawing insights about collective effort from studies of cooperative behavior of primates. Her work illustrates the conceptual clarity to be gained by linking the relatively ambiguous idea of the "collective good" to a more biologically discernable end state: evolutionary fitness. To promote one's own outcomes over that of others is self-serving, but so are actions that increase the chances for the survival of one's genes in future generations. Cooperation, rendering aid, and even self-injurious altruism may appear to require invoking evolutionarily atypical motivations, but in reality these actions may all be adaptive

ones in certain social environments. Brosnan, going down to the biological level of analysis, suggests that altruistic actions require no special explanation evolutionarily speaking, for in many cases the overall fitness of the individual is enhanced when he or she cooperates with others. Moving beyond early conceptions of general instincts and motivations, Brosnan's work makes it clear that these inherited tendencies are nuanced ones—finely tuned adaptations to specific situations involving interdependent outcomes. Brosnan and her colleagues have created, in a sense, situations requiring leadership in their studies. In one study, for example, two capuchin monkeys must work collaboratively to secure a reward, but the reward is given to only one of the monkeys who could keep it all for herself. She does not, however: she shares. Although this action can be due to a wide range of instinctive and learned factors, it suggests that the capuchin who controls the resources recognizes her dependence on the other. It accounts for two of the great riddles of leadership: Why would anyone accept the influence of another individual? And why do those who acquire the resource, and could keep it all for themselves, nonetheless share.

Daniel Batson, a social psychologist, extends the analysis to the psychological level, positing the central importance of a specific psychological mechanism—empathy—in producing actions that benefit others. Batson's intriguing experimental work illustrates, again and again, that altruistic actions are not exceptional ones: that they occur when individuals experience empathic concern for others. He distinguishes between individuals who contribute to the collective to reduce their own personal distress, and those who help only because they recognize others' needs. Both egoistic and empathic helpers become upset when they see others suffering, but empathic bystanders describe themselves as concerned, softhearted, compassionate, sympathetic, and moved. Distressed helpers, in contrast, feel alarmed, grieved, upset, worried, disturbed, or perturbed. These differing emotional reactions also lead to differences in helpfulness, for egoistic people are not particularly helpful if they can easily escape, physically or psychologically, from the distressing situation. Empathic people, in contrast, suffer because someone else is suffering, so their help is more enduring. Through a series of studies Batson identifies, repeatedly, the key role that empathy plays in elevating cooperation, altruism, and devotion to the needs of others.

Cultural neuroscientists Joan Chiao, Lisa Hechtman, and Narun Pornpattananangkul examine the role of cultural and biological

forces involved in empathy and other capacities that facilitate the collective good. As a cultural neuroscientists, they consider both cultural and genetic selection when trying to understand how the human brain has evolved to facilitate social group living. Chiao and her colleagues integrate recent research, demonstrating that the neural responses underlying empathy, altruism, and fairness demonstrate robust cultural variation. They describe the evolutionary process as bidirectional with genetic and neural processes both facilitating the emergence and transmission of culture as well as being shaped by culture. Chiao's research group finds this bidirectional, culture-gene coevolution process applies to the cultural values of individualism and collectivism and the serotonin transporter gene. Individualism and collectivism are cultural values that differ in how people define themselves relative to their environment, ranging from thinking of people as independent to highly interconnected, respectively. Chiao's research supports the argument that collectivist cultural values have persisted, at least in part, to buffer individuals who have a genetic predisposition to experience heightened negative emotion from affective disorders. They also review research demonstrating that these cultural values of individualism and collectivism appear to shape the neural responses humans have when thinking about themselves in relation to others. After demonstrating how individual capacities that promote the collective good are by-products of both cultural and biological forces, the chapter ends with a discussion of how cultural neuroscience can shed light on three important issues of the collective good: interethnic ideology, international aid, and philanthropy. The important and risky role of philanthropy in the greater good is taken up in a later chapter by Moody.

Eric Daniels, a historian, examines the complex mutation of the concept of individualism from the initial founding of America to its more contemporary expression in the work of philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand (1957/1992). Daniels, taking a historical perspective, explores the meaning of the term individualism, and traces its use and misuse in American politics and civil discourse. Americans are often thought of as "rugged individualists," due in part to the founders' emphasis on individual rights, autonomy, and freedom, but also because of the use of this word by the political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville (1835/1990) in his famed book *Democracy in America*. As Daniels explains, Tocqueville's conception of individualism was complex and nuanced, for it recognized the unique combination of American independence, concern for family, willingness to join local

community groups and organizations, and commitment to shared governance. To Tocqueville, individualism did not mean isolation or selfishness, but rather a furthering of one's own outcomes through service to others. Over time, however, this particular concept of individualism changed, particularly as used by U.S. President Herbert Hoover, social philosopher and educator John Dewey, and the novelist/philosopher Ayn Rand. Daniels concludes that individualism is a largely misunderstood notion, for it is both a descriptive account of interrelated themes that define some societies, and a prescriptive theory that recommends how a society should be best organized. He concludes that, depending on the final resolution of these perspectives, individualism may be consistent with, rather than antagonistic to, the concept of shared values and the collective good.

Organizational psychologist Edwin Locke is not so sure. Drawing on his years of study of the circumstances that promote and impede human productivity, as well as the insights provided by Ayn Rand, Locke is, to use perhaps too mild a word, suspicious of the potential alignment of a concern for the common good with an individualistic orientation. Locke's chapter begins by comparing and contrasting the notions of collectivism and individualism from metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political perspectives. Locke takes a different view on individualism and collectivism from others in this volume: to Locke, individualism refers to every individual in society having the right to pursue their own self-interest without violating others' rights, whereas he defines collectivism as the subordination of the individual to the group. Locke then argues that true individualism has never been realized and that even in the most individualistic country in the world, the United States, both the philosophical and economic systems represent a compromise of individualism mixed with collectivism. In addition to championing individualism in governments, Locke highlights the importance of individualism in the business world explaining that there is no conflict between working for oneself and for a company and that good company leaders are duty-bound to be selfish. He ends the chapter with a cautionary note of the potential disastrous outcomes of an overly altruistic and collectivistic society and warns that the United States may be approaching the dystopian society found in Rand's (1957/1992) *Atlas Shrugged*.

Brian Hayden is concerned with a fundamental anthropological question: Why did humans shift from a relatively communal orientation characteristic of the bands in hunter/gatherer societies to a

more hierarchical, class-based, centralized form of social organization seen in tribes, chiefdoms, and states? He traces his research and thinking on this puzzling question, as he moves from a systems view of social organization to one that seeks to consider the evolutionary functions and foundations of society. Anhropological investigations indicate that humans survived, for 99 percent of the species' history, in small mobile groups whose flat, communal organization regulated population, mandated fairness in resource distribution, and increased each individual's chances of survival in the difficult and unpredictable ecological niche humans occupied. As the climate shifts calmed and generation after generation faced a stable environment in the upper Pleistocene and early Holocene epochs, the land could support humans in larger numbers, and these larger aggregations required more in terms of social organizational structures. Those individuals who found themselves at the hub or center of these networks of association took on the duties required of their position to benefit the community, but Hayden's field studies also suggest that these emerging leaders often used their position to exploit, rather than support, the greater good. Hayden concludes that each individual, and each society, has within it the capacity to shift from a communal focus to a more self-centered, self-protective focus depending on circumstances and internal as well as external threats.

Political scientist Neil Mitchell uses the distinction between actions taken to promote personal interests over collective ones to clarify fundamental questions about leaders and their commitment to the greater good. He examines the basic problem inherent in civil war; violence, on a large scale, when the collective is splintered and finds itself at odds with itself. Mitchell addresses the very real harm done to millions of people, both civilians and combatants, by comparing two periods of political unrest: England's civil war involving Cromwell's attack on Charles I and Lenin's revolution, which resulted in the overthrow of the Romanovs. He explores the motives and methods of the leader of the collective, and how a leader who acts as in ways that are consistent with those advanced by Machiavelli (1977) in his treatise *The Prince* might cause greater harm to the collective than one who acts with restraint and, perhaps, a more collectivistic orientation. The chapter also introduces the very basic problem of the leader's uncertainty when regulating the actions of his or her agents, for the leader cannot be certain that they will act in the collective's best interests (assuming the leader is so acting). Mitchell compares two great leaders of the recent era, Cromwell and Lenin, to conclude

that their differences in concern for social justice and ethics led to very different outcomes for the collectives they supposedly served.

The final chapters of the book consider the practical implications of humans' capacity to function as both independent, autonomous individuals and as cooperative, collaborating members of collectives. Michael Moody, a sociologist, explores the nature of philanthropy, which he defines broadly as voluntary, freely done action that serves the public good. He recognizes, and even champions, the work of the humanitarian philanthropist, and provides several examples of good works that have benefited the many. He suggests, however, that philanthropists must be ever mindful of the harm that their efforts may cause, suggesting that one must heed the Hippocratic Oath's dual emphasis on beneficence and nonmaleficence when engaged in charitable activities. Moody explores how this maxim to "seek to do good, but do no harm" helps shed light on both the goals and dilemmas of philanthropists by focusing on two prominent philanthropic organizations: the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Teach for America. Great good can result from philanthropy, but, as Moody demonstrates, attempting to do good is not easy and people often do not agree on what "good" means. However, it is these philanthropists, or moral leaders, who contribute to the ongoing debate, definition, and redefinition of what the greater good is in society. Moody demonstrates that doing good is much more than having good intentions and his list of possible harms is sobering—corruption, malfeasance, unintended harmful side effects, dependency and strained relations, reinforcement of the status quo, paternalism, moralization, and failure—suggesting that in some cases fools rush in where angels fear to tread. Moody ends the chapter offering suggestions to help these moral leaders minimize harm and maximize good with an ultimate admonition for philanthropists to not lose sight of the central element of the Oath: seek to do good.

Mark Snyder, a social psychologist, provides a fitting conclusion for the volume, for he seeks answers to the question "why do people volunteer?" Researchers have spent considerable time and energy examining when people respond in dire emergencies, but Snyder focuses on situations that require long-term and continuing assistance, care, and support. As Snyder notes, volunteerism is a remarkable form of behavior, for it seems so inconsistent with the self-focused rational decision-maker model of human beings. Volunteers donate their time and energy, and make considerable personal sacrifices, to help people. They act without coercion, and in many cases no one

would think worse of them if they did not volunteer. Volunteering is also an action that is rarely rushed into thoughtless, for it requires careful planning and strategy, and volunteers, by definition, serve without the prospect of financial recompense. Snyder examines the motivations of the followers, searching carefully for the motivational and situational factors that keep volunteers returning again and again to their work, and those who work to undermine volunteers' commitment to their cause.

Leadership and the Collective Good

The insightful analyses of the contributors to this volume underscore the practical complexities of the very notion of individualism and the common good. One thing that is apparent from this collection is that the relationship between individualism and the greater good is complex and highly dependent on the definition of individualism, a term that is largely misunderstood and debatable. Understanding the nature of the greater good is no less, and perhaps even more, complicated. These chapters point to a number of situational factors, including social organization and culture, that influence the extent to which the collective good is supported and the extent to which various prosocial behaviors, such as altruism, are adaptive. Likewise, prosocial behaviors are also shown to be impacted by individual-level factors including genetic predispositions, emotional reactions, collectivistic orientations, and individual actions. The practical importance of these situational and individual factors on both the willingness and effectiveness of people to contribute to their collectives is demonstrated through their impact on both philanthropy and volunteerism.

Each of these chapters also details, sometimes indirectly but in many cases explicitly, the close association between leadership and an understanding of and commitment to the collective and its welfare. Scholars are by no means in agreement when it comes to defining leadership, but many would accept as a working definition one that suggests it is a process of exchange and influence between individuals who are, in many cases, united in their pursuit of a common goal. Although those who use their position within a group, organization, or society to compel others to act, without regard to those others' desires and interests, could be called *leaders*, the dictator, the tyrant, and the despot are barred by some from the category of leader precisely because they ignore the interests of the collective. Those individuals who seem to

epitomize the rare but nonnull category of "great leader" are those who consistently act in ways that further the interests and outcomes of those they lead. One popular approach to leadership, known as servant leadership, stresses the selfless nature of leadership, as does—with a bit more finesse—James McGregor Burns (1978) who suggests that one who fails to act morally is not worthy of the label leader.

Moral righteousness is often in the eye of the beholder, but leaders are assumed to be motivated by their concern for others rather than their own needs. Although in both contemporary and evolutionarily older times leaders tended to prosper relative to those who followed, in some sense a life spent leading others is one spent in "public service" to others and sacrifice. In earlier times leaders put themselves at great risk, and although the advantages they accrued in terms of fitness were substantial, they stood to lose a great deal by taking on extra responsibility for helping others collaborate in the pursuit of shared goals. Leaders must, in many cases, also ask their followers to sacrifice for the good of the group. Is their success in such an undertaking more likely if followers recognize the rationality of such an undertaking; that by helping the collective they help themselves? Or is something more needed: must followers be able to empathize with other, less fortunate, individuals, or with the leader himself or herself? The chapters in this volume seek to illuminate the nature of the greater good, and in so doing illuminate the nature of leadership.

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CHAPTER ONE

What Do Capuchin Monkeys Tell Us about Cooperation?

Sarah F. Brosnan

Nature may be red in tooth and claw, but working together with one's group mates can be an efficient way to increase fitness. Cooperation is common, for example, among capuchin monkeys. These monkeys are not only willing to help others obtain resources, but are more likely to share with individuals who help them. Cooperation can be risky, however, and not surprisingly capuchins are much less likely to cooperate when a partner is able to monopolize the reward. However, they also pay attention to the partner's behavior; monkeys that share with their partners promote successful cooperation, and thus actually receive more benefits over the long term than those who always claim the best rewards for themselves. The ability to recognize inequity may be a mechanism by which the monkeys determine which partners are the best collaborators. The study of capuchin monkeys can tell us quite a lot about how, when, and with whom to cooperate, perhaps providing insight into the design and implementation of our own human cooperative institutions.

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Human beings are not the only animals that act as if they are mindful of the needs of others. Although often the focus is on those qualities that supposedly set humans apart from the rest of the animals, many organisms, including both human and nonhuman primates, act in ways that seem to serve "the greater good." From sounding the alarm when a predator is sighted to sharing food with another who has none, many

socially oriented animals—humans included—contribute to others' welfare. While the mechanisms leading to these behaviors undoubtedly differ across species, the outcome remains the same; one individual is benefitted by the actions of another. By studying the nature of such cooperative and prosocial behaviors in primates, researchers can provide an enhanced understanding of their evolutionary function. This chapter considers the many ways that contributing to collective outcomes can enhance the fitness of the individual, and how difficult cooperation can be to maintain.

The Evolution of Cooperation

Cooperation has been an evolutionary conundrum for almost as long as the theory of natural selection has existed (Dugatkin, 1997). After all, the main tenet of natural selection is that a trait is passed on if it provides a specific fitness benefit to an individual, meaning that this individual leaves more or healthier offspring than everyone else. If this is how genes are selected, it seems challenging to explain how traits that provide benefits to others—such as cooperation—could exist.

One answer is what is now called group selection. This is the idea that traits may be selected because they provide a benefit to the group in which an organism lives, which benefits the individual even if there is an individual fitness cost to the act. Group selection enjoyed an early flurry of support, which was followed by some less-than-rigorous theorizing (Wynne-Edwards, 1962), and then the inevitable challenges (Williams, 1966). More recently, group selection, or more broadly, multilevel selection, has been resurrected as potentially viable (e.g., Sober & Wilson, 1998), particularly with regard to gene-culture coevolution in humans (Richerson & Boyd, 2005). However, group selection is limited to a rather specific set of circumstances, leaving open the question of how cooperation evolves in other situations.

Cooperation certainly does exist (Brosnan & Bshary, 2010). Organisms from single-cell beings (Strassmann, Zhu, & Queller, 2000) to our closest relatives, the apes (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006b), cooperate, and some of the most impressive examples of cooperation on earth come from the so-called superorganisms, or insect societies (Holldobler & Wilson, 2008). This latter form of cooperation is so extreme that the majority of individuals never even breed, but instead support a queen or queens who do the breeding for the entire colony. So how does individual selection lead to such extensive forms of cooperation?

The Mechanisms of Cooperation

There are generally considered to be three mechanisms for cooperation (Dugatkin, 1997). First is by-product mutualism, in which individuals work together to achieve a common goal (Brown, 1983). Mutualism is not difficult to explain from an evolution standpoint. There is no incentive to cheat; individuals benefit jointly and immediately. Mutualism requires no cognitive mechanisms such as memory for previous encounters, individual recognition, or an ability to delay gratification. Individuals don't even need to understand that they are cooperating; cooperation can be functional rather than intentional (Brosnan, Salwiczek, & Bshary, 2010).

The second form of cooperation is cooperation among kin (Hamilton, 1964). Although ideas related to kin selection existed previously, Hamilton was the first to outline the theory of how individuals benefit from helping kin. A critical recognition was that fitness could be divided into direct fitness—your personal fitness—and indirect fitness—fitness you get through the success of other kin not in your direct lineage (together these are called inclusive fitness). Thus, since you share 50 percent of your genes with your offspring and only 25 percent of your genes with your nieces and nephews, you should require a greater benefit or lower costs to help the latter.

Hamilton formalized this insight in an equation known as Hamilton's rule: rB>C. Here r represents the degree of relatedness between you and the potential recipient, B represents the benefit to them (in terms of how many more offspring they successfully rear due specifically to your help), and C represents the potential cost to you, in terms of your offspring's fitness. Note that this is an average cost, which incorporates the degree of risk and the potential extent of the cost (e.g., death). Essentially, you should help your kin if the benefit to them, discounted by their degree of relatedness to you, is greater than the cost to you. Of course, organisms do not need to understand this relationship. Rather, individuals who acted in a way consistent with this rule had higher fitness, which led to them passing on more of their genes, presumably including the gene to help kin in this fashion. Thus ultimately the organisms' behavior reflects this relationship. In fact, helping behavior may have evolved from the behavior present in kin relationships, and some relationships, such as friendships, may provide a safe haven for cooperative and helping relationships between nonkin to develop (Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2007; Wasilewski, 2003).

The third mechanism for cooperation is reciprocal altruism. Trivers (1971) recognized that if a short-term cost, obtained while helping another, is offset by a future benefit, from a purely self-interested standpoint, the (long-term) benefits of helping outweigh the (short-term) costs. In other words, if I help you out today (at a cost to me and a benefit to you), and this leads you to help me out next week, we are both better off than we were before. Reciprocal altruism is in practice quite challenging as it may require a number of fairly stringent conditions to be met (Stevens & Hauser, 2004; although these conditions may be present in primates; see Dufour, Pele, Neumann, Thierry, & Call 2008), however some forms of reciprocity may be simpler. One proposal recommends that reciprocity be divided into three components, symmetry-based, attitudinal, and calculated (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002; de Waal & Luttrell, 1988). Symmetry-based reciprocity is a function of the symmetries in the relationships between individuals, while attitudinal is reciprocity affected by one's feelings toward another individual. Neither of these requires individuals to remember favors given and received. Only the latter, calculated reciprocity, does so.

These forms of reciprocity are all essentially dyadic and specific to the partnership. However, reciprocity may also involve other configurations. For instance, reciprocity may exist in larger groups (Connor, 2010), and individuals may be able to use information from others' interactions to inform their own cooperative behavior (Brosnan, Earley, & Dugatkin, 2003; Earley, 2010), leading to the formation of reputations and image scoring (Wenekind & Milinski, 2000; Bshary & Gruter, 2006). Finally, generalized reciprocity may lead to reciprocal interactions on a noncontingent basis (Rutte & Taborsky, 2007).

Although there are good examples of reciprocity in the animal kingdom, contingent reciprocity is harder to find. Chimpanzees are often studied in this regard since their intelligence and phylogenetic closeness to humans seem to make them likely candidates (although see Brosnan, Salwiczek, & Bshary, 2010, for the point that cooperation need not require cognition). In experiments, chimpanzees often fail to show contingent reciprocity (Brosnan, Henrich, Mareno, Lambeth, Schapiro, & Silk, 2009; Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2008), even though they are known to reciprocate in other situations (e.g., de Waal, 1989). There may be several reasons for this. First, most experiments do not allow individuals to choose their own partners, and partner identity is likely critical in reciprocity (de Waal, 1989, did allow for partner

choice, potentially explaining the different results). Second, experiments occur over minutes, or at the most hours, while most reciprocity seen in the wild occurs over much longer time frames (days to weeks; Gomes & Boesch, 2009; Gomes, Mundry, & Boesch, 2008). Of course, cooperation is not the only context in which individuals behave in ways that benefit others, as is discussed next.

Prosocial Behavior in Noncooperative Contexts

Some behavior that benefits others also occurs outside of the context of cooperation (although such behaviors may later lead to cooperative interactions). Such prosocial behavior cannot easily be explained by the three mechanisms mentioned previously. These behaviors include such acts as tipping in a restaurant to which you will never return, giving blood, and even voting, for which it is unlikely that any one person's vote will be the deciding factor. These behaviors are common in humans (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989) but also occur in other species (*marmosets:* Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, & van Schaik, 2007; *capuchins:* Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008; de Waal, Leimgruber, & Greenberg, 2008; Takimoto, Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2009; *chimpanzees:* Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; although see Cronin, Schroeder, Rothwell, Silk, & Snowdon, 2009; Silk, Brosnan, Vonk, Henrich, Povinelli, Richardson et al., 2005; Vonk, Sarah, Brosnan, Silk, Henrich, Richardson et al., 2008; Jensen, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2006).

Despite the lack of immediate benefits, there are several potential functions to prosocial behavior. For instance, prosocial behavior may serve as a commitment device that demonstrates to others the actor's dedication to equity, and thus their general merit as a social partner (Frank, 1988). Humans' behavior supports this in some experimental settings; people will make decisions that lower their absolute and relative outcomes, presumably to send a signal to their partner (Yamagishi, Horita, Takagishi, Shinada, Tanida, & Cook, 2009). Related to this, prosocial behaviors may also improve one's own reputation, providing benefits in the future (Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Wenekind, 2000). In addition, helping others may avoid punishment or harassment that ensues if help is not given (Blurton-Jones, 1987). For instance, chimpanzees and other primate species harass food possessors, which makes the possessor more likely to share (Gilby, 2006; Stevens, 2004).

One mechanism that increases the chances of such prosocial behavior may be the "warm glow" people get from helping others (Andreoni,

1989; Batson, 1991), a mechanism that may be shared with other species (de Waal, Leimgruber, & Greenberg, 2008). This mechanism may encourage us to perform behaviors that benefit us in the long run despite the immediate costs (Brosnan, Salwiczek, & Bshary, 2010).

Capuchin monkeys are an interesting species to study with respect to prosocial and cooperative behaviors. First of all, they demonstrate both of these types of behaviors in the lab (see below for details). Moreover, many studies have been done investigating both types of behavior, and attempting to understand the tradeoffs the monkeys face as they make determinations whether or not to cooperate or share. Below I discuss what capuchin monkeys can tell us about the evolution of cooperation and prosocial behavior.

Cooperation Lessons from Capuchins

Capuchin monkeys are a gregarious monkey species indigenous to South and Central America. The brown capuchin monkey (*Cebus apella*), discussed here, is particularly well suited for studies of cooperation. They have the largest brain-to-body ratio of any monkey species, on par with that of apes (Rilling & Insel, 1999), and show an array of advanced cognitive behaviors (for a review, see Fragaszy, Visalberghi, & Fedigan, 2004). Thus, if cognition is required for some types of cooperation, they are likely to have the necessary prerequisites. Moreover, their social behavior predisposes them to cooperate. They are highly tolerant, and even subordinates can maintain access to resources that are in their possession (de Waal & Brosnan, 2006). Capuchins also collaborate, for instance, on hunts (Rose, 1997) and group defense (Boinski, 1988), and share food (de Waal, 1997; Perry & Rose, 1994), an unusual trait among adult primates (Feistner & McGrew, 1989).

Next I discuss a series of studies that were done in the lab, using nonkin pairs drawn from the same social group. All lived in large social groups (fifteen to –twenty individuals) and so spent their days interacting with the monkeys with whom they are tested. Most were done using a "barpull" tray, which is a counterweighted tray that can be pulled in by the monkeys to obtain rewards. Adjustments can be made to the weight of the tray (to require monkeys to pull together) and rewards (offering them in different locations, quantities, or types) to examine how different features and contexts affect cooperation. This flexibility allowed the barpull apparatus to be used to examine both mutualism and reciprocity.

Cooperation Requires Coordination

Capuchin monkeys easily coordinate their behavior to jointly pull in the tray to each receive an identical reward (e.g., a mutualism task: Mendres & de Waal, 2000). Moreover, the capuchins were actively synchronizing their behavior. First, the capuchins glanced at their partner more often in the coordination task than in a control in which they could pull in the tray without their partner's help. Second, when an opaque panel blocked the capuchins' visual access to each other, cooperation almost disappeared, indicating visual coordination was required for success. Finally, there was a condition in which the partner could come and go freely, but the subject could not. The subject pulled more frequently when the partner was present than absent, indicating that they understood that a partner's presence was necessary for success.

In order to successfully cooperate, capuchins seem to require an intuitive task, or one that is both biologically relevant and provides appropriate kinesthetic feedback. In an earlier study, capuchin monkeys were trained to pull two handles simultaneously to activate a food reward. The handles were gradually moved further apart until two monkeys were required to activate the apparatus. The monkeys never learned to do this task (Visalberghi, Quarantotti, & Tranchida, 2000). To understand the difference between these results and those with the barpull apparatus, we ran an analogue of the Visalberghi study using the capuchins that had been successful in the Mendres study (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002). The monkeys were trained to push a lever to activate a juice dispenser, which they quickly learned to do. We then placed the monkeys next to each other, each with a lever and a juice dispenser, and required the monkeys to press their levers together to activate their juice dispensers. None of the monkeys learned this. We then altered the task so that the levers were adjacent and several feet from the adjacent juice dispensers, which encouraged the monkeys to move together and, potentially, pay attention to their partner's relevance (e.g., synchronize their behaviors). At this point, one adult female monkey learned to alter her behavior contingent upon her partner's actions. This female pressed her lever more often when her partner was also near the levers. However, no other monkeys learned to activate the juice boxes, even though these monkeys learn socially in other situations (Brosnan & de Waal, 2002).

Based on these studies, we concluded that a critical feature of any cooperative task is that the individuals must be able to understand it.

Apparently the monkeys did not understand the contingencies of the electronic lever-pressing tasks, and thus never learned to pattern their behavior based on their partners'. On the other hand, the barpull was intuitive; the tray could be pulled only with the partner and if the partner let go, the tray immediately became too heavy for the remaining individual. Thus there was immediate kinesthetic feedback. Of course, an intuitive task is necessary, but not sufficient; the work of Mendres and de Waal shows that the monkeys must also be able to see each other to coordinate their behavior.

Cooperation Depends on the Partner's Behavior

Since cooperation necessarily involves two (or more) individuals, there is always a potentially weak link in the interaction. When making a decision to cooperate, individuals have to not only understand the task, but also determine whether their partner will be a good partner. Capuchins are sensitive to situations in which a partner might fail to cooperate. In the previous study, the rewards were always dispersed, such that each monkey could control "their" rewards. When rewards were clustered together in the middle of the tray, such that one individual could monopolize them, cooperation was much less common (de Waal & Davis, 2002). This was true from the first trial, indicating that their reticence to cooperate when rewards were clumped is not based on learning during the course of the experiment.

Capuchins are also sensitive to their partner's actual behavior. If rewards are altered such that only one of the monkeys gets rewarded, the unlucky monkeys cooperated at higher rates when their partner shared the food bonanza. Moreover, the rates of food sharing were lower in a control in which the subject could pull the tray in by themselves (also for a single reward). This indicates that the subjects understood when their partner's help was essential and rewarded their partners for their assistance (de Waal & Berger, 2000).

Finally, capuchins are sensitive to relative payoffs between themselves and others, and are more likely to cooperate with partners who do not dominate rewards. In this mutual barpull, the food rewards were dispersed, but varied between the two monkeys. In some conditions, the monkeys received the same high- or low-value food, while in others, one monkey received a high-value food while the other received a low-value one. Critically, in this test the monkeys were not separated from one another and the experimenter did not determine which monkey received which reward. Instead, the monkeys had to work out for

themselves which one got the high-value reward and which one got the low-value reward (Brosnan, Freeman, & de Waal, 2006).

We found that cooperation increased when partners shared access to the higher-value food. When one monkey repeatedly claimed the higher-value food, their partner quit cooperating. Interestingly, this held true across all conditions, not just the inequitable ones. So if a monkey consistently took the high-value reward, their partner quit cooperating with them not only when the rewards were unequal, but also when the rewards were equal and high. Thus, it seems that they were not reacting to the actual distribution of the rewards, but instead to their partner's behavior.

It is also of note that in this study, the monkeys were willing to accept short-term inequity—getting the lower value of the two rewards—as long as the long-term outcomes were approximately equal. This implies that the monkeys were evaluating their interactions based on the long-term relationship rather than each individual interaction. This is important for cooperation in natural situations, as it is rare that individual outcomes are ever completely equitable. In fact, these monkeys normally react negatively to inequitable outcomes as compared to a partner, a topic discussed in depth in the following section.

Inequity Is Detrimental to Cooperation

Capuchin monkeys dislike inequity. They reject outcomes that are not equitable, even if their reaction does not change their partners' outcomes (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003). This is not a result of individual contrast, as the monkeys respond less strongly if they are offered a high-value reward but then receive a lower-value one after completing a task (Fletcher, 2008; van Wolkenten, Brosnan, & de Waal, 2007). Moreover, the monkeys seem to be much more focused on outcomes than on effort; they react quite negatively to receiving a reward that is not as good, but do not react negatively to having to work less hard for an outcome (Fontenot, Watson, Roberts, & Miller, 2007; van Wolkenten, Brosnan, & de Waal, 2007). Much has been written on the topic, so I refer the reader to several reviews for the details (Brosnan, 2006, 2008) and will refer to only those aspects that are of importance for cooperation.

One hypothesis is that inequity is a mechanism that underpins cooperation (Brosnan, 2006; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Individuals who respond negatively to inequity may have better outcomes because they cease interacting with those individuals who do not give them a fair deal. If

they then seek a new partner, this will result in a change for the better. There is evidence for this in capuchin monkeys. First, capuchins seem to respond to inequity primarily in the context of a task, and not when rewards are simply handed out for "free" (Dindo & de Waal, 2006; Dubreuil, Gentile, & Visalberghi, 2006; Roma, Silberberg, Ruggiero, & Suomi, 2006). In other words, if one monkey has to complete a task to receive a particularly preferred reward (a grape), and another has to complete the same task but receives only a less-preferred reward (a cucumber), the monkey that received the cucumber will refuse to either complete the task or accept the cucumber. On the other hand, if one monkey is simply handed the grape and the other is handed the cucumber, the monkey that receives the cucumber will accept the reward (Dindo & de Waal, 2006). This behavior is also seen in tamarins and chimpanzees (Brosnan, Talbot, Ahlgren, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2010; Neiworth, Johnson, Whillock, Greenberg, & Brown, 2009). As might be expected, dominant subjects tend to be more likely to refuse lower value rewards than subordinates, presumably because they are less accustomed to this situation (Brosnan et al., 2010).

This refers to "Brosnan, Talbot, Ahlgren, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2010" or "Brosnan, Houser, Leimgruber, Xiao, Chen, & de Waal, 2010"? Please clarify.

Several explanations exist for this behavior (Brosnan et al., 2010). First, it is possibly a quirk of captivity. Monkeys receive foods on a regular basis from humans (their daily meals, for instance), and dominant individuals routinely claim more than subordinates. Thus, they may be used to unequal outcomes in this context (or consider them equitable). A second possibility is that the act of working together triggers a negative response if rewards are unequal (van Wolkenten, Brosnan, & de Waal, 2007). If inequity is a mechanism underpinning cooperation, it may be that any effort triggers an expectation of more equal outcomes. In the wild, refusal to participate may lead them to find a new, potentially more equitably behaving, partner. In fact, in cooperative situations, monkeys prefer to help partners who share outcomes (de Waal & Berger, 2000) and do so more equitably (Brosnan, Freeman, & de Waal, 2006). Given a choice, chimpanzees actively choose more tolerant partners for cooperative tasks (Melis, Hare, & Tomasello, 2006a).

This refers to "Brosnan, Talbot, Ahlgren, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2010" or "Brosnan, Houser, Leimgruber, Xiao, Chen, & de Waal, 2010"? Please clarify.

Another way to test this hypothesis is to examine these behaviors phylogenetically. Species that differ on one trait, such as cooperation, may also differ on a second trait, such as responding negatively to inequity. Although this is correlational data, and can tell only if the traits are linked, this is a powerful mechanism for determining if behaviors likely evolved in concert. Thus far, all species that have been shown to respond negatively to inequity are also cooperative (chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys, tamarins, dogs), so it is difficult to tell if this behavior is

due to some common characteristic among these species, such as sociality or cooperation (e.g., evolutionary convergence), or if the negative response to inequity is widespread in primates and mammals (e.g., homology). We currently have studies underway with other species of primates that differ in their cooperative tendencies to determine which of these possibilities is more likely.

Be Nice When You Can, But Never If It Costs You Too Much

In all of the previous work discussed, the capuchins' behavior could easily be explained by mutualism, which provides an immediate benefit to the self, or reciprocity, which provides a benefit in the future. However, sometimes animals do things that help their partners for no obvious benefit. There has been a recent interest in prosocial behavior, or the willingness to benefit another at either no or a very small cost to the self. Initial studies in nonhumans (Jensen, Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 2006; Silk, Brosnan, Vonk, Henrich, Povinelli, Richardson et al., 2005; Vonk, Sarah, Brosnan, Silk, Henrich, Richardson et al., 2008) found that chimpanzees did not bring food to conspecifics, even when it did not cost them anything. In these studies, the chimpanzees were given a choice between an option that brought food only to themselves or an option that brought food to both themselves and a partner. The subject received the same food no matter which choice they made, so there was no cost to behaving prosocially. To control for the possibility that they preferred the option with more food items, the subjects' behaviors were compared when paired with another chimp versus when alone. In none of these studies did chimpanzees choose to bring food to their partners more often when their partner was present than when they were next to an empty cage.

