## It's All in the Timing: Assessing the Impact of Bilateral Tax Treaties on US FDI Activity

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## Abstract

Despite substantial evidence that foreign direct investment (FDI) is influenced by taxation, the impact of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is surprisingly unclear. We investigate one possible reason: previous empirical research restricts treaties to have a one-time, discrete effect on FDI. We find this assumption to be rejected in the data on US inbound FDI. Moreover, allowing for anticipatory and lagged effects of treaty formation indicates a more substantial, positive effect on FDI activity.

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#### **1. Introduction**

Foreign affiliate sales (FAS) grew by 11% in the 1990s, roughly double the growth rate for exports and quadruple the growth rate for worldwide GDP (Markusen 2002). In 2004, total FAS represented nearly 51% of world GDP, with world exports representing roughly half this amount (Ramondo 2007). In light of important and expanding role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in today's global economy, a vast literature has emerged attempting to uncover the salient factors determining the spatial and temporal pattern of FDI activity. In this paper, we investigate one potential factor: bilateral tax treaties.

Perhaps surprisingly, the empirical impact of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is very murky. This ambiguity exists amid fairly pervasive empirical evidence that cross-country variation in taxation does influence the distribution of FDI activity (e.g., Chakrabarti 2001; Gresik 2001; Gordon and Hines 2002; De Mooij and Ederveen 2003; Mutti and Grubert 2004; Blonigen 2005), as well as the fact that tax treaties are costly to negotiate and implement, yet nonetheless cover much of today's bilateral FDI activity. Specially, the number of tax treaties in force has increased from 100 in the 1960s to over 2,500 more recently (Egger et al. 2006). The US presently belongs to roughly 60 such treaties, covering approximately 78% of total US outbound FDI and 96% of total US inbound FDI, with over one-third being implemented since 1990 (Blonigen and Davies 2004).

While the theoretical literature on bilateral tax treaties is more developed, empirical studies are relatively sparse. Blonigen and Davies (2004, 2005) and strong positive effects of .old tax treaties on FDI, but negative effects of .new tax treaties, using 1980.1999 US and 1983.1992 OECD data, respectively, particularly when modeling FDI in levels (as opposed to logs).1 Egger et al. (2006) also obtain a significant negative effect of .new tax treaties on OECD outbound FDI

from 1985.2000 using a difference-in-difference propensity score matching estimator. Davies et al. (2007) use Swedish data on multinational firms from 1965.1998 and find no impact of tax treaties on total affiliate sales, but do find that a treaty increases the likelihood of an investment occurring. On the other hand, di Giovanni (2005) analyzes cross-border capital flows for mergers and acquisitions from 1990--1999 and finds positive effects of tax treaties. Similarly, Stein and Daude (2007) obtain a positive and statistically significant effect using data on OECD outbound FDI stocks from 1997--1999; Neumayer (2007) obtains positive effects using data on US outbound FDI from 1970--2001 and inbound FDI to developing countries over the same time period. Finally, Davies (2003a) finds no effect of revisions of existing bilateral tax treaties on FDI, and Hartman (1985) and Sinn (1993) find that the expansion of activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is essentially independent of withholding taxes. Davies (2004) provides an excellent review.2

The mixed, and perhaps counter-intuitive, empirical results could be an artifact of the restriction implicit in the empirical approach that overshadows nearly all of these previous studies: treaties are allowed to have only a one-time, discrete effect on FDI. Given the complexity of the treaties, the political environment in which they are negotiated, and the fixed costs associated with FDI activity, it is possible that firms are aware of at least the possibility of a treaty prior to its actual formation, leading to effects of the treaty that pre-date official implementation (referred to as anticipatory effects). On the other hand, it is possible that firms may react slowly to a newly formed treaty, leading to effects of a treaty several periods after official implementation (referred to as lagged effects).

To assess the timing issue empirically, we utilize data on US inbound and outbound FDI stocks, flows, and FAS over the period 1980--1999. The data are from Blonigen and Davies

(2004), and thus enable us to compare our findings to the existing literature. Our results are striking, indicating the importance of allowing for a more complex timing of responses to tax treaties in empirical research, particularly when analyzing US inbound FDI. However, allowing for this flexibility does not resolve some of the empirical puzzles present in the data. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical methodology. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the results, while Section 5 concludes.

#### 2. Empirical Methodology

#### 2.1 A Model with Flexible Timing

To contrast the assumptions required for various estimators to identify the causal impact of bilateral tax treaties, we utilize the potential outcomes framework often adopted in the program evaluation literature. However, in a more general model that allows for both anticipatory and lagged effects of the treatment being analyzed – in this case, the presence of bilateral tax treaty – the framework is a bit more complex. To begin, let

$$y_{iit}(D_{ii1}, D_{ii2}, \dots, D_{iik}), \quad t = 1, \dots, T$$
 (1)

denote a measure of FDI activity involving countries i and j at time t, which in principal may depend on the tax treaty status of the two countries in all periods. Equation (1) defines potential outcomes since it reflects FDI activity in period t under any combination of historical, current, and future tax treaty status. Specifically,  $D_{ijt}$  is an indicator variable, taking on the value one if i and j have a bilateral tax treaty in place in year t, and zero otherwise. For compactness, we denote potential outcomes as  $y_{ijt}(D)$ , where D represents the complete vector of tax treaty indicators.