A series of similar studies have been run with capuchin monkeys with very different results. The capuchins behaved prosocially, choosing outcomes that benefit their partners over those that did not (de Waal, Leimgruber, & Greenberg, 2008; Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2008; Takimoto, Kuroshima, & Fujita, 2009). Additional research indicates that there are many factors that affect prosocial behavior. Chimpanzees, despite failing to bring food to their partners, do help them in non–food related tasks (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006). Moreover, callitrichids vary, with some species behaving prosocially (Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, & van Schaik, 2007) and some not (Cronin, Schroeder, Rothwell, Silk, & Snowdon, 2009). The fact that some cooperative breeders are prosocial, including

humans, has led to the hypothesis that cooperative breeding creates the interdependence that selects for prosocial behavior (Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, & van Schaik, 2007). However, additional data is required before firm conclusions can be drawn.

Note that capuchins monkeys' behavior seems on the surface contradictory. These monkeys make choices that are prosocial, choosing to bring food to their partners when it doesn't cost them anything to do so, yet they also dislike inequity, refusing to participate when outcomes are unequal or when their partners do not share better rewards. Thus, what happens when capuchins must decide whether or not to be prosocial when doing so will also create inequity?

To test this we recently ran a study in which monkeys had to decide whether to bring a set reward to themselves and their partner (Brosnan et al., 2010). Rewards varied such that they were either equal, somewhat unequal (no versus less-preferred reward or less-preferred versus more-preferred reward), or very unequal (no versus more-preferred reward). Capuchins were prosocial—that is, they chose to pull in the rewards more often when a partner was present than absent—when rewards were equal or moderately unequal. However, when rewards were very unequal, the subjects were no longer prosocial. This cannot be explained by the presence or absence of a reward for the subject, since the subject received no reward in one of the low-inequity conditions. Thus, it appears that capuchins are willing to be prosocial even when it results in inequity, as long as the inequity is not too great.

This refers to "Brosnan, Talbot, Ahlgren, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2010" or "Brosnan, Houser, Leimgruber, Xiao, Chen, & de Waal, 2010"? Please clarify.

Conclusions

What can capuchins tell us about the evolution of cooperation? On the basis of these experiments, we can find quite a lot. To be successful in cooperation, individuals must be able to understand how to cooperate. Although this seems straightforward, it is clear that if the opportunity for cooperation is not intuitive and clear to the interactors, cooperation will fail. Thus, providing opportunities to cooperate may not be sufficient if individuals don't recognize them as such. Second, cooperation will often fail if one individual can monopolize the rewards. In humans, this means that the institutional structure should encourage fair distribution. If this is not possible, the behavior of the partner is paramount. Cooperation can occur even when one individual gets all of the rewards as long as that individual shares those rewards.

As important as what cooperation requires is what cooperation does not require. Cooperation does not require that each individual get exactly the same payoff on each interaction. Cooperation can survive short-term inequity as long as outcomes are equitable over the long term. Moreover, capuchins behave prosocially toward their partners, even when outcomes are somewhat inequitable. This is of critical importance since outcomes are rarely, if ever, exactly the same in cooperative interactions.

Probably the most critical lesson is that joint efforts seem to require joint payoffs (van Wolkenten, Brosnan, & de Waal, 2007). In other words, individuals seem to expect that their payoffs will be commensurate with the level of effort that they put in. If one individual does not get rewarded appropriately, the interaction falls apart. While this lesson seems rather intuitive, it is important in every enterprise from interpersonal interactions to global politics. As with the monkeys, human cooperation cannot succeed in situations in which inequity prevails. On the other hand, we have a long evolutionary history of cooperative behavior and with a little care, cooperation can be achieved in even the most unlikely of situations.

Notes

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CHAPTER TWO

Empathy-Induced Altruism: Friend or Foe of the Common Good?

C. Daniel Batson

Research supporting the empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that the value assumption of the theory of rational choice is wrong. Apparently, humans can value more than their own welfare. Empathic concern felt for someone in need can produce altruistic motivation with the ultimate goal of increasing that person's welfare. But this altruistic motivation is not always a friend of the common good. Research also reveals that empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the common good in social dilemmas. Indeed, in certain nontrivial circumstances, it can pose a more powerful threat than does self-interested egoism.

★ ★ ★

Why do people act for the common good at cost to themselves? Why do they contribute to public TV or the symphony, support school-bond issues or welfare programs, volunteer for community projects, recycle trash, or conserve scarce environmental resources? In the behavioral and social sciences, the orthodox answer has long been that people act for the common good when and only when it is in their personal interest to do so—when the personal benefits outweigh the personal costs. Ecologist and social-policy analyst Garrett Hardin (1977) called this the Cardinal Rule of Policy: "Never ask a person to act against his own self-interest" (p. 27). Similarly, economist Mancur Olson (1971) asserted that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve

their common or group interest" (p. 2). Such individuals will act for the common good only when the personal value to them of that good exceeds the cost to them of the act—or when promotion of the common good is an unintended consequence of pursuing self-interest.

As Olson's assertion makes clear, this orthodox answer rests on the theory of rational choice (Downs, 1957; Taylor, 1976; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), which in turn rests on two assumptions, a rationality assumption and a value assumption. The *rationality assumption* is that humans will choose the action that is most likely to get them what they want. The *value assumption* is that what they want is to maximize self-interest.

A long line of research by Kahneman, Tversky, and others has addressed—and challenged—the rationality assumption, showing that people's decisions are often illogical and suboptimal for getting them what they want (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). But this research has not questioned the value assumption, that people want to maximize self-interest. As a result, it has not challenged the core of the orthodox answer to the question of why people act for the common good.

Acting for the Common Good in Social Dilemmas

Research on social dilemmas has, however, challenged the value assumption. A social dilemma arises when (1) each individual in a group or collective has a choice about how to allocate scarce resources (e.g., money, time, energy), and (2) allocation to the group as a whole provides greater good for all than does allocation to self, but (3) allocation to self provides more personal self-benefit than does allocation to the group as a whole. In such a situation, one cannot appeal to mutualism or cooperation (see Brosnan, this volume). The action that is best for me personally is to allocate resources to myself rather than to the group as a whole. But if each individual tries thus to maximize personal welfare, the strategy will backfire. Everyone, including me, will be worse off. Unilateral pursuit of what is best for each creates a situation in which everyone suffers more. Hence, the dilemma. (For a conceptual analysis of social dilemmas, see Dawes, 1980; for research examples, see Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988.)

What does the theory of rational choice predict will happen in a social dilemma? Catastrophe. It predicts that each individual will blindly and relentlessly pursue his or her own personal self-interest rather than the

common good. Like rats on a sinking ship, this effort to scramble over others to benefit self will send everyone more quickly to their demise.

Fortunately, human behavior in social dilemmas is rarely this disastrous. There is considerable evidence that when faced with such a dilemma, whether in research laboratories or in real life, a substantial proportion of resources are allocated in a way that benefits the group at cost to self. People donate money to public television and radio; they recycle when inconvenient; they donate to blood drives with no strings attached. In laboratory dilemmas, the percentage of allocations to the group rather than the self is often 50 percent or higher—sometimes as high as 80 percent (see Alfano & Marwell, 1980; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes, 1980; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Marwell & Ames, 1979, 1980; Messick & Brewer, 1983; Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986).

Explaining the Apparent Violation of the Value Assumption: Expanding Self-Interest

How are we to account for this apparent violation of the value assumption of the theory of rational choice? Two explanations are most common. Neither involves an overthrow of the assumption, but substantial revision.

Enlightened Self-Interest

The first explanation is based on expansion of the notion of self-interest to include enlightened self-interest. There are a number of different ways that self-interest may be enlightened. These different ways may be loosely grouped into two categories: (1) consideration of long-term consequences and (2) attention to side payments (Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell 1990). One may recognize that headlong pursuit of immediate personal gain in a social dilemma will lead to less long-term personal gain than will acting for the common good—if one can be assured that others will do the same. As a result, one may be willing to act in a way that promotes the common good in the short term as an instrumental means to maximize self-benefit in the long term.

Side payments include nontangible self-benefits of acting for the common good, self-benefits such as social and self-approval (e.g., admiration of others; personal pride at a good deed done) and avoidance of social and self-punishments (e.g., censure for violation of norms of fairness

or reciprocity; pangs of conscience—Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell 1990). One may anticipate criticism, accusations, guilt, and shame if one favors oneself in a social dilemma at the expense of the group, especially if others do not. Avoidance of these punishments, as well as anticipation of social and self-rewards, may tip the balance toward acting for the common good as an instrumental means to maximize overall self-benefit (Bixenstein, Levitt, & Wilson, 1966; Bonacich, 1972; Dawes, 1980; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977).

Group Identity

The second explanation of acting for the common good in social dilemmas extends the boundaries of self-interest along a different dimension. Self-categorization theory rests on the idea that the self can be defined not only at the personal level but also at the group level (Tajfel & Turner, 1985; Turner, 1987). If one identifies with the group as a whole, defining the self collectively rather than personally, maximizing the common good is a natural and direct expression of self-interest (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell 1990; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Turner, 1987).

This second explanation challenges the assumption that the self whose benefit is maximized is the personal self, but it does not challenge the assumption that one always acts to maximize self-benefit. Self-categorization theory is quite explicit in this regard:

> To the degree that the self is depersonalized [being instead conceived at the group level], so too is self-interest. . . . The perception of identity between oneself and ingroup members leads to a perceived identity of interests in terms of the needs, goals, and motives associated with ingroup membership. (Turner, 1987, p. 65)

If group identity involves suppression of differentiation between myself and other ingroup members as individuals, I no longer think of my interests or your interests. I think of our—the group's—interests. In the words of Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell (1988), it is "not me or thee but we" (p. 83).

Consistent with this second explanation, heightened group identity tends to increase allocations to the group in a social dilemma (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Dawes, van de Kragt, & Orbell, 1990; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988). Heightened individual self-concern or self-focus tends to increase

allocations to oneself as an individual to the detriment of the common good (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kelley & Grzelak, 1972; Komorita, Sweeney, & Kravitz, 1980; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). Finally, heightened identification with a subgroup tends to increase allocations to the subgroup to the detriment of the group as a whole (Komorita & Lapworth, 1982; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988).[1]

A Third Component of Social Dilemmas: Others as Individuals

I think there is merit in each of these revisionist explanations of why people act for the common good. At the same time, I believe that each, as well as the research on which each is based, omits an important component of many social dilemmas. In addition to benefiting oneself as an individual or benefiting the collective, one may act to benefit other individuals as individuals.

Traditional social-dilemma research has not considered the possibility of acting to benefit another individual in the collective. I suspect this possibility has been overlooked because the theory of rational choice and its derivatives—whether enlightened self-interest or redefinition of the self through group identity—maintain the essence of the value assumption, that all human action is directed toward self-interest. The understanding of what is in the self's interest may change, the understanding of how the self is defined may change, but the assumption that all action is directed toward self-interest remains. If this assumption is valid, the possibility of acting to benefit another individual in the group can be ignored. But is it valid?

Empathic Concern as a Source of Altruistic Motivation

Recent theory and research on altruistic motivation—defined as a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing another person's welfare (Batson, 1987, 1991)—challenges the essence of the value assumption. (In this definition, *ultimate goal* refers to a state sought as an end in itself rather than as a means to some other end; it does not refer to a metaphysical first or final cause—or to evolutionary function.) Altruistic motivation, if it exists, transcends self-interest.

The most commonly proposed source of altruistic motivation is empathic concern. By *empathic concern* I mean other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of a person in need. Empathic emotions include feelings of sympathy, compassion, tenderness, and the like. Empathic concern is other-oriented in that it involves feeling *for* the other (e.g., feeling distressed or sad for the other—as distinct from feeling personally distressed or sad at witnessing the other's plight—see Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). Such concern has typically been considered to be a product not only of (1) perceiving the other as in need but also of (2) adopting the perspective of the other, which means imagining how the other is affected by his or her situation (Batson, 1987, 1991; Stotland, 1969). Recently, Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, and Ortiz (2007) provided evidence of an additional antecedent of empathic concern. In the normal flow of behavior, (3) intrinsic valuing of the other's welfare, such as one often experiences for family or friends, seems to precede and produce other-oriented perspective taking.

Empathic concern has been named as a source—if not *the* source—of altruistic motivation by David Hume, Adam Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William McDougall, and in contemporary psychology by Hoffman (1976), Krebs (1975), and Batson (1987, 1991). There is now evidence from more than thirty-five experiments supporting the empathy-altruism hypothesis, the hypothesis that empathic concern produces altruistic motivation (see Batson, 1991; Batson & Oleson, 1991, for partial reviews; Batson, in press, provides a complete review). This evidence contradicts the value assumption of the theory of rational choice. In so doing, it goes beyond even the modified orthodox answer to the question of why people act for the common good. At times, empathy-induced altruism may lead a person to act for the common good. But when is it?

any update?

Empathy-Induced Altruism as a Friend of the Common Good

I can think of two situations in which empathy-induced altruism should lead a person to act in a way that promotes the common good. The first is when empathic concern is induced for all or a large percentage of the members of some group—as seems likely when the need for which empathy is aroused is shared by many if not all members (e.g., Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002). The limited available research

suggests that attempts to arouse group-level empathic concern should focus on one or a few prototypical group members, allowing feelings of empathy to generalize from these to other individuals in the group because of their similar need (Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Dovidio & Schroeder, 1987). Attempts to arouse empathic concern for a collective as an abstract whole—people with AIDS, the homeless—seem ineffective (Kogut & Ritov, 2005). Apparently, the other-oriented nature of empathic concern requires specific individuals as targets.

The second situation is when the response that most benefits the target of empathy promotes the common good as an unintended consequence. This can occur, for example, in the simplest of all social dilemmas, a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma. Paradigmatic of a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma is the following (adapted from Rapoport & Chammah, 1965): Two people must each choose between two options—cooperate or defect—without knowing the other's choice. If both choose to cooperate, each receives a payoff of +15; if both defect, each receives a payoff of +5. If one cooperates and the other defects, the former receives nothing and the latter receives a payoff of +25. Given these payoffs, it is always in the material self-interest of each person (P) to defect regardless what the other person (O) does, but if both defect, each is worse off than if both cooperate. Moreover, the common good—that is, the joint payoff—is increased by cooperating regardless what the other person does. To illustrate, imagine that P defects. If O cooperates, P receives +25 rather than +15; if O defects, P receives +5 rather than nothing. But if both P and O defect, they are each individually worse off (+5) than if both cooperate (+15). There is irony—and fascination—in this simple dilemma.

If one faces a Prisoner's Dilemma repeatedly over a number of trials, it is in one's interest to cooperate, at least on some trials. Strategies like tit-for-tat, where P cooperates on the first trial and then responds on every subsequent trial as O responded on the previous trial, are likely to produce more overall personal gain than a strategy of relentless defection—although defecting is optimal on each individual trial (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, May, & Sigmund, 1995). However, in the one-trial situation, the situation in which the Prisoner's Dilemma was originally conceived, tit-for-tat and other strategies for inducing reciprocity are irrelevant (Dawes, 1991). So why would anyone cooperate in a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma?

Narrow versions of game theory and of the theory of rational choice both predict no cooperation in a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma because each theory assumes that there is only one motive in play: material

self-interest. Regardless of what the other person does, material self-interest is best served by defecting. However, as noted earlier, broader versions of rational choice allow for forms of self-interest that can be served by cooperating, such as feeling good about oneself or avoiding pangs of guilt. These broader versions can account for the finding that as many as one-third to one-half of people placed in a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma cooperate.

What about empathy-induced altruistic motivation? The empathy-altruism hypothesis predicts that if one person in a Prisoner's Dilemma is induced to feel empathic concern for the other, this person should be even more likely to cooperate. Regardless of how the other player in a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma acts, if you want to benefit him or her, you should cooperate, which produces greater common good (i.e., a higher joint payoff) than if you defect. So, if you feel empathic concern for the other player, the resulting altruistic motivation should increase the chances that you will cooperate in order to benefit him or her, which will in turn increase the common good as an unintended consequence. Let me briefly describe two experiments designed to test this reasoning.

An Initial Test

To provide an initial test, Batson and Moran (1999) conducted an experiment in which undergraduate women faced a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma. These women learned at the outset that they would never meet the other woman participating in the dilemma (who was actually fictitious). Payoffs were the same as those outlined previously, but were made concrete and real in the form of the number of raffle tickets (from zero to twenty-five) received. The prize in the raffle was a $30 gift certificate at any store the winner chose.

All participants in the experiment were told that one factor being studied was the type of interaction between the two participants prior to choosing, and they were in a condition with indirect rather than face-to-face interaction. What participants were told indirect interaction meant differed across experimental conditions. One-third learned that it meant no communication would occur between themselves and the other woman. The other two-thirds learned that it meant one-way written communication, and they had been randomly assigned to be the Receiver of the communication. As Receiver, they would read a note that the other woman—the Sender—had written before knowing anything about the study. The

note was to be about something interesting that happened to the Sender recently.

The Sender's note was always the same. It told of being down after suffering a breakup with her boyfriend. The note ended: "I've been kind of upset. It's all I think about. My friends all tell me that I'll meet other guys and all I need is for something good to happen to cheer me up. I guess they're right, but so far that hasn't happened." It was assumed participants would think that giving the Sender more tickets and a better chance at the raffle by cooperating might cheer her up, whereas reducing her chances by defecting would not.

Perspective-taking instructions given prior to reading the note manipulated empathic concern for the Sender. Participants in a low-empathy condition were instructed to take an objective perspective toward what was described in the note. Those in a high-empathy condition were instructed to imagine how the Sender felt about what was described. Indicating the effectiveness of this manipulation, assessment of feelings toward the Sender indicated that participants in the high-empathy condition felt significantly more empathic concern than those in the low-empathy condition.

After reading the note from the assigned perspective (or not reading a note), participants made their decision whether to cooperate or defect. Results revealed that cooperation was much higher among participants induced to feel empathic concern for the other woman (75 percent) than among those not induced to feel empathy—whether those in the no-communication condition (30 percent) or the low-empathy condition (35 percent). The difference in cooperation between the high- and low-empathy conditions was, as expected, mediated by self-reported empathic concern. (For other evidence of empathy-induced cooperation in dilemmas, see Cohen & Insko, 2008; Rumble, van Lange, & Parks, 2010; van Lange, 2008.)

A More Stringent Test

In a subsequent experiment, Batson and Ahmad (2001) used a similar procedure to conduct an even more stringent test of the ability of empathic concern to increase the common good. Rather than the standard one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma, in which participants make their decisions simultaneously without knowing what the other has done, Batson and Ahmad altered the procedure so that decisions were made sequentially. Ostensibly by chance, the other woman always went first—and defected. Thus, when each of the undergraduate women in

this experiment made her decision, she knew that the other woman (again, actually fictitious) had already defected. This meant that possible payoffs for the participant were either to receive five tickets if she also defected (in which case, the other woman would receive five tickets as well) or to receive zero tickets if she cooperated (in which case, the other woman would receive twenty-five tickets).

Predictions from game theory, from the theory of rational choice, and even from theories of justice and social norms are clear. In this sequential situation, there is no longer a dilemma at all; the only rational thing to do is to defect. Defecting will not only maximize your own outcome but will also satisfy the norms of fairness and distributive justice. Moreover, there is no need to worry about feeling guilty should you defect and the other person cooperate, as can happen in a simultaneous-decision dilemma, because the other woman has already defected. Not surprisingly, in the very few previous studies that bothered to look at such a situation, the rate of cooperation has been extremely low (around 5 percent—see Shafir & Tversky, 1992; van Lange, 1999).

The empathy-altruism hypothesis predicts that even in this sequential situation a dilemma remains for participants led to feel empathic concern for the defecting woman. For them, self-interest and fairness counsel defection, but empathy-induced altruism counsels cooperation. Results again patterned as predicted by the empathy-altruism hypothesis. In the absence of empathy—that is, in the no-communication condition and the low-empathy condition—cooperation was extremely low (0 percent and 10 percent, respectively). When empathy was induced, cooperation rose to 45 percent. Empathy-induced altruism was not strong enough to override other motives (self-interest, retribution, justice) for all participants led to feel empathic concern, but it was strong enough to do so for almost half. As an unintended consequence, it increased the common good—that is, it led to a higher joint payoff. (Once again, assessment of feelings toward the Sender indicated that participants in the high-empathy condition felt significantly more empathic concern than those in the low-empathy condition, and the difference in cooperation between the two conditions was mediated by this self-reported empathic concern.)

Results of these experiments suggest that when one feels empathic concern for the other, one's interest lies not only in maximizing one's own gains but also in maximizing the other's gains, which as an unintended consequence increases joint gains. Insofar as I know, the idea of using empathy to increase cooperation in a one-trial Prisoner's Dilemma had not even been considered in any of the more than 2,000

Prisoner's Dilemma studies previously conducted. I suspect this was because no one thought empathy-induced altruistic motivation could increase cooperation. Yet clearly it can. Indeed, inducing empathic concern seems far more effective than most other techniques that have been proposed to increase cooperation in one-trial dilemmas.

Empathy-induced altruism is not always a friend of the common good. I would suggest that, at times, it may even pose a more serious threat to the greater good than does self-interested egoism. Let me turn now to the line of thought that leads me to this somewhat surprising suggestion.

Empathy-Induced Altruism as a Foe of the Common Good

Earlier, when discussing social dilemmas, I raised the possibility that one could allocate resources to other individuals in the group. If this possibility exists, and if we feel empathic concern for one of these individuals, then we will be altruistically motivated to benefit that person. In addition to the two motives traditionally assumed to conflict in a social dilemma—self-interested egoism and interest in the common good—a third motive is now in play.

When will empathic concern be aroused in a social dilemma? Whenever two conditions exist: (1) An allocator values the welfare—or is otherwise induced to adopt the perspective—of one or more but not all other individuals in the collective, and (2) the allocator perceives the cared-for other(s) to be in need of resources. How often do these conditions exist? Frequently. Indeed, it is hard to think of a real-world social dilemma in which they do not. These conditions exist every time we try to decide whether to spend our time or money to benefit ourselves, the community, or another individual about whom we especially care. A father may resist contributing to the United Way not to buy himself a new shirt but because he feels for his daughter who wants new shoes. Whalers may kill to extinction not out of personal greed but to provide for their families. An executive may retain an ineffective employee for whom he or she feels compassion, thereby hurting the company.

It is possible, of course, that a person will eschew both personal interest and the interests of cared-for others in order to act for the greater good of all. However, the nobility ascribed to such action is a clue to the strength of the forces working against it. Rick in *Casablanca* charmed and challenged a generation when he chose to put his own and even his beloved Ilsa's desires aside and send her with her husband

because doing so was best for the Resistance. Rick explained, "I'm no good at being noble, but it doesn't take much to see that the problems of three little people don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world." No good at being noble? To put aside both his desires and hers was noble indeed.

These examples suggest the potential for empathy-induced altruism to harm the common good. Yet, for each example one can easily generate explanations based on either enlightened or expanded self-interest: The father would feel guilty if his daughter did not get new shoes. Rick knew their love would soon fade. The whaler's family was part of his group-level self. To determine whether empathy-induced altruism can pose a threat to the common good, we need more than examples.

Accordingly, colleagues and I placed female and male undergraduate in a social dilemma in which they could choose to benefit themselves, the group, or one or more of the other three same-sex group members as individuals (Batson, Batson, Todd, Brummett, Shaw, & Aldeguer et al., 1995). Empathic concern for another group member (Jennifer for females; Mike for males) was induced (or was not induced) through experimental manipulation, using essentially the same procedure as in the Prisoner's Dilemma experiments already described. Participants were given sixteen raffle tickets, each good for one chance at a $30.00 gift certificate, to allocate. The sixteen tickets were in two blocks of eight and allocated as blocks. Each block could be allocated to (1) the participant him- or herself, (2) any of the three other individual members of the group, or (3) the group as a whole. Blocks allocated to the group would increase in value by 50 percent, providing twelve tickets, which would be divided equally among the four group members, three tickets each. These allocation possibilities created a social dilemma: For each block, allocation to the group as a whole best served the common good; allocation to an individual best served that individual's personal good.

Table 2.1 summarizes the number of blocks of tickets allocated to self, to the group as a whole, and to Jennifer (Mike) in each experimental condition. Consistent with the predictions of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, participants in the high-empathy condition were much more likely than participants in either of the other two conditions (no-communication, low-empathy) to allocate at least one block to Jennifer (Mike). Further, the increased allocation to the note-writer came at the expense of the group as a whole—allocations to the self were not reduced in the high-empathy condition. A follow-up study, in which the level of empathic concern after reading the "dumped" note was determined by self-report replicated this effect.

Table 2.1 Blocks of Tickets Allocated to Self, to the Group as a Whole, and to Jennifer (Mike) in Each Experimental Condition

Blocks allocated	*Experimental condition*			
	No Communication	*Communication/ Low empathy*	*Communication/ High empathy*	*Total*
To Self	32	36	36	104
To the Group	46	42	29	117
To Jennifer (Mike)	0	2	15	17
Total	78	80	80	238

Source: Batson, Batson, Todd, Brummett, Shaw, & Aldeguer et al. 1995, Study 1.

The results of these two studies suggest the importance of considering self-interest, collective interest, and other interest (empathy-induced altruism) as three distinct motives, all of which may operate in a social dilemma. Empathy-induced altruism sometimes aligns with collective interest, sometimes not. These results take us beyond conventional thinking about threats to the common good in social dilemmas, which focuses exclusively on self-interested, egoistic motives. Empathy-induced altruistic motivation can pose a threat as well. This conclusion begs the question: How much of a threat *is* empathy-induced altruism?

Most people would say that altruism, even if it exists, is weak compared to self-interest (egoism). After all, you feel your own needs directly; you feel for another's needs only vicariously. Egoistic motives are plentiful and powerful; empathy-induced altruism arises only under specific circumstances. Surely, empathy-induced altruism is, at most, a minor threat.

I disagree. I think empathy-induced altruism can be a serious threat. In fact, when one's action is public, altruism can be a more serious threat to the common good than is self-interest. There are clear social norms and sanctions to inhibit pursuit of one's own interests at the expense of what is fair and best for all (Kerr, 1995). "Selfish" and "greedy" are stinging epithets. Norms and sanctions against showing concern for another's interests, even if doing so diminishes the common good, are far less clear. Although philosophers have long debated the morality of showing partiality (Kant, 1785/1898; Nagel, 1991; Rawls, 1971), to show favoritism toward another individual, especially an individual in need, is not likely to be called selfish or greedy. One may be accused of being "naive," "a pushover," "soft," or

"a bleeding heart," but these terms carry an implicit charge of weakness, not greed.

To test the idea that when one's behavior is public, altruism can be a more serious threat to the common good than is egoism, colleagues and I used a modified dilemma situation (Batson, Ahmad, Bedell, Johnson, Templin, & Whiteside, 1999). Some participants chose between allocation of resources to the group as a whole or to themselves alone, as in a standard social dilemma (egoism condition). Some chose between allocation to a group of which they were not a member or to a member of that group for whom they were induced to feel empathy (altruism condition). Finally, some chose between allocation to a group of which they were not a member or to a member of that group without empathy being induced (baseline condition).

When the allocation decisions were private, allocation to the group was significantly—and similarly—lower in the egoism (30 percent) and altruism (35 percent) conditions compared to the baseline (70 percent). However, when decisions were public, allocation to the group was significantly lower only in the altruism condition (40 percent, compared to 75 percent and 85 percent in the egoism and baseline conditions, respectively). These results indicate, first, that both egoism and altruism can be potent threats to the common good and, second, that anticipated social evaluation is a powerful inhibitor of the egoistic but not the altruistic threat. These results have wide-ranging implications. How do coal miners and loggers stand up to the public outcry about overdepletion of natural resources? Easily; they strip-mine and clear-cut not out of personal greed but to care for little Suzie and Johnny.

Why No Sanctions against Altruism?

Why are there not social sanctions when acting against the common good for altruistic reasons? Let me suggest two possible reasons. First is the widespread belief that altruistic motivation is necessarily good and inevitably produces a good outcome. If this belief is correct, altruism poses no threat to the common good, and no sanctions are needed. But the research reviewed in the previous section indicates that this belief is not correct. In each study, empathy-induced altruism reduced the common good.

A second possible reason for the lack of sanctions against altruism is even more basic. This is the assumption that altruistic motivation

either does not exist or, if it exists, is too weak to pose a threat to any other motive (Miller & Ratner, 1998; Wallach & Wallach, 1983). If altruism is nonexistent or weak, there is no need for society to develop sanctions to limit its ability to undermine the common good. So there are none. True, there are sanctions against rampant or compulsive altruism. One might get labeled foolish or do-gooder. But these sanctions seem designed to protect self-interest more than society's interests.

Through the media, empathy-induced altruism may even be a threat to the common good on a global level. As Walter Isaacson pointed out in a *Time Magazine* essay at the time UN troops were sent to Somalia in 1992, empathy was a potent factor in the decision, so potent as to pose a problem:

> In a democracy, policy (unless pursued in secret) must reflect public sentiment. But sentiment can ooze sentimentality, especially in the age of global information, when networks and newsmagazines can sear the vision of a suffering Somalian child or Bosnian orphan into the soft hearts of millions. Random bursts of compassion provoked by compelling pictures may be a suitable basis for Christmas charity drives, but are they the proper foundation for a foreign policy? Will the world end up rescuing Somalia while ignoring the Sudan mainly because the former proves more photogenic? (Isaacson, 1992)

Conclusion

In this world of growing numbers and shrinking resources, self-interest is a powerful and dangerous threat to the common good. It can lead us to grab for ourselves even when giving rather than grabbing—if others give as well—would bring more benefit to all, including ourselves. But social dilemmas are often more complex than a conflict between what is best for me and what is best for all. Contrary to the value assumption of the theory of rational choice—the assumption that I always want what is best for me—I may also be pulled by what is best for one or more specific individuals for whom I care. Empathy-induced altruism can be a friend of the common good, but it can also be a foe. If I can be led to care about the welfare of all members of a group, or if increasing the welfare of those for whom I especially care increases the common good as an unintended consequence, empathy-induced altruism

is a friend. If neither of these conditions pertains, it is likely to be a foe. Indeed, under certain nontrivial circumstances, such as when one's behavior is public, empathy-induced altruism can pose a more powerful threat to the common good than self-interest. It can lead me to feel justified focusing my concern on those for whom I especially care—a needing friend—to the detriment of the bleeding crowd.

Note

1. Rather than adopting the self-categorization argument that interest in the group's welfare involves an extension of self-interest based on recategorization of self at the group level (Turner, 1987), one might argue that interest in the group's welfare reflects enlightened self-interest (see Batson, 1994). Or one might argue—contrary to the value assumption of the theory of rational choice—that the group's interest is valued as an end in itself, distinct from self-interest. At times, Dawes and his colleagues seem to adopt the self-categorization argument; at times, the group-interest argument (see Dawes et al., 1988, 1990). Insofar as I know, there is at present no clear evidence to support one of these arguments over the other. Indeed, each might be true under different circumstances. Therefore, I shall remain agnostic on the ultimate goal of motivation to uphold the common good. When in later sections I juxtapose this motive to egoism, the juxtaposition is to individual material self-interest. Upholding the common good could be produced by (1) a special form of egoism in which self-interest is redefined at the group level, (2) enlightened self-interest (e.g., pursuit of side payments), or (3) a motive, distinct from egoism, with the ultimate goal of increasing the group's welfare (I have called this last motive "collectivism"—Batson, 1994).

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CHAPTER THREE

Cultural Neuroscience and the Collective Good

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What is the role of the individual in the collective good? From Rosa Parks to Mother Theresa, human history is rife with examples of prosocial change brought about by individual heroism. In this chapter, we explore the importance of the individual in shaping the collective good through the lens of cultural neuroscience. Specifically, we examine how fundamental components of the social brain, including self-knowledge, empathy-altruism, and a sense of fairness and justice, have been shaped by culture-gene coevolutionary forces and how we can understand individual and collective good as by-products of these core capacities.

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> The community stagnates without the impulse of the individual. The impulse dies away without the sympathy of the community.
> —William James (1880)

What is the role of the individual in the collective good? From Rosa Parks to Mother Theresa, human history is rife with examples of prosocial change brought about by individual heroism. William James, in a lecture presented at the Harvard Natural History Society in 1880,

argued for the importance of the individual in shaping and transforming human social life, believing that prosocial change requires both individual action and a community sympathetic to the vision. This view of individuals as existing in service of the larger collective is consistent with contemporary evolutionary biological notions of humans as evolved to facilitate social group living.

Humans, like nonhuman primates, live in incredibly complex social groups of varying size from small-scale hunter gather tribes, ranging from a few to a few hundred people, to large-scale settled horticultural tribes, ranging from a few hundred to a few thousand people. Such versatility in social living arrangements is possible due to increased growth in brain size, particularly in the neocortex (Brothers, 2001; Dunbar, 1998). That is, humans, like other primates, have evolved an unusually large brain with increased cognitive capacities in order to meet the demands of living in unusually complex social structures. For instance, relative volume of the neocortex is positively correlated with a range of markers of social group complexity, including the average size of a social group, number of females in the group, grooming group size, frequency of coalitions, prevalence of social play, prevalence of deception, and frequency of social learning (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). These findings provide initial support for the notion that the human brain has evolved for social group living. A contemporary mystery for social neuroscientists and social cognitive neuroscientists alike has been to distill the core mechanisms in the human brain that facilitate complex social behavior, by mapping networks of brain structures to complex social functions.

Though great progress has been made over the past decade in understanding the neurobiological basis of human social behavior, an important puzzle remains. Research to date in social neuroscience has focused largely on the role of natural selection in shaping adaptive mechanisms in the human mind and brain that facilitate social group living and are largely shared across cultures. However, more recently, culture-gene coevolutionary theory has emerged as a complementary process by which adaptive mechanisms in the human mind and brain may have evolved to facilitate social group living through both cultural and genetic selection. In this chapter, we explore the importance of the individual in shaping the collective good through the lens of cultural neuroscience. Specifically, we examine how fundamental components of the social brain, including self-knowledge, empathy-altruism, and a sense of fairness and justice, have been shaped by culture-gene coevolutionary forces and how we can understand individual and collective good as by-products of these core capacities.

Cultural Neuroscience: An Overview

Cultural neuroscience is an emerging research discipline that investigates cultural variation in psychological, neural, and genomic processes as a means of articulating the bidirectional relationship of these processes and their emergent properties. Research in cultural neuroscience is motivated by two intriguing questions of human nature: How do cultural traits (e.g., values, beliefs, practices) shape neurobiology (e.g., genetic and neural processes) and behavior and how do neurobiological mechanisms (e.g., genetic and neural processes) facilitate the emergence and transmission of cultural traits?

The idea that complex behavior results from the dynamic interaction of genes and cultural environment is not new (Caspi & Moffitt, 2006; Johnson, 1997; Li, 2003); however, cultural neuroscience represents a novel empirical approach to demonstrating bidirectional interactions between culture and biology by integrating theory and methods from cultural psychology (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007), neuroscience (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002), and neurogenetics (Canli & Lesch, 2007; Green, Munafò, DeYoung, Fossella, Fan, & Gray, 2008, Hariri, Drabant, & Weinberger, 2006). Similar to other interdisciplinary fields such as social neuroscience (Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan, & McClintock, 2000) or social cognitive neuroscience (Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001), affective neuroscience (Davidson & Sutton, 1995), and neuroeconomics (Glimcher, Camerer, Poldrack, & Fehr, 2008), cultural neuroscience aims to explain a given mental phenomenon in terms of a synergistic product of mental, neural, and genetic events. Cultural neuroscience shares overlapping research goals with social neuroscience, in particular, since understanding how neurobiological mechanisms facilitate cultural transmission involves investigating primary social processes that enable humans to learn from one another, such as imitative learning. However, cultural neuroscience is also unique from related disciplines in that it focuses explicitly on ways that mental and neural events vary as a function of culture traits (e.g., values, practices, and beliefs) in some meaningful way. In addition, cultural neuroscience illustrates how cultural traits may alter neurobiological and psychological processes beyond those that facilitate social experience and behavior, such as perception and cognition.

There are at least three reasons why understanding cultural and genetic influences on brain function likely holds the key to articulating better psychological theory. First, a plethora of evidence from cultural psychology demonstrates that culture influences psychological processes

and behavior (Kitayama & Cohen, 2007). To the extent that human behavior results from neural activity, cultural variation in behavior likely emerges from cultural variation in neural mechanisms underlying these behaviors. Second, cultural variation in neural mechanisms may exist even in the absence of cultural variation at the behavioral or genetic level. That is, people living in different cultural environments may develop distinct neural mechanisms that underlie the same observable behavior or recruit the same neural mechanism to varying extents during a given task. Third, population variation in the genome exists, albeit on a much smaller scale relative to individual variation, and 70 percent of genes express themselves in the brain (Hariri, Drabant, & Weinberger, 2006). This population variation in allelic frequency in functional polymorphisms, such as those that regulate neural activity, may exert influence on subsequent mental processes and behavior. To the extent that behavior arises from neural events and both cultural and genetic factors influence neural events, a comprehensive understanding of the nature of the human mind and behavior is impoverished without a theoretical and empirical approach that incorporates these multiple levels of analyses.

Culture-Gene Coevolution of Individualism-Collectivism and the Serotonin Transporter Gene

Conventional evolutionary biology theory posits that organisms adapt to their environment and over time exhibit favorable traits or characteristics that best enable them to survive and reproduce in their given environment, through the process of natural selection (Darwin, 1859). The concept of natural selection has been enormously influential to the study of human behavior, particularly in evolutionary psychology, which has emphasized that much of human behavior arises as a by-product of adaptive mechanisms in the mind and brain (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992). More recently, culture-gene coevolutionary theory has emerged as a complementary process by which adaptive mechanisms in the human mind and brain may have evolved to facilitate social group living through both cultural and genetic selection. In particular, culture-gene coevolutionary theory posits that cultural traits are adaptive, evolve, and influence the social and physical environments under which genetic selection operates (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). A prominent example of dual inheritance theory across species is the culture-gene coevolution between cattle milk protein genes and

human lactase genes (Beja-Pereira, Luikart, England, Bradley, Jann, Bertorelle et al., 2003) whereby the cultural propensity for milk consumption in humans has led to genetic selection for milk protein genes in cattle and gene encoding lactase in humans. Recently, Chiao and Blizinsky (2009) uncovered novel evidence for culture-gene coevolution in humans.

A fundamental way in which culture shapes human behavior is through self-construal style, or in how people define themselves and their relation to others in their environment (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995; Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001). In particular, cultural psychologists have identified two primary styles of self-construal across cultures: individualism and collectivism. Individualistic cultures encourage thinking of people as independent of each other. By contrast, collectivistic cultures endorse thinking of people as highly interconnected to one another. Individualistic cultures emphasize self-expression and pursuit of individuality over group goals, whereas collectivistic cultures favor maintenance of social harmony over assertion of individuality. Self-construal style affects a wide range of human behavior, including how people feel, think, perceive, and reason about people and objects in their environment (Nisbett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Kitayama & Cohen, 2007), and their underlying neural substrates (Chiao & Ambady, 2007). Evident from the writings of Socrates and Lao Tzu, cultural divergences in ancient Western and East Asian philosophical views of the self are thought to have emerged early in human history. However, a parsimonious explanation of the origin of individualistic and collectivistic cultural values has largely remained elusive.

Prior research by Fincher and colleagues (2008) showed that geographical regions with high prevalence of infectious diseases, both historically and contemporarily, were more likely to be collectivistic. That is, the increased threat of infectious disease in certain regions of the world likely lead to the cultivation of collectivistic cultural norms, including preference for social hierarchy and ingroup members, which act to reduce the probability of contact with outsiders and thus are likely advantageous for reducing the spread of contagious disease. However, little was known about the genetic selection mechanism underlying the cultural evolution of collectivism once it emerged in response to the environmental pressure of infectious disease until now.

In addition to cultural factors, human behavior is influenced by specific genes, such as the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4), which

regulates serotonergic neurotransmission (5-HTT) (Lesch, Bengel, Heils, Sabol, Greenberg, Petri et al., 1996; Canli & Lesch, 2007). The serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4) contains a polymorphic region, known as 5-HTTLPR, comprised of a short (S) allele and a long (L) allele version that result in differential 5-HTT expression and function (Hariri, 2006; Lesch, Bengel, Heils, Sabol, Greenberg, Petri et al., 1996). Individuals carrying the S allele of the 5-HTTLPR produce significantly less 5-HTT mRNA and protein, resulting in higher concentrations of serotonin in the synaptic cleft relative to individuals carrying the L allele (Lesch, Bengel, Heils, Sabol, Greenberg, Petri et al., 1996). Evidence from behavioral genetics indicates that the S allele of the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR) is associated with increased negative emotion, including heightened anxiety (Munafò, Clark, & Flint, 2005; Sen, Burmeister, & Ghosh, 2004), harm avoidance (Munafò, Clark, & Flint, 2005), fear conditioning (Lonsforf, Weike, Nikamo, Schalling, Hamm, & Ohman 2009), attentional bias to negative information (Beevers, Wells, Ellis, & McGeary, 2008) as well as increased risk for depression in the presence of environmental risk factors (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt, Taylor, Craig, Harrington et al., 2003; Taylor, Way, Welch, Hilmert, Lehman, & Eisenberger, 2006; Uher & McGuffin, 2008; see also Munafò, Durrant, Lewis, & Flint, 2009). In particular, exposure to chronic life stress, such as interpersonal conflict, loss or threat, is considered a well-known environmental risk factor for depression in S allele carriers of the 5-HTT (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt, Taylor, Craig, Harrington et al., 2003; see also Risch, Herrell, Lehner, Liang, Eaves, Hoh 2009). Convergent evidence from endophenotypes indicates that activity in brain regions that are regulated by serotonergic neurotransmission and are critical to emotional behavior, such as the amygdala, varies as a function of 5-HTT. Specifically, individuals carrying the S allele show greater amygdala response (Hariri, Drabant, Weinberger, 2006; Munafò, Brown, & Hariri, 2008), which is likely due to increased amygdala resting activation (Canli et al., 2005) and decreased functional coupling between the amygdala and subgenul cingulate gyrus (Pezawas, Meyer-Lindenberg, Goldman, Verchinski, Chen, Kolachana et al., 2005), relative to those carrying the L allele.

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Chiao and Blizinsky (2009) found that cultural values of individualism and collectivism are associated with allelic variation of the serotonin transporter gene (*5-HTTLPR*) across the globe. Specifically, collectivistic cultures were significantly more likely to be comprised of individuals carrying the S allele of the 5-HTTLPR

across twenty-nine nations. In addition, cultural values and frequency of S allele carriers negatively predicted global prevalence of anxiety and mood disorder. Increased frequency of S allele carriers predicted decreased anxiety and mood disorder prevalence due to increased collectivistic cultural values. Finally, historical pathogen prevalence predicted degree of collectivism across nations, due to the prevalence of the S allele of the 5-HTTLPR, suggesting that the S allele likely serves as a genetic mechanism by which collectivistic cultural values persisted after emerging in response to environmental pressure. Taken together, these findings support the notion that cultural values buffer genetically susceptible populations from increased prevalence of affective disorders and suggest culture-gene coevolution between allelic frequency of 5-HTTLPR and cultural values of individualism-collectivism.

A central claim of culture-gene coevolutionary theory is that once cultural traits are adaptive, it is likely that genetic selection causes refinement of the cognitive and neural architecture responsible for the storage and transmission of those cultural capacities (Boyd & Richerson, 1985). Neural activity within brain regions innervated by serotonergic neural pathways, such as the human amygdala and prefrontal cortex, may serve as another likely information processing mechanism involved in the storage and transmission of cultural values of individualism and collectivism. A contemporary puzzle for cultural neuroscience research is to understand how culture-gene coevolution may have shaped mechanisms in the social mind and brain differently across cultural contexts as a result of diversity of selection pressures across geographical regions. In the next section, we review evidence for how cultural values shape neural mechanisms underlying social capacities critical to the collective good, including the capacity for individualism and collectivism, empathy and altruism, as well as a sense of fairness.

Neural Basis of Individualism and Collectivism

Cultural values, practices, and beliefs shape social behavior in profound ways. One of the most robust ways that values, such as individualism and collectivism, influence human behavior is in self-construal, or how people think about themselves in relation to others. Individualists think of themselves as autonomous from others, while collectivists think of themselves as highly interconnected with

others (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995). Recent evidence from social neuroscience indicates that specific brain regions, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) are involved in self-evaluation and self-knowledge (Amodio & Frith, 2006).

Recent cultural neuroscience evidence indicates that neural substrates of self-evaluation are modulated by cultural values of individualism and collectivism. In one study, Caucasians, but not Chinese, showed greater neural activity within the MPFC during evaluation of personality traits of one's self relative to a close other (i.e., mother), suggesting cultural variation in MPFC response during self-evaluation (Zhu, Zhang, Li, Fan, & Han, 2007). More recent evidence has demonstrated that cultural values (i.e., individualism-collectivism), rather than cultural affiliation (i.e., East Asian-Westerners) per se modulate neural response during self-evaluation. In another cross-cultural neuroimaging study, people in both Japan and the United States who endorsed individualistic values show greater MPFC activity for general relative to contextual self-descriptions, whereas people who endorsed collectivistic values greater MPFC for contextual relative to general self-descriptions (Chiao, Harada, Komeda, Li, Mano, Saito et al., 2009a). Supporting this view, another study using cultural priming (Hong, Ip, Chiu, Morris, & Menon, 2001) showed that even temporarily heightening awareness of individualistic and collectivistic values in bicultural individuals (i.e., bicultural Asian-Americans) modulates MPFC and PCC in a similar manner (Chiao, Harada, Komeda, Li, Mano, Saito et al., 2009b). In addition to cultural values modulating neural responses during explicit self-processing, a recent neuroimaging study shows that dorsal, but not ventral, regions of MPFC are modulated by cultural priming of individualism and collectivism when thinking about one's self in an implicit manner (Harada, Li, & Chiao, 2010). Such findings suggest that cultural values dynamically shape neural representations during the evaluation, rather than the detection, of self-relevant information. Taken together, these studies provide convergent evidence that cultural values of individualism-collectivism shape neural representations of both implicit and explicit self-knowledge.

In addition to cultural values of individualism-collectivism, religious beliefs may also play an important role in modulating neural responses underlying social cognition. One set of neuroimaging studies

examining the neural substrates of religiosity found that activity within theory-of-mind regions, including left precuneus, left temporoparietal junction, and left middle frontal gyrus, was correlated with the degree of one's religiosity (Kapogiannis, Barbey, Su, Zamboni, Krueger, Grafman, 2009). In addition, religious practices, such as praying, also modulate neural responses within the theory of mind regions. For instance, compared to formalized prayer and secular cognition, improvised praying activated the temporopolar region, medial prefrontal cortex, temporoparietal junction, and precuneus (Schjoedt, Stodkilde-Jorgensen, Geertz, & Roepstorff, 2009). Finally, religious beliefs affect neural representations of the self. Whereas atheists typically recruit ventral MPFC during self-evaluation, religious individuals show greater response within dorsal MPFC, suggesting that religious beliefs promote greater evaluation, rather than representation, of one's self (Han, Mao, Gu, Zhu, Ge, Ma, 2008). Hence, the human ability to possess religious beliefs and exercise religious practices relies on theory of mind and mentalizing brain regions that facilitate the representation and evaluation of one's own and others' (e.g., human, God) mental states.

Although the lion's share of cultural neuroscience research on knowledge of self and other has been conducted with human neuroimaging methodology, a couple of recent studies have examined the effect of culture on eletrophysiological indices of individualism and collectivism. In one study, Lewis and colleagues (2008) measured event-related potentials while participants completed the oddball task, where they are shown visual stimuli in either a frequent or infrequent (i.e., oddball stimulus) manner. Results demonstrated that European-American participants showed greater novelty P3, or late positive potential, amplitude for target events, whereas East Asians showed greater P3 amplitude to oddball events. Another study by Ishii and colleagues (2009) found that amplitude of the N400, a late negative potential, was significantly larger when individuals perceived incongruent relative to congruent information and degree of late negativity activity was reliably predicted by chronic social orientation (e.g., interdependence) for females. Both electrophysiological studies demonstrate the effect of cultural values of individualism-collectivism on how people respond to information that is either congruent or incongruent to one another. Hence, cultural values of individualism-collectivism not only affect how people represent knowledge about self and others, but also respond to congruent or incongruent informational cues in the environment.

Neural Basis of Empathy and Altruism

According to the perception-action model of empathy (Preston & de Waal, 2002), seeing another in pain automatically activates the perceiver's own representations of the painful state, causing the perceiver to experience the target's emotion. Here we review recent findings in cultural neuroscience that demonstrate cultural variation in the neural basis of social capacities underlying empathy and altruism, including the ability to recognize, share, and understand other people's suffering.

Emotion Recognition

One social capacity critical to empathy and altruism is the ability to recognize others' emotional states, particularly signals of suffering or pain. Culture affects how people prefer to experience, express, recognize, and regulate their emotions (Mesquita & Leu, 2007). East Asians prefer to experience low arousal relative to high arousal (Tsai, 2007), are more likely to suppress their emotions relative to Westerners (Butler, Lee, & Gross, 2007). In addition, both East Asians and Westerners demonstrate cultural specificity in emotion recognition, whereby they show greater recognition for emotions expressed by their own cultural group members relative to members of other cultural groups (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Recent cultural neuroscience of emotion research has shown cultural specificity effects within a number of brain regions involved in emotion recognition. Moriguchi and colleagues (2005) found greater activation in the posterior cingulated, supplementary motor cortex, and amygdala in Caucasians, relative to Japanese who showed greater activity within the right inferior frontal, premotor cortex, and left insula when participants were asked to explicitly recognize emotions from the face. Chiao and colleagues (2008) examined neural responses in adults living in either the United States or Japan to facial displays of a fear. They found that across cultures, people exhibit greater bilateral amygdala response to fear faces expressed by own- relative to other-culture members (Chiao et al., 2008). Another recent neuroimaging study comparing neural responses during emotion recognition in Asians and Europeans found a significant negative correlation between duration of stay and amygdala response such that amygdala response during emotion recognition was higher in individuals who were recent immigrants to the region, suggesting

that experience alters neural responses to emotional expressions (Dertnl, Habel, Robinson, Windischberger, Kryspin-Exner, Gur et al., 2009). Taken together, this research indicates that activity within the human amygdala is modulated by cultural group membership.

Empathy

Empathy is the capacity not only to recognize, but also to share the emotional states of others (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Preston & de Waal, 2002). The perception-action model of empathy indicates that empathy is a key motivator (Decety & Grèzes, 2006) and the proximate mechanism (de Waal, 2008) of altruistic behavior, whereby an individual perceives and shares in the distress of another person, and acts to reduce his or her suffering (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Prior social neuroscience research indicates that empathy is a multicomponent process that includes affect sharing, cognitive perspective taking, and cognitive appraisal (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hein & Singer, 2008; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008). Empathy for pain is supported by neuroanatomical circuits underlying both affective and cognitive processes (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hein & Singer, 2008; Lamm, Batson et al., 2007; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008). A distinct neural matrix, including bilateral anterior insula (AI) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hein & Singer, 2008; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008) is thought to underlie the affective components of empathy. AI and ACC code the autonomic and affective dimension of pain and in particular, the subjective experience of empathy when perceiving pain or distress in others (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Hein & Singer, 2008; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008). A recent neuroimaging study by Xu and colleagues (2009) examined whether or not cultural group membership modulates neural response during the perception of pain in others. Chinese and Caucasian participants were scanned while observing Chinese and Caucasian targets either in physically painful (e.g., needle stick) or neutral (e.g., Q-tip probe) scenes. All participants showed greater ACC and AI response to scenes depicting a painful event relative to neutral scenes. However, they also showed greater ACC response to ingroup relative to outgroup members. Another recent study by Mathur and colleagues found that empathic neural response for majority and minority culture members varies (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010). Specifically, minority culture members, such as African Americans, tend to show increased

ingroup biases in empathy and altruistic motivation. That is, African Americans are more likely to express greater empathy and altruistic motivation for members of their own cultural group. Moreover, ingroup biases in empathy and altruistic motivation are associated with greater activity within the medial prefrontal cortex, a brain region important in the the ability to identify with another person. These findings demonstrate that cultural group membership affects neural responses to perceived physical and emotional pain of others and suggest a neural precursor to group selection in altruistic behavior (Wilson, 2006).

Neural Basis of Fairness

Scholars have recently begun to employ methods from neuroscience to shed some light on the neural mechanisms underlying fairness, extending previous work done by behavioral economists and social psychologists (for review see Fehr & Camerer, 2007; Krueger, Grafman, & McCabe, 2008). These researchers have been investigating fairness both in the view of responders (e.g., employees or the public) and in the view of resource allocators (e.g., employers or the government).

In research investigating fairness from responders' perspective, the Ultimatum Games (UG) has often been used to elucidate the role of the nervous systems of responders receiving fair or unfair offers. In this paradigm, one player, namely the proposer, splits money between him or herself and the other player, namely the responder (Güth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). The responder then has to decide whether to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money will be divided accordingly; however, if the offer is rejected, no one will receive money. To maximize the outcome, the responders should accept the offer no matter how small. Nonetheless, when tested, they often reject the offers less than 20 percent (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). Behaviorally, unfair offers were found to elicit anger, which potentially leads to the rejection of the offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996).

Recent neuroimaging studies were able to show brain areas that are associated to the emotions toward unfair/fair offers the responders have during UG. Using fMRI, Sanfey and colleagues (2003) found that when the responders received unfair offers (i.e., $1 or $2 out of $10) compared to when they received fair offers (i.e., $5 out of $10), their activities in bilateral anterior insula (AI), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and

dosolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) increased. These increases in activities were more pronounced when the participants were told to play UG with other humans than with computers. More specifically, the more the activities in AI, the more the rejections were likely to be made. The authors argued that AI involves negative emotions like anger and disgust, occurring as a result of being treated unfairly. These results are, in fact, in line with research investigating painful empathy in that AI and ACC activities were found to be active both when participants were in pain themselves and when seeing others in pain (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; Singer, Seymour, O'Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2004;). Hence, negative feeling from unfairly treated situations might occur in a similar fashion to affective pain in social interactions.

Cultural values, such as preference for social hierarchy, may influence emotions allocators have toward the respondents. Chiao, Mathur, Harada, and Lipke (2009) found that people who vary in their social dominance orientation (SDO), or the degree to which they favor their own social group to dominate others, have different neural responses toward seeing others in pain. Particularly, participants who prefer hierarchy over egalitarianism showed less activity within the left AI and ACC during empathy tasks. Since AI and ACC are involved in fairness both from responders' and allocators' perspective (Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, Cohen, 2003; Tabibnia, Satpute, & Lieberman, 2008; Hsu, Anen, & Quartz, 2008), this result may explain both individual and cultural differences in fairness. For example, hierarchical allocators who show less neural activity in AI may not experience as much inequity aversion as egalitarian allocators, and, as a result, prefer an "efficiency" strategy to distribute the resources to responders instead of an "equity" one.

How Can Cultural Neuroscience Contribute to the Collective Good?

Recent cultural neuroscience findings demonstrate that individual capacities that promote the collective good, such as understanding one's self as both an individual and group member or being able to share and respond to the suffering of others, are by-products of cultural and biological forces. The existence of cultural diversity in human capacities underlying sociality provides unique ways for understanding how diverse communities may respond to common collective

good problems. Here we address the promise of cultural neuroscience research for informing three complex collective good issues: interethnic ideology and philanthropy and international aid.

Interethnic Ideology

As a result of technological advances and globalization, cultural communities of the world are becoming increasingly interdependent and interethnic, leading to an increasing urgency to understand how diverse communities of people may optimally coexist (Bodenhausen, 2010; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). On the one hand, interethnic ideologies such as colorblindness advocate treating people of different cultural heritages similarly, with no regard to interethnic differences. On the other hand, interethnic ideologies such as pluralism advocate embracing cultural differences and creating public policies that respect interethnic differences. Research in cultural neuroscience can potentially inform this important debate by studying how cultural identity affects the brain and behavior, whether or not cultural traits have adaptive value and how changes in cultural diversity may affect the human mind, brain, and behavior. At the same time, scientific rigor and ethical care is needed when seeking to apply cultural neuroscience evidence toward larger public policy discourse regarding how best to achieve optimal coexistence of diverse cultural and ethnic groups.

Philanthropy and International Aid

Philanthropy is one of the most profound examples of human altruism, whereby people donate their private goods to collective causes. Whether it is a donation of money to victims of a natural disaster or a collection of food donated to the local homeless shelter, charitable acts often serve a part of the collective that is most in need and least able to meet that need without the help of another. While philanthropy and international aid are both seen as prosocial and positive human actions, not all individuals and groups donate resources in the same way or to the same extent. For instance, individual and cultural variation in preference for social hierarchy has been shown to affect empathic neural response and may, in turn, affect motivation for altruistic behavior. Moreover, recent evidence has shown cultural variation in the extent to which people are more likely to help or respond to the suffering of members of their own cultural group. Individual and group variability

in the extent to which people experience empathy and who they experience empathy toward may explain how and why some individuals and groups are more likely to donate their time, energy, and resources to those in need. Complementarily, understanding the cultural diversity in how and why people give may be advantageous for promoting prosocial behavior across diverse cultural communities, particularly in response to urgent humanitarian crises, when needed.

By using the cultural neuroscience framework to identify and investigate candidate phenomena using the multiple levels of analysis approach, we will enhance our chances of understanding how sociocultural and biological forces interact and shape each other as well as find potential ways to direct this knowledge toward understanding how best to solve collective good problems in a culturally diverse and ever globalizing world.

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CHAPTER FOUR

A Brief History of Individualism in American Thought

ERIC DANIELS

This chapter surveys the idea and ideal of individualism in American thought. Beginning in the Founding Era, Daniels traces the intellectual trends that supported and critiqued individualism. Focusing on the key moments of debate and contention over individualism and its role in shaping American life and institutions, the chapter argues that an authentic individualism found its place at America's Founding without a full theoretical justification. Over the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, critics of individualism bemoaned its baleful effects and sought to replace Americans' commitment to it with a defense of collective action. In the middle of the twentieth century, individualism found its most ardent champion and a renewed debate about the term began. Daniels argues that a full understanding of the idea is possible only through this survey of the contours of how individualism has been understood and debated in our history.

★ ★ ★

> For the last fifty years no pains have been spared to convince the inhabitants of the United States that they are the only religious, enlightened, and free people. They perceive that, for the present, their own democratic institutions prosper, while those of other countries fail; hence, they conceive a high opinion of their superiority, and are not very remote from believing themselves to be a distinct species of mankind.
>
> —Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*

Individualism rests at the foundation of American political and social life. Since the American Revolution, Americans have believed in and generally lived up to the ideal of individualism. Having bundled together a foundational political freedom with social autonomy, economic mobility, and cultural self-sufficiency, Americans of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries embraced the idea that their attitudes about the relationship between the individual and the greater whole are unique and special. At root, the ideal of individualism regards each individual as a moral, political, and economic primary, meaning that each person in a civil society is by right an independent and sovereign being and that he or she should be free to choose his or her associations voluntarily and not have obligations or duties imposed by society without consent.

Individualism was central in the emerging American culture and played a vital role in the American Founding. Despite their embrace of individualism, Americans held this social and political ideal without articulating a full theoretical defense for it. In an era of institutional adaptation and innovation, the legacies of older social orders remained, and individualism still did not have a full voice. As Americans struggled throughout the nineteenth century to throw off the old traditions of Europe and to frame their social and cultural institutions in a way consistent with their political individualism, the wider implications of individualism often ran aground of visions of social cohesion and the collective good. Throughout the nineteenth and nineteenth centuries, both defenders and critics of individualism have contested its meaning and place in American life. On the surface, the term individualism appears to have been adapted to widely different contexts and meanings. Yet despite the seeming protean character of the term, the history of individualism in American thought betrays a deeper battle that has been pitched between, on the one side, those who embrace the ideal and, on the other, those who resist or resent its implications or even openly disagree with its vision of free individuals directing their own lives according to their own judgment.

The result of this battle over individualism in American thought is a widespread misunderstanding of the term. In many ways, although it is still deployed as a descriptive term for American attitudes, the ideal of individualism and the arguments about it have largely disappeared from the contemporary scene. The misinterpretation of the idea of individualism and its misapplication grows out of the fact that many today have lost touch with the central issues in the debate about individualism in American life. Yet to engage the problem of how individualism fits

into questions about how Americans can achieve the common good, it is vital that we grasp the role that individualism played in the American Founding and the subsequent criticism of individualism that occurred. Likewise, to assess the validity and contemporary relevance of individualism to the problems of our society and its place in leadership, it is necessary to give this highly contested concept its best defense; we must see where it has come from, what criticisms it has endured and which may have modified it, and we must probe its features and explore its contours before we make an assessment. Although the tradition of individualism and the prolonged and varied criticisms of it might encompass a lengthy tome, it is still valuable here to investigate the main critical moments in the history of individualism in American thought. By looking at select, key turning points in the articulation of individualism and the criticism thereof, we can gain a better vision of what it truly means and how it might help us to understand ourselves better.

The Origins of Individualism in America

One of the ironies of individualism in America is the fact that the doctrine and basic institutional framework that supported the idea was developed some fifty years prior to the invention of the term itself. Drawing on broad trends in eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought, the American Founders established a political and social system that embraced the basic features of individualism without ever having used the concept itself. The dignity and sovereignty of individuals and the need for government to respect those qualities, the very hallmark of an individualist social order, formed the very essence of the Founders' political project. Yet they had not given a name to this approach, nor had they worked out systematically the implications of this approach for all facets of society.

As John Adams once observed, the real American Revolution did not begin in 1776, but rather in the decades leading up to the Revolutionary War, when a whole generation of Americans revisited basic questions of political theory and discovered new insights about the proper relationship between the individual and the state. Under the influence of John Locke, Isaac Newton, and other leading figures of the Enlightenment, Americans in the eighteenth century took seriously the idea that each individual stood alone from society, despite being a part of that society. More than a mere abstraction or theoretical sleight of hand, American

individualism meant that each person had an autonomous existence apart from his or her role in society. Instead of being defined by one's class, status, rank, or occupation, Americans believed in individual self-definition. As Jefferson (2005) noted, it meant "each individual seeking his own good in his own way" (p. 69).

As early as 1787, foreign observers began noting the distinctive character of Americans in regard to individualism. Reverend Charles Nisbet (2005) explained that Americans believed in "the moral duty of people to pursue their own happiness," and that each individual was a "moral agent... [free] to dispose of himself and be his own master in all respects" (p. 68). To meet the challenge of this individual freedom required a political-legal framework that would protect it. The revolutionary generation devised constitutions at both the state and national level that embodied the principle that the primary function of government was the protection of individual rights. In an essay defining property as inclusive of both tangible goods and the individual's rights, James Madison argued (1981), "government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that which the term particularly expresses" (p. 186). Madison (further captured the spirit of the times when he observed that "this being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own" (pp. 186–187).

The individualism of the Founders meant that all citizens could exercise a control over all aspects of their own lives and expect protection of their rights. The freedom of conscience and free exercise of religion embodied in the Bill of Rights, for example, expressed the uniquely American attitude about religion inasmuch as it facilitated each individual choosing faith without regard to any intermediary or authority. The denominational disposition of the American colonies to Protestantism had cultivated a belief that individual relationships with God mattered more than church hierarchies and doctrines. When the Founders created the institutions around such a social individualism, they acted to protect it by enabling its freest exercise. Likewise, American political leaders worked to abolish other forms of status and hierarchy, including primogeniture, titles of nobility, and occupational class distinctions. In the American individualist ideal, if not always in practice, each individual was free to pursue a trade, to rise (or fall) in social circles, and to participate in politics, and to have a say over his or her own destiny.

Despite the emphasis on individual freedom and detachment from artificial collective obligations, the Founding generation believed that

such an individualism promoted the social good. "Public good is not a term opposed to the good of individuals," noted Thomas Paine (1973, p. 49). "On the contrary," he continued, "it is the good of every individual collected. It is the good of all, because it is the good of every one; for as the public body is every individual collected, so the public good is the collected good of those individuals" (p. 49).

Introducing and Critiquing the Concept of Individualism

The origins of the term individualism in American debate, and indeed the English word itself, date to the 1830s conflict over utopian socialism. Although de Tocqueville (1990) certainly offered the most popularized and well-known explanation of individualism, Arieli (1964) notes that Michel Chevalier, Friedrich List, and Albert Brisbane used the term in their works that appeared around the same time as Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*. As Arieli notes, for these European critics and utopian socialists, individualism "referred to the basic principle of the modern uprooted society" (p. 193)—that is, the society where individuals did not have obligations, statuses, and limitations imposed by the larger society. Yet because he wished to criticize the consequences of individualism, de Tocqueville laid out a narrower version of it.

As Tocqueville (1990) set out to see in America "the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character, its prejudices, and its passions," he hoped to learn "what we have to fear or hope from its progress" (I, p. 14). What he discovered about American democracy and its distinctive equality of condition pushed him to understand how it influenced the *mores* of the American people. It is here that he found a tendency to individualism. Tocqueville described individualism as "a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellows and to draw apart with his family and his friends, so that after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself" (II, p. 98). By individualism, he did not mean ordinary selfishness or egotism—"a passionate and exaggerated love of self" (II, p. 98)—that was common to men at all times, but a unique withdrawal from the traditional ties of society. Whereas Tocqueville believed that selfishness was a blind passion, he argued that individualism arose from a faulty judgment about the individual's autonomy in modern society.

For Tocqueville, individualism was a malign force that threatened to undermine the project of political liberty. Those who embraced individualism, Tocqueville argued, believe that they "owe nothing to any man; they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands" (p. 99). It is important to note that Tocqueville does not portray individualism as a literal physical withdrawal from society or lack of willingness to interact with other men. Instead, it is a psychological trait and cultural disposition that *guides* men in their interactions. Whereas aristocratic and traditional societies had ready-made hierarchies that stipulated how men would interact and that imposed various social obligations, democratic societies in which individualism took root had evolving notions of social obligations. Where individualism grew, he argued, public virtues would decline and citizens would neglect their social obligations until they reverted to mere selfishness (II, p. 98).

Despite what he saw as the dangerous tendency of individualism, Tocqueville believed that Americans had found a means of combating its effects. By adopting a vision of "self interest rightly understood," Tocqueville noted, the Americans had moderated their individualistic tendencies by casting them as being tied to the social interest. Individualism became something of a foreground assumption that required an adaption to social circumstances. Americans, Tocqueville observed, "content themselves with inquiring whether the personal advantage of each member of the community does not consist in working for the good of all; and when they have hit upon some point on which private interest and public interest meet and amalgamate, they are eager to bring it into notice" (II, p. 121). In other words, Tocqueville believed that Americans had convinced themselves to moderate their individualism and to continue to accept social and public obligations because they could also serve private interest. Inasmuch as examples of this are multiplied, he continues, "it is held as a truth that man serves himself in serving his fellow creatures and that his private interest is to do good" (p. 121). For Tocqueville, then, individuals should sacrifice some private interest to the public good lest the decay that supposedly results from individualism imperil that private interest itself.

Crucial to understanding of how Americans came to perceive their own tendency to individualism is understanding the characteristic mental formulation of self-interest that Tocqueville describes. Americans, Tocqueville observed, "are fond of explaining almost all the actions of their lives by the principle of self-interest rightly understood; they show

with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist one another and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state" (p. 122). Through this doctrine of "self-interest rightly understood" Americans absorbed and celebrated their individualism even though Tocqueville had meant his thoughts on it to be a warning, not a prompt to indulge it. Nevertheless, he observed that despite their individualistic tendencies, Americans in fact had not retreated into their private interest, but frequently and characteristically undertook associations with other citizens for collective undertakings.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, Americans came to adopt the term individualism as a stand-in for their broader beliefs in self-government and self-determination. As Arieli (1964) noted, individualism "supplied the nation with a rationalization of its characteristic attitudes, behavior patterns, and aspirations. It endowed the past, the present, and the future with the perspective of unity and progress" (p. 345). Americans themselves stretched and pushed the concept beyond its original meaning. Some adopted the idea that individualism meant a literal physical separation of individuals from settled society. As the boundaries of the United States expanded during this period, individualism came to stand as a celebration of the virtues that pioneer settlers exhibited in forging a new life for themselves (Kohl, 1989, pp. 133–144). Yet still others adopted the mantle of individualism as an identification of the type of character that would emerge in a laissez-faire economic environment (Arieli, 1964, pp. 323–330). Sensing the deep value of self-reliance and economic independence, political economists denounced centralized economic decision making as contrary to the American tradition of individualism. Regardless of how it came to be applied, the American conception of individualism displayed a protean nature that allowed it to mean many things to many people.

The Progressive Challenge

The first few decades of the twentieth century marked a period of radical challenge to the dominant notion of individualism as well as to its implementation in American institutions. Though the concept of individualism as a distinctive American trait had persisted throughout the twentieth century, its widespread acceptance during that period of economic expansion and national growth came under new scrutiny when the material effects of that growth and change themselves

posed intellectual and political challenges. The early twentieth-century Progressives' critique of industrial society and their push to centralization, socialization, and nationalism fostered a reconsideration of the role of individualism in American society. During the decade of the 1920s and 1930s, Progressive thinkers blasted traditional individualism, calling for collective, social solutions.