In contrast to the existing literature, the setup in (1) allows FDI activity to depend on more than just whether a bilateral tax treaty is currently in place. For example, suppose we are considering three periods (T = 3). Thus, there are eight ( $2^3 = 8$ ) potential outcomes in time period t, given by

$$y_{ijt}(0,0,0), y_{ijt}(1,0,0), y_{ijt}(0,1,0), y_{ijt}(0,0,1),$$
  
 $y_{ijt}(1,1,0), y_{ijt}(1,0,1), y_{ijt}(0,1,1), y_{ijt}(1,1,1), t = 1,2,3.$ 

Given this flexibility in the timing of the treaty effect, defining the treatment effect of a tax treaty between contracting countries i and j on FDI activity at time t requires defining a 'treated' state, say  $D_1$  and a 'control' state, say  $D_0$ . This entails specifying a complete pattern of tax treaty status. The observation-specific treatment effect is then given by  $\tau_{ijt}(D_1, D_0) \equiv y_{ijt}(D_1) - y_{ijt}(D_0)$ , which depends on how the treatment and control states are defined. For instance, in our previous three-period example, we may wish to compare FDI activity if countries have a tax treaty in effect in periods 2 and 3 (but not in period 1) to FDI activity under the control state of no tax treaty in any period. Thus,  $D_1 = [0, 1, 1]$  and  $D_0 = [0, 0, 0]$ 0], and the observation-specific treatment effect is given by  $\tau_{ijt}(D_1, D_0) \equiv y_{ijt}(0, 1, 1) - y_{ijt}(0, 0, 0)$ .

Although relatively straightforward, the fundamental problem of causal inference is that, at most, only one state of world (and, hence, potential outcome) is observed for a given pair of countries at a particular point in time (Holland 1986). For example, if one of the two states  $-D_1$  or  $D_0$  – actually occurs, then one observes  $y_{ijt} = D_1 y_{ijt} (D_1) + D_0 y_{ijt} (D_0)$ . Thus, the effect of the treatment  $D_1$  relative to the control  $D_0$  cannot be computed; instead, it must be estimated. This entails estimation of the missing counterfactual under some set of identifying assumptions. More generally, one observes

$$y_{ijt} = \sum_{d \in \Omega} I[D = d] y_{ijt}(d)$$
<sup>(2)</sup>

where  $\Omega$  denotes the set of all possible combinations of *D* and *I*[·] is an indicator function.

To circumvent the missing counterfactual problem, we specify a structural relationship for the potential outcome associated with each possible pattern of tax treaty status. Define

$$y_{ijt}(d) = \mu_d(x_{ijt}) + u_{ijt}(d), \quad d \in \Omega$$

where  $E[y_{ijt}(d) | x_{ijt}] = \mu_d(x_{ijt})$  for all  $d \in \Omega$  and  $x_{ijt}$  is a vector of observable attributes of country pair *ij* (including an intercept).  $u_{ijt}(d)$  captures the impact of unobservable attributes on FDI activity when the vector of treatments is given by d,  $d \in \Omega$ . Following in the spirit of Heckman et al. (1999), if one assumes that  $\mu_d(x_{ijt}) = x_{ijt}\beta(d)$  and  $\beta(d) = \beta(d')$ ,  $d \neq d'$ , except for a certain pattern of non-equivalent intercept terms, then one can obtain the following regression model

$$y_{ijt} = x_{ijt}\beta(0) + \sum_{s:s < t} \tau_{t-s}^{+} D_{ijs} + \tau_0 D_{ijt} + \sum_{s:s > t} \tau_{s-t}^{-} D_{ijs} + \{u_{ijt}(0) + \sum_{d \in \Omega} I[D = d][u_{ijt}(d) - u_{ijt}(0)]$$
(3)

where D = 0 represents a pair of countries with no bilateral tax treaty in any period,  $\tau_s^+$  captures the lagged effects of tax treaties (i.e., the effect of a tax treaty being in place *s* periods in the past),  $\tau_s^-$  captures the anticipatory effects of tax treaties (i.e., the effect of a tax treaty being in place *s* periods in the future), and  $\tau_0$  is the contemporaneous effect of a tax treaty. We obtain (3) by assuming that effect of a tax treaty in some period *s* on FDI activity in some period *t* (*s*,*t* = 1,...,*T*) depends only on *t*-*s* (and not *t* or *s* individually), where *t*-*s* > 0 captures lagged effects and *t*-*s* < 0 captures anticipatory effects. Referring to our three-period example once more, the model in (3) contains five treatment parameters: the impact on current FDI activity of a tax treaty two periods ahead ( $\tau_2^-$ ), one period ahead ( $\tau_1^-$ ), in the current period ( $\tau_0$ ), one period in the past ( $\tau_1^+$ ) , and two periods in the past ( $\tau_2^+$ ). OLS estimation of (3) yields a consistent estimate of the  $\tau$  parameters if, conditional on x, the presence or absence of a tax treaty in any time period is independent of contemporaneous (i) unobservables affecting FDI activity without a tax treaty in each time period, and (ii) unobserved, country-pair-specific gains in each time period from deviating from no tax treaty in all time periods (D = 0) to the observed pattern (D = d).