In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the most famous if ill-fated positive critical exposition of individualism came from the pen of Herbert Hoover in 1922. Though more frequently remembered today for his presidency and actions during the Great Depression, Hoover had come to the public scene as something of an epitome of what American individualism could achieve. Orphaned at an early age, Hoover worked through his youth while attending night school and eventually reaching the newly founded Stanford University, where he studied geology. The "frontier" calling of Australian gold mining soon occupied his attention, and once he had established his reputation for superior engineering and management skills, Hoover was soon traveling the world as a mining consultant. Caught in Europe at the outbreak of war, Hoover applied his organizational talents first to help American expats return home and escape war and then to coordinate food aid to Belgium and to provide relief aid to all of Europe at the war's conclusion. From there he took a position at the Commerce Department under Presidents Harding and Coolidge before his own successful run for the White House, which was his first elected position since serving as Stanford's student body president.

During the early months of his tenure at the Department of Commerce, Hoover (1922) penned a short book entitled *American Individualism*. The purpose, he wrote, was in large part "to review the political, economic, and spiritual principles through which our country has steadily grown in usefulness and greatness, not only to preserve them from being fouled by false notions, but more important that we may guide ourselves in the road of progress" (p. 4). The worldwide ravages of war and revolution in the eight years preceding its publication gave to Hoover's brief treatise a compelling relevance as he framed his argument about individualism around the need of Americans to draw upon their unique form of individualism against the encroachments of European radicalism. Yet his belief in individualism was not so firm that he did not critique it and wish to modify it as well.

Despite "contending with economic degeneration, with social disintegration, with all of its seething and ferment of individual and class conflict," Hoover wrote, "I emerge an individualist" (pp. 7–8). He was

careful to warn his readers that he did not merely accept the historical vision of individualism but was instead offering a critique. He was "an American individualist," which meant for him a "progressive individualism." Unlike the unabashed defenses of individualism adopted in the nineteenth century, Hoover's supposed praise of it ended up being a modification and ultimately a corruption of it. "No doubt," he observed, "individualism run riot, with no tempering principle, would provide a long category of inequalities, of tyrannies, dominations, and injustices" (p. 8). Yet more like de Tocqueville, Hoover believed that Americans had figured a way out of the supposedly harsher and more destructive elements of individualism by "the injection of a definite principle," which was for him "the equality of opportunity. . . . [and a] sense of service" (p. 9). Hoover's brand of individualism disdained the idea that individualism meant "only legalistic justice based upon contracts, property, and political equality," which would have been a concise summary of the nineteenth-century view (p. 10). Instead, he insisted, there must be a "fair division of the product [of labor]. . . . certain restrictions on the strong and the dominant. . . . and a greater and broader sense of responsibility to others" (p. 11).

Hoover's defense of individualism rested on his idea that it was not the end of American society, but rather a means of reaching an end. Though recognition of the importance of the individual, Hoover conceded, led to greater motivation for innovation and creativity, it also could lead to an insular attitude about society. Hoover believed that individualism could form a foundation of a higher vision of society, but only if free individuals freely lashed themselves to some higher purpose. "What we need today," Hoover (1922) declared, "is steady devotion to a better, brighter, broader individualism—an individualism that carries increasing responsibility and service to our fellows" (p. 66). Hoover eschewed both radicalism and reaction and argued that this tempered, progressive individualism could lead Americans out of the dilemmas of the modern machine age.

Hoover's hope that individualism could be meshed with service to society and that such an amalgam could avoid radicalism proved to be a false hope. Once he occupied the White House, thanks in no small part to his 1928 campaign that emphasized his vision of "progressive individualism," Hoover faced challenges that he had not anticipated. In spite of his book's call for a "higher realization of freedom, of justice, [and] of service" and its rejection of "the selfish impulses" and its call to "abandon the laissez faire of the 18th century," Hoover came to be seen, and is still misremembered, as a do-nothing ideologue who

frittered away his chance to help the country climb out of the Great Depression (pp. 17, 11). The historical record shows that Hoover was as interventionist and Progressive as his successor, yet his perceived failures overshadow his vision of "progressive individualism" that would so quickly be supplanted by a new individualism (Hoff-Wilson, 1975).

In the wake of the catastrophe of the Great Depression, Progressive intellectuals quickly sought the chance to put individualism to rest and to raise the standard of collective action and national planning (Zinn, 1966). The perception that struggling Americans could not revert to boot-strapping their way out of an economic crash became widespread in the early 1930s. Economists, politicians, and pundits alike pointed out that the social and institutional forces, which had precipitated the market crash in 1929 and the sustained slump in the 1930s, were larger than individuals. The age of collective problems and collective solutions had arrived. By the early 1930s, the old notions of individualism had come under a two-pronged attack.

One of the most scathing attacks on individualism came from the historian Charles Beard in 1931. Writing in *Harper's Monthly Magazine*, Beard laid bare the inadequacies of the old vision of "rugged individualism" as an account of the American past. Responding to the late nineteenth-century proponents of "frontier individualism," Beard argued that there was no evidence that the political implications of individualism had ever been put into practice. Titled "The Myth of Rugged American Individualism," Beard's piece began by laying out the arguments of self-professed individualists in his own day. Proponents of the idea, Beard (1931) demonstrated, had agitated against "government interference with business" and "certain forms of taxation and regulation" (p. 14). Despite their rhetoric, Beard argued, there had never been a time in American history when the government had not been involved in some way or another in business. From early railroad regulations to the financial promotion of infrastructure projects, Beard detailed the many ways in which those who professed individualism had also implicitly and even explicitly consented to "government involvement in business." The thrust of his article amounted to a stern charge of hypocrisy. Yet this rhetorical economic individualism was not the only kind that Beard found in the past. He also conceded the existence of an American school of individualism founded in Jefferson's vision of an agrarian republic of yeoman farmers. Yet it was exactly the historical nature of this individualism that recommended against it in Beard's mind. Though he did not doubt that "great things have been done in its name," Beard believed that the old individualism had died

out and "was not applicable in an age of technology, science, and rationalized economy" (p. 20). Once useful, he concluded, individualism "had become a danger to society" (p. 20).

That Beard's harsh criticism had much in common with Hoover's vision of a tempered, progressive individualism did little to bring the two together. Beard and many of his contemporaries were unwilling to accept a modified individualism. To them, it was "principally responsible for the distress in which Western civilization finds itself" (p. 22). The New Deal coalition that brought planning, social action, and collective solutions stood ready to abandon individualism to the dustbin of history.

Just when it seemed that Progressive intellectuals who had come to dominate American intellectual life would cast aside all remaining vestiges of individualism, one of that group's leading figures recaptured and rebranded individualism while attacking the idea's very essence. In the very attempt, however, the resurrection brought about a distinct inversion and reinvention of the concept, such that it became nearly unrecognizable.

John Dewey stood as a towering figure over American intellectual life in the first half of the twentieth century. The leading figure in the American school of Pragmatism, Dewey's nearly fifty-year academic career and influential writing placed him at the forefront of the new Progressive movement of America. In 1930, as the world lurched deeper and deeper into the Great Depression, he published a brief book of collected essays entitled *Individualism Old and New*. The problem of the age, Dewey (1999a) opined, was "the creation of a new individualism as significant for modern conditions as the old individualism at its best was for its day and place" (pp. 16–17). For Dewey, consistent with the pragmatist philosophy he espoused, the doctrine of individualism was not an eternal verity, but an adaptable set of ideas that had to be tested against our experience. As it stood in the 1930s, people held tightly to old ideas that no longer described their experience, and so it was necessary to replace the old conception with a new one. If conditions had changed, Dewey argued, new ways of conceptualizing our experience became necessary.

For Dewey, the most significant change that caused a collapse of the old individualism was the increasingly industrial and corporate society in which individuals lived. Modern Americans could no longer solve the "machine age" problems they faced by resorting to older ideas about individual autonomy and self-determination. Instead, Dewey noted, they needed to confront the reality that a "collectivistic scheme

of interdependence" had permeated "every cranny of life, personal, intellectual, [and] emotional . . . [that] affect[s] leisure as well as work, morals as well as economics" (p. 24). The goal, Dewey proclaimed, was a recovery of individuality in the face of the increasing corporateness of American life. Such a rescue "waits upon an elimination of the older economic and political individualism, an elimination which will liberate imagination and endeavor for the task of making corporate society contribute to the free culture of its members" (pp. 35–36).

The ultimate goal for Dewey (1999a) was a rewiring of individual dispositions away from "pecuniary profit" and toward "the creation of a type of individual whose pattern of thought and desire is enduringly marked by consensus with others, and in whom sociability is one with cooperation in all regular human associations" (p. 44). The new individual would be ready-made for the systems of collectivist political authority and social planning that Dewey had come to advocate. "The only form of enduring social organization that is now possible," Dewey (1999b) explained to audiences at the University of Virginia, "is one in which the forces of productivity are cooperatively controlled and used in the interest of the effective liberty and the cultural development of the individuals that constitute society. Organized social planning is now the sole method of social action by which liberalism can realize its professed aims" (pp. 59–60).

In the end, Dewey's idea of a new individualism meant a vision of subjective individuality that could arise only in a society in which collective needs had first been met through collective processes. As he articulated in *My Pedagogic Creed*, Dewey fundamentally believed that individuality was a social creation. The mind itself, wrote Dewey (2001), "cannot be regarded as an individual, monopolistic possession" (p. 60). Students, Dewey (1897) argued, must be trained "to share in social consciousness" (p. 3). Society, Dewey (1969) explained, "in its unified and structural character is the fact of the case. The non-social individual is an abstraction arrived at by imagining what man would be if all his human qualities were taken away. Society, as a real whole, is the normal order, and the mass as an aggregate of isolated units is the fiction" (p. 232).

Under this assault, it would appear that individualism faced its death throes, never again to find voice on the American scene. Though Dewey had attempted to fashion a "new individualism," his assault on the old version succeeded to the point where "individualism" came to represent an antiquated notion that had failed in modern circumstances. Yet the durability of the concept remained, and it stood ready for yet

another reformulation in the wake of the New Deal. A new breed of individualists arose, both drawing from the nineteenth-century tradition as well as marking out new ground.

The New Individualists

One consequence of the virtual abandonment of individualism as a description of the American character was that the concept could be picked up by a new set of intellectuals who could breathe new life into it, and this is indeed what happened between the 1930s and the 1960s. As the Old Right lashed out at the growing collectivism fostered by the New Deal, they sought to recapture the idea of individualism not merely as a description but as a creed. The new individualists who reacted against the trends of the day used the opportunity of laying out a whole theory of individualism. Although the new vision resembled in many ways some of the ad hoc beliefs of the nineteenth-century version, its most articulate and consistent defenders went considerably farther in articulating a theoretical individualism that would supplant the earlier descriptive individualism.

The most prominent and influential of the new individualist is by far the philosopher-novelist Ayn Rand. In the course of her writing, through four novels and a half dozen works of philosophy, Rand presented an integrated philosophic defense of individualism that has helped to redefine the very concept of individualism. A crucial aspect of Rand's philosophic system is the identification of fundamentals, which drove her to situate individualism at a far deeper level than previous thinkers. The theme of her first commercially successful book, *The Fountainhead*, Rand (1963) noted, was "individualism versus collectivism, not in politics, but in man's soul" (p. 73). As Rand (2005) explained in a lecture at West Point in 1974, "individualism is not a philosophical, nor even a political, primary. It is a concept which, to be valid, must rest on a valid epistemological and metaphysical base" (p. 162). Thus, although Rand (1995) held that individualism meant "that man has inalienable rights which cannot be taken away from him by any other man, nor by any number, group or collective of other men" (p. 366), she held that this view was a *consequence* of her view of human reason, and further, that such a political state was possible only if one held such a view.

What is most distinctive about Rand's theoretical approach to individualism in distinction from earlier views is that Rand seeks to validate

individualism as a philosophic doctrine rather than merely employ it descriptively to people who reject serving the collective good or who want individual freedom politically. Rand believed that the individual was the primary unit of social and political value, which she saw as a corollary of the view that each man was morally an end in himself (Peikoff, 1991, p. 361). Yet Rand did not even consider her vision of an egoist moral code to be her philosophic primary. Instead, it was her advocacy of reason that grounded her individualism. As Rand's student Nathanial Branden (Rand, 1964) explained in one of her books, "an individualist is, first and foremost, a *man of reason*" (p. 136). In this way, Rand believed that her theoretical ethical-political individualism was a requirement of human survival because such survival depended on each man's exercise of his rational faculty. As Peikoff (1991) explains, "if reason is an attribute of the individual; and if the choice to think or not controls all of a man's other choices and their products . . . then the individual is *sovereign*" (p. 202).

Rand's individualism is uniquely both theoretical—justifying and validating through an epistemological observation about man's nature why he must live under a system of individual rights and freedom—and aspirational, arguing that each individual ought to seek morally to live up to the requirements of his own survival by depending morally only on himself and his own mind even as he exists in an economically complex division-of-labor society where he trades with and interacts with others every day. Rand (Peikoff, 1991) noted this aspect of her view of individualism when she wrote "as man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul" (p. 202). For her, individualism meant a recognition that each individual, even in society, exists as though he were on a desert island, that the responsibility for his life and his survival redounds to him alone. The political manifestation of this individualism is a system where individuals are left free to pursue their own ends, in ways that are compatible with the like freedom of others (Rand, 1964, p. 135). Thus, to succeed in living as an individualist thus requires that each individual recognize and respect the rights of others.

Conclusion

Although this survey of the idea of individualism in American thought is necessarily incomplete and truncated, it has nevertheless illustrated the need for a more historically informed notion of individualism if we

are to evaluate seriously the relevance and truth of the idea itself. We must take care to distinguish between individualism as an attitude and cultural disposition and individualism as a developed, robust theory of the individual's relation to society. Likewise, it is important to note that individualism as a theory does not stand in opposition to the idea of social values, but instead offers different answers as to how those ought to be achieved. As libertarian social theorist Tom Palmer (2009) has recently noted, it is incoherent to declare that an individualist theory of society necessarily rejects "shared values" and "common good." The more important questions are how a society goes about defining what is and what is not a "shared value" and what constitutes the "common good" as well as what means are acceptable in achieving those values and goods. If, as theoretical individualism holds, the truly shared values are liberty and individual freedom, and the common good consists in designing and maintaining a government and society that operates to uphold and protect those values, the individualist perspective remains just as dedicated to these ends but insists upon the priority of restraints on the means of defining and attaining them. The fundamental perspective for a theoretical individualist like Ayn Rand is not whether the individual's pursuit of his self-interest can be compatible with achieving the social good—whether it requires sacrifice, or whether selfish intentions undermine the social good—but is instead the idea that only theoretical individualism, with its recognition of individual rights and the moral autonomy of each individual, will benefit both the individual and society (Rand, 1995, p. 372).

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CHAPTER FIVE

Individualism, Collectivism, Leadership, and the Greater Good

EDWIN A. LOCKE

This chapter examines the metaphysical, epistemological, ethical, and political implications of two opposite approaches to the organization of human society: individualism and collectivism. Individualism asserts that every individual is sovereign and grants the right of every individual in society to pursue his or her own rational self-interest without violating others' rights, whereas collectivism advocates the subordination of the individual to the group. True individualism has yet to be realized, for even in contemporary societies that stress its ideals, individualism is increasingly compromised by the intrusion of collectivistic premises. It is argued that collectivism results in a dystopian society like that described by the philosopher Ayn Rand in *Atlas Shrugged*.

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This conference was called to propose solutions to what Gordon Allport labeled the "master problem" of social science: the relation between the individual and society. Actually this is most fundamentally a problem of political philosophy, not social science. More precisely, the problem was described as how to balance individual freedom with the need to sacrifice for the "greater good" of society, which means "of the collective."

Let me begin by saying that I disagree with the whole formulation of this problem, because it assumes in advance what needs to be proved: that the individual must sacrifice to society. Since this idea

is based most directly on the concept of collectivism, I start with a discussion of collectivism and contrast it with individualism. I discuss these concepts at the deepest level—that is, in terms of their basic, philosophical meaning. I recognize that in the social sciences, these terms are often used very loosely. For example, collectivism may be used to mean trying to help others. But such loose usage only confuses matters—for example, one can help others for self-interested reasons. Similarly, individualism may be used to denote people who like to be or work alone, but such usage reduces an important political concept to a personality quirk.

Collectivism versus Individualism

Individualism and collectivism are at root political concepts. In a political context they are logical opposites. Individualism views people as sovereign entities possessing inalienable rights (a subject I come back to later). In contrast, collectivism means the subordination of the individual to the group (Peikoff, 1982). *The American Heritage Dictionary* (1996) (3rd edition) defines collectivism as "The principle or system of ownership and control of the means of production and distribution by the people collectively." (The full meaning of collectivism, however, is wider than economics; see Peikoff, 1982, pp. 24ff). Collectivism as a political doctrine is based on three more fundamental branches of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics.

Metaphysics

With respect to the basic nature of the individual and reality, individualism asserts, based on direct perceptual evidence, that every individual is real and separate from every other individual. This reflects the philosophy of Aristotle, who upheld the reality of the world we perceive. Individualism holds that individuals are autonomous entities possessing the capacity to reason and free will—which is the choice of whether or not to use one's rational faculty (Binswanger, 1991; Rand, 1961).

Collectivism holds an opposite view on these issues. The metaphysical base of collectivism was provided by Plato, who claimed that peoples' basic character was not chosen but determined by birth. He asserted that the senses deceive us, and that the individual objects we perceive are not fully real but only reflections of true reality, in this case the "one Form of a human being." Individuals, according to

Plato, are all part of one unit or superorganism, the state. This view later came to be called the "organic theory of the state." Advocates of this organic view were Fichte and Hegel, who paved the way, in this regard, for totalitarian movements such as Nazism and Communism (Peikoff, 1982).

All this does not invalidate the use of concepts such as group or society so long as one holds in mind that these are abstractions, not actual entities. Thus a group is a collection of individuals, usually working toward a common purpose or sharing common values. One can "see" a group but what one sees is individuals together.

Epistemology

With respect to how one gains knowledge, individualism holds, to quote Ayn Rand (1993, p. 679) "the mind is an attribute of the individual. There is no such thing as a collective brain. There is no such thing as a collective thought. An agreement reached by a group of men is only a compromise or an average drawn upon many individual thoughts. It is a secondary consequence. The primary act—the process of reason—must be performed by each man alone.... No man can use his brain to think for another. All the functions of the body and spirit are private." For each individual, one's mind, one's rational judgment, is one's main means of survival—the means by which one identifies facts, forms concepts, integrates concepts into principles, chooses values, makes decisions, and thereby regulates the course of one's life. Obviously people learn from each other, but one must use one's mind to understand others and judge the validity of their assertions.

Collectivists deny that thinking is an action of the individual. For the Platonists, the individual is not fully real, therefore, neither is individual thought. In the highest form of the state, Plato writes, "the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands have become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and all men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same occasions..." (Plato, 1937). Because both the denial of the reality of the individual and the assertion of the reality of a nonperceivable superorganism are based on the rejection of the evidence of the senses (a self-contradictory premise), the concept of the organic theory of the state necessarily rests on a mystical basis (e.g., some form of ineffable, nonrational "intuition").

For collectivism, truth is not a discovery made by the individual mind and validated through reason but is pronounced through special agents of history or mere convention established by collective consensus. Individuals are not sovereign entities but the determined social influences. The foundation for the view of truth as social or collective subjectivism (Rand, 1961) was originally promulgated by Kant (Peikoff, 1982). For Kant the real (noumenal) world was unknowable and what we perceive (the phenomenal world) is dictated by innate mental structures common to all people. This skeptical view of knowledge was accepted by virtually all of his successors, including postmodernists who basically replaced the innate structures with collective feelings (Ghate, 2003; Ghate & Locke, 2003).

Ethics

The ultimate, objective standard in ethics for Ayn Rand is life. "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible" (Rand, 1964, pp. 15–16). Rationality is the highest virtue and value, because it is rational thinking that makes survival possible.

According to individualism, since only the individual is real and autonomous, the individual is necessarily the unit of value. As noted, concepts such as "groups" and "societies" are abstractions referring to collections of individuals. By implication, therefore, individualism entails egoism, as in Aristotle's view that each individual should seek his or her own happiness. Individualism holds, with Rand (1992), that individuals are ends in themselves, not a means to the end of others, and thus the proper beneficiary of their own actions. Seeking one's own individual happiness (egoism) is not just permissible but morally virtuous (Peikoff, 1991). Collectivism, in contrast, holds that the group (e.g., society, the state, the party, the race) is the true reality and the unit of value. Therefore, collectivism advocates the doctrine that individuals must sacrifice themselves to others. In this view individuals are not ends in themselves but a means to the ends of the collective. This also reflects the philosophy of Plato, who advocated self-sacrificial service to the community as a whole (the "real" entity). The view that self-sacrifice is the highest virtue was made more explicit and intensified by Christianity and by a long line of philosophers including Comte (who coined the term altruism, meaning "other-ism"), Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, and others. Immanuel Kant, an ardent Christian, was the most extreme and influential philosophical advocate of self-sacrifice (Peikoff, 1982). To Kant (1960,

pp. 27–32) capitulation to self-love represents a "*wickedness* (the wickedness of the human heart), which secretly undermines the [moral] disposition with soul destroying principles...." Kant added "[T] principle of one's own happiness is the most objectionable of all....a *radical* innate *evil* in human nature." The alternative to self-love for Kant and for collectivists is duty—a life of unchosen obligations even if (and especially if) they lead to life-long suffering and misery (cf. Peikoff, 1982, pp. 80–81).

Politics

In politics, individualism reflects the facts established previously, that individuals are separate entities who live by the thoughts of their own minds and properly seek their own happiness. In a political context this means that one possesses individual rights. To quote Ayn Rand's view (1964, p. 93), "A 'right' is a moral principle defining and sanctioning a man's freedom of action in a social context." The concept of rights protects the individual from the government and from other people by prohibiting the initiation of physical force against the individual. Why is this critical? Because force negates reason and reason is man's source of knowledge and thus his main means of survival. Rights leave individuals free to act on their own judgment and to pursue their own happiness, so long as they do not violate the rights of others. The role of the government, which has a (proper) monopoly on the retaliatory use of physical force, is solely to protect individual rights (via the courts, the police, the armed forces). In all other matters, individuals, not the government, are responsible for taking the actions their survival, health, and happiness require. Individuals do not have the right to forcibly make other people support them, even if they vote on it. If there is charity, it must be voluntary. The economic expression of individualism is laissez-faire capitalism (Rand, 1967). Under capitalism property is privately owned and individuals deal with one another through voluntary trade; force and fraud (a form of force) are prohibited.

It should be noted that a crucial distinction needs to be made between political and economic power. Political power is the power of the gun; obey or die or get sent to prison. Economic power is the power of voluntary trade—for example, to buy or not to buy a product or accept or not accept a job (see Binswanger, 1986, pp. 136–137). Differences in wealth do not change the principle that all should be equal before the law.

It must be stressed that the philosophy of individualism rejects entirely the notion of group rights. As noted earlier, groups or societies are not entities but collections of individuals. (Again, this is validated by direct, sensory perception). To claim that rights belong to groups rather than to individuals means, and can only mean, that some individuals (those not in the designated group) are to be sacrificed in some way to other individuals. If this were not the case, the concept of group rights would serve no function and would not have any meaning beyond individual rights.

Under collectivism, there are no individual rights; as Marxists put it, rights are a simply a bourgeois prejudice. Since individuals exist only to serve the collective (such as the race, the party, the state), the collective can use them and dispose of them as it sees fit. It is no accident that pure collectivist states are totalitarian (Nazism, Communism) and that the results in every case have been mass poverty, terror, and mass slaughter. (For full documentation of the Nazis' worship of self-sacrifice, see Peikoff, 1982). Collectivism is an assault not only on the individual's body but also on the individual's mind—on the right to think freely in accordance with one's own judgment and to act on the basis of one's thinking.

Of course, few people today advocate pure collectivism, as in communism. They advocate compromise. A little collectivism here; a little freedom there. They call it democracy. Now the founding fathers were quite explicit about not choosing to found a democracy in the Greek sense: unlimited majority rule. They knew that the tyranny of the many was no better than the tyranny of the few or the tyranny of the one. That's why they founded a constitutional republic; their goal was to protect the individual against the mob as well as the tyrant. But they were only partly successful; they did not foresee centuries of anti-reason philosophies. And the moral code of the founding fathers had contradictions: the selfish pursuit of happiness mixed with Christian altruism. And the altruist side has been winning hands down because nobody before Ayn Rand could successfully defend self-interest as moral. (Adam Smith is viewed by some as a defender of self-interest and rights but he was not; he advocated allowing self-interest because it was good for society, not because it was an inalienable right. His "defense" of rights was collectivistic; thus rights, logically, could be rescinded at society's discretion).

The most common way in which the ideal of democracy is formulated philosophically today is utilitarianism: the greatest good for the greatest number. This is probably the philosophy that many takes as a

given. But this doctrine cannot be rationally defended. Consider, first, that it does not include any definition of what the good is—and the good is not even something that everyone agrees on. By implication it is whatever the majority says it is—that is, collective subjectivism. Some might argue that the minority gets to defend its self-interest, because it has a vote. But what if it lacks enough votes? Then the majority could do whatever it wants after voting, including enslave or slaughter the minority.

Utilitarianism cannot protect individual rights or even a limited form of egoism. Consider what one of the early advocates of utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill, has to say:

> All honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world... (quoted in Peikoff, 1982, p. 122)

Observe that Mill, who was seen by many as a champion of individualism, here advocates pure altruism. Mill actually ended up as a "qualified socialist" (p. 123). Although Mill implies that he wants voluntary sacrifice, that is not the way altruism works out in the end. If altruism is a moral ideal and the collective (meaning everyone but yourself) is the unit of value, all collectivist governments, because they deny individual rights, will force people to sacrifice whether they want to or not.

There is no way to balance altruism and egoism, democracy and individual rights, or freedom and coercion. It's either-or (Rand, 1992). *Politically, the greater good in Rand's terms would be: the good of each individual pursing their rational self-interest.*

Mixed Philosophies and Mixed Economies

The United States is still the most individualistic country in the world. It was founded specifically on John Locke's principle of individual rights as presented in his *Second Treatise on Civil Government* (Locke, 1986/1690). Locke's philosophical errors in defending rights were corrected only much later by Rand (1964; see also Peikoff, 1991).The principle of rights was one aspect of the culmination of the Western Enlightenment—the triumph of reason over religion, superstition, dogma, dictatorship (absolute monarchy), and tradition—the triumph of Aristotle over Plato (Peikoff, 1982). Thanks to capitalism (to the

degree that it still exists—and survives the present administration), the United States has become the most prosperous and most powerful nation on earth. (Our current fiscal crisis, which I believe was caused by out of control spending motivated by altruism, unfortunately, may change all that).

Free, individualistic countries are consistently more prosperous than statist, collectivist countries. In societies that recognize individual rights, the mind is free to function; people are free to think, to act on their thinking, and to keep the rewards (earned by voluntary trade) of their achievements. None of this is permitted under statism, and the inevitable result is economic stagnation.

However, the United States, despite its Aristotelian base, is not and never was 100 percent individualistic. We have been increasingly influenced, since the peak of the Enlightenment, by Platonic and neo-Platonic elements (e.g., Hegel). Our society now represents a mixture of egoism and altruism, freedom and controls, rights and the abrogation of rights. We are a "mixed economy," partly free and partly controlled by statist elements with the controls growing daily. Collectivism and its corollaries (statism and altruism), which are still worshipped, to varying degrees, in every part of the world, are the major threat to our continued freedom and prosperity—and that of other countries.

Ghate and Locke (2003) have argued that modern philosophy is mostly bankrupt, dominated by postmodernism, which is basically skepticism and nihilism, with Marxist elements thrown in. Both Marxism and postmodernism are outgrowths of Plato and his intellectual heirs, including and especially Kant (Peikoff, 1982). The main voice of opposition to collectivism and postmodernism is Ayn Rand's individualistic philosophy of Objectivism (Peikoff, 1991; Rand, 1961, 1992), which, from an Aristotelian base, advocates reality, reason, egoism, individual rights, and capitalism.

Individualism and Collectivism in the World of Business

There has been much discussion on whether individualism is better or worse than collectivism[1] in a specifically business context even within countries that are relatively free. For example, many claimed in the 1980s that Japan's semifree economy would soon surpass ours as the most powerful economy in the world, because it was based on collectivistic principles—a kind of "organic theory of the company"—that

included unlimited employee loyalty to the company, group conformity, saving face, lifetime guarantees of employment, promotion on seniority, groups of mutually supporting, diverse businesses grouped under one company's control, or Keiretsu. But it was these principles and the premises on which they were based that helped (along with other factors) push the Japanese economy into the stagnation from which it has still not fully emerged. Unlimited group loyalty makes employees fearful of disagreeing with poor ideas suggested by their managers. Conformity undermines creative accomplishment. Lifetime employment makes it almost impossible for dissatisfied employees to find other jobs for which they are better suited, because other companies will not hire them. Furthermore, lifetime employment is something that modern companies cannot afford, as it prevents downsizing and restructuring in times of crisis and thus drains desperately needed capital. Promotion on seniority, which rewards tenure, and thereby loyalty to the company rather than individual merit, undermines the progress of the best-qualified employees into management positions. Having companies support one another in order to "preserve the whole" prevents noncompetitive companies from being sold or closed and prevents capital from being allocated where it will make the most profit. "Face-saving" (a collectivistic principle focused in avoiding public shame) prevented Japanese banks from honestly acknowledging bad loans (amounted to hundreds of billions of dollars) and almost destroyed the banking system. Gradually Japanese companies are abandoning these self-defeating collectivistic practices, but the country is still under great economic stress. Of course, they have greatly benefitted from a strong focus on product quality, a concept, ironically, that they learned from an American, Edwards Deming, although the Toyota scandal is now threatening that image.

China's economy is for now the fastest growing in the world, because the Chinese government has allowed and supported capitalism—in fact, it is probably less regulated than the U.S. economy and is far more fiscally responsible. However, capitalism is practiced only by permission and not by right and politically the country is a dictatorship. Right now no one can predict how it will all turn out.

The kibbutz system in Israel was considered by many to be the ideal collectivistic system in that everyone works for the group and yet it did not involve totalitarian coercion. However, a large percentage of kibbutz-reared children leave when they grow up and many kibbutzim, which typically are small in scale and technologically primitive, are closing or having a very difficult time—not only in retaining

members but also in remaining economically viable within Israel's mixed economy.

It is true that all companies need people to work together toward a common goal. But true collectivism is actually the enemy of rational cooperation, as it undermines or destroys the ability of the individual mind to function. Capitalism is based on individualism and encourages and rewards independent thinking. In a free economy people choose to work in a certain company, because they find it in their self-interest to do so. If a company wants its employees to stay and be productive, it must appeal to their self-interest with respect to salary, benefits, working conditions, and the provision of interesting, challenging work.

Companies have the best chance of success if they hire the best people they can afford without regard to what "group" they belong to (although collectivistic laws that compel hiring based on other factors sometimes limit or prohibit merit-based hiring, e.g., hiring based on race). Success is most likely when companies reward and promote on individual merit;[2] otherwise the best people will leave (and may start their own, competing companies) and the less able who remain will have authority beyond their ability. The best companies are unified by means of a common vision communicated by the CEO, by core values that all employees endorse, and by rewards. Individualists can and do work together happily and successfully so long as they have a personal interest in doing so.

But one might ask, doesn't everyone in an organization have to work for the good of the organization as a whole for the organization to succeed, and doesn't that require collectivism? The answers are, respectively, yes and no.

Obviously, if the members were not wedded to a common purpose, one would have anarchy and the organization would fall apart. Some badly led organizations do deteriorate into fiefdoms with each unit or division trying to grow at the expense of the others. The heads of such units are often called "selfish" because they are seeking extra power, but such actions are not in their self-interest because organizations beset by internal conflict cannot succeed in the end.

How, then, do you get members to cooperate without mandating self-sacrifice "for the greater good"?

As previously noted, the organization needs to have a common vision (e.g., what business are we in and what do we aspire to?). The organization needs a common value system. This is needed at two levels. First, they need a set of ethical values. According to Ayn Rand's

philosophy (Peikoff, 1991), they would properly be the same values that should guide an individual's life: reason as the highest virtue, accompanied by its corollaries: honesty, integrity, independence, productiveness, justice, and (earned) pride. The purpose of moral values in her philosophy is to guide your choices and actions in order to lead a successful and happy life. The beneficiary of your model code, given the very purpose of a moral code, should be yourself; thus she advocates rational egoism (not to be confused with hedonism, pragmatism, or criminality).

Why does an organization need a moral code? For the same reason an individual needs one: to guide choices and action that will lead to success and survival. The most common moral code in business (and probably in most people's lives today) is pragmatism: the doctrine that there are no principles and that you should do whatever seems to work or makes you feel good at the moment. We read about the disastrous consequences of pragmatism every day in the news. (For a discussion of why organizations need to be honest see Locke & Woiceshyn, 1995).

Organizations may also have a company-specific code of values that they consider integral to their success such as innovation, speed, quality, customer service, and low prices, for example.

How do these values get matched to self-interest? First, through selection from both sides. Let's start from the point of view of the employee. Effective organizations try to hire people who "fit" their culture just as prospective employees try to find organizations whose values they support.

What happens next? The company value system is (ideally) explained in detail to new hires. Then they start working. Usually, they will have applied for a specific job, because it is something they personally (selfishly) like doing—for example, accounting, sales, finance.

Now let's say they are assigned to a team. Why should they work to help the team? Several reasons. First, doing what is asked is what they are paid for. The refusal to do this is a breach of the employment contract (implicitly or explicitly). Second, they will usually be evaluated, at least in part, on their contribution to the team; their team contribution will affect their reputation. Third, team success contributes to organizational success, which helps ensure their job security and enhances the value of any company stock they may hold. Fourth, making a contribution to a team effort contributes to personal pride in performance. Thus contrary to much of the organizational behavior literature, working to help a team succeed, at least in well run organizations, is not inherently altruistic. In reality, it is in one's self-interest. (Consider a simple sports

example to make the issue crystal clear: why do individual members work together on a basketball team? Because they want to win.)

In sum, there is no inherent conflict between working for yourself on a job and working for the company unless the company has irrational policies including unjust practices and condones treating people without dignity or respect. When this happens people are likely to quit, assuming they can find better jobs, or withhold their best efforts.

Now consider why good company leaders are properly selfish and what types of action that implies (Locke, 2004, 2008). First, effective leaders need to selfishly love the job. Who would want to spend 60–100 hours a week of exhausting, stressful effort doing something they did not like?

Second, business leaders want to succeed. Failure means loss of reputation, job, and salary, and it hurts future prospects. Thus, leaders who are rationally selfish take steps to make sure that they do succeed (Locke, 2004), which means they take steps to make sure that the company as a whole succeeds (i.e., makes a profit), not just today or next week but in long run. If the company succeeds, they succeed; if it fails, they fail.

To achieve their self-interest requires at the outset—and as noted earlier—a set of core values for the organization and a core vision. The core vision needs to include a business strategy—a means of getting competitive advantage.

Successful business leaders also need select outstanding top management teams. The team members should have skills that compliment those of the CEO. The teams ideally will help develop core values, vision, and strategies based in their own thinking, but the top leaders need to make the final decisions on fundamental issues themselves.

Top leaders must also make sure that competent, honest people are hired, and trained, all the way down the line; the more competent people they hire, the more likely they are to succeed. The more competent people, the greater the chances of success.

Leaders must ensure that subordinates are motivated. Part of this comes from hiring the right people to start with and part is what is done after they are hired. Motivational devices include goal setting, empowerment, building confidence, and recognition (Locke, 2009).

But obviously pay is critical as a reward. Here is where the virtue of justice is vital. Perceptions of injustice have very strong negative effects on employee morale and thereby other actions such as effort and the decision to leave or stay.

There are more things that a leader has to do than I have noted previously, but observe that everything I noted is fully consistent with individualism and egoism from both the viewpoint of the employee and the organizational leader. An organization is not a superorganism but a group of individuals voluntarily working together toward common goals (or individual goals that promote the overall goal of success) bound by common values. Success requires independent thinking by all members. Members can exchange information, stimulate the thinking of others, and help get the job done, but they are still individuals. And everyone is getting something out of it for themselves: a job they enjoy, intellectual stimulation, a sense of purpose, and payment for their achievements.

Now what about leaders or employees who are conventionally called selfish, because they are, say, stealing from the company, cheating customers, or thinking only about the next quarterly report? They may be acting on their desires but they are not acting in their actual, rational, self-interest. Stealing from or by the organization undermines its chances for success and puts the perpetrator at risk for job loss and even end them up in jail. In the case of cheating a customer, it usually means, eventually, losing that customer's business and damaging the organization's reputation, which could lead to further loss of business. Dishonesty also undermines one's own moral character, thereby undermining pride. Thinking only of the short range leads to long range destruction.

Rights versus Service

Now what about service to society? Under individualism the moral justification for an organization's existence is not service to the public but rather individual rights, which includes the right to voluntarily trade with others. (Fraud, as noted, is a form of force so it would be prohibited). If the organization is selling something and someone else is buying, then both parties are, in reality, benefiting. One gets money and the other gets goods or services. If people are free to trade, then you have capitalism, and everyone benefits.

Although the general standard of living for all continuously increases under full capitalism, everyone does not prosper equally. People differ in their abilities, ambition, effort, and moral character, which leads to differences in results. This is where many collectivists raise their voices

in indignation. Their view is that the only moral justification of business (which includes, by implication, everyone who holds a job) is service to society, and since everyone serves, everyone should have their needs fulfilled equally. This equal outcome view is called egalitarianism, which is not to be confused with equality before the law as in the Declaration of Independence. To egalitarian collectivists it is not "fair" that a business leader earns, say, a million dollars a year or has assets of $20 million whereas some day laborers have no health insurance or savings and rent cheap apartments. Under the code of altruism it is the duty of the successful to provide for those "in need"—need as defined by government authorities. Money must be taken by force from the more wealthy and redistributed. Collectivists call this "social justice." Individualists call it theft.

As noted earlier, today supporters of democracy, utilitarianism, and the welfare state advocate a compromise system. They want enough capitalism to create enough wealth to enable them to seize as much as they can get away with to fund "social programs." But there is a problem: the demand for these programs, created by politicians, is unlimited, but the supply of wealth is limited. Eventually you have to pay the piper. Our government's solution is to set arbitrary interest rates and print paper money, causing a never ending series of business cycles and the destruction of the value of the dollar. Money is not wealth; it is just paper—a claim on wealth—but if wealth is not created, the paper money has no value.

Today we are approaching the end game. Altruism has done its work too well; everyone is being sacrificed to everyone. The debts we have and those yet to come simply cannot be paid. Collectivism has reached its dead end; there will soon be no real wealth to collect. To see how this plays out, read Ayn Rand's (1992) *Atlas Shrugged*. Everything in that novel is coming true. You might say, "Well, all the people of ability are not on strike yet." But in a way they are; business regulation today is so all encompassing that people are not starting businesses, not expanding businesses, and not buying businesses—and certainly not hiring employees. The many threats from government are paralyzing people in business and those who might go into business. To get out of a severe recession you have to take steps to encourage productivity rather than print money.

The only hope for recovery is to abandon collectivism, including altruism, once and for all and to replace it with full-fledged individualism. This is the way to actually achieve the greater good of all. As noted earlier this means every individual acting freely to pursue their own self-interest without violating the rights of others.

Notes

1. It should be noted that attempts to measure individualism in a business context, such as the work of Hofstede, have used items (e.g., wanting time for your personal life, wanting empowerment on the job, wanting challenge, wanting good working conditions), that, although implicitly egoistic, do not identify the essential element involved: wanting the job for the purpose of enhancing your own personal happiness.
2. Individualism does not preclude the use of team incentives as a means of enhancing cooperation and coordination so long as the more able members are not sacrificing rewards for the benefit of the less able.

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CHAPTER SIX

Big Man, Big Heart? The Political Role of Aggrandizers in Egalitarian and Transegalitarian Societies

Brian Hayden

Anthropological theories of elites (leaders) in traditional societies tend to focus on how elites can be viewed as helping the community at large. The origin of elites is cast in functionalist or communitarian terms (viewing societies as adaptive systems). A minority opinion argues that elites were not established by communities for the community benefit, but emerged as a result of manipulative strategies used by ambitious, exploitative individuals (aggrandizers). While the communitarian perspective may be appropriate for understanding simple hunter/gatherer communities, I argue that elites in complex hunter/gatherer communities and horticultural communities operate much more in accordance with aggrandizer principles, and that it is their pursuit of aggrandizer self-interests that really explains the initial emergence of elites. This occurs preferentially under conditions of resource abundance and involves a variety of strategies used to manipulate community opinions, values, surplus production, and surplus use.

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One of my main interests in archaeology has always been to understand the human behavior and social or political organization behind the artifacts that archaeologists dig up. I began by studying not only the stone tools and animal bones left by hunter and gatherers, but

also the ethnographic accounts of their societies. I initially focused on hunters and gatherers because they were among the simplest and earliest human societies. Over the years, my perspectives on hunter/gatherer community dynamics and individualism have changed. For the purposes of this colloquium, these topics can be dealt with best in the context of a discussion on the origins of socioeconomic complexity and the nature of early leaders as well as the motives that led them to take on leadership roles in their communities. To preface this discussion, I originally thought that institutionalized leadership, socioeconomic complexity, and inequalities among hunter/gatherers emerged in order to solve community problems and serve communal interests. I now think these developments were fundamentally due to the pursuit of individual interests by ambitious individuals. Above all, my current views have been shaped by my ethnoarchaeological work among Australian Aboriginals in the Western Desert, the Highland Maya in Mesoamerica, and the Hill Tribes of Thailand. In the following pages, I discuss some of the major factors that led me to adopt what I refer to as a "paleo-political ecology" model of cultural change.

Communitarian Outlooks

During the formative years of my archaeological training, in the 1960s and 1970s, many "new archaeologists" advocated viewing prehistoric cultures as integrated systems with internal regulation mechanisms that maintained communities in balance with their environments, much as a thermostat maintains a constant temperature in homes despite outside temperature fluctuations. The ability to maintain adequate nutrition for all band members, despite major seasonal and yearly fluctuations in climate and species availability (as well as the ability to maintain the same social structure over time despite individual behavioral variability, deaths, marriages, and relocations) provided convincing support for such systems models. According to the systems theory model, it was the entire system that adapted rather than individual actors. Change in these cultural "systems" was thought to occur only when environmental fluctuations became so stressful that the cultural systems had to undergo transformations. This theoretical model had a certain elegance and appeal, especially given earlier views by Alfred Kroeber and Leslie White who maintained that culture was an extrasomatic means of adaptation that functioned like a body, but was noncorporeal. Functionalists

like Malinowski proposed similar notions, as did Julian Steward with the culture core adaptations that he advocated. Ultimately, many of these models were derived from, or influenced by, Marx's ideas of the relationships of the means of production to other aspects of society and by Emile Durkheim's views of a structured noncorporeal cultural consciousness that affected people's behavior. So there was a long and respected tradition for these types of models.

The new ethnographic research that was emerging during my formative university years (as epitomized by Richard Lee and Irven Devore's *Man the Hunter* volume) also seemed to lend strong support to the systems view of culture—more recently termed the "communitarian" view—Saitta, 1999; Saitta & Keene, 1990). Almost all basic social characteristics of simple hunter/gatherers could be viewed as adaptations to limited and fluctuating resources. Thus, survival for simple hunter/gatherers was critically dependent upon the obligatory sharing of resources and cooperation among all members of the community. Almost everything could be borrowed with no expectation of direct return. Reciprocity was general. Individual ownership of resources was generally proscribed. Individual aggrandizement that might lead to the pursuit of self-interests and a lack of cooperation or sharing was systematically eliminated. Hunters were sometimes not even permitted to directly take a share of the animals that they killed. Lavish gifts that might lead to feelings or claims of indebtedness were ridiculed (as Richard Lee discovered). In fact, aside from community religious paraphernalia, no wealth objects seem to have existed. Rituals ensured conformity to community values. Any economically based competition that might threaten the uncertain resource base was strictly prohibited. Thus, these societies seemed to conform very well to the "systems" or communitarian model of culture. The overriding emphasis was on the common good, the survival of the community in the face of stresses or environmental uncertainties.

In the popular media of the time, a similar message was also dramatically illustrated for agricultural villages by Kurosawa's film, *The Seven Samurai*, where a Japanese peasant community was threatened by brigands. The major point of the film was that everyone in the community was in the same boat. In order for as many people to survive as possible, the pursuit of individual interests to the detriment of others could not be tolerated. Everyone had to work together as a unit, as one system.

Some of my first publications clearly reflected the systems view of hunter/gatherer societies. In 1972, I proposed that bands had to be able to regulate their populations in order to avoid increasing in size to

the point where they were chronically overexploiting their resources (Hayden, 1972). I suggested that the regulatory mechanism that was acting to keep populations below the regional carrying capacity was the heavy amount of work and stress culturally imposed on fecund women. In a similar vein, I proposed that ecstatic rituals (and religion) emerged early among Paleolithic hunter/gatherers as a means of emotionally bonding individuals to group values and group identities (totemic ancestors, in particular), thus creating almost unbreakable devotion to the group and submerging individual tendencies to pursue self-interests (Hayden, 1987). During my work in Australia, I became familiar with the writings of Strehlow (1965) and Yengoyan (1976). Like them, I argued that alliances with more distant groups were critical adaptive aspects of simple foraging societies that provided access to alternative resource locations in times of local droughts or starvation. Thus, band exogamy, extended kinship, multiband rituals (including dancing, singing, music, and ritual dramas that created favorable emotional states), gift giving, institutionalized visiting, and other kinds of behavior were all viewed as adaptations to the critical need for interband alliances. And these alliances were essential to maintain resilient, self-regulating hunter/gatherer cultural systems (Hayden, 2003, 1993, 1982). Other ethnographers had come to similar conclusions (Wiessner, 1977) and helped to refine my own ideas.

In regard to simple (generalized) hunter/gatherers, my views have not changed much since my early university years. I still view foraging bands as fundamentally operating as communitarian groups defending community interests against any threats from attempts to promote individual interests using economically based strategies. Any individuals exhibiting self-interested behavior that threatened the community were ridiculed, ostracized, driven from the community, or killed. While self-interest may be the foundation of Darwinian selection, under these resource conditions, it appears to have been kept on a tight leash or expressed in noneconomic ways. The cultural extension of kinship to all band members also undoubtedly helped to define self-interest in community terms. Throughout the Lower Paleolithic and most of the Middle Paleolithic (some 2.4 million years), there is no material indication of any different kind of social organization, although some of the richest resource locations along coastlines are now submerged and it may be possible that more complex types of band organization developed earlier in these areas. Nevertheless, at present, we have no indication that this was the case except for a few prestige items that appear in the Middle Paleolithic about 100,000 years ago (Hayden, 2003).

Complex Hunter/Gatherers

Thus, some years later, when I became interested in more complex types of societies and the factors that led hunter/gatherers to domesticate plants and animals, I rather naturally first approached these issues from a "systems," or communitarian, perspective. In addition to the systems approach, the "New Archaeologists" "social archaeology" involved the documentation and explanation of various social organizational characteristics of past societies (e.g., Freeman, 1968, pp. 265–266). In taking up the challenge to do social archaeology, I focused my research on a prehistoric village of complex hunter/gatherers at Keatley Creek (located near the Fraser River in the Interior Plateau of British Columbia). My research goal was to understand the economic, social, and political dynamics underlying this large prehistoric community—estimated to have had at least 1,200–1,500 people at its peak some 1–2,000 years ago. As part of this research, I began to examine the dynamics of inequalities that were documented ethnographically both on the Northwest Coast and in the Interior as well as the archaeological indicators of inequality that had been discovered in both areas.

In trying to understand the specific conditions, mechanisms, relationships, and behaviors underlying inequality at Keatley Creek, I found the existing models of "rank" or "tribal" society far too vague or generally "status" oriented to be of much use. Rather, I considered inequality and socioeconomic complexity as more of a continuum, recognizing three distinct levels (egalitarian, transegalitarian, and stratified societies) as well as gradations within each of the categories (Hayden, 1995). While it is clear that all societies, including hunters and gatherers, exhibit inequalities and complexity in some domains (especially age, gender, art, ritual, and language), when archaeologists discuss inequalities and complexity, they generally refer to social and economic inequalities as expressed by differential local power, hierarchies, and institutions. These are developments beyond what one normally finds in simple band societies. I use the term "transegalitarian" to refer to societies that recognize private ownership; use prestige items; produce some surpluses; generally hold feasts or other economically based competitive displays; limit sharing; and have a range of poor and wealthy families that do not form permanent classes. Transegalitarian societies, therefore, differ from societies with permanent classes and political hierarchies on the one hand and egalitarian societies on the other hand where sharing is mandatory and there is essentially little or no private ownership or *economically based* competition.

After several years of excavating large multifamily residential structures at the Keatley Creek site (with internal storage pits, wealth items, and ownership of resource areas), I felt that the modeling of internal dynamics (and origins) of these corporate groups required a more sound interpretive foundation. I thought that it would be useful to demonstrate that the elites described in ethnographic accounts actually functioned to advance the interests of the community (in contrast to the exploitative views of elites and complexity being advocated by researchers such as Antonio Gilman [1981] working in Iberia). In contrast to the exploitative views of the origin of complexity, my first attempts to model social dynamics at Keatley Creek followed the "systems" approach. I thought that larger communities, like Keatley Creek, could afford to support political specialists to help the community cope with famines, defense, and other problems. In this view, leadership positions were established by the community to benefit the community, not for the benefit of the leaders.

At this time, it occurred to me that there was a unique opportunity to test the systems model propositions concerning the communitarian function of elites. Notably, this could be done in and around some of the remote Highland Maya villages where I had worked from 1979 to 1985. By returning to the Maya Highlands, I anticipated that I would be able to produce convincing proof of the way elites in tribal village societies functioned to maintain community stability under conditions of stress (as systems theory predicted they should). The Maya communities were about the same size as the Keatley Creek village, they had been relatively autonomous politically until the 1960s (being largely cut off from wider political and economic influences), and they arguably should have represented very similar community dynamics to those operating at Keatley Creek (aside from subsistence differences of agriculture versus hunting and gathering).

Therefore, in 1988, I returned to the Maya Highlands with a student to seek out older individuals in those villages and ask them what community leaders and wealthier individuals had done in earlier years (before the current road system was established). I wanted to document how elites had helped their communities when there were crop failures, food shortages, or other community calamities. I fully expected them to tell me how leaders or the well-off local elites had helped organize expeditions to obtain food from elsewhere or implemented activities to redistribute food to needy families via feasting or community work projects, or simple transfers. I was astounded when *none* of these expectations were met. Instead, in village after village, we were told of the

failure of leaders or wealthy people to provide any help to those most in need. In fact, we recorded many instances where those who were better off took advantage of the situation in order to increase their own resource base via the sale of maize to the poor at exorbitant rates or the exchange of maize for land (Hayden & Gargett, 1990).

This was a major turning point in my career. Either the communitarian model that I had always believed in was deficient and inaccurate, or perhaps the Maya case was somehow unique or unrepresentative. I began to rethink all of my assumptions and reexamine the ethnographies. In fact, in rereading many ethnographies, it soon became apparent that there were many accounts of the exploitative nature of big men, chiefs, and other elites that I had previously overlooked or dismissed as idiosyncratic personal behaviors. I continued to critically reassess my earlier assumptions and models. The conundrum seemed difficult to resolve. If conditions of stress resulted in communitarian societies among simple hunter/gatherers where individualism was not tolerated, why did similar situations of stress among simple agricultural village societies like the Maya not also result in communitarian behaviors? What had changed? I reasoned that the establishment of principles of private property, the abandonment of mandatory sharing, and other factors were probably important in understanding these differences. So, the question became, what community dynamics enabled these features to emerge? Clearly, private property and the other associated social conventions could not, and did not, emerge in the context of limited and fluctuating resources over the span of 2.5 million years that constituted the Paleolithic period.

The predominant view of archaeologists from ca. 1970 to 2000 was that domestication was the result of population pressure. This same template was also widely applied to the development of increasing social complexity and inequality during the Mesolithic and Neolithic by postulating communitarian systems' responses (in the form of decision-making managers) to the stresses created by overpopulation (Cohen, 1977; Rosenberg, 1998). However, I thought these Malthusian models were inadequate partly on the basis of my earlier research where it seemed that hunter/gatherer societies could and did control their populations so as to maintain a good equilibrium with available resources (1972). In addition to logistical problems with the model (Hayden, 1995, 2000), I saw no reason why this situation should have changed any more at the end of the Pleistocene than it had during the many climatic (glacial) fluctuations during the Pleistocene.

Thus, it seemed clear to me that neither population pressure nor limited and fluctuating resources could have resulted in private property or the other aspects of complex societies. I then began to consider the possibility that it might make sense for complexity to emerge under conditions of resource abundance, where everyone could be assured of having enough to eat under normal conditions. At first this seemed a strange, counterintuitive idea. How could a situation where everyone had enough for their basic needs create inequalities? But, as I continued to examine the ethnographic and archaeological data, it became increasingly apparent that not only were conditions of abundance strongly associated with private property and the elimination of community-wide mandatory sharing, but many other characteristics of social complexity were strongly associated with abundant resources as well. This seemed to be the situation at Keatley Creek with its proximity to the most productive salmon fishery in the Interior Fraser River drainage. Early historic accounts reported many tens of thousands of surplus dried fish being traded out from that locality. Farther south, at The Dalles on the Columbia River, the fish resources were even richer and the level of complexity was correspondingly greater. Several researchers were even able to quantify the relationship between resource abundance and complexity on the Northwest Coast by demonstrating that political complexity was strongly correlated with the salmon productivity of the streams controlled by individual villages (Donald & Mitchell, 1975). Diana Alexander also demonstrated that complexity on the Plateau decreased with the distance from the mouth of the Fraser River, reflecting diminishing amounts of salmon that were available farther upstream in the watershed (Alexander, 1992). Archaeologically, Rick Schulting and I (Hayden & Schulting, 1997) demonstrated a strong correspondence between rich fishing locations and the appearance of wealth objects across the Northwest Plateau.

On the basis of my ethnographic reading, it seemed that wealth goods, social inequalities (often even involving slavery), sedentism, monumental constructions (houses, mounds, fortifications, or poles), large communities, high population densities, economically based competition, elevated levels of conflict, feasting, bride prices, ancestor worship, and secret societies *all* tended to occur together as a cultural cluster of traits and to be associated with the exploitation of abundant resources capable of producing surpluses in most years. When based on hunting and gathering subsistence, I referred to societies exhibiting some or all of these characteristics as "complex hunter/gatherers."

However, these characteristics also typified many simple horticultural and pastoral communities (except for the high mobility of pastoralists). And thus, I used the term "transegalitarian" to refer to societies with most of these characteristics whether their subsistence was based on hunting and gathering, horticulture, or pastoralism—hence, the relevance of Maya village dynamics to understanding the sociopolitical organization at Keatley Creek.

In trying to understand how abundant resources were used to transform egalitarian societies into transegalitarian societies, I developed an approach that I refer to as "political ecology," or more precisely, "paleo-political ecology" (applied anthropologists use the term "political ecology" in their analysis of how modern elites and polities exploit natural environments for their own benefit). Simply stated, paleo-political ecology is the study of the way in which surplus resources are and were used in traditional village-level societies to promote the self-interests of individuals or factions. Over the years, I have concluded that there are two essential components in dealing with this question. First is the ability of a technology to extract and store surpluses from environments with abundant resources. The second involves the motivations and strategies used by individuals seeking to increase their own self-benefits, whether in terms of reproduction, power, survival, or standard of living. I discuss these in more detail.

Technology and Resources

It seems self-evident that in order to produce surpluses one must have resources that are at least seasonally abundant. Such conditions must have always existed in various parts of the world over the past 2 million years, but it appears that simple hunter/gatherers never could make maximal use of such abundance, presumably because of technological limitations.

Technological bottlenecks could have occurred in the procurement, processing, or storage of seasonally abundant resources. However, I suspect that it was primarily the lack of a good storage technology that constrained the use of abundant resources. If one must subsist on very limited resources for most of the year, it does little good to have a few months with more food than one can eat unless this food can be stored for the lean parts of the year. Although I was originally skeptical about the importance of storage technology for understanding the emergence of complex hunter/gatherer societies (as advocated by Testart, 1982),

I am now more inclined to see it as a potential key to understanding initial developments of surpluses and the resulting complexity.

Long-term storage (several months to several years) is a complex and poorly understood phenomenon that entails many risks and considerable wasted labor. One must build special facilities to store food. One must also harvest significantly more than one needs to store because of losses from insects, spoilage, rodents, birds, bears, as well as risks of theft. Perfecting procedures for drying requires knowledge and skills, and the butchering of meat or fish in thin strips for drying is time-consuming. Mobility patterns of simple hunter/gatherers may further limit access to stored foods when needed. Thus, there are many risks, problems, and costs involved in storage that do not make it an immediately attractive strategy to pursue. However, *if* such a technology were to be perfected, it would provide those using it with important survival and demographic advantages. In fact, this factor may ultimately constitute the critical difference between Middle and Upper Paleolithic adaptations in Europe. There is little or no evidence for storage in the Middle Paleolithic, whereas good evidence exists for storage in the Upper Paleolithic, especially in Eastern Europe and the Russsian Plain (Soffer, 1989). With storage, higher population densities and larger group sizes were possible. This alone would have conferred competitive advantages on Upper Paleolithic communities in any conflicts with Middle Paleolithic groups. In turn, large group size may have rendered communal hunting strategies more productive, thus increasing the amount and reliability of meat that could be procured. Storage would also have led to seasonal, and in some cases perhaps prolonged sedentism as well as favoring notions of private property since stored foods represented a supplemental investment of labor by individual households for their own survival benefit.

Importantly, as noted previously, where possible, families would harvest and store significantly more food than needed during times of abundance in order to offset risks of scarcity in following years or loss during the storage period. Any uneaten stored foods (which must have been on hand in many normal years) would have constituted surpluses that could be used in other social or political strategies, thus potentially creating social and political inequalities, as discussed next.

While storage technology may have been an initial constraint in the development of more complex societies, procurement and processing technological impediments also seem to have played important roles where abundant fish and grain resources existed. There does not seem to have been any effective mass fishing or grain harvesting/grinding

technology before the Mesolithic. However, once effective mass procurement/processing technologies were developed for fish and grains, together with storage technologies they were used in many areas in the world to extract abundant resources. Precisely why these technological changes occurred is another issue that needs to be dealt with in the future, but I suspect they emerged as a result of episodic food shortages that slowly encouraged the exploration of alternative resources. The main point is that these mass harvesting and storage technological changes (which later included domesticated animals and plants) can be easily documented in the archaeological record and either precede or occur in tandem with the creation of complex types of hunter/gatherer societies.

Individual Motivations and Their Strategies

The argument thus far is that new storage, procurement, and processing technologies created abundant extractable resources in locations where seasonally abundant animals, fish, or plants occurred. This combination of factors resulted in recurring surpluses. It is now necessary to determine how surpluses could have been used to create inequalities in power and wealth. On the face of it, and according to the model of simple hunter/gatherer sharing adaptations, it might seem that individuals could not really use any more food than they could personally eat. Nor could they use food to create debts because sharing food was mandatory and reciprocity was generalized.

However, from my own ethnographic work in Mexico, and my readings of the ethnographies, it soon became apparent that the situation was very different among complex hunter/gatherers and other transegalitarian communities. In those communities, surplus food *was* used to create debts and advantages. Sharing was no longer practiced on a community-wide basis. Reciprocity was not very general.

In contemplating a number of different scenarios and possible pathways from strictly enforced egalitarian social systems to ones with private property and storage, I gradually began to conceptualize two critical aspects that could account for the differences between simple egalitarian hunter/gatherers and the more complex hunter/gatherer communities. First, conditions of abundance could logically lead to the eventual relaxation on proscriptions against the expressions of, and pursuit of, individual self-interests *provided that* such behavior did not adversely affect survival prospects of the rest of the community, or large segments

of it. Strictly egalitarian communities were expensive and difficult to maintain because of freeloaders, the excessive time and efforts spent inculcating and maintaining strict egalitarian values (via painful and lengthy rituals, regular visiting, social networking, and constant vigilance over virtually everyone together with enforcement against any deviations or transgressions by people pursuing self-interests or indicating that they might do so). The unusual nature and disadvantages of egalitarianism had been noted by others (Wiessner, 1996; Cashdan, 1980: Ames, 2007) and began to make sense.

The second key element that I postulated to be important in the development of nonegalitarian societies was the existence of individuals within egalitarian societies who were willing to pursue their own self-interests, at considerable risk of ostracism, injury, or even death. Could the desire to pursue self-interests have somehow always been present in portions of egalitarian societies but simply been culturally suppressed, later to emerge under more permissive conditions, and then acted to transform those societies into more complex, unequal social systems? Boasian cultural anthropologists maintained that people were molded by the cultural values they were taught in childhood. While this was certainly true of some aspects of behavior, I argue that there is a strong genetic component to much human behavior as well. And of all the Darwinian imperatives for survival, the pursuit of self-interest is perhaps the most fundamental. Altruistic behavior is the most difficult to account for in terms of natural selection.

Thus, I reasoned that while scarcity and fluctuations in resources might induce communities to curtail self-interested behaviors (or at least channel them into avenues other than resource exploitation), egalitarian communities were unlikely to eradicate expressions of self-interest entirely, even with systematic indoctrination and elimination of individuals who could not or would not refrain from overtly pursuing their own *economically based* self-interests. In fact, there were a few accounts in the ethnographic literature of self-centered individuals in egalitarian hunter/gatherer societies who intimidated and terrorized others to achieve advantages for themselves. Perhaps the most extreme case is that of an Inuit shaman who wanted to marry a woman in opposition to her family's wishes. To fulfill his own desires, he killed the woman's family and others who opposed him (seven in all) and took the woman for himself (Campbell, 1983, pp. 20, 164–170). Accounts of killings from conflicts over women, or elopements despite the death penalties for such behavior, are not uncommon even in the Western Desert of Australia (I was told of several cases when I was in the field) or in !Kung

or Hadza communities. These were clear examples of individuals who did not accept the values that they had been taught and who had chosen options that favored their own emotional and reproductive interests, all at considerable risk. In North Australia, there was also an early account of a tribal Aboriginal who murdered for small economic gains (Love, 1936, pp. 103–112). In addition to this, I found that Aboriginal life, both now and in oral accounts of life before contact with Europeans, was rife with factions and constant grievances being lodged against individuals for social infractions or infringements. Certainly, this was the dominant means of curtailing the pursuit of self-interests, but these societies were far from peaceful, indicating that allegations of violations of the egalitarian ethic were constantly occurring and in constant need of vigilance and repression. Thus, it seems that individuals aggressively promoting their own self-interests appear to have existed in many, if not all, egalitarian hunter/gatherer societies, but their behavior was systematically constrained, or they were eliminated.

It also seems apparent that these were exceptional cases and that most people, most of the time, were, in fact, following egalitarian principles of behavior. I thus began to develop the idea that in all large human populations, there was a naturally occurring range of variability pertaining to the pursuit of self-interests. At one end were personality types who behaved extremely altruistically. In today's societies, they devote their lives to helping the poor, they give away most or all of the money that they earn, and they even risk their lives for others by working in epidemic contexts or in conflict areas. They are the Mother Theresas of the world and the volunteers in Médecins Sans Frontières. I am sure that most readers at least know of a few people with such tendencies.

At the other extreme there were people who thought only of their own self-interests, or thought of others' interests only when it was part of a scheme to advance their own benefits or advantages. Often they did not care what effects their pursuit of wealth and power had on other people. Thus, it was common for some entrepreneurs to develop industries that polluted or poisoned streams so that businessmen could make profits, to kill off native groups so that colonists could farm or mine the earth, to indebt factory workers, to scam the elderly of life-savings, to prostitute children, and many other such kinds of behaviors. At the very extreme end of the spectrum are what we refer to as "sociopaths" or "psychopaths": personalities that exhibit no emotional empathy for other people and seem to have no moral or social conscience—people who are frequently aggressive in the pursuit of their own advantages. In *Without*

Conscience, Robert Hare (1993) makes the important point that sociopathic personality types occur in all societies, in all social classes, and in all kinds of family upbringings. He, therefore, concludes that there is (and presumably always was) an important worldwide genetic component to this type of personality.

As with other genetically influenced traits, like height or weight, and other personality traits (Matthews, Deary, & Whiteman 2003) the distribution of behavior along the altruism-to-self-interest dimension of values seems to be represented by a bell-shaped curve with a few extreme cases in any large population, but with most people exhibiting moderate values. And, in fact, most people prefer to devote most of their time and energy to achieving their own goals but are usually happy to spend time or resources to help others as well. Most people save or spend their earnings for their own projects and pleasures, but also contribute to charities or make loans to friends in need or buy presents for others. The average behavior (the equilibrium point between communitarian helping of others and the pursuit of individualistic goals) may shift depending on economic or other conditions, but the important point is that the full range of behaviors is always present in any large population. In evolutionary terms, both extremes may be adaptive under some unforeseen future conditions, and so the full range is maintained to draw upon if necessary under a range of different circumstances. Thus, in times of scarcity, sharing of resources and mutual help is highly adaptive. Poor communities are often noted for their generosity. In contrast, when resources are abundant, evolutionary advantages are most rapidly and effectively achieved by self-interested pursuits. The important point from an evolutionary perspective is to maintain within populations the potential possibility of switching from one strategy to another, and this requires maintaining genetic and behavioral diversity. However, the most common values are generally adapted to the prevailing circumstances much as individuals change their adaptive strategies throughout their life history and according to life circumstances, from childhood to mating to family life and heritage years (Roff, 1992; Stearns, 1992).

Some criticisms of my approach pretend that I view all people as being Machiavellian. This is far from the case. In fact, I try to describe the *full range* of people's personalities. What I do maintain is that individuals who aggressively pursue their own self-interests constitute a small but extremely powerful element in the personality types that occur in all populations. They are highly motivated to create changes away from egalitarian constraints, and I suggest that they are probably

responsible for the fundamental transformations of culture that archaeology has been able to document over the past 40,000 years.

Thus, as social value orientation studies in psychology inform us, we can expect at least a few people who uncontrollably pursue their own self-interests to occur in all large populations (even in the most egalitarian cultures) and to take risks to achieve benefits for themselves. These are the individuals I refer to as "aggrandizers," or "triple A" personality types: ambitious, aggressive, accumulative, aggrandizing, abrasive people. Among simple hunter/gatherers, individuals who could not control these impulses, even with severe sanctions and acculturation practices, were driven from communities or killed. Today they are incarcerated or confined in other institutional ways. In times of war or intense economic competition, their ruthlessness may be much more positively valued. But people with less extreme expressions of this type of behavior often become successful in business and politics in contemporary societies and constantly push for changes in policies that will primarily benefit themselves or their associates. It seems reasonable to suggest that, in the past, similar people were also exerting pressures on societies to change and to accommodate their ambitions to pursue their own self-interests. Once it no longer became necessary to rigidly enforce egalitarian behavior, these individuals became freer to find ways to achieve their own goals.

Aggrandizers Develop Many Strategies

Thus, I suggest that once new (mainly Mesolithic) procurement, processing, and storage technologies made it possible to assure the subsistence needs for the great majority of families under normal circumstances (some periodic shortfalls appear inevitable under all traditional conditions), ambitious aggrandizers began to explore ways to increase their own wealth, power, and other benefits without triggering negative community reactions against themselves. What were the most common and successful strategies that aggrandizers developed as documented ethnographically? In order to use food resources in any strategy to promote individual self-interests, it is necessary to exert individual control over resources. Thus, *private ownership* would have been the first key transformation in values that aggrandizers needed to achieve. The development of storage technology suited itself admirably to advancing or defending claims of private or family ownership due to the extra labor involved in storing food and the intended future use of

the stores. But even given abilities to retain control of one's own produce and to accumulate some surplus food, how could such surpluses be used to create benefits for ambitious aggrandizers? An individual family could eat only a limited amount of food and any remaining amounts would eventually spoil. I suggest that aggrandizers invented a number of strategies to use food surpluses. The most common and the most important of these strategies include the following:

- The hosting of feasts with obligatory reciprocity as a way to indebt people.
- The creation of wealth (or prestige) objects used to validate social transactions with obligatory returns, thus creating debts and forcing people to produce surpluses.
- The establishment of marriage prices (in food and wealth objects) required for obtaining spouses and reproducing.
- The investment of food and wealth in children via maturation ceremonies to increase their marriage desirability and marriage prices.
- The co-opting of opposition through food and wealth dispensations.

Other strategies included the restriction of access to the supernatural, separation from others via distinctive dress or etiquette, the extension of kinship networks, the creation of elaborate taboos and a system of differential penalties for those in power versus the disenfranchised, the manipulation of cultural conventions and values to serve aggrandizer interests, and the manipulation of conflicts and warfare to serve self-interests (see Hayden, 2001).