In contrast, a consistent estimate of the  $\tau$  parameters may be obtained under an alternative set of assumptions. Given the presence of panel data, where at least some country-pairs are observed both with and without an effective tax treaty during the sample period, then (3) may be estimated using either fixed effects (FE) or first-differences (FD). Either method allows one to decompose unobservable determinants of FDI activity as

$$u_{ijt}(d) = \alpha_{ij} + \widetilde{u}_{ijt}(d), d \in \Omega$$
(4)

where  $\alpha_{ij}$  represents time invariant, country-pair-specific unobsevables affecting FDI activity and  $\tilde{u}_{iji}(d)$  represents idiosyncratic shocks to FDI between countries *i* and *j* (given D = d). Substituting (4) into (3) yields

$$y_{ijt} = x_{ijt}\beta(0) + \sum_{s:s < t} \tau_{t-s}^{+} D_{ijs} + \tau_{0} D_{ijt} + \sum_{s:s > t} \tau_{s-t}^{-} D_{ijs} + \{\alpha_{ij} + \widetilde{u}_{ijt}(0) + \sum_{d \in \Omega} I[D = d][\widetilde{u}_{ijt}(d) - \widetilde{u}_{ijt}(0)\}.$$
(5)

As is well known (see, e.g., Wooldridge 2001, Chapter 10), FE estimation of (5) transforms the model by mean-differencing (i.e., subtracting  $y_{ij}$  from both sides of the equation, where  $y_{ij}$  represents the average value of  $y_{ijt}$  computed over all time periods). FD estimation of (5), on the other hand, transforms the model by subtracting  $y_{ijt-1}$  from both sides of the equation. Both methods eliminate  $\alpha_{ij}$  from the error term of the transformed model, and thus allow for consistent estimation of the remaining parameters even if x or the tax treaty variables are not independent

of  $\alpha_{ij}$  However, FE and FD still place restrictions on the correlations between x and the tax treaty variables and the idiosyncratic error term,  $\tilde{u}_{ijt}(d)$ . Strict exogeneity of x and the tax treaty variables is sufficient to guarantee FE and FD will both yield consistent estimates.

To make the model in (5) a bit more tractable and the coefficient estimates a bit easier to interpret, the estimating equation actually employed in the analysis is given by

$$y_{ijt} = x_{ijt}\beta(0) + \tau_{3^{+}}^{+}\widetilde{D}_{ijt}^{3^{+}} + \tau_{2}^{+}\widetilde{D}_{ijt}^{2} + \tau_{1}^{+}\widetilde{D}_{ijt}^{1} + \tau_{0}\widetilde{D}_{ijt}^{0} + \tau_{1}^{-}\widetilde{D}_{ijt}^{-1} + \{\alpha_{ij} + \widetilde{u}_{ijt}(0) + \sum_{d \in \Omega} I[D = d][\widetilde{u}_{ijt}(d) - \widetilde{u}_{ijt}(0)\}.$$
(6)

where

$$\widetilde{D}_{ijt}^{s} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } ij \text{ have a tax treaty become effective in period } t - s \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

and  $s = -1,0,1,2,3^{+}$ . To be clear,  $\tilde{D}_{ijt}^{-1}$  equals one for country-pair *ij* in year *t* if the countries will have a tax treaty become effective in the next period (zero otherwise);  $\tilde{D}_{ijt}^{0}$  equals one in the period when the tax treaty becomes effective (zero otherwise);  $\tilde{D}_{ijt}^{1}$  equals one in the period immediately after the tax treaty becomes effective (zero otherwise);  $\tilde{D}_{ijt}^{2}$  equals one in the period two periods after the tax treaty becomes effective (zero otherwise); and,  $\tilde{D}_{ijt}^{3^{+}}$  equals one in any period three periods or more after the tax treaty becomes effective (zero otherwise); and,  $\tilde{D}_{ijt}^{3^{+}}$  equals one in any nost only one of the tax status indicators is non-zero for any *ijt* combination, and  $\tau_{1}^{-}$  captures any (short-run) anticipatory effects,  $\tau_{0}$  captures the instantaneous response, and  $\tau_{s}^{+}$ ,  $s = 1,2,3^{+}$ , capture any lagged effects. The omitted category contains periods two or more years prior to a tax treaty becoming effective.

#### 2.2 A Model with Restricted Timing

While existing empirical studies of bilateral tax treaties have utilized FE estimation to remove time invariant, country-pair-specific unobservables, they do not permit the sort of flexible timing of response to a bilateral tax treaty as in (5) Instead, tax treaties are restricted to have only a one-time, discrete change in FDI activity, as in

$$y_{ijt} = x_{ijt}\beta(0) + \tau_0 D_{ijt} + \{\alpha_{ij} + \tilde{u}_{ijt}(0) + \sum_{d \in \Omega} I[D = d][\tilde{u}_{ijt}(d) - \tilde{u}_{ijt}(0)\}$$
(7)

where

$$\tilde{\widetilde{u}}_{ijt}(d) = \widetilde{\widetilde{u}}_{ijt}(d) + \sum_{s:s < t} \tau_{t-s}^+ D_{ijs} + \sum_{s:s > t} \tau_{s-t}^- D_{ijs}$$
(8)

and  $\tilde{u}_{ijt}(0) = \tilde{u}_{ijt}(0)$ . Thus, (7) reduces to (5) only in the event of no anticipatory or lagged effects of tax treaties. Given the discussion earlier about the several possible dates that one could use to define the tax treaty variable (discussed in Section 3), combined with the fact that some of the effects of a tax treaty may precede the treaty (anticipatory effects) or operate with a lag (lagged effects), the restricted model in (7) seems likely to be mis-specified in the current context.

A formal specification test for the restricted model in (7) is provided in Laporte and Windmeijer (2005). The intuition behind their test is quite straightforward: if (7) is correctly specified (including the assumption that *x* and *D* are strictly exogenous), then FE and FD will each yield a consistent estimate of  $\tau_0$ . However, in the presence of anticipatory or lagged effects, FE and FD will provide statistically different estimates of  $\tau_0$ . Thus, a test of equality of  $\tau_0^{FE}$  and  $\tau_0^{FD}$  constitutes a test of the specification in (7). The test involves estimation of the stacked model

$$\begin{pmatrix} y_{ijt} - y_{ijt-1} \\ y_{ijt} - y_{ij.} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} D_{ijt} - D_{ijt-1} \\ D_{ijt} - D_{ij.} \end{pmatrix} \tau_0 + \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ D_{ijt} - D_{ij.} \end{pmatrix} \varphi + \begin{pmatrix} x_{ijt} - x_{ijt-1} \\ x_{ijt} - x_{ij.} \end{pmatrix} \beta(0) + \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ x_{ijt} - x_{ij.} \end{pmatrix} \delta(0) + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

$$(9)$$

by OLS and testing  $H_0: \varphi = 0$  via a standard *t*-test using standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and (serial) correlation.

### 3. Data

The data come from Blonigen and Davies (2004); thus, we provide only limited details4.

The data include information on US inbound FDI from 91 countries, as well as US outbound FDI to 44 countries, over the period 1980-1999. Thus, we analyze US inbound and outbound FDI separately, thereby allowing the effects of treaties to differ depending on the direction of investment. Three measures of FDI are utilized: (i) FDI stock, (ii) FDI flows, and (iii) FAS. In addition, we conduct the analysis using each measure in both levels and logs. As noted earlier, log specifications tend to preferred in the FDI literature given the skewness of the data, although this may not matter for the distributional approach. Nonetheless, it does provide some interesting insight into the pattern of regression results observed when using logs versus levels. The FDI data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) website, and are converted into millions of real 1996 US dollars using the US chain-type price index for gross domestic investment calculated by the Economic Report of the President.

Information on US bilateral tax treaties is taken from the Worldwide Tax Treaties database at Tax.com (2002). Following Blonigen and Davies (2004), we compare FDI activity with and without a tax treaty in effect, as opposed to a tax treaty being signed or in force. Given the

different possibilities concerning measurement of 'treatment' date, allowing for flexibility in timing of responses by firms - as in the model discussed in Section 2.1 - seems crucial.

As noted in the previous sections, each estimator relies on some assumption concerning conditional independence between the presence of an effective tax treaty and unobservable determinants of FDI activity. However, the US may negotiate tax treaties with countries on the basis of such unobservables (e.g., countries having historical ties to US, or countries for whom the gains from such a treaty are increasing over time). While some troublesome unobservables may be time invariant, non-random selection on the basis of time-varying unobservables remains a possibility. To at least partially circumvent this issue, we follow Blonigen and Davies (2004) and assess the impact of 'new' treaties, where 'new' treaties are those negotiated after 1979. As shown in Blonigen and Davies (2004), the relative rank of a country in terms of the stock of US outbound FDI appears unrelated to the decision by the US to enter into a new tax treaty with that country.

The controls included in *x* follow the specification developed in Carr et al. (2001) and Markusen and Maskus (2001), combined with the skill adjustment applied in Blonigen et al. (2003). The specification is based on the knowledge-capital model of MNE activity. In the models analyzing both US inbound and outbound FDI activity, the vector of covariates includes the sum of real gross domestic products (GDPs), the GDP difference between the US and foreign country squared, the (absolute value of the) skill difference between the US and foreign country, the distance between US and foreign country, a trade cost measure for home and host country, an investment barrier measure for the host country, the interaction between the skill difference and GDP difference, and the interaction between the host trade cost and the squared skill difference. We also include a dummy variable for old treaty countries. Finally, to improve the likelihood

that the tax treaty variables are strictly exogenous, in some specifications we augment the covariate set to include interactions between a dummy variable for 'rich' countries and each of the aforementioned variables.5 Table 1 displays summary statistics.

#### 4. Results

#### 4.1 Inbound FDI

To begin, Table 2 presents estimates of  $\tau_0$  from the restricted model given in (7). The full set of regression estimates is available in the Appendix, Tables A1-A4. We utilize six dependent variables, each of the three measures of FDI activity, measured in levels and logs. In addition, we estimate each model twice, once omitting the rich country interactions and once including the interaction terms. Finally, we estimate four versions of each specification: using pooled OLS, treating  $\alpha_{ij}$  as random effects (RE), transforming the model using FD, and transforming the model using FE.