In sum, I argue that it was aggrandizer personalities rather than communitarian interests that have constituted the driving force behind all the major changes that have taken humanity in directions away from the simple egalitarian hunter/gatherers of the Paleolithic (and those that survived in marginal areas in modern times). These changes began in the Upper Paleolithic some 35,000 years ago and have continuously spread and developed over the succeeding millennia. While many of these changes were certainly pitched in terms of community interests (just as land developers today are driven by self-interests but emphasize all the benefits that their developments will provide for communities), there is little doubt about who benefited the most from such developments. Indeed, in some cases such as marriage payments, it would clearly not have been to the average person's benefit to have to pay exorbitant amounts to marry and have

children. The only people such conventions would benefit would be the wealthy. While Margaret Murray almost certainly had something very different in mind, the dictum attributed to her seems an appropriate conclusion to this discussion: Never doubt that a small group of determined individuals can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

Resisting Machiavelli: Reducing Collective Harm in Conflict

Neil J. Mitchell

Not all civil wars are equal in damage to the collective good. Responding to Lenin's invitation to compare his war with the English Civil War, this chapter examines the impact of leadership on the level and nature of violence. It sorts out three common problems, the captive monarch problem, mutiny, and protecting noncombatants, and examines the consequences of the diverging choices of Lenin and Oliver Cromwell. The general argument is derived from the logic of delegation and Machiavelli's individualist analysis and advice. As the author of *The Prince* knew, a leader's beliefs and management style have a substantial impact on the course of events. His analysis suggests that events are explained by a combination of motives and opportunities. His advice is that effective leaders must be willing to use deception and unaccountable violence. Lenin followed his advice but did not subscribe to his analysis of political change. Cromwell followed his analysis, but not his advice.

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In his August 20, 1918, "Letter to American Workers" Vladimir Lenin invited comparison of his use of terror with that of earlier revolutionaries: "The British bourgeoisie have forgotten their 1649 . . . Terror was just and legitimate when the bourgeoisie resorted to it" (Lenin, 1965a). This chapter pursues that comparison.[1] Contrary to Lenin's assertion, it argues that conflicts are not equally destructive of the collective good.

The nature of violence and the degree of terror depends on the parties to the conflict and reflects a leader's core beliefs and the willingness to apply those beliefs in the management of delegated violence.

As Lenin suggests, there are common grounds for comparing the Russian Civil War with the English Civil War. These wars were both about government control. They were not separatist conflicts. They both occurred at the tail end of major international wars. They both attracted outside intervention. What is more, leaders in these wars confronted common problems. Lenin and Oliver Cromwell shared a captive monarch problem. They had to deal with this most visible representative of the old regime. They shared the problem posed by mutinously revolutionary elements within their own ranks and armed resistance from peasant groups. Finally, and common to all wartime leaders, they shared the problem of controlling their own agents and protecting civilian populations and noncombatants from killing and rape. For each problem, the two leaders consistently chose different strategies.

The framework for comparing these leaders is Machiavelli's individualist and actor-centered analysis of political change and his unsentimental prescriptions for successful leaders. I position their diverging strategies in relation to Machiavelli's advice for getting and holding power and in particular his recommendations to use cruelty, deceit, and scapegoats in the manner of Cesare Borgia. Lenin resisted Machiavelli with his encouragement of disproportionately high levels of violence, while assiduously following his advice to evade responsibility for the blame, as the opening quotation suggests with his *tu quoque* claims about the British bourgeoisie. Cromwell, in contrast, exercised restraint and chose not to deceive. He rejected Machiavelli's advice and achieved success. Machiavelli's analytical approach that focuses on motives and opportunities survives the comparison better than his advice.

General Argument

Much of social science is focused on structural conditions for conflict and violence. It examines factors such as poverty, ethnic fractionalization, geographical terrain, regime type, or the openness of the economy. In contrast, I am more interested in the motives and relationships of those involved. Elsewhere I have argued that there are three general motives for political violence (Mitchell, 2004). Leaders are motivated by the self-interested pursuit of power or by the intolerant logic of a

divisive belief system. Leaders use violence to destroy challengers to their power or to destroy those whom they see as on the wrong side of the political argument. But they do not do the violence themselves. They rely on others to carry it out. In turn, these agents bring their own motivation. This observation may seem unremarkable but the relationship between leader and follower has been overlooked in much of the human rights and conflict literature.

The agents' selfish natures and superior information weaken control (see Waterman, Rouse, & Wright, 2004). The conventional development of this logic stresses the principal's problem of not being able to trust the agent. The principal is disadvantaged by a lack of knowledge of the task and of the character of the agent. As this information asymmetry increases, so does the likelihood of the agent using his or her position for private benefits. He or she seizes opportunities to secure some private gratification. With violence the personal reward might be revenge, or looting, or the violence itself.

Some have always sought violence individually and for their own ends, and there was a time when principals unashamedly recognized this private incentive. Agamemnon, having sorted out his difficulty with Achilles over a slave girl, exhorted the troops by offering them the prospect of ill-treating the civilians of Troy: "So now let no man hurry to sail for home, not yet . . . not till he beds down with a faithful Trojan wife, payment in full for the groans and shocks of war we have all borne for Helen" (Homer, 1990, p. 111). Once history attached shame to the ill-treatment, this private reward became a control problem for the morally sensitive leader. It required willingness on the leader's part to apply managerial effort to keep untrustworthy followers in line. Monitoring is costly.

Neglected in the conventional principal-agent account is the advantage that unscrupulous leaders can take of delegation. What Machiavelli adds to this account is the insight that you cannot trust the leader either. The leader may be indifferent to control problems and even tempted to use the agent to evade blame. So my focus is on those who give the orders, their motivations, and their relationship with those who carry them out. I consider how they manage their own and their agents' temptations to be opportunistic and to err on the side of greater nastiness.

To situate Machiavelli's analysis within this volume's overall theme of individualism and collectivism, his is a robustly individualist and actor-centered conception of political change. He assumes individuals are motivated by fear and "greedy for gain" and argues that this assumption must inform a successful Prince's strategies (Machiavelli, 1977, p. 48).

He says "any man who tries to be good all the time is bound to come to ruin among the great number who are not good. Hence a prince who wants to keep his post must learn how not to be good" (p. 44). So be feared rather than loved and lie when it suits. While he is clear about the importance of taking account of motivations and incentives, illustrated with incisive discussion of the disadvantages of employing mercenaries, he is not, at the same time, theoretically naive about how much is within the individual's control. He attributes about half of what happens to choice and motivation (Virtu) and the other half to the Goddess Fortuna. This struggle of Virtu with Fortuna informs the contemporary social science of violence. It is captured with the opposition of greed or grievance and opportunity (see, e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Assuming greed and entrepreneurial capacity (Virtu), attention is focused on the structural factors and circumstances, for example, lootable resources or mountainous terrain that make insurgency and the use of violence viable (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Weinstein, 2007). Our significant advance is in the empirical analysis and finding proxy variables for Fortuna rather than taking a dip into the history of ancient Rome.

Much of *The Prince* is narrowly attentive to how an individual gets and holds onto power. Yet it finishes with a larger vision of what can be done for the good of all Italy. The task is to restore liberty and rid the country of "the cruel insolence of barbarians" (Machiavelli, 1977, p. 73). He pins his hopes on an individual leader overcoming the collective action problems that beset the building of an effective army in Italy. Individually, Italians are fine martial specimens "you will find that Italians excel in strength, in dexterity, in mental agility; but when it is a matter of armies, they don't stand comparison" (p. 74). Cromwell, one suspects, would find Machiavelli's analysis of the importance of individual leadership persuasive, although as we see, his conception of motivation would allow a role for conscience as well as greed. Lenin's collectivist conception of the working of economic and political forces allows little role for individual actors. It would at best allow a "vanguard" role for a party rather than an individual.

Here I compare the leaders' core beliefs and their willingness to use violence and deceit. I describe the common problems they face and the different solutions they devise. In common with Machiavelli's analysis, if not with his specific prescriptions for political power, I argue that leaders' cores beliefs and management styles have a substantial impact on a conflict and its collective harm.

Core Beliefs

A politician turned soldier, Oliver Cromwell, though devout, supported an agenda of toleration consistent with his values of individual freedom and responsibility. Cromwell's letters and speeches testify to his toleration: "I have waited for the day to see union and right understanding between the godly people (Scots, English, Jews, Gentiles, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, and all)" (Abbott, 1937, I, p. 677). His commitment to freedom of conscience was founded in contemporary religious convictions and debate but anticipated liberal thought. In 1654, speaking to members of Parliament, Cromwell again asserts "Liberty of Conscience is a natural right; and he that would have it ought to give it... Indeed, that has been one of the vanities of our Contest. Every Sect saith, Oh! give me liberty. But give it him, and to his power he will not yield it to anybody else... Truly, that's a thing ought to be very reciprocal" (Abbott,1939, III, p. 459). Liberty is a "natural right" and not to be interfered with by sects or groups. Cromwell understood guilt or innocence on an individual not collective basis and argued that punishment must be proportionate. He criticized the overreliance on capital punishment. He wanted it to be reserved for murder and treason: "I have known in my experience abominable murders quitted; and to see men lose their lives for petty matters. This is a thing God will reckon for..." (Abbott, 1947, IV, p. 274). Individuals should be judged as individuals and punished as the particular case warranted. In short, he had a commitment to liberty, to free speech, to the rule of law, and to restraint in the use of violence.

Some historians have claimed that Cromwell had a collectivist or racist intolerance toward the Irish and targeted violence at them as a people (see Hill, 1970, p. 113). But it is not well-substantiated. There has been an effort among historians to evaluate the record in Ireland, and to "question the uncritical ease with which the allegations of indiscriminate slaughter have been repeated by historians. The statistics and the continuities of life in the communities involved bear this out" (Davis, 2001, p. 109). Ashley notes that "what recent historians do appear to agree about... is that Cromwell was fundamentally a tolerant and conciliatory statesman, far removed from the police-state autocrats of modern times" (Ashley, 1969, p. 170). As a commander, the Earl of Clarendon, the contemporary royalist historian testifies to his insistence on rules of conduct and discipline: "Cromwell had been most strict and severe in the forming of the manners of his army, and in chastising all irregularities; insomuch that sure there was never any such body

of men so without rapine, swearing, drinking, or any other debauchery . . . " (Clarendon, 1978, p. 381). Ian Gentles says, "that the armies of Parliament were better disciplined than those of the king is a cliché," and claims that although "England had atrocities . . . it was spared the full horrors of the Thirty Years' War, in part because of the restraining effect of the Articles of War adopted by both sides" (Gentles, 1998, pp. 111–112). In terms of his "combat morality," Cromwell distinguished between combatants and noncombatants and insisted on individual responsibility for observing the articles of war, which extended to protections for noncombatants and forbade rape.

One of Lenin's biographers describes his subject as a sincere "secular believer" with a clear vision of the good of all: "a vision of a future for mankind when all exploitation and oppression would disappear . . . The danger posed by the Lenins is not that they are simply power-crazed. It is that they combine a thirst for power with an ideological intolerance that casts down all in their path. Lenin was dignified and thoughtful, a decent man in his personal relations" (Service, 1995, p. 323). For Lenin, the good of all was to be reached through violent class conflict. He had no tolerance for those he saw working in opposition to historical processes. As Lenin said in November 1917, "the state is an instrument of coercion . . . we want to organize violence in the name of the interests of the workers" (Leggett, 1981, p. 41). The groups in the way of historical processes were to be targeted. They were the bourgeoisie, the Whites, the clergy, the rich peasants or kulaks, and political opponents, including anarchists and socialist parties. The *Red Sword* of August 18, 1919, described this line of reasoning: "Ours is a new morality. Our humanism is absolute, for it has as its basis the desire for the abolition of all oppression and tyranny. To us everything is permitted, for we are the first in the world to raise the sword not for the purpose of enslavement and oppression but in the name of liberty and emancipation from slavery. We do not wage war against individuals. We seek to destroy the bourgeoisie as a class" (Shub, 1951, p. 327). Under such a collectivist vision violence is uninhibited by considerations of an individual's just deserts. The restraint on violence was also lifted in a definitional way.

In order for a revolution to be a revolution it had to be violent: "violence is always the midwife of the old society" (Lenin, 1972). Lenin's priority on violence as essential to the revolution, as an end in itself and not just as an instrument to hold on to power, was clear to others. A leader of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party and participant in the early Bolshevik-led government said that it was this attitude to violence that distinguished the Bolsheviks: "It was soon evident that the

Bolshevik leaders—Lenin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and others—wanted to intensify the violence of events . . . absence of violence would prove that the upheaval was not sufficiently revolutionary" (Steinberg, 1953, p. 119). In January 1918, Lenin was asked: "why do we bother with a Commissariat of Justice? Let's call it frankly the Commissariat for Social Extermination and be done with it!" Lenin replied: "Well put . . . that's exactly what it should be . . . but we can't say that" (p. 145). Lenin's valuation of violence as important in itself is a departure from Machiavelli. Machiavelli's view of violence was as an instrument to get and to hold on to power, not as valuable in itself. Machiavelli could see a limit to the useful amount of violence.

The argument is that the core beliefs and management practices of these leaders led to very different outcomes in the way the civil wars were fought, and in the way these leaders addressed their common problems. The next section provides a brief overview of the two civil wars, before discussing the shared problems.

The Civil Wars

In England in 1642 a protracted constitutional dispute between King Charles I and parliament deteriorated into armed conflict. The issues concerned taxation, parliamentary approval of the king's advisers, events in Ireland, religion, and the relationship with Catholic France and other foreign powers. The king had earlier and ineffectively resorted to arms against the Scots over religious convictions. The Scots in 1638 and 1640 had illustrated the military vulnerability of Charles I. In 1642 his rash attempt to arrest parliamentary leaders failed. Both sides organized for war. Member of Parliament, Oliver Cromwell, recruited cavalrymen for the parliamentary army. London, urban and Eastern England, the wealthier parts of the country, supported Parliament. The North and West were for the king. The conflict stretched over nine years. The first war ended in 1646 with the king's forces defeated and the king in custody. The second war saw the Scots intervening unsuccessfully on the side of the king, and lasted some months in 1648. The conflict ended in 1651 with the defeat of the Scottish-supported heir to the throne at Worcester. Oliver Cromwell's military reputation was established in the first war, with his notable contributions at the battles of Marston Moor and Naseby. In 1648 he took to the field to defeat Royalist uprisings and a Scottish army at Preston. In 1649 he defeated the Royalist threat in Ireland. It was in that theater of conflict that

Cromwell and his forces committed atrocity and came closest to providing support for the claim Lenin made in his letter.

The Russian Civil War was shorter but involved far greater loss of life. In 1917, Lenin and his fellow Bolsheviks took the opportunity created by the World War I, food shortages, the czar's abdication, and the political uncertainties of provisional government to seize power. In contrast to Parliament, the Bolsheviks did not give the captive czar the freedom to exchange ideas and to negotiate and then to commit to further conflict. The Bolsheviks formed the Red Army and the Cheka or Vecheka, the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Sabotage, and Speculation, to carry through their revolutionary program. The Cheka was the special agency set up in December 1917 by the new government to deal with the enemies of revolution. Internally, these enemies included other political parties such as the Left Socialist Revolutionaries, Czarists, and other social and politically defined groups who they considered obstacles to realizing their vision of the Greater Good. From abroad, the Bolsheviks faced German, Polish, and other hostile powers. In the countryside, peasants organized to resist both White and Red Armies. Finally, the Bolsheviks (Communists from March 1918) faced resistance from within their own forces with the mutiny of the naval garrison at Kronstadt.

Both civil wars started as political struggles that displaced authoritarian monarchies. Neither was primarily a separatist or ethnic struggle. It is sometimes claimed that ethnic and separatist civil wars are notably violent (Walter, 2009). Both civil wars saw foreign interventions. Both were fought in the context of major and very destructive international wars. And many of the combatants in the civil wars had seen service in these major international wars. The English Civil War—a war that was fought across England and in Wales, Scotland, and Ireland—began in the final stages of the Thirty Years' War. And the Russian Civil War began in the final stages of World War I. In both wars, the stakes for the participants and political leaders were very high, but the levels of violence and deceit employed by the leaders were very different. This difference is illustrated in the way they addressed their common problems.

Problem One: Captive Monarchs

Nicholas II was shot at night in the cellar of a house in a provincial city. The czar's family and members of his staff were shot as well. Ostensibly

it was a decision of the local Cheka. Lenin took no responsibility. In contrast, Charles I was beheaded in daylight in the capital on January 30, 1649. He spoke from the scaffold, indicated when the axe should fall, and his audience was heard to groan in sympathy. The warrant was signed by Oliver Cromwell and others. The king's family survived. Prior to his execution he was allowed to reassure his young children and urged them to forgive. The regicides took the trouble to sew the head to the body and he was buried in Windsor Castle (Royle, 2005, p. 506).[2] As executions go, Charles had a dignified exit. Headless in Whitehall, he was popular.

To regain public support for Cromwell and his new regime, John Milton, newly appointed as Secretary for Foreign Tongues (yet to write of being "eyeless in Gaza"), defended the decision to execute the king. In 1649, he argued the case as a liberal social contract theorist would, a couple of years before the publication of *Leviathan* (1651) and 40 years before Locke's *Second Treatise* (1689). In *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates* (February 13, 1649), he appealed to individual reason over the tyrannies of "custom" and "blind affections" and claimed that "all men naturally were borne free . . ." (Milton, 1962, p. 198). Government was a response to the tendency of individuals for "falling among themselves to doe wrong and violence" and to avoid judging in one's own case (p. 199). It was efficient to consent to a common authority to sort out violations of "peace and common right." But he is clear that this decision to delegate is conditional. It was "manifest that the power of Kings and Magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferr'd and committed to them in trust from the People, to the Common good of them all, in whom the power yet remaines fundamentally, and cannot be tak'n from them, without violation of thir natural birthright" (p. 202). The king is the "agent" of the people and is accountable. At the same time, he is aware of the volatile nature of public opinion. Observing the shift in popular support as a result of the execution in *Eikonoklastes*, Milton says it will "gaine him after death a short, contemptible, and soon fading reward" and may "catch the worthless approbation of an inconstant, irrational, and Image-doting rabble." He continues, "the rest, whom perhaps ignorance without malice, or some error, less then fatal, hath for the time misled, on this side of Sorcery or obduration may find the grace and good guidance to bethink themselves, and recover" (p. 601). Those who think for themselves, rather than as a crowd, know the justice of the case against the king. He argues that the king had caused the loss of life in the civil war, was willing to betray his country to the Irish and Scots to hold on to

his throne, and was fundamentally untrustworthy: "He lays down his Armes, but not his Wiles" (p. 545). In contrast, Cromwell is in Milton's sonnet "our chief of men."

Parliament prepared for the king's trial by passing a resolution "that the people are, under God, the original of all just power" (Fraser, 1973, p. 276). According to Antonia Fraser's account "it was clear that the actions of the Commons were not only inimical to the large majority of the population of England—not one in twenty supported it said Lord Northumberland—but the slender nature of their support was well known to the men concerned" (p. 278). Of the 135 "Commissioners" chosen to sit in judgment, only a minority attended. It was difficult to find a judge willing to serve, and the one they found wore armor beneath his robes (p. 280). The Scots denounced the execution and crowned his heir: "the execution of the king... horrified even those Scots who had hitherto been the king's bitterest opponents, and swung the whole country round into opposition to Cromwell and the Commonwealth" (Mackie, 1962, p. 175). Elsewhere, "an English envoy was murdered at the Hague... France refused to recognize the republic, put an embargo on English imports... Russia imprisoned English merchants... In protestant Germany, Scandinavia, and the United Provinces the pulpits rang with denunciations of the regicides... In Ireland Ormonde had made terms with the Confederate Catholics and was threatening Dublin with a formidable army" (Buchan, 1971, p. 329). In Ireland, "news of the trial and execution of the king deeply shocked the settler community, and the vast majority instinctively rallied to the royalist cause" (Ó Siochrú, 2008, p. 54). It was an action that cost political support at home and abroad.

When negotiation with the king failed, and he had demonstrated his willingness to continue armed conflict even in captivity, Cromwell had no alternative to judicial execution. It was a trial of a man who had waged aggressive war, or "a man of blood." Cromwell later described it as "the execution of exemplary justice upon the prime leader of all this quarrel" (Fraser, 1973, p. 294). Whatever the fairness of victors presiding over war crimes trials, it was a visible, attributable act. In pursuing this judicial course, Cromwell was aware of the lack of support even from within his own ranks. He knew that the survival of bitter relatives endangered his own family. Given the political and possible personal costs, Machiavelli would not have advised this course of action. It was not the "Borgia option" of midnight murders and finding scapegoats.

An opportunist would have killed the king and evaded accountability. He would not have signed the warrant for public execution.

Counterfactually, if Cromwell had been an opportunist, the king would have died while attempting to escape, out hunting, or of an illness. There is no evidence that Cromwell even considered such a course. Instead, Cromwell first attempted to cooperate with Charles. The king refused and struck a secret bargain with the Scots in order to regain his throne. Only after that did Cromwell pursue judicial execution while putting his own accountability to the fore. As historians point out, the strategy of murder and hunting accidents had precedent. King William Rufus had a hunting accident, and Richard II, Henry VI, and Edward V died in custody or were murdered (Edwards, 1999, p. xiii). But Cromwell did the opposite. He even took measures against others following such a strategy. Informed of the possibility of the king being killed in custody, he alerted the guards to this "most horrid act" (Abbott, 1937, I, p. 552). The contemporary royalist historian, the Earl of Clarendon, reported that some military officers were "for the taking away of his life by poison; which would make least noise; or, if that could not be so easily contrived, by assassination" (Clarendon, 1978, p. 528). Clarendon explains: "whilst he was alive . . . there would be always plots and designs to set him at liberty . . . and in a short time a faction . . . may be in the army itself . . . Whereas, if he were confessedly dead, all these fears would be over; especially if they proceeded with that circumspection and severity towards all his party as in prudence they ought to do" (pp. 528–29). Clarendon notes the risks the king took in attempting escape: "The making of an escape, if it were not contrived with wonderful sagacity, would expose him to be assassinated by pretended ignorance, and would be charged upon himself" (1849, p. 287). In short, and although he knew it to be unpopular and entailed costs, Cromwell acted according to his conception of the collective good as he saw it—to avoid further bloodshed instigated by an untrustworthy opponent. He could have achieved this end by other means. Instead he chose accountability at considerable political cost and personal risk. The royalist historian describes Cromwell resisting Machiavelli:

> He was not a man of blood, and totally declined Machiavel's method, which prescribes, upon any alteration of a government, as a thing absolutely necessary, to cut off all the heads of those, and extirpate their families, who are friends to the old [one.] And it was confidently reported, that in the council of officers it was more than once proposed that there might be a general massacre of all the royal party, as the only expedient to secure the government; but Cromwell would never consent to it . . . (p. 110)

For a general massacre of a royal party we have what took place on the night of July 16–17, 1918, in Russia.

Cheka agents and Latvian riflemen shot Czar Nicholas, his family, and his staff. They burnt and buried the bodies. The official Soviet account was: "the Ural Territorial Soviet decided to shoot Nicholas Romanov . . . the wife and son of Nicholas Romanov were sent to a safe place" (Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 92–94). Accountability is difficult to nail down even for so prominent a victim. There is some consensus that Lenin made the decision. The timing was in the context of the movement of a Czechoslovak legion that had fought with the Russians against the Germans in World War I. This legion was now opposed to the Bolsheviks and close to Yekaterinburg where the czar and family were held (Mawdesly, 2007, p. 137). Given the victims, and with Lenin's attention to detail, it is unlikely he did not authorize it. A leading Bolshevik was later quoted as saying: "We decided it here. Ilyich believed that we shouldn't leave the Whites a live banner to rally around . . . " (Leggett, 1981, p. 66).[3] On July 17, other members of the Romanov family were murdered elsewhere. The announcement was that they had been abducted, and the previous month the czar's brother and his English secretary had been shot (Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 92–94). The contrasts between the two solutions to the captive monarch problem are stark: general massacre versus single execution; midnight shooting versus public execution; disposal of bodies versus Windsor Castle burial; and clear leader accountability versus no clear accountability. Both leaders were in the grip of ideas. Lenin saw "terror" and collective punishment as "just and legitimate" in the interests of revolutionary progress. Cromwell is in the liberal tradition of individual accountability and the rule of law.

Problem Two: Peasant Resistance and Mutineers

In both civil wars, peasants managed to solve coordination problems and work together to defend their lives and property. In itself this is an interesting development, and the rational expectation is that there would have been some elite involvement in organizing such solutions (see Weingast, 1997). With the Clubmen of the English Civil War there was some "entrepreneurial" work by clergy. With the Greens in Russia concepts of "peasant justice" and anarchism inspired some leaders (see Brovkin, 1994, p. 562). While the ability of these informal groups to

form is of analytical interest in itself, I focus on the contrasting reaction to armed peasant resistance.

The Clubmen Associations organized to defend lives and property against soldiers from both sides in the conflict (Wedgwood, 1959, p. 429; Morrill, 1999, p. 133). Cromwell dismissed those involved in these groups as "poor silly creatures" (Fraser, 1973, p. 168) and asked permission of Thomas Fairfax to release those he had taken prisoner. They were "to have the liberty to defend themselves against plundering" (Abbott, 1937, I, p. 369). While the English Clubmen presented a parallel opportunity to the Greens for massacre, they were tolerated within limits.

The Greens, labeled for their forest locales, fought both the White and Red armies. Food shortages and starvation in the cities meant forced requisition of agricultural produce and the mobilization demands of the Red Army made peasants the target of conscription (Figes, 1990, p. 179). The Bolshevik response to Green uprisings was execution and deportation (see Brovkin, 1994, p. 562). Lenin had some use for the Greens. In an August 1920 note to a colleague he wrote: "A beautiful plan. Finish it off together with Dzerzhynski. Disguised as 'Greens' (and we'll pin this on them subsequently), we'll advance for 10–20 versts and hang the kulaks, priests, and landowners. he prize: 100,000 rubles for every man hanged" (quoted in Service, 1995, p. 42).

A more severe test of a leader's restraint was resistance from within the armed forces. Both civil wars saw mutinies motivated by revolutionary, not counterrevolutionary sentiments. In 1921, the Red Army under Mikhail Tukhachevskii fought the 15,000 defenders of the naval fortress on Kronstadt off St. Petersburg (Petrograd) to their death (Leggett, 1981, p. 327). The sailors wanted democratic freedom for the non-Communist left, free speech for workers, peasants, anarchists, and left socialist parties, freedom of assembly for trade unions and peasant associations, the release of socialist political prisoners, an end to the Cheka and the death penalty, and equal rations. Lenin's position was that "we must counter it with rifles, no matter how innocent it may appear" (Lenin, 1965b). Lenin lied about the sailors' political views and denounced them as Whites and counterrevolutionary:

> the Socialist Revolutionaries and the bourgeois counterrevolutionaries in general resorted in Kronstadt to slogans calling for an insurrection against the Soviet Government of Russia ostensibly in the interest of the Soviet power. These facts fully prove that the White Guards strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as

> Communists, and even as the most left-wing Communists, solely for the purpose of weakening and destroying the bulwark of the proletarian revolution in Russia. (Lenin, 1965c)

It is plausible to argue that by 1921, with the formation of the Red Army and the defeat of the White Armies, there was an opportunity for more restraint. These were former comrades and they were committed to revolution.

Once the fortress was taken by the Red Army, the surviving defenders were shot or executed at a later date (Leggett, 1981, p. 327; Shub, 1951, p. 361; Getzler, 1983, p. 244). This lack of restraint did not reflect reciprocity and was not proportionate to the practices of the mutineers: "the worst that befell the imprisoned Communists was the confiscation, on 10th and 12th March, of their boots, sheepskins and great coats for use of the soldiers manning the outer defenses" (Getzler, 1983, p. 241). Lenin's use of repression was generally disproportionate to the threat. Whoever posed the threat, former comrades or not, was dealt with similarly. In contrast, Machiavelli thought that at some point there could be too much cruelty. Fear was useful to a Prince but not "hatred." It could prompt "backlash" violence and increased resistance.

In comparison with the response to Kronstadt, Cromwell managed the threat from mutinous "Leveller" soldiers with minimal force. The Levellers were a democratic political movement that attracted support within the parliamentary New Model Army. They were for manhood suffrage, a republic, freedom of religion, and economic reform. They proposed free schools and welfare policies, and made common cause with the ordinary people of Ireland. The first response of Parliamentary commanders Cromwell and Thomas Fairfax was to engage in debate with the Levellers in October through November of 1647. The unrest in the army came to a head in the spring of 1649 in the context of mobilization for the war in Ireland. In March the Leveller leader, John Lilburne, was arrested. He was later tried and acquitted (Royle, 2005, p. 510). By May soldiers in some regiments were refusing to fight in Ireland and "many of them made public statements that they would take no part in any military action against a people, the Irish, whose liberties were under threat" (p. 511). Cromwell and his loyal regiments captured about 400 mutineers and held them in Burford Church, Oxfordshire. Three mutineers were shot in the churchyard. The rest were subjected to a speech by Cromwell and released (pp. 513–14). Money was found to make up for arrears in military pay, which was one of the causes of the unrest.

Problem Three: Noncombatants

Historians give a total mortality figure of about 10 million for the Russian Civil War, including deaths from famine and disease (Read, 1996, p. 191). For the Crimea, Sergey Melgounov (1926) reports from 50,000 to 150,000 killed (p. 76). Robert Conquest (1971) gives a total of 200,000 executed up to 1923, which rises to 500,000 if deaths in custody and killings of insurgents are included (p. 11). Dmitri Volkogonov (1996) comes up with an estimate of 1.7 million for Bolshevik terror (p. 145). More broadly, Taisia Osipova states:

> The total casualties of armed peasant detachments, the Greens, deserters, and other insurgents were 1 million, counting those who were killed or executed or who died in prisons and concentration camps. The casualty rate was even higher among the civilian population in areas of the most serious insurgencies. The civilian casualties of the Red Terror in those areas were estimated at 5 million. (Ospiova, 1997, p. 173)

Of particular importance in understanding leadership in conflict and the leader's relationship with his agents is the incidence of rape and sexual violence. The incidence of rape is a direct measure of a leader's attention to the management of delegated violence and the principal-agent problem in militaries. It is an "agent-centered" violation of humanitarian and human rights laws (see Butler, Gluch, & Mitchell, 2007). Among violations of human rights, and not ruling out the use of sexual violence as a "weapon of war," it is most easily identified as motivated by an agent's private interests rather than strategic interests.

Women being sent to "wash the barracks" (Brovkin, 1994) was contemporary Russian military slang for rape (pp. 96, 121). Melgounov (1975) says, "dozens of cases of rape have taken place in Morshansk" (p. 128). Brovkin (1994) suggests that in the suppression of the Don Cossacks, rape and plunder were widespread (p. 559). In Isaac Babel's diary of his summer spent with the Red Cavalry (Kuban Cossacks) in Poland, shooting prisoners and rape were the routine: "The Jews look for liberation—and in ride the Kuban Cossacks," was his ironic entry for July 21, 1920 (Babel, 2002, p. 28). A Cheka official reported that "instead of pursuing the fleeing army, Budyonny's Army preferred to spend its time in looting and drunkenness in Rostov. Local comrades have spoken of atrocities in the pogroms carried out by Budyonny's

men" (quoted in Murphy, 2000, p. 194). The Red Army had regulations. However, historian D. Fedotov White describes these regulations as "more in the nature of a blueprint of a building the Soviet authorities expected to erect in the future" (Fedotov White, 1944, p. 112). Women were not identified as victims by the logic of Lenin's revolutionary political argument that identified the groups to be the target of violence. They formed part of the agents' Homeric incentive structure and Bolshevik commanders were not sufficiently interested to reform or correct for their agents' behavior.

Finally, loot or ordinary monetary gain was on the minds of some of the agents: "Letts [Latvians] flock to the Extraordinary Commission of Moscow as folk emigrate to America, and for the same reason—to make their fortune" (quoted in Gerson, 1976, p. 60). Chamberlin states: "The Cheka acquired a reputation not only for inhuman cruelty, but also for blackmail and corruption. Its real or self-styled agents not infrequently took bribes from friends or relatives of prisoners . . . " (Chamberlin, 1935, pp. 71–72). Even senior Cheka officials like Latsis were open about the problem of adverse selection: "Often unworthy elements, sometimes even counterrevolutionaries, attached themselves to the Vecheka, some for motives of personal gain" (quoted in Leggett, 1981, p. 188). In the Russian Civil War both leaders and followers contributed to raising the level of violence.

For the English Civil War, historian Charles Carlton (1998) says, "compared to other wars, both ancient and modern, few folk became victim of atrocities" (p. 272). Barbara Donagan (1994) describes it as "unusually benign" (p. 1137). The incidence of rape was low: "one sign of the comparative lack of gratuitous violence was a remarkable absence of rape in the British civil war" (Carlton, 1992, p. 259). Lenin's seventeenth-century counterpart protected noncombatants, ensured that his soldiers knew what was expected of them, and punished those who did not meet expectations. Cromwell paid attention to recruitment: "I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did. And from that day forward I must say to you, they were never beaten . . ." (Abbott, 1947, IV, p. 471). The rule of law extended to the Parliamentary New Model Army. It had clear standards of conduct described in its articles of war. Cromwell saw to it that the standards were promulgated and he punished those who deviated. The worst of the Parliamentary atrocities were in Ireland, so it is worth examining what went wrong there.

It began well. On landing in Ireland, Cromwell made a public declaration that his army was unlike other armies. It was not like the Catholic and Protestant armies the Irish people were used to. In Dublin on August 24, 1649, he ordered the publishing "throughout all Ireland" of a promise of good treatment:

> Whereas I am informed that, upon the marching out of Armies heretofore, or of parties from Garrisons, a liberty hath been taken by the Soldiery to abuse, rob and pillage, and too often to execute cruelties upon the Country People: Being resolved . . . diligently and strictly to restrain such wickedness for the future, I do hereby warn and require all Officers, Soldiers, and others under my command, henceforth to forbear all such evil practices as aforesaid; and not to do any wrong or violence toward Country People, or persons whatsoever, unless they be actually in arms or office with the Enemy; and Not to meddle with the goods of such, without special order. (Abbott, 1939, II, p. 111)

He hanged two of his men for plundering days later.