Turning to the results when FDI is measured in levels (Panels I-III), we obtain a statistically and economically significant, negative impact of an effective tax treaty on all three measures of FDI in the POLS specifications without rich country interactions. The impact remains negative and statistically significant, but of more reasonable magnitude, for FDI stocks and FAS (Panels I and III) after we include rich country interactions; the coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant for FDI flows (Panel II). However, when we switch from POLS to RE, we obtain positive and statistically insignificant tax treaty effects for each measure of FDI when we include rich country interactions; results omitting the rich country interactions remain negative, statistically significant, and quite large in magnitude. The FD estimates with rich country interactions switch signs relative to the RE estimates in Panels II and III (now becoming negative), but remain statistically insignificant at conventional levels in all three cases; results omitting the rich country interactions remain negative, but are considerably smaller in magnitude and are only statistically significant in two of three cases (excluding FDI flows (Panel II)). Lastly, the FE estimates return to being negative, statistically significant, and implausibly large when omitting the rich country interactions, but positive and statistically significant for FDI stocks and flows (Panels I and II) when including such interactions.

Viewing the results from the level specifications, two observations stand out. First, as argued in Blonigen and Davies (2004), inclusion of the rich country interactions matters and thus the estimates including such interactions are preferable. Second, modeling assumptions matter even when rich country interactions are included. Specifically, while POLS yields negative and statistically significant results for two of the three FDI measures, the other models do not. Moreover, even among the models that remove time invariant, country-level heterogeneity, the results are sensitive to modeling choice as the FE estimator yields a positive and statistically significant of an effective tax treaty on FDI stocks and flows, whereas FD does not (in fact, two of the three point estimates are negative).

The differences between the FD and FE estimates suggest the possibility of mis-specification. To formally test the equivalence of the FD and FE estimates, we utilize the specification test proposed in Laporte and Windmeijer (2005). The results are shown in the row labeled Specification Test. We reject equality of the FD and FE estimates at the p < 0.10 level for all three FDI measures when excluding rich country interactions, and two of the three measures (Panels I and II) when including the interactions. Thus, the assumption of no anticipatory and lagged effects of tax treaties is not supported by the data.

To relax this assumption, then, we estimate the model given in (6) via FD and FE. The estimates of the  $\tau$  parameters for the level specifications are given in Panel I of Table 3; the full set of results is provided in the Appendix, Tables A5-A6. Concentrating on the models including rich country interactions, three findings emerge. First, the FD and FE estimates are much more closely aligned; in only one situation (the coefficient on New Treaty two years prior for FDI flows) are the coefficients of the opposite sign, but then each is statistically insignificant. Second, for both FDI stocks and flows, we find positive and statistically significant lagged effects of tax treaties, particularly in the FE models. In other words, the FDI-inducing impact of an effective tax treaty is not realized until a couple of years after the treaty becomes effective. This may suggest that the most important FDI-inducing component of bilateral tax treaties is the reduction in uncertainty in the foreign tax environment, as such diminished uncertainty may be realized after a lag. It is also consonant with the gradualism argument in Chisik and Davies (2004b), where declines in tax rates may be gradual since tax treaties need to be self-enforcing. However, these effects are very modest in economic terms, representing roughly 0.03 - 0.04standard deviations. Finally, consonant with the results in Table 2, we find no impact of an effective tax treaty on FAS once rich country interactions are included. Thus, we find some evidence of positive effects of a new tax treaty on the level of US inbound FDI stocks and flows, but not FAS, although the effects tend to be small and operate with a lag.

As noted previously, Blonigen and Davies (2004), Mutti and Grubert (2004), and others advocate the estimation of models of FDI activity in logs given the skewed nature of the data. Panels IV-VI in Table 2 present the estimates for the restricted timing model when we log all (non-binary) variables.6 In the interest of brevity, we focus on the major findings. First, for FDI stocks and flows, we fail to find any statistically significant impact of an effective tax treaty in

the RE, FD, and FE models, either with or without rich country interactions. Moreover, in all four cases, we fail to reject equality between the FD and FE estimates at conventional levels of statistical significance. Second, we find positive, statistically significant, and (unreasonably) large effects on FAS using the RE and FE estimators either with or without rich country interactions; negative, statistically significant, and (unreasonably) large effects using POLS. Finally, we reject equality of the FD and FE estimates using the Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) specification test for FAS either with or without rich country interactions.

Turning to the more flexible model for FAS in Table 3, we again find much greater alignment between the FD and FE estimates.7 In particular, in the models including rich country interactions, we find positive and statistically significant lagged effects of new tax treaties according to both the FD and FE estimates, with the magnitudes remaining quite large. Moreover, the FE estimates also indicate fairly sizeable, statistically significant anticipatory effects of tax treaties. Perhaps surprising, not one of the coefficients reflecting the contemporaneous effect of tax treaties is statistically significant in either Panel I or II of Table 3 once rich country interactions are included.

In sum, then, the regression analysis yields a positive, statistically significant, and relatively robust effect of an effective bilateral tax treaty when one allows for a more flexible timing of the impact on US inbound FDI stocks and flows (in levels) and FAS (in logs) and includes rich country interactions. We now turn to the regression results for US outbound FDI.

#### 4.2 Outbound FDI

Table 4 presents estimates of  $\tau_0$  from the restricted model given in (7). Results from the flexible timing models are presented in Table 5. The full set of regression estimates is available in the Appendix, Tables A9-A16. In the interest of brevity, we focus on the major findings. First,

when estimating the models in levels, we only obtain one statistically significant effect of a new tax treaty when using an estimation method other than POLS: FDI stocks (Panel I) when using RE without rich country interactions. For the remainder of the non-POLS models in levels, the estimated impact of an effective tax treaty is statistically insignificant. Moreover, we fail to reject equality between the FD and FE estimates at conventional levels in all cases. The point estimates in the FE models with rich country interactions are positive, however, for all three FDI measures. Second, when estimating the models in logs, we obtain a positive and statistically significant impact of an effective tax treaty on FAS using POLS and FD both with and without rich country interactions. For log FDI stocks and flows, all estimation methods yield a statistically insignificant coefficient on an effective tax treaty. Moreover, for all three FDI measures, we continue to fail to reject equality between the FD and FE estimates. Finally, the results from the more flexible specifications with rich country interactions indicate a statistically insignificant impact of an effective tax treaty on all three FDI measures in levels (Panel I), as well as FAS in logs. However, the more flexible FE model indicates some positive and statistically significant (anticipatory and lagged) effects on log FDI stocks; the more flexible FD model indicates a negative and statistically significant effect on log FDI flows three or more years after a bilateral tax treaty becomes effective.

In sum, then, the regression analysis for US outbound FDI yields a much more muted impact of effective tax treaties relative to US inbound FDI. Specifically, there is no statistically meaningful evidence of a non-zero effect of an effective tax treaty – even in the more flexible specifications – when analyzing FDI in levels. There is, however, some evidence of a positive and statistically significant impact of an effective tax treaty on FDI stocks and FAS in the log models, the former (latter) occurring with a lag (instantaneously), and a negative lagged effect on log FDI flows.

#### **5.** Conclusion

Economists have been a bit puzzled by bilateral tax treaties because of the divergence of the empirical and theoretical results in the literature, the fragility of existing empirical estimates, as well as the extreme magnitudes obtained in some specifications. Whereas the theoretical literature suggests that such treaties can be FDI-inducing, the empirical (and legal) literature disputes these claims in practice. In this paper, we have re-examined the panel data set from Blonigen and Davies (2004) on US inbound and outbound FDI, which spans the period 1980-1999, in light of recent methodological advances in the program evaluation literature that emphasize the role of timing of policy effects. In doing so, we reach two primary conclusions. First, regression estimates of bilateral tax treaty effects are indeed quite fragile. Not only do statistical modeling assumptions matter, but assumptions concerning the timing of the effect of tax treaties are important. In our preferred specifications based on the more flexible Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) model with rich country interactions, we find some evidence of a positive, lagged response to tax treaties becoming effective. Although contrary to Egger et al. (2006), the coefficients are of a reasonable magnitude. Moreover, the positive, lagged response is consistent with the gradualism argument in Chisik and Davies (2004b), where tax rates can only be reduced gradually under tax treaties due to the self-enforcing nature of such agreements. Our findings are also consistent with the tax certainty role of tax treaties, where such certainty is only revealed over time, again perhaps due to lack of formal enforcement of such treaties. However, these positive, lagged effects are statistically significant only for US inbound FDI stocks and flows in levels, and inbound FAS and outbound stocks in logs.

Second, the regression estimates indicate some asymmetric impacts of effective tax treaties on US inbound and outbound FDI. As just stated, in our preferable specifications for US inbound FDI, we obtain positive effects of an effective bilateral tax treaty on FDI stocks and flows (in levels) and FAS (in logs) several years after the tax treaty becomes effective. For US outbound FDI, we obtain some less robust evidence of positive effects of an effective bilateral tax treaty on FDI stocks and FAS (in logs), the former occurring with a lag. However, we also obtain some evidence of negative effects of an effective bilateral tax treaty on FDI flows (in logs) several years after the tax treaty on FDI flows (in logs) several years after the tax treaty on FDI flows (in logs) several years after the tax treaty becomes effective. Thus, in the end, while relaxing the assumption of no anticipatory or lagged effects of a bilateral tax treaty resolves some of the puzzle with respect the empirical effects of such treaties, some issues remain unresolved. Most notably, the decision to model FDI activity in levels or logs remains crucial, as does the decision to focus on inbound or outbound FDI.

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#### Footnotes:

**1.** Results from log specifications with country fixed effects yield positive, but insignificant results (Blonigen and Davies 2004). Mutti and Grubert (2004) also advocate the use of log-linear models when analyzing FDI.

**2.** A related literature assessing the impact of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) also fails to produce a consensus. For example, while Hallward-Driemeier (2003) fail to find a positive effect of such treaties on FDI, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) and Stein and Daude (2007) do.

**3.** Egger et al. (2006) similarly undertake some exploratory analysis of possible anticipatory and lagged effects of bilateral tax treaties involving OECD countries. The authors find little evidence of either; anticipatory effects seem nonexistent in their data, and treatment effects appear constant over a five-year window following the implementation of a tax treaty.