On September 11, 1649, Cromwell led the assault on Drogheda after earlier failed attempts. Once in the town, he took no prisoners. He ordered the killing of those in arms (Fraser, 1973, p. 340). Cromwell had asked the garrison to surrender. The English commander, Sir Arthur Aston, refused. Historians point out that given the refusal, Cromwell was not bound under contemporary rules of warfare to show mercy. Cromwell's victims were not defined by national identity. They were defined by their bearing arms against him. The victims included English Protestant and Irish Catholic soldiers. He killed Catholic clergy at Drogheda. He saw them as in the service of foreign powers and held them responsible for instigating a massacre of Protestants in 1641. Catholic priests were "treated more or less as officers in a hostile army, and put to death in circumstances in which officers were executed, but there were also instances of their lives being spared, and Cromwell was more merciful than the old Protestants such as Broghill and Coote" (Corish, 1976, p. 382). When Catholic clergy tried to galvanize the resistance to Cromwell in December 1649, they accused Cromwell of a policy of massacre and banishment. He angrily refuted this claim in his "Declaration of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, for the Undeceiving of deluded and seduced People: which may be satisfactory to all that doe not willfully shut their eyes against the light . . ." and challenged them to "give us an instance of one man

since my coming into Ireland, not in arms, massacred, destroyed or banished…" (Abbott, 1939, II, p. 203). He admitted the slaughter of the prisoners and those in arms.

Cromwell's own account of his Irish campaign details the slaughter committed on his order. His reputation is forever disfigured by Drogheda. But the weight of recent historical interpretation of the evidence does not suggest that he ordered the killing of noncombatants at Drogheda (see Bennett, 1997, p. 330; Carlton, 1992, p. 330; Fraser, 1973, p. 337; Hainsworth, 1997, p. 68). As Bennett (1997) says, "few civilians were killed; no contemporary sources suggested that soldiers killed unarmed civilians, and these have been extensively verified by modern historians" (p. 330). There is no mention of rape and sexual violence in Ireland.[4] Hainsworth states: "the story that on Cromwell's orders every man, woman and child with the town was slain is a fantasy…there is no record of women or children being killed and nobody at the time claimed that they were despite the propaganda value of such an accusation" (Hainsworth, 1997, p. 68). Nicholas Canny says that "whenever he [Cromwell] was forced by military circumstances to grant terms to besieged garrisons—notably at Clonmel—he observed the terms of the surrender to the letter" (Canny, 2001, p. 569). At Clonmel, Cromwell was outfought by Hugh O'Neill. Prior to the surrender of the town, O'Neill slipped away. When he found that he had been tricked by the Mayor, Cromwell considered reneging on the treaty conditions. But the Mayor reminded him that "his Excellency had the reputation of keeping his promises" (Abbott, 1939, II, p. 252). In early December 1649 he issues another proclamation to protect noncombatants: "I am informed that the horse under my command…do behave themselves outrageously towards the inhabitants, not contenting themselves with such provisions as they are able to afford them, but do kill their sheep and other cattle.. I do hereby straightly charge and command all soldiers to forbear such like practices upon the pain of death …" (II, p. 175). He is concerned about local governance, not deliberately targeting civilians.

On New Year's Eve, 1649, he writes to the town clerk of London: "we have a great opportunity to set up…a way of doing justice amongst these poor people, which, for the uprightness and cheapness of it, may exceedingly gain upon them, who have been accustomed to as much injustice, tyranny and oppression from their landlords, the great men, and those that should have done them rights, as, I believe, any people in that which we call Christendom…Sir, if justice were freely and impartially administered here, the foregoing darkness and corruption would make it look so much the more glorious and beautiful" (Abbott,

1939, II, p. 187). Abbott says "save for the sparing of noncombatants and the fact that the town was neither looted nor burned, the capture of Drogheda resembled more closely than any other action of the Civil Wars, those terrible massacres to which Europe had been accustomed in the preceding Thirty Years' War" (II, p. 121). But what also separated Cromwell from other military leaders, then and now, is his willingness to take responsibility.

Without mitigating the atrocity, responsibility was taken by the "murdering bastard," as Cromwell was called by the Irish Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern in 1997. Apparently Ahern demanded Cromwell's portrait be removed when he visited the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in 1997 (Ó Siochrú, 2008, p. 1; Bennett, 2008). Cromwell wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House Commons, William Lenthall, just after the atrocity at Drogheda. He said, "being in the heat of action, I forbade them to spare any that were in arms in the town, and, I think, that night they put to the sword 2,000 men." He describes the terrible burning of other defenders in a church: "these being summoned to yield to mercy, refused, whereupon I ordered the steeple of S. Peter's Church to be fired…" (Abbott, 1939, II, p. 126). As he suggests in his own words, he lost self-control in the heat of the action. Participating in rather than delegating the violence, he lost control of himself and sought the agent's reward of vengeance.

He offered further justification in terms of reciprocity for earlier atrocities and making future sieges unnecessary, saying that it was an action "which otherwise cannot but work remorse and regret." The 1641 massacre of Protestants was inflated, as historians have noted, and used for political purposes, as Drogheda was later to be used by Irish nationalists and the Catholic Church. This justification does not serve him as well as the sorrow he almost expressed. But he did take responsibility. He did not let the blame fall to his soldiers and plead "vain command." He did not say that he had lost control of his men. As one biographer has put it, "In Ireland he was false to his own creed. Never in the English wars, except at Basing, had he been anything but merciful.He knew that he had erred and therefore he tried to justify his conduct to Lenthall, a thing, it may fairly be said, that no other soldier of the day would have dreamed of" (Buchan, 1971, p. 353). Cromwell did not evade his responsibility, either in September 1649 or in January of that year with the execution of the king.

Table 7.1 summarizes the common problems and contrasting strategies adopted by the two leaders.

Table 7.1 Cromwell and Lenin: Parallel Problems and Diverging Strategies

Parallel Problems	*Diverging Strategies*	
	Cromwell	*Lenin*
Captive Monarch	Public trial and execution	Cellar shooting and murder of family
Mutiny and Peasant Resistance	Minimal force against Clubmen and Levellers	Massacre of Kronstadt sailors and Greens
Noncombatants	Low levels of violence and rape	High levels of violence and rape

Discussion

I have argued that Machiavelli's analysis and advice is useful in positioning the leaders involved in these wars. With emphasis on the intervention of leaders, his analysis suggests that events are explained by motives and opportunities. His advice is that effective leaders must be willing to use deception and unaccountable violence. Lenin followed his advice but did not subscribe to his analysis of political change. Cromwell followed his analysis, but not his advice.

Lenin's collectivist analysis of historical change and the determinants of conflict and violence is at odds with Machiavelli's focus on a leader's motives and his opportunities. But Lenin followed Machiavelli's prescriptions for holding on to power. He evaded accountability for his actions, slaughtered relatives, and lied about former comrades. He sought the "greater good of all." Any means was palatable given that end.

Cromwell likely would have subscribed to Machiavelli's analysis of the importance of individual action. But he parted company with the Italian on the necessities for successful leadership. Machiavelli did not think a good man could be a good Prince. In contrast, Cromwell saw no contradiction between the rules that governed his private life and his public life. Cromwell had un-Machiavellian virtues. He valued toleration, individual freedom, and excepting Drogheda, he avoided cruelty. He kept promises to enemies. His values carried through to the implementation of violence. He had the commitment to exercise the responsibility of command and manage the problems associated with delegation. He was careful about who he recruited. He tried to make his agents value their positions and have some conscience about what they did. He set clear standards of conduct, and he monitored and enforced those standards.

Both leaders were modest and not given to flattering portraits or cults of personality. But their individual decisions and their management of their followers had enormous consequences for collective well-being. Not all wars are equally hellish as this comparison of the Russian and the English, Scots, and Irish wars illustrates. Who is in charge and their motivations make a difference, as Machiavelli knew.

Notes

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1. This chapter draws directly on the argument and the discussion of the Russian and English Civil Wars in Mitchell (2004).
2. With the restoration, and in contrast, Cromwell's body was exhumed, hung, decapitated, and exposed to public vilification. His head was put on a pole.
3. See Volkogonov (1994, p. 209) and Steinberg and Khrustalev (1995) for a discussion of the evidence.
4. One recent account cites a royalist cleric: He describes how, "parliamentary troops shot through the windows of his house, where over thirty Protestants had gathered seeking sanctuary, killing one person and seriously wounding another. The soldiers broke into the building, discharging their weapons, before the timely intervention of an officer known to the dean restored order" (Ó Siochrú, 2008, p. 89). From this description, the claim is that "according to the one surviving civilian account of the storming of Drogheda, troops of the New Model Army deliberately attacked non-combatants in their homes" (Ó Siochrú, 2008, p. 89). The cleric's account, which was known to earlier historians (Abbott, 1939, II, p. 121), would also support the argument that Cromwell and his officers sought to control their soldiers and protect noncombatants from collateral violence.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

A Hippocratic Oath for Philanthropists

Michael Moody

The primary principle in the Hippocratic Oath—"seek to do good, but do no harm"—is a useful way of summarizing the ideal ethics of philanthropy, illuminating both the goals and the dilemmas of philanthropic leaders. This chapter explores how both parts of this ethical commitment can be applied to the essential yet risky work of philanthropists, including donors, volunteers, and nonprofit organizations. Questions about the good and potential harm done by two prominent philanthropic organizations—the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and Teach for America—are reviewed in depth, along with other examples. The challenges of seeking to advance a vision of the public good through philanthropy are discussed, and a detailed list of types of potential harm is presented. Practical suggestions for how philanthropists can minimize harm conclude the chapter.

★ ★ ★

Most people probably have some vague familiarity with what has come to be called the "Hippocratic Oath," and might know that newly minted doctors commit to this ethical pledge in some way. Some people might even be able to quote what is usually considered the key vow in that oath, the promise to "first, do no harm." While it is undoubtedly good that the doctors who provide our health care are sworn to uphold some sort of ethical code, when it comes to the specifics of that code, most of us know very little.

For one thing, the phrase "first, do no harm" is not actually in the Hippocratic Oath—in either the various translations of the ancient

oath or in the modern restatements of the oath that are recited by the graduates of nearly every medical school today. The original oath—reputedly composed by Hippocrates around 400 BC (although there is no definitive evidence of authorship)—contains a list of principles and practices for physicians (Miles, 2003). The key vow has a physician promise to prescribe "dietetic measures" or other palliative measures "for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment," while also keeping patients "from harm and injustice" (Edelstein, 1943/1967, p. 6).[1] However, other parts of the original oath have the doctor promise to give women neither an "abortive remedy" nor a "deadly drug" if asked, and to refrain from sexual relations with anyone—"female or male . . . free or slaves"—in the houses he visits (Edelstein, 1943/1967). You can see why the oath was often accompanied by gasps or snickers (or both) when medical schools began to incorporate it into graduation ceremonies in the twentieth century. The call to Apollo and other gods and goddesses to serve as witnesses didn't help either.

So medical schools began to rework the oath to fit the modern realities of medicine, to emphasize the public trust placed in doctors and their professional responsibility to patients, and often to edit out the more controversial parts. A popular restatement of the oath, written by Dr. Louis Lasagna in 1964 while he was on the faculty of Johns Hopkins, also does not contain the words "do no harm." And it too has doctors promise to use their "ability and judgment" to "apply, for the benefit of the sick, all measures [that] are required." The modern oath emphasizes treating patients as humans instead of mere cases, with "warmth," "sympathy," "humbleness," and a willingness to work with other physicians when necessary to meet the profession's primary goal, which is the good of the patient (Lasagna, 1964, p. 1). A content analysis of the various versions of the oath used in American medical schools found that these positive, "good of the patient"-oriented vows were common. Some sort of explicit promise to "act with beneficence" was found in 60 percent of oaths, while admonitions to not do harm were only found in 18 percent; however, reminders to protect patient confidentiality (a sort of social harm to be avoided, if you will) were the most common element at 91 percent (Kao & Parsi, 2004).

Reviewing the ethical promises that doctors make at this specific level, then, shows us that "first, do no harm" is an accurate but inadequate summary of what doctors pledge as they set about their healing

interventions in our lives. The first ethical prescription for doctors is in fact to "do good," or at least to *seek* to do good by keeping the "benefit of the patient" as their primary goal and by using their "ability and judgment" to seek this goal. Still, doctors do promise to be vigilant to ensure that their interventions do not cause harm to patients, either physically or otherwise.

Therefore, the primary principle that guides ethical doctors is better summarized as "*seek to do good, but do no harm*."And it is not just the individual patient who benefits from doctors following ethical guidelines such as this. Principled medical work, whether by a cadre of trained professionals or indigenous healers, is necessary for the greater good of any society—a point we are reminded of whenever we debate our national health care policy. Doctors play an essential social role, and anyone playing such a role should, in a good society, take that role seriously and agree to uphold principles such as the Hippocratic Oath.

Applying the Oath to Philanthropists

Robert Payton and I have suggested elsewhere (Payton & Moody, 2008) that this maxim of "seek to do good, but do no harm," might also serve as an ethical guideline for philanthropists, for those who seek to heal our society's ills instead of our physical ones. Philanthropists, like physicians, serve an essential public role in any society, but we are even more uncertain of the principles they can or should follow in fulfilling this role. (Most philanthropists are unclear on this point also.) In this chapter, I argue in more depth that this maxim—seek to do good, but do no harm—is a compelling and quite useful way of capturing the ideal ethics of philanthropy. I explore how both parts of this Hippocratic Oath help illuminate some of the goals and the dilemmas faced by philanthropists—from the Gates Foundation to those providing emergency aid in Haiti—and I raise some questions that philanthropists implementing such an ethical commitment will likely confront.

The definition of "philanthropy" used here is broader than most, so it deserves some explanation. Philanthropy *is voluntary action for the public good* (see Payton & Moody, 2008, pp. 27ff.), and philanthropy includes not just the voluntary giving of money but also voluntary service and voluntary association through nonprofit organizations or less formal

means. So under this broad, affirmative definition, a "philanthropist" can be someone like Warren Buffett, but it can also be someone like my grandpa who volunteers at a soup kitchen, or the people who work for a nonprofit like Teach for America.

Defining philanthropy as action oriented "for the public good" is particularly important in the context of applying the Hippocratic Oath. Philanthropy encompasses any sort of voluntary intervention that seeks to fulfill any sort of vision of the greater good, whether that vision is of a world without hungry children or a world without unsaved souls. The "public" that benefits from philanthropy can be universal—for example, founding a nonprofit to seek world peace—or very particular—for example, founding a nonprofit day care center in a disadvantaged neighborhood. Like with doctors who work for the good health of their patients, we want philanthropists to be focused on the good they seek (and the harm they deter) for others, not on themselves. Philanthropy can still be personally rewarding just as medical practice is—such as through warm fuzzy feelings or your name on a building—but philanthropy is distinguished and heralded for its intention to enact some vision of the public good, some way of healing others or improving the health of society.[2]

Philanthropy by this definition is moral action, and philanthropists can be seen as moral leaders by virtue of their actions to pursue a vision of the good. Of course, moral visions of the good often differ from philanthropist to philanthropist and nonprofit to nonprofit, and again, this vision of the good is not the only motive for philanthropic work. Taken together, though, these voluntary interventions in service of the public good are responsible in large part for shaping and advancing any society's moral agenda, and for doing a great amount of good. This is why clarifying the ethical prescriptions that philanthropists follow is crucial.

As this chapter explores applying the Hippocratic Oath to philanthropy, it will become clear that both parts of the primary principle, as stated previously, require close attention—being an ethical philanthropist, like an ethical doctor, is not just a matter of "do no harm." Applying the oath to philanthropy will also prove to be much more difficult than in medicine, because there is no generally agreed upon definition of "good" and "harm" like there is (in most cases) with medicine. But exploring these questions is a good way to highlight the promise as well as the potential peril of philanthropy. It reminds us that intervening philanthropically in other people's lives—in our own communities or in the earthquake zone in Haiti—is both inherently dangerous and absolutely essential to a good society.

"Seek to do good" is an admonition to be philanthropic, something we find in some form in every society and tradition. "Do no harm" is a reminder that doing good through philanthropy is not always easy, that good results do not always follow from good intentions.

Questions about the Good and Harm Done by Prominent Philanthropists

To see how applying the Hippocratic Oath to philanthropy is both illuminating and challenging, it is helpful to look in depth at some prominent examples of contemporary philanthropists. The two examples below—The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, and Teach for America—are different in many ways. But in both cases we can see philanthropists seeking to do good through voluntary action, and critics alleging that these actions cause some harm.

The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation

It is safe to say that we are currently in a historic era for philanthropy, if only because in the past decade a philanthropic institution has emerged that dwarfs all others, past and present, at least in terms of the sheer size of its assets and grants. Simply put, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is the largest foundation in the history of the world, by far (Fleishman, 2007). When billionaire investor Warren Buffett decided in 2006 to entrust most of his philanthropic dollars to the foundation set up by his good friends, the founder of Microsoft and his wife Melinda, it meant that the Gates Foundation would thereafter combine the philanthropic commitments of two people who were for many years the two wealthiest in the world. The result is an institution with nearly $30 billion in assets, and annual grants of more than $3.6 billion (2008 figures from Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009, pp. 19, 21)—which means the Gates Foundation gives more than six and a half times more money each year than the next largest foundation.[3] The equivalent would be a single corporation that took in six times more revenue than any other on the planet.

With this amount of money committed to doing good in the world, how these philanthropists define the "good" they seek to do is enormously important. To start with, Bill and Melinda Gates have consistently held that the core value behind all of their giving is that "all lives have equal value." This value informs the foundation's grantmaking

areas and will continue to do so because of the Gates' personal involvement—the Gates Foundation is still a family foundation after all, with only Gates family members and Mr. Buffett as trustees. The foundation gives in three areas: global health (especially research and vaccinations, and especially concerning tuberculosis, HIV, polio, and malaria), global development (particularly microfinance for the poor and agricultural innovation), and a U.S. program that is focused primarily on education, libraries, and minority scholarships. These areas might seem to have broad coverage, but consider all the pressing domestic social needs and global issues that the foundation does *not* focus on (at least directly)—climate change, domestic poverty and health care, peace, civil rights, and so on. This focused vision of the intended good is by design, even if the strategy is riskier. The foundation is committed to a strategic grant-making approach that tries to generate real impact through large-scale giving to particular solutions and in selected (though large) areas.

The Gates Foundation's substantial giving in support of these focused mission areas make this institution a moral leader, a major force intervening in the world and advancing their vision of the public good. And it is hard to deny that in their avid philanthropy they meet the demands of the first part of a Hippocratic Oath. They seek to do good. Most observers would also agree that they actually accomplish a truly impressive amount of good.

Still, the Gates Foundation's success in doing good and not doing harm has been called into question. Such a high-minded, ambitious, and deep-pocketed effort was bound to be a big target for reactionary critics and reputable reviewers alike, much as the Ford Foundation was a target of both conservative and liberal critics in the 1950s–1960s because of their urban development, "Gray Areas," and "war on poverty" grants (Domhoff, 2009; Fleishman, 2007; Wooster, 2006). And indeed the Gates Foundation has received a tremendous amount of scrutiny and critique in recent years. This scrutiny has forced the Gates Foundation to ask whether some of their work might be doing as much harm as good, and how they might minimize harm going forward.

For example, because the foundation is such a major funder of research on diseases like malaria, then what the Gates Foundation experts believe to be the most promising strands of research makes a huge difference in regard to which scientists get significant funding for their work. Scientists or public health officials who espouse opposing theories or other epidemiological approaches complain that this stifles productive dialogue and experimentation (see McNeil, 2008, for just one example). Similarly, some development officials and aid workers believe that

the immense amount of available funding for Gates-identified priority areas—such as specific diseases—or solutions—such as vaccinations—draws experts, other funding sources, and public attention away from other urgent needs and alternative solutions (Piller & Smith, 2007). An intensive review of Gates Foundation funding for global health published in the journal *The Lancet* raised concerns that their funding priorities contributed to a lack of progress in dealing with many other chronic diseases, in providing basic health services outside of vaccinations, and in improving maternal and child hygiene, nutrition, and health care, all of which are essential for prevention of avoidable killers such as diarrhea (Sridhar & Batniji, 2008). These sets of critiques define harm, in a sense, as the opportunity costs associated with diverting so many resources toward one understanding of how to achieve the intended good. For its part, the Gates Foundation has proven to be relatively open to these critiques, when there is evidence to back them up, and periodically tweaks its grantmaking strategies to avoid potential harms or invest in a better idea (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009, p. 3).

The Gates Foundation's choices in their domestic philanthropy have also been challenged from this diversion of resources or opportunity cost angle. Their education funding was for many years focused on encouraging smaller schools and the development of charter schools, on the theory that these—along with their minority scholarships—were most likely to lead to improvements in failing schools and declines in achievement gaps. Recently, they have come to question this theory and are more interested in funding programs to develop more effective teachers. Foundation leaders have admitted that this massive outlay of funding for smaller schools in the United States was an "experiment" that did not yield the results they hoped—though there were some signs of improvement (Blankinship, 2009). Critics wonder how many better solutions to the education problem were denied vital funding. They argue, in effect, that even if the Gates Foundation's education funding sought to do good, it ended up doing harm.

A final major criticism of the Gates Foundation was most notably made in a series of exposé pieces in the *Los Angeles Times* by the investigative journalist Charles Piller (and associates), although he is not the only one to raise this critique (Piller, 2007a; Piller, Saunders, & Dixon, 2007). Piller focused on the investment practices of the money managers who handle the multibillion-dollar endowment of the foundation. Some foundations practice what is called "mission-related investing" in which the asset managers are required to invest endowment money

only in companies that fit with the philanthropic mission of the foundation. Piller found that this is not the case at the Gates Foundation, where the managers of the asset investments are deliberately kept organizationally separate from the grantmaking staff and priorities. The articles identified several investments that were seen to conflict with, even counteract, the good work that Gates sought to do with their grantmaking. For example, Piller pointed to major holdings in oil companies that are often charged with causing pollution-related health problems in countries where the foundation then makes health grants, and investments in pharmaceutical companies that had resisted calls to provide discounted drugs in the developing world. These challenges in a way counterpose the two sides of the Hippocratic Oath. Can the Gates Foundation be doing good with one arm and causing harm with the other? Does this corporate harm cancel out the philanthropic good? The Gates Foundation undertook a review of this question and ultimately decided not to change their investment practices (Piller, 2007b).

Teach for America

Of course, it is not just individual donors and institutional foundations that count as philanthropists seeking to do good in the world. The nonprofit organizations that do the daily work of meeting needs, and the social entrepreneurs who innovate new ways to achieve change, these too are philanthropists who struggle to adhere to the principle of "seek to do good, but do no harm."

One of the more notable success stories in the philanthropic world in the past quarter century is a nonprofit organization called Teach for America (TFA). TFA was dreamed up by Wendy Kopp, a Princeton University senior, while working on her thesis in 1989 (Kopp, 2001). Kopp was concerned with the quality of education in many disadvantaged school districts and the lack of teachers willing to teach in those schools. She imagined a program that would recruit new college graduates—eager to work for change and relatively free to go on a career adventure—train them over the summer, and place them as teachers in low-income communities across the country. They would commit to two years of service, but the hope was that a substantial number would decide to stay and make teaching their career. Kopp's vision has since proven to be as inspirational to legions of recent college graduates as the Peace Corps was in decades past. In 2009, 35,000 graduates applied for less than 4,100 slots as TFA "corps members."

This includes 11 percent of the seniors graduating from Ivy League universities that year (Teach for America, 2009).

Kopp and TFA seek to advance a general vision of the public good—the elimination of educational inequity—on which we can probably all agree, and which has certainly helped bring the education problem in the United States into public consciousness. The appeal of Kopp's moral vision, of children in troubled areas getting the better education that they deserve, is demonstrated with each new wave of applications, and TFA is known for being extraordinarily successful in garnering foundation and corporate philanthropic funding (as well as government funding). The question often raised about TFA, though, is whether it actually has the level of impact that the support for it would suggest it deserves. Does TFA actually do good and avoid harm in those communities it serves?

A number of studies have offered evidence on this question in relation to student performance outcomes. While there is considerable variance in the findings depending on methods and focus, the rough consensus is that having a TFA teacher does make a positive difference, on average, even if that difference is small. And the performance increase is mostly confined to student's math scores rather than reading (Decker, Mayer, & Glazerman, 2004). Still, there is no shortage of strong, vocal critics of the program, particularly from within the traditional education community and among teachers unions. And their arguments cut directly to the question of how TFA manages to walk the ethical line between doing good where it is clearly needed, and inadvertently causing harm to those who can least afford it.

One variety of negative assessment of TFA focuses on the fact that the corps members only commit to stay for two years (Greenwell, 2008). This is a classic sort of "band-aid" critique that is actually made against all sorts of philanthropic interventions. Not only does TFA not address the systemic causes of poor schools, this critique goes, but it only brings in temporary workers to deal with the symptoms. And what is more, it diverts resources—corporate grant funding, school district, and teacher union time, for example.—that would be better spent investing in long-term teacher recruitment and retention efforts. Like similar critiques of the Gates Foundation, these sorts of "diversion of resources" arguments are commonly leveled against TFA. They work from an assumption—usually true in education, unfortunately—of scarce resources. And so the defense of TFA that says "doing something is better than doing nothing" is rejected; while doing something might create some good, critics note, it also causes problems by keeping us from doing another,

more effective "something." This argument comes out most forcefully against TFA in cases where it appears that hiring more TFA teachers coincides with layoffs of regular, long-term teachers.

Another variety of argument against TFA focuses on the fact that TFA corps members are not necessarily trained to be teachers, beyond the intensive summer courses, before they are placed. This is said to demean the teaching profession by suggesting that being a good teacher is mostly about enthusiasm and showing up (Appleman, 2009). And worse, critics say, ill-trained TFA teachers are put into difficult classrooms where the students deserve and need the best-trained, most experienced teachers; having a teacher without training or experience further shortchanges kids who have already been shortchanged by their circumstances. Clearly this is a claim of potential harm that TFA must take seriously, and which they have tried to address by improving their training and citing research that shows it is effective (Kopp, 2001).

Perhaps the most dramatic critiques of TFA raise questions about the intentions of the young people who become corps members, doubting whether they really are seeking to do good. Some critics allege that TFA is treated more as a sort of way station for privileged kids looking to have an adventure for a couple of years before moving on to their "real" profession, or looking to pad their resumes for law school or other pursuits (Darling-Hammond, 1994). Worse, some see TFA teachers as wealthy kids looking to impose their values and worldview on their low-income students in a misguided attempt at moral and social reform. This sort of critique harkens back to another classic charge that has long been leveled against social workers and social reformers, calling them paternalistic and condescending.

Despite this review, it would be foolish to think TFA is besieged by critical evaluations and scandalous charges that constantly call their intentions and impact into question. Rather, it is a remarkably popular program, has some good quality research to back up its claims of doing good (though certainly not solving the education crisis), and has a dedicated and growing alumni network committed to sustaining the program. However, it is clear, and TFA admits, that the program is not perfect, and that potentially serious problems could result from their bold intervention into the lives of a highly vulnerable population. This is why they must be careful to listen to the range of critical views and constantly evaluate their impacts, lest they allow even inadvertent harm to come to those who so desperately need help.

Seek to Do "Good"

These examples demonstrate the essential role that philanthropists, seeking to do good, play in making society and individual lives better. The Gates Foundation puts vast resources behind a vision of the world in which everyone has an equal chance to avoid sickness and thrive. The examples also demonstrate that seeking to do good isn't easy, that others might disagree with your specific definition of good or means of achieving it, and that creating good outcomes involves more than just good intentions. Teach for America's critics disagree that placing idealistic young people into our nation's most challenging classrooms is necessarily "good" for the children in those rooms.

History is full of similar examples of individual and institutional philanthropists accomplishing public goals that we all now agree are good—from rejecting slavery, to abolishing child labor, to assisting earthquake victims, to taking care of the sick, poor, and displaced around the world, every single day. Through philanthropy people affirm and enact what they believe is good, and together these moral leaders contribute to the ongoing debate and definition of the greater good in any society. In fact, many accounts of the role and purpose of the nonprofit sector (Frumkin, 2002; Payton & Moody, 2008) argue that it is the arena where new causes are introduced, new social problems are defined, and new solutions are introduced and promoted. So the "good" that philanthropists seek changes in part over time and across cultures. This is not to say that philanthropy is the only arena in which we debate or pursue our views of the public good, just that it is an essential one—and that this public good orientation is a primary criteria for judging any philanthropic action.

We must remember that the Hippocratic maxim calls for philanthropists to *seek* to do good, not necessarily to "do good by everyone's definition." For many, using the term "public good" suggests that there is something close to an absolute, correct, objectively determined, and universally agreed public good out there, and our job is to discover it and implement it. But the reality, as Calhoun (1998) puts it, is that the public good is "forged" not "found"; it is "created in and through the public process, it does not exist in advance of it" (p. 32). The public good is constantly contested and debated, and philanthropists engage in this debate when they intervene in others' lives to enact their own view of what is good. This can lead to problems, of course, such as when a philanthropist's definition of "good" is reprehensible to the majority, or prioritizes certain needs or goals over what seem to be

much more urgent ones. A notable recent example of the latter was when the famously caustic and eccentric New York hotel magnate Leona Helmsley left the bulk of her multibillion-dollar fortune, upon her death, to a charitable trust with (somewhat vague) instructions that the money be used chiefly to support the care and welfare of dogs. While leaving money to help animals was laudatory, many felt that leaving all of the money to this purpose—especially when this would be one of the largest philanthropic grantmakers in the country—was problematic. Critics essentially questioned her definition of the public good. Less striking disagreements over what is "good" are similar to those raised in the examples above—for example, which diseases deserve priority funding and which solutions to teacher shortages will have the most impact.

The point is that honoring the first part of a Hippocratic Oath for philanthropists involves making choices about the definition of the public good they seek, and that these choices might be called into question. This is part of trying to follow an ethical principle.

The public good mission of a philanthropic endeavor is often implicit—we might just be acting on a vague feeling that we want to help. And acting with the intention of doing good does not mean that these philanthropic acts must be "altruistic" in a pure sense. In fact, there are very often tangible and intangible benefits to the philanthropist—such as applause from peers, personal satisfaction, heartfelt thanks from an earthquake victim, or a tax break—and these personal benefits are part of the philanthropist's mixed motives. The question of altruism that concerns many of the contributors to this volume—in terms of non-self-interested motives and lack of tangible return for example—is best seen as an adjunct one to the question of action toward a vision of the public good that is the focus here. What the Hippocratic Oath for philanthropists would require is simply that the action be designed to seek to do good, regardless of whether or not the philanthropist benefits from this seeking.

Types of Potential Harm

The second part of the Hippocratic Oath as applied to philanthropy certainly makes doing good even more uncomfortable and challenging. Again, history provides too many examples of how doing harm can result from trying to do good through philanthropy (see Nielsen, 1996); we might even know this from our own experiences of good

deeds going bad. There is risk whenever we intervene in other people's lives.

The range of criticisms reviewed in the examples above should give a sense of the diversity of claims of harm, or at least warnings of potential harm, made against philanthropic individuals and institutions. There is also a long tradition of passionate and often thoughtful critiques of foundations and wealthy donors that point out both their outright failures and the more hidden but insidious problems they might cause (Dowie, 2001; Fleishman, 2007; NCRP, 2009; Odendahl, 1990; Roelofs, 2003; Wooster, 2006). These critiques come from both sides of the political aisle.

So far, though, there have been few systematic attempts (e.g., Shulman, 2008) to summarize the range of types of potential harm from philanthropic interventions. Below I offer an initial list, in the hopes that others will then refine and expand it. Some of these categories of harm were illustrated above, while others emerge from the scholarly literature, commentary on philanthropic practice, and news coverage of philanthropic activities such as the recent response to the Haitian earthquake of January 2010. While most of these are defined by the cause of potential harm, implicit in each are consequences of the harm as well. A couple of these result from intentional harm, but most are ways in which philanthropists seeking to do good might unintentionally also do bad.

- *Malfeasance, Corruption, Fraud*: This is the most blatant form of harm and can take many forms, which legal scholars have reviewed (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating, 2007; Shulman, 2008). Funds donated to a nonprofit can be misappropriated or embezzled for personal gain. Volunteers can commit crimes while on site. Board members can fail to report conflicts of interest or funnel contracts to friends. Scammers can raise money for a fake charity. Food donated to Haitian earthquake victims can be hoarded and sold for profit.
- *Lack of Transparency*: In the worst cases, this sort of harm involves outright deception by philanthropic actors in a way that approaches fraud but remains legal, such as when nonprofit organizations with secret ties to politicians raise money as a way to get around campaign finance laws, or when multinational corporations make a rash of new donations in countries where they are vying for a government contract. In more subtle instances, this involves cases of intentional nondisclosure, such as nonprofits that make their major

sponsors hard to decipher, or cases in which decisions about grants are made behind closed foundation doors in ways that seem to favor certain recipients. The Foundation Center recently initiated a project known as "Glasspockets" to address this potential harm by promoting transparency by grantmakers.

- *Diversion of Resources*: The Gates Foundation, Teach for America, and even Leona Helmsley examples revealed how broadly the claim of this sort of harm can be made. This is harm by omission and opportunity cost, by diverting scarce resources (time, talent, treasure) from a more effective or efficient solution, or from a more pressing or widespread need. In the recent response to the Haiti crisis, for example, some aid organizations were criticized for soliciting and distributing donations of clothing in the first few days, when medical supplies should have been the priority. Critiques of wealthy donors giving to elite universities or arts organizations often make this claim of harm (Odendahl, 1990). A controversial recent report from the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP, 2009) made a similar critique by suggesting that scarce foundation resources were being given to groups that did not represent the truly needy.
- *Short-Term Band-Aids*: Philanthropic interventions can do harm by merely addressing the symptoms of a problem with band-aid solutions, while ignoring the persistent and systemic causes and more permanent solutions. Philanthropy can create short-term good but in doing so perhaps expand the long-term harm. Certainly this classic criticism is among those leveled against Teach for America, as noted. It is sometimes also made against foundations or individual donors who support service delivery programs but not advocacy efforts. And clearly in disaster response situations such as Haiti, observers often warn of the potential for an overemphasis—for example, in donor appeals—on short-term "relief" instead of long-term "development."
- *Faulty or Inefficient Strategy*: The two previous types can both be seen as forms of a more general category of potential harm, when a philanthropist's faulty strategy causes well-meaning efforts to fail—or, at least, to be less effective or efficient than they could be. The Gates Foundation, for example, concluded after several years of major grantmaking in education that their primary strategy of funding the creation of smaller schools was not working as well as it should, so they shifted focus to a new theory of educational change. Other foundations might not give large enough

grants, or might abandon a solution before it has a chance to work, or might have a "theory of change" that ignores a major cause of the problem, or might ignore the need to build an inclusive coalition to create lasting reforms (see Brest & Harvey, 2008; Fleishman, 2007). Some strategy problems that lead to harm arise from philanthropists going too slow, or too fast. In crisis situations like the Haiti aftermath, the impulse is often to deploy relief too quickly—for example, to create "tent cities" for survivors before adequate food supply chains and sanitation facilities can be arranged, which can then create new problems for victims. On the other hand, withholding relief supplies while proper plans are drawn up can lead to harsh criticism and the classic "paralysis by analysis" problem. A related problem can be providing the wrong sort of assistance, often because philanthropists fail to listen closely enough to what potential beneficiaries are saying. For example, a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal* told of a development NGO eagerly constructing new toilets or a small village in Peru, when what the village really needed was an irrigation system (Zaslow, 2010).