**4.** The data are found at http://www.uoregon.edu/~bruceb/. We are very grateful to the authors for making the data available

**5.** The set of rich countries includes EU countries, Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Hong Kong, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

**6**. Note, Blonigen and Davies (2004) exclude the two interaction terms -- between the skill difference and GDP difference and between the host trade cost and the squared skill difference -- in their log specifications since the log of the interaction is collinear with the other variables entered in the model. However, rather than taking the log of the interactions, we include the interactions of the logs so that these variables remain in the model. The impact on the results is minor.

7. The full set of results is provided in the Appendix, Tables A7—A8.

Table 1.	Summary	Statistics

		Inbound		1	Outbound	
	Mean	SD	Ν	Mean	SD	Ν
FDI						
Stock	5.897.798	20.662.218	1470	11.100.921	22.311.850	871
Flow	983.490	5.050.522	1468	1.110.685	3.029.439	862
FAS	21.946.257	60.490.618	806	35.454.022	58.470.896	652
Controls						
Sum of GDPs	6.947.968	1.436.883	1556	7.142.787	1.515.579	881
GDP Difference Squared	42.413.787.434	17.311.073.759	1556	39.999.271.187	16.894.367.031	881
Skill Difference (Inbound)	5.837	2.609	1556	-4.992	2.412	881
Skill Difference (Outbound)				4.992	2.412	881
Skill Difference*	36.910.721	17.937.410	1556	30.289.531	15.328.371	881
GDP Difference						
Distance	4.988.012	2.391.464	1556	5.128.033	2.248.001	881
Investment Cost	29.236	2.561	1556	47.268	12.472	881
Trade Costs (Host)	80.709	4.888	1556	42.438	43.033	881
Trade Costs (Home)	33.869	44.927	1556	80.710	4.884	881
Trade Costs (Host)*	3.322.917	2.503.452	1556	1.504.743	2.206.793	881
Skill Difference Squared						

Notes: Data cover 1980-1999. Inbound refers to US inbound FDI from 91 countries; outbound refers to US outbound FDI to 44 countries. FDI variables are in millions of 1996 dollars.

GDP variables in trillions of real dollars.

_	No Rich Country Interactions     Rich Country Interactions							
	Pooled	RE	FD	FE	Pooled	RE	FD	FE
	OLS				OLS			
I. FDI = Inbo	und Stock (Levels)	)						
New Treaty	-9,879.008***	-8,402.201***	-741.404***	-8,569.491**	-413.884***	164.034	104.868	397.283*
	(1.123.737)	(3.051.727)	(270.829)	(3.357.197)	(146.169)	(211.520)	(64.130)	(211.395)
Ν	1470	1470	1335	1470	1470	1470	1335	1470
Spec Test			<b>p</b> =	0.021			p = 0	).078
II. FDI = Inb	ound Flow (Levels)	)						
New Treaty	-1,626.135***	-1,508.543**	-177.784	-1,576.250**	11.715	43.087	-54.535	110.631*
	(293.048)	(590.087)	(120.586)	(728.756)	(40.999)	(53.558)	(88.063)	(57.698)
Ν	1468	1468	1326	1468	1468	1468	1326	1468
Spec Test			p =	0.057			p = 0	0.074
III. FDI = Inl	bound FAS (Levels							
New Treaty	-27,581.878***	-15,899.797**	-1,850.999**	-15,388.288**	-782.477***	307.142	-63.279	641.969
	(3.776.081)	(6.889.170)	(804.066)	(7.075.517)	(283.697)	(717.502)	(242.780)	(798.905)
Ν	806	806	686	806	806	806	686	806
Spec Test			p =	0.059			p = 0	0.430
IV. FDI = Int	oound Stock (Logs)	)						
New Treaty	-0.121	0.306	-0.085	0.299	-0.605**	0.281	-0.048	0.347
	(0.273)	(0.427)	(0.060)	(0.445)	(0.299)	(0.435)	(0.057)	(0.450)
Ν	1470	1470	1335	1470	1470	1470	1335	1470
Spec Test			p =	0.404			$\mathbf{p} = 0$	).393
V. FDI = Inbe	ound Flow (Logs)							
New Treaty	-0.236	0.255	-0.973	0.481	-0.27	0.416	-0.924	0.551
	(0.254)	(0.316)	(01.20)	(0.381)	(0.268)	(0.324)	(01.192)	(0.407)
Ν	1468	1468	1326	1468	1468	1468	1326	1468
Spec Test			p =	0.212			$\mathbf{p} = 0$	).199
$\mathbf{VI.} \ \mathbf{FDI} = \mathbf{Int}$	oound FAS (Logs)							
New Treaty	-1.169***	1.250***	-0.008	1.353***	-1.542***	1.283***	-0.001	1.422***
	(0.316)	(0.399)	(0.164)	(0.422)	(0.333)	(0.413)	(0.167)	(0.452)
Ν	806	806	686	806	806	806	686	806
Spec Test			p =	0.003			p = (	).004

Table 2. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI

Notes: FAS = foreign affiliate sales. Standard errors in parentheses are robust in pooled OLS models and clustered in random effects (RE), first-differenced (FD), and fixed effects

(FE) models. Specification test is from Laporte and Windmeijer (2005) and tests equality between the coefficient on New Treaty in the FD and FE models. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denotes

statistical significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. See text for further details, as well as list of covariates included.