- *Faulty or Inefficient Implementation*: Sometimes the negative consequences of philanthropy come not from a faulty strategy, but a faulty implementation of strategy. This has long been a critique made of international humanitarian and development organizations, that their lack of coordination, bureaucratic bottlenecks, and ineffective systems of information sharing lead to failed programs on the ground. A report from the International Red Cross following the tsunami disaster acknowledged that the lack of reliable information dissemination caused resources to pile up in areas that did not need them, while other areas got little help (Walter, 2005). In some cases, the failure of implementation comes from a failure to adapt in the face of new information or altered circumstances.
- *Lack of Measurable Impact*: This is the primary type of potential harm that concerns many thought leaders in the philanthropic field at the moment (e.g., Brest & Harvey, 2008). The issue here is one of uncertainty about whether good or harm is resulting from a philanthropic action. A community's cherished youth literacy program might be producing real, sustainable outcomes for the kids involved, but if this cannot be demonstrated and measured, its supporters cannot know if the program is in fact achieving good or not. Without impact measures, the argument goes, we cannot optimally direct our philanthropic investments to those solutions that

do the most good and the least harm. We cannot know whether to tweak our strategy or improve our implementation.

- *Unintended Consequences*: There are myriad reasons why good intentions can lead to unexpected bad outcomes, and the likelihood of this increases as problems and solutions become more complex. If the Gates Foundation's financial investments are indeed working at cross-purposes to their philanthropic grants, as some allege, the harm that results would be an unintended consequence. And as Batson shows in his chapter in this volume, sometimes helping one person can end up hurting a lot of other people. In Great Britain the popular charity Oxfam has solicited used book donations and opened a number of local bookstores to generate revenue for their programs, but these fundraising efforts have had the unfortunate effect of hurting independent booksellers in those same towns. In Haiti, the huge influx of donated clothing and food has the potential to force some food and clothing merchants to close up shop.
- *Dependency:* Another sort of unintended consequence—that philanthropy creates dependency on the part of recipients—has been the source of an enduring critique of philanthropy. Critics have long claimed that charity causes harm by discouraging self-reliance. This view persists today in arguments for microfinance loans or for foreign assistance directed at market development instead of mere "handouts." We see it also in arguments that antipoverty nonprofits should focus on job skills training instead of grocery vouchers. A version of this problem also arises at the level of interpersonal philanthropic interaction. We know that individuals who receive a philanthropic gift often feel indebted to their benefactor, and feel an obligation to repay them somehow (Moody, 2008). And when they cannot find a way to repay adequately—they often cannot—these recipients sometimes feel resentful, or avoid contact, or otherwise suffer from the weight of their burden.
- *Reinforcing Status Quo*: In both subtle and obvious ways, philanthropy can perpetuate dominant power relations and neglect to support truly disadvantaged groups, or groups that seek more systemic social change (Odendahl, 1990; Roelofs, 2003). In a way, this is a specific form of the diversion of resources problem. The recent National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy report (NCRP, 2009) claimed that institutional philanthropy was guilty of reinforcing the status quo and underfunding social change. They called on foundations to correct this by giving half of their grant money to benefit low-income groups or those representing

communities of color, and at least 25 percent to support social justice advocacy and organizing. This type of harm can take a more nefarious tint, such as when humanitarian aid to the developing world reinforces tyrannical governance structures, or even funds warlords (Maren, 2002).

- *Paternalism and Cultural Insensitivity*: This classic criticism of philanthropic interventions in the lives of vulnerable people was seen in the Teach for America example. "Do-gooders" can cause harm by taking what some consider a condescending, paternalistic attitude, believing they know what is "good" for the targets of their interventions, and by imposing their own values instead of being sensitive to the values and situation of those they seek to help. This sort of argument was often made against Victorian-era social reformers, such as the elite students involved in the settlement house movement, and "friendly visitors" who sought to "civilize" the poor by bringing high culture into their homes (see Schwartz, 2000).
- *Favoring Philanthropist's Needs over Recipients*: As those last examples suggest, many people consider it harmful when philanthropy seems overly driven by the donor's interests and needs, especially when these are out of synch with what recipients or communities really need (Dowie, 2001). Individual donors might be attracted to a particular solution or favorite organization, ignoring evidence that another solution or group is more effective. Foundations might stick to safe, familiar giving guidelines instead of listening to what their grantees really need. Or too much attention can be paid to helping donors feel good about themselves or ensuring they have a good experience—another charge leveled against some Teach for America teachers. Eikenberry (2009) sees this sort of problem in the current spate of "cause marketing" ventures—for example, buying a cup of coffee as a way to support fair trade farming or to donate ten cents to breast cancer research. She argues that these give the illusion that collective problems can be solved by individual consumption, and might discourage people from engaging in other forms of giving that can make a bigger difference.
- *Teleopathy*: This is a term coined by Goodpaster (1991) to refer to the unbalanced pursuit of nonessential goals in organizations. In philanthropic organizations defined by the pursuit of a mission, teleopathy occurs when people lose sight of that mission as the primary goal, and let other concerns (e.g., organizational politics, career goals) determine their action. This is actually another

way in which philanthropists' needs are favored over public good goals or needs, and this teleopathy is a sickness, a pathology in an organization that can cause harm. Perhaps the most common illustrations of teleopathy are those organizations that spend nearly every dollar they raise on internal administrative expenses instead of programs—exposes often focus on these groups with unacceptable "fund-raising ratios."

- *Risks for Philanthropists:* Finally, harm can come to the philanthropists themselves as a result of their interventions for the public good. The risks of harm can be minor, as with the everyday Good Samaritans who provide a helping hand (Payton & Moody, 2008), or extraordinary, as with Holocaust rescuers, or volunteer searchers clamoring into collapsed buildings to save someone trapped inside. The potential harms can be physical, emotional, or even social and political—when a donor chooses to remain anonymous to avoid unwanted attention or potential social backlash for their giving choices for example.

This litany of types of potential harm is certainly incomplete. And the types of harm, as well as their perceived importance or prevalence, will change over time and vary across cultures. For instance, concerns about the paternalism of philanthropists grew much more common after the Victorian period, and critiques of philanthropy's support for the status quo intensified in the 1970s.

This list is also sobering, especially when we consider how many types might result from causes outside of our control. It might be the case that we will never be able to do *no* harm at all, but we can certainly work to minimize the harm we might cause. This vigilance and care is what applying the Hippocratic Oath to philanthropy requires.

Conclusion—Ways to Avoid Harm

The principle admonition in the Hippocratic Oath—seek to do good, but do no harm—nicely summarizes the ideal ethics of philanthropy. This chapter has illustrated some of the challenges ethical philanthropists face as they attempt to follow both parts of that oath. Like the work of doctors, the work of philanthropists in any society is both risky and essential. Philanthropy is a form of moral leadership in support of a vision of the good, and involves choices about the meaning of the good as well as actions that intervene in people's lives and in

our social business. These actions and choices can be challenged, and can potentially lead to harm. But these risks are necessary to advance the public good through philanthropy. Given this, it is most helpful to conclude with some brief, practical suggestions on how ethical philanthropists can minimize harm and, hopefully, maximize the good that they seek.

- *Follow the law and prioritize safety.* This is the most basic way to avoid harm. For nonprofit organizations, it means creating and enforcing policies that minimize conflicts of interest, avoid fraud, and monitor for corruption (Greenlee, Fischer, Gordon, & Keating, 2007). It also means paying close attention to risks that might affect volunteers, donors, program participants, and others, and working to protect them from those risks.
- *Take time to plan before seeking to do good.* Many of the forms of harm listed can be avoided with careful planning before engaging in philanthropy. For many donors (institutional or individual) and new nonprofit organizations, this means doing research, specifying a theory of change and strategy based on this research, anticipating potential process problems and obstacles, and so on.
- *Evaluate, and measure what you can.* "What is going on?" has been called the "first ethical question" (Payton & Moody, 2008, p. 16). Avoiding harm requires knowing what is working, what is not, and why. It involves conscientious information gathering, continual monitoring, and appropriate measurement when possible. This evaluation can help avoid harm particularly if it focuses on intended outcomes, if it compares the current approach to alternate strategies or solutions, if it assesses whether long-term success in being sacrificed for short-term wins, and if it looks for unintended consequences. In addition, the information gathered should be shared to the extent possible, like Teach for America does on its Web site.
- *Be willing to adapt.* On the basis of the information on what is working and what is not, an individual or institutional philanthropist should be open and able to change course or adapt in ways that will avoid harm and increase good. Transparent midcourse corrections such as the Gates Foundations' change in their educational grantmaking should be applauded.
- *Share failures and learn from mistakes.* Failures are inevitable in risky ventures like trying to make society better through philanthropy. In fact, Warren Buffett has said that some of the grants the Gates

Foundation makes *should* fail; if none does, the foundation is not taking enough risks (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2009, p. 3). Many other people in the philanthropic world are calling for increased public sharing and dissection of failures (Brest & Harvey, 2008; Fleishman, 2007; Giloth & Gewirtz, 2009) as a way to learn from others' mistakes and to build shared knowledge of what works and what can go wrong among other things. This knowledge can steer other philanthropists away from harmful paths.

- *Listen to recipients and communities.* Many of the types of potential harm listed could be avoided if philanthropists and organizational leaders listened more closely to those "on the ground" and in the mix of the philanthropic work. This requires time and effort, but it can help avoid problems that are much more costly down the road. If information is a key to minimizing harm, then recipients, beneficiaries, community leaders, and other stakeholders are key sources of that information. New technologies make this listening much easier.
- *Be transparent and participatory.* Increasing transparency not only decreases suspicion and increases trust, but also provides extra incentive to avoid malfeasance. Opening up the process of philanthropy can also attract help from parties that would otherwise have been shut out. And beyond listening to recipients and communities, philanthropists should consider inviting those folks into the decision-making and management processes (NCRP, 2009). This is being done successful in some foundations, such as the Liberty Hill Foundation in Los Angeles and the Haymarket People's Fund in Boston (Ostrander, 1995).
- *Stay involved.* Being vigilant about doing good and avoiding harm requires both time and attention. Fully engaged donors will know quicker and better when something isn't proceeding as it should. Nonprofits that meet regularly with community members or beneficiaries will hear about unintended consequences or charges of paternalism. Being present and making a commitment to stay active also builds trust and respects the beneficiary, which can prevent harm. This is why volunteers who work with vulnerable populations—such as Big Brothers/Big Sisters, or literacy tutors—are often required to commit to a certain length of engagement.
- *When in doubt, return to mission.* In philanthropy, the mission is the ethical keystone. If tough choices need to be made, or when faced with uncertainty or changing circumstances that might lead

to problems, philanthropists would do well to use their vision of the public good as their compass. They should remember the first, essential part of the Hippocratic Oath for philanthropists: seek to do good.

Notes

1. It is also important to note that the phrase "do no harm" does appear in another of Hippocrates' writings, "Of the Epidemics," which is more reliably connected to him. In that work (Book 1, Section 2, Number 5), he writes, "The physician must…have two special objects in view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm." (1886/1939, p. 104).
2. Philanthropy is "voluntary" action in the sense of being uncoerced by law, threat, or other external compulsions forcing us to give, volunteer, or join a nonprofit against our will. This does not mean that philanthropic action is never the result of someone feeling an obligation to help; in fact, it very often is. People engage in philanthropy all the time because they feel they "should"—to meet a religious dictate to help the less fortunate, to fulfill a "duty" to pay back those who helped them in the past or for some other reason. Philanthropy as voluntary action can even be driven by other emotions such as guilt or shame, by peer pressure, or by instincts that overtake us without much conscious, rational thought. In sum, saying philanthropy is voluntary action is not an attempt to specify the proper or full motivations for philanthropy; it simply distinguishes this type of public action from, say, paying taxes.
3. Note that this asset figure is $9 billion less than 2007 because of recessionary investment losses, and that annual grantmaking is supposed to increase as more of the money committed by Buffett arrives. Note also that the Gates Foundation is intentionally giving away more than the annually required 5 percent of its endowment. The next largest foundation, the Ford Foundation, reported around $11 billion in assets total and annual grants of $539 million in 2008 (Ford Foundation, 2009, pp. 45–46). There are only a couple other foundations with assets of more than $10 billion.

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The chronological order has been followed. January 8 and then 14. Hence it should remain as is. Please note.

CHAPTER NINE

Working for the Common Good: Individuals and Groups Address the Challenges Facing the World

MARK SNYDER

How and why do people become actively involved in doing good for others and for society by taking action to respond to social problems? Such involvement in social action can take the form of participation in volunteerism and philanthropy, community groups and neighborhood organizations, and social activism and political movements. In this chapter, I draw on coordinated programs of basic and applied research that help to explain why some people become involved in social action, what sustains their involvement over time, and the consequences of such action for individuals and for society. Then, in concluding remarks, I note the relevance of this research for social policy issues of affecting individuals and society, as well as possible contributions of the social sciences to the functioning of society.

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How and why do people become involved in doing good for others and for society by taking action to respond to social problems? When and why do people step outside the confines of their own individual interests to work for the common good of all members of their communities and for the benefit of society at large? These are questions that my colleagues and I have sought to address in our studies of the psychology

of helping, prosocial behavior, and social action—studies in which we have observed people as they work, individually and collectively, to try to solve some of the problems facing society.

There are, of course, many problems facing the world, including conflict and violence, prejudice and discrimination, poverty and hunger, as just a few examples. There is a sense in which many of these problems are fundamentally human problems—problems caused by the actions of humans, and problems that can be solved only by the actions of humans. One way that people can address the problems of society is through a set of activities known variously as citizen participation, civic engagement, or social action (for reviews, see Snyder & Omoto, 2007; Van Vugt, Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000).

What Is Social Action?

In many ways, working alone and together, people act for the benefit of other people, their communities, and society at large. They donate money to charitable causes. They volunteer to help those who cannot care for themselves. They join neighborhood groups and community organizations. They vote in elections and work on political campaigns. They engage in lobbying and advocacy, and participate in social movements dedicated to causes of concern to them. These activities are all instances of people seeking to address the problems of society by engaging in various forms of *social action* (for a review, see Snyder & Omoto, 2007).

Social action is intriguing for many reasons. It involves real people engaging in real actions on behalf of real causes, often doing so over extended periods of time and at some personal cost and with some sacrifice. Moreover, social action represents a bridge between individual and collective concerns, a way for people to join their own interests with the interests of other people, to bond with their communities, and to engage with the larger society. As such, social action provides opportunities to address questions about when and why people act for the good of others and for the benefit of society.

Social action is intriguing for another reason. For, as much as social action is highly valued (after all, it is hard to disagree with the goal of making the world a better place, even if opinions vary on the best way to do so), there are no general laws, rules, or commandments that dictate that everyone must be a volunteer, that everyone must donate to charity, or even (in many countries) that everyone must vote. Rather,

when people get involved in social action, they do so because they choose to do so and because they want to do so. As such, social action provides opportunities to understand the psychology of volitional phenomena, undertaken on the initiative of individuals and groups without the requirement or the obligation to become involved.

Why Does Social Action Occur?

Clearly, social action occurs at the level of individual behaviors (such as charitable giving, volunteering, and voting) and at the level of collective actions (such as community organizations, political campaigns, and social movements). But, in many ways, social action is a curious phenomenon. For a variety of reasons, social action simply should not occur. There is no press of circumstances, no bonds of obligation, and no requirement that people involve themselves in the affairs of their communities and society. Moreover, it is effortful, and it has opportunity costs, potentially taking people away from their work, their leisure, their friends, and their families. Why, then, does social action occur? Why do people get involved in the first place? And, why do they stay involved, often doing so for extended periods of time? The question of "why" is, of course, the question of *motivation*—a question that has been addressed in theory and research.

The Role of Motivation

Across many forms of social action, investigators working from diverse perspectives and with diverse methodologies have focused on the role of motivations in understanding why people engage in it (for a review, see Snyder & Omoto, 2007). Specifically, researchers have searched for motivations that move people to seek out opportunities to *initiate* social action, and the motivations that *sustain* their actions over time.

Let us examine some of these motivations in the context of one form of social action in which the role of motivation has been extensively studied—volunteerism. Every year, millions of people around the world volunteer. These volunteers provide (among other services) companionship to the lonely, tutoring to the illiterate, counseling to the troubled, and health care to the sick. In the United States, it is estimated that some 61 million people (approximately 30 percent of the U.S. adult population) volunteered during 2005–2006 (U.S. Dept.

of Labor, 2008). Whereas the United States has long had relatively high rates of volunteerism, voluntary action can be found in countries throughout the world (e.g., Curtis, Baer, & Grabb, 2001).

Volunteerism is also an important source of helping. The helping and services of volunteers are often provided on a sustained and ongoing basis, and they frequently fill gaps in services and programs that support individuals and communities. According to one estimate, volunteers contribute more than 15 billion hours of volunteer services each year, which if it were paid labor would be worth about 240 billion dollars (Independent Sector, 2001). Volunteering delivers benefits not only to individuals and communities, but also to volunteers themselves, including positive effects on self-esteem, academic achievement, personal efficacy, confidence, optimism, health, and even a longer life for those who offer assistance to others (for a review of the literature, see Snyder & Omoto, 2008).

Volunteerism is, in addition, a special form of helping (for discussion of the features of volunteerism, see Snyder & Omoto, 2008; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Piliavin & Charng, 1990; Wilson, 2000). As is the case with many forms of social action, volunteering is performed on the basis of the actor's volition *without coercion or bonds of obligation*; as such, volunteerism differs from many other forms of helping, such as that which occurs when a person provides care for an aging parent or a sick spouse. Moreover, volunteering involves some amount of *deliberation and planning* (volunteers decide not only whether to help, but also where to help, when to help, and how to help); as such, acts of volunteering are not reflexive acts of assistance such as those that occur when bystanders respond to emergencies. In addition, volunteering typically *extends over time*—weeks, months, and years—rather than being limited to one-time special events (such as walks or runs for charity). In addition, the acts of volunteering are typically undertaken *without expectation of material compensation* or as part of one's job; as such, there is what may appear to be (and perhaps actually be) a self-sacrificing, virtuous, selfless, and altruistic quality to volunteerism. Finally, volunteers usually give their time to organizations that seek to assist causes and people who desire to be helped and even actively seek to be helped.

The prevalence of volunteerism, its conceptual importance for understanding the nature of helping, and its practical significance as a way that people work for the common good, all help to define volunteering as an important social phenomenon, worthy of scientific inquiry, both basic and applied. The key question in such scientific inquiry is: Why

does volunteerism occur? And, among the answers to that question are the motivations behind volunteering. For, what seems to characterize volunteers, and to distinguish them from nonvolunteers, is the integration of the values and ideals of helping into *motivational agendas* that link the good that volunteers do for others to good done for the self. That is, volunteers seem to be motivated to use volunteering as a way to do something for themselves (to boost their self-esteem, to make friends, to gain skills) at the same time as they do good deeds for other people. This answer to the question of why volunteerism occurs emerges from research that has articulated the motivations that promote it.

Much of this research has involved studying volunteers in service with community-based organizations, often following them over months and years as they move through the course of their service (for a review, see Snyder & Omoto, 2008). Our work has been guided by *functionalist* theorizing that emphasizes the purposes served by action and the role of such purposes in initiating, guiding, and sustaining action (e.g., Snyder, 1993; Snyder & Cantor, 1998). In the case of volunteerism, a functional analysis concerns the needs being met, the motives being fulfilled, and the purposes or functions being served by volunteer service (e.g., Snyder, Clary, & Stukas, 2000).

Research guided by functionalist theorizing has revealed that quite different motivations can and do underlie the very same actions. Thus, several people may all engage in the same form of volunteerism, but do so in the service of quite different motives, motives that can be identified and measured with reliability and validity. In fact, several inventories have been developed to assess motivations for volunteerism (e.g., Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Copeland, Stukas, Haugen et al., 1998; Omoto & Snyder, 1995), and these inventories have revealed strong family resemblances in the motivations identified across distinct groups of volunteers who span a wide range of ages, and who serve on behalf of a great variety of causes and concerns in many countries around the globe (for a review, see Snyder & Omoto, 2008).

Among the motivations identified by these inventories are personal *values*, including humanitarian concern about others and personal convictions, including religious and spiritual values. Another motivation is *community concern* and the desire to help a community, whether or not the volunteer is a member of the community. Some people volunteer for *career* reasons, seeking to bolster career and networking opportunities or to obtain career-relevant experiences and others volunteer to gain greater *understanding* or knowledge about a problem, cause, or set of people. Other motivations for volunteering include *personal development*

(e.g., developing skills, testing oneself), *esteem enhancement* (e.g., to feel better about oneself or bring stability to one's life), and *social* concerns (e.g., to meet people and make friends).

These functionally oriented motives, which weave together actions in the service of others and the quest for benefits to the self, are intimately and intricately linked to the processes of volunteerism, differentiating volunteers from nonvolunteers, predicting the behavior of volunteers, and guiding and directing the course of volunteer service. Let us now consider research relevant to these aspects of volunteerism.

Volunteer Motives Predict Volunteer Behavior

Volunteers generally score higher on these motives than nonvolunteers (e.g., Clary, Snyder, & Stukas, 1996). In addition, volunteers can be motivated by more than one motive; in fact, in one investigation, 62.9 percent of the volunteers studied had multiple motives for volunteering (Kiviniemi, Snyder, & Omoto, 2002). And, these motives predict who stays active as a volunteer. In a field study of volunteers (Omoto & Snyder, 1995), volunteer motives significantly influenced duration of service over a 2 ½ year period—and did so better than other potentially relevant predictors (such as having the traits of a "helping personality" or being part of a large and supportive social network).

These motivations form the basis for *agendas for action* in which the motivations that bring people into volunteerism set the stage for events to come over the course of service as a volunteer—with these motivations influencing the decision to become a volunteer, interacting with experiences as a volunteer, and foreshadowing the outcomes of volunteer service (for examples of research on the interweaving of motivation in the unfolding dynamics of the volunteer process, see Clary & Orenstein, 1991; Clary et al., 1998; Davis, Hall, & Meyer, 2003; Omoto & Snyder, 1995; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998; Piliavin, 2005; Simon, Stuermer, & Steffens, 2000).

Becoming a Volunteer

The processes involved in becoming a volunteer are revealed by how people respond to messages designed to encourage them to become volunteers by appealing to their motivations. Critically important in these processes is the *matching* of messages to motivation. That is, building on the diversity of potential motivations for volunteering, research has

documented that the persuasive impact of a message—whether in the form of a videotaped public service announcement, a printed brochure, or a newspaper advertisement—is greater when it directly addresses the recipient's primary motivations than when it addresses other potentially relevant motivations (e.g., Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, & Haugen, 1994; Clary et al., 1998; Smith, Omoto, & Snyder, 2001). These demonstrations attest to the power of motivationally based appeals to recruit volunteers, with these appeals especially likely to attract motivationally matched volunteers. The same matching principle is reflected over the course of volunteer service, where the interaction of personal motives and experiences as a volunteer predicts critical events in the life history of volunteers, including satisfaction with being a volunteer and intentions to continue serving as a volunteer.

Satisfaction as a Volunteer

In a field study of an "elder volunteer" program, the matching of benefits to motivation (e.g., actually making the friends or getting the esteem boost that one seeks through volunteering) predicted satisfaction with volunteer experience (Clary et al., 1998). Moreover, in a longitudinal study of the volunteer process, matching between motivations, expectations, and experiences predicted greater satisfaction and lesser burnout (Crain, Omoto, & Snyder, 1998). Additional evidence of the importance of matching volunteers' tasks and experiences to their motivations in predicting satisfaction is provided by the research of Davis, Hall, and Meyer (2003) and Houle, Sagarin, and Kaplan (2005).

Intentions to Continue Volunteering

In research on intentions to continue serving as a volunteer, Stukas, Snyder, and Clary (1999) found that the matching of benefits to motivation (e.g., looking to gain career skills through volunteering and actually gaining the sought-after career skills, discovering that volunteering actually affirms humanitarian values important to the volunteer) predicts short- and long-term intentions to volunteer among students in a campus volunteer program. Moreover, commitment to sustained service has been found to be greater among volunteers whose experiences were congruent with, or matched to, their motivations for volunteering as measured six months earlier (O'Brien, Crain,

Omoto, & Snyder, 2000). Finally, the effects of matching on intentions for continued volunteer service have also been demonstrated in laboratory analogues of volunteer activity (e.g., O'Brien, Crain, Omoto, & Snyder, 2000; Williamson, Snyder, & Omoto, 2000).

As critically important as motivations are throughout the course of service as a volunteer, there are indications that motivations may operate differently at different stages of the volunteer process. In fact, the forces that *initiate* action are not necessarily the same as those that *sustain* action. Thus, although "other-oriented" considerations such as humanitarian concern often figure prominently in the motivations reported by new volunteers, such motivations may have little predictive power in accounting for ultimate duration of volunteer service; by contrast, although "self-oriented" motivations such as esteem enhancement are relatively rare among the motivations that bring volunteers into service, such motivations can have particularly great predictive power in forecasting just how long volunteers will remain active as volunteers (Omoto & Snyder, 1995; but, see also, Penner & Finkelstein, 1998). In keeping with the critical importance of the matching of motivation and experience at various stages of the volunteer process, it may be that differences between the motivations behind the initiation and maintenance of volunteer service may reflect differences in the extent to which these motivations match the experiences that volunteers have in the course of their service as volunteers.

The particular power of self-oriented motivations suggests a possible irony—it may be that it is the most self-oriented, and perhaps even selfish, of citizens who end up making the most seemingly altruistic contributions to society through their sustained involvement in volunteerism. For this reason, it can be tempting to use the term "selfish altruists" to describe volunteers who have created the "win-win" situation of doing good for themselves at the same time as they do good for others and for society. The criteria for identifying actions as altruistic are, of course, complex (for one discussion, see Batson, 1998); nevertheless, the motivations behind volunteer service may be revealing of some of the complex intertwining of the dynamics of actions for the benefit of others and actions for the benefit of the self.

The role of motivations in volunteerism is also evident in other forms of social action. In fact, studies of phenomena as diverse as participation in social movements (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; Simon, Loewy, Stuermer, Weber, Freytag, Habig et al., 1998), organizational citizenship in the workplace (e.g., Rioux & Penner, 2001), community leadership (e.g., Bono, Snyder, & Duehr, 2005), and civic and political

participation (e.g., Miller, 2004; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) have all revealed motivations with strong family resemblances to those emerging from studies of volunteerism.

The Role of Connections to Other People and Communities

In addition to the motivations that individuals bring to volunteerism, theory and research point to important influences of other people and of social contexts. Thus, studies of volunteerism have revealed that connections to other people and to the larger community are intricately interwoven into the processes of volunteerism (Omoto & Snyder, 2002). Specifically, concerns for the well-being of one's community and the influences of other community members figure prominently in the motivations measured in samples of new volunteers. Moreover, longitudinal studies in which volunteers are followed over the course of their service and measured at successive points in time have revealed that volunteers become increasing connected with their surrounding communities, including those defined by their volunteer service organizations. And, their effectiveness as volunteers is enhanced by these community connections.

In addition, volunteering builds community. For instance, longitudinal studies of volunteerism reveal that, over time and as a consequence of their work, volunteers are increasingly surrounded by a community of people who are connected to their volunteer service; including people they personally have recruited to be volunteers (Omoto & Snyder, 2002). Moreover, as connections to a community of shared concerns increase, participation in the community, including forms of social action other than volunteerism (such as giving to charitable causes, attending fund raising events, and engaging in social activism), also increase (Omoto & Malsch, 2005). Finally, volunteering can and does contribute to the creation of the bonds of social capital (e.g., Stukas, Daly, & Cowling, 2005) that are thought to be the "glue" that holds society together; in fact, volunteering is sometimes considered a key indicator of social capital itself (Putnam, 2000).

It appears, then, that there is a cyclical process at work here, one in which connection to community leads to volunteerism, which builds further community connection, which stimulates more volunteerism, which in turn leads to other forms of social action. As this process spreads and permeates the larger society, it may contribute to

the emergence, development, and perpetuation of a concerned, caring, and actively involved citizenry working for the common good of all members of society. For elaboration on, and discussion of, these interconnections of volunteerism and community, see Omoto and Snyder (2002; 2009).

The Collective Context of Individual Action

Moreover, these considerations of community remind us that, even though volunteers act as individuals, there is a larger *collective context* for their actions. For, much volunteering occurs in the context of groups, organizations, and movements that recruit, train, and place volunteers.

Further, in the context of these collective concerns, some volunteering is explicitly *intragroup* (helping other members of one's own *in-group*, whether defined by race, ethnicity, religion, or nationality) and other volunteering is *intergroup* (helping others who aren't members of one's own group). It turns out that volunteering within groups is facilitated by a sense of *"we-ness"* that is associated with empathizing with members of an in-group (who are, in some sense, extensions of one's self) whereas such feelings of empathic "we-ness" do not seem to apply in helping across group lines (e.g., Stuermer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005; Stuermer, Snyder, Kropp, & Siem, 2006).

This sense of "we-ness"—of sharing concerns with others, of psychological connection to one's community, of acting together for the benefit of one's community—need not be defined with regard to a specific place or geographic entity with clear physical boundaries (a neighborhood, a town, a city). But, instead, it can be a community in a *psychological* sense of belonging to and connecting with a broad and diverse community of people with shared concerns, whether or not they live in the same geographical area or even interact with each other. In this sense, community includes more people than one personally knows or even possibly can know—a community defined by the feelings of connection, attachment, identification, and esteem that one derives from it. For further discussion of psychological sense of community and its involvement in social action, see Omoto and Snyder (2002).

In recent and ongoing research, Omoto and Snyder (2009) are working to develop reliable and valid *measures* of variation in this psychological sense of community and to actually *create* it through systematic

interventions implemented in the context of a series of workshops led by trained facilitators. Thus, we have incorporated both the intervention and the measure of community in a large-scale field experiment that we have conducted with some 600 participants recruited through community-based AIDS service organizations in California and Minnesota. Our findings indicate that psychological sense of community, whether created by our interventions or measured with our inventory, has clear consequences for individuals and potential benefits for society. For *individuals*, psychological sense of community had positive health consequences, including reports of decreased likelihood of engaging in risky sexual behavior and greater likelihood of engaging in HIV preventing behaviors (for oneself and for others). Moreover, of potential benefit to *society*, psychological sense of community resulted in increased *intentions to become involved in one's community* by giving money and goods to charity, joining community groups, and participating in social activism.

More generally, sense of community manifests itself in diverse forms of action. People with a strong sense of community are likely to be active in their neighborhoods by, among other things, engaging in neighboring behaviors such as lending their neighbors food or tools (e.g., Kingston, Mitchell, Forin, & Stevenson, 1999), participating in community organizations (e.g., Wandersman, Florin, Friedmann, & Mier, 1987), and engaging in political activities (e.g., Davidson & Cotter, 1989). In a larger sense, it would seem that one consequence of the interplay between the sense of community connection and social action may be the creation of a culture of service, participation, and involvement in civil society.

Features of Community Conducive to Social Action

Building on the important role of community in facilitating social action, let us now turn to the question: *What features of community are most conducive to social action?* One such feature that has been examined in theory and in research is the *residential stability* of communities. Indeed, it has been argued that, when people have lived in a community for a long time, one in which others have also lived for a long time, they will develop an *identity* as a community resident that they share with other members of their community, be invested in and concerned for the well-being of the community, and get involved in doing good for their community (Oishi, Rothman, Snyder, Su, Zehm, Hertel et al., 2007).

Studies of the effects of residential stability, conducted in both field and laboratory settings, have demonstrated that members of stable communities are more likely to take action to promote the general well-being of their communities (through actions as diverse as working for the preservation of the environment and supporting the community's sports teams) as well as to help individual members of their communities than are members of more mobile communities (e.g., Oishi et al., 2007). In addition, residential stability has been linked to identification with one's community, which in turn manifests itself in diverse forms of helping behaviors, procommunity involvement, collective efficacy, and social action (Kang & Kwak, 2003; Kasarda & Janowitz, 1974; Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997).

Taken together, the work on residential stability and social action contribute to an emerging "big picture" of the mutual interplay of individuals and their contexts—just as individuals, acting on their motivations, engage in social action that builds connection to community, so too do some kinds of communities promote identification with the community and, in turn, social action.

From Social Science to Social Policy

Reflecting on the messages of research on social action, it is tempting to speculate about the implications of the scientific study of social action for social policy. In the case of volunteerism as a form of social action, as we have seen, its importance in providing much needed services to individuals, communities, and society is well documented. Moreover, volunteerism (and, more generally, helping behavior), as we have also seen, has been linked to better health, greater optimism, and longer life, suggesting a possible adaptive value and evolutionary significance of volunteerism as well as other forms of helping and social action.

Accordingly, it has been argued (e.g., Snyder & Omoto, 2008; Snyder, 2009) that social policies that facilitate volunteerism (and other forms of social action) might be in the interests of society. In societies in which the ideals of volunteerism are widely shared, and in which substantial amounts of helping are provided by volunteers, the knowledge generated by scientific inquiry into volunteerism becomes a valuable basis for informing social policies designed to encourage volunteerism and to optimize its effectiveness. However, words of caution should be voiced about going so far as to mandate volunteerism and other forms of social action or even to offer strong and substantial rewards for

such involvement, lest such mandates and rewards have the unintended effects of undermining intrinsic motivations for taking action on behalf of society, as suggested by some studies of students in campus based volunteer service programs involving academic requirement and credit (e.g., Stukas, Snyder, & Clary, 1999).

In addition, if it is true, as it has been said, that "a society is judged by how well it responds in times of greatest need" (Watkins, 1989), networks of civic engagement and social action may be the building blocks of a society well able to respond to the needs of its citizens and to meet the challenges that confront it. Moreover, to the extent that organizations, communities, and society are built on the principles that scientific research has documented as important in promoting social action, it is possible that positive consequences for individuals, communities, and society may result.

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