		FDI Sto	ck			FDI I	Flow		Foreign Affiliate Sales			
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE
I. Levels												
(New Treaty)-1	-792.776**	-3,390.553**	119.244	150.615	-118.272	-697.575	207.093**	101.114	- 1,659.765**	-1.889.331	392.881	468.737
	(345.011)	(1.602.914)	(97.306)	(174.131)	(129.734)	(442.708)	(84.192)	(68.785)	(724.899)	(2.551.893)	(452.051)	(643.487)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-1,442.359**	-2.362.26	141.853	236.397	-324.234	-882.836*	140.997	44.560	- 3,509.657**	-4.804.728	285.034	408.232
	(559.676)	(2.095.459)	(85.378)	(146.978)	(205.848)	(489.214)	(118.601)	(51.008)	(1.395.519)	(3.275.731)	(746.170)	(852.161)
(New Treaty) <sub>+1</sub>	-1,944.282**	-2.853.03	291.125*	468.995**	-269.959	-335.563	327.284*	135.512	4,156.651**	-2.560.045	1.048.683	899.173
	(751.596)	(2.275.323)	(169.045)	(224.750)	(329.431)	(494.453)	(187.813)	(102.458)	(1.734.346)	(3.903.684)	(1.019.70)	(1.265.968)
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	2,741.414***	-4.195.202	173.614	406.184**	-655.376	-929.017	198.173	-9.177	6,410.244**	-7,375.583*	1.361.361	1.192.506
	(963.051)	(2.850.485)	(130.712)	(177.948)	(421.250)	(618.067)	(177.392)	(37.541)	(2.599.012)	(4.308.350)	(1.091.721)	(1.328.889)
(New Treaty) <sub>+3+</sub>	3,380.269***	10,601.061**	208.984	647.114**	-836.643	-2,100.313*	319.297*	146.212**	8,010.765**	22,414.127**	1.708.137	667.951
	(1.198.871)	(4.774.681)	(128.502)	(274.90)	(566.099)	(1.103.691)	(190.937)	(59.406)	(3.179.010)	(9.711.917)	(1.190.428)	(1.545.290)
<b>Rich Interactions</b>	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Ν	908	1002	908	1002	898	990	898	990	402	462	402	462
II. Logs												
(New Treaty) 1	0.774	0 164	0.845	0.292	0.745	0.853	0.817	0.941	0.029	0.350	0.061	0.462*
(	(0.558)	(0.699)	(0.567)	(0.649)	(0.843)	(0.988)	(0.853)	(0.984)	(0.104)	(0.218)	(0.116)	(0.236)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	0.661	0.173	0.785	0.334	-0.453	-0.147	-0.385	0.038	0.113	0.381	0.171	0.524
	(0.577)	(0.573)	(0.588)	(0.520)	(1.567)	(0.988)	(1.601)	(1.016)	(0.227)	(0.372)	(0.234)	(0.380)
(New Treaty) <sub>+1</sub>	-0.270	-0.072	-0.173	0.052	0.072	0.512	0.066	0.676	0.171	0.495	0.242	0.650*
	(0.628)	(0.755)	(0.623)	(0.770)	(1.550)	(0.895)	(1.631)	(0.931)	(0.246)	(0.348)	(0.269)	(0.376)
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	-0.331	-0.049	-0.261	0.094	-0.682	-0.153	-0.744	0.031	1.070*	1.250***	1.165**	1.415***
	(0.398)	(0.634)	(0.450)	(0.630)	(1.752)	(1.108)	(1.851)	(1.127)	(0.534)	(0.455)	(0.569)	(0.513)
(New Treaty) <sub>+3+</sub>	0.286	0.584	0.277	0.715	0.344	0.707	0.267	0.832	1.219**	1.619***	1.311**	1.852***
	(0.309)	(0.488)	(0.350)	(0.488)	(1.715)	(0.520)	(1.794)	(0.531)	(0.557)	(0.511)	(0.604)	(0.592)
<b>Rich Interactions</b>												
Ν	908	1002	908	1002	898	990	898	990	402	462	402	462

## Table 3. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI

Notes: (New Treaty), is an indicator for t years prior to (after) a new tax treaty becoming effective if t is negative (positive). See Table 2 for further details.

	N	lo Rich Country I	nteractions			<b>Rich Country Interactions</b>				
	Pooled	RE	FD	FE	Pooled	RE	FD	FE		
	OLS				OLS					
I. FDI = Outbo	ound Stock (Levels)									
New Treaty	-7,798.073***	-5,585.681*	-381.71	-5.205.76	-1,794.917***	-166.38	-3.348	291.158		
	(1.236.821)	(3.026.619)	(338.974)	(3.133.447)	(648.569)	(1.462.261)	(212.923)	(1.519.070)		
Ν	871	871	820	871	871	871	820	871		
Spec Test			p =	0.123			p =	0.858		
II. FDI = Outb	ound Flow (Levels)		-				-			
New Treaty	-844.018***	-748.083	-70.349	-664.012	-205.719*	-7.516	-40.227	76.157		
	(183.239)	(487.060)	(185.637)	(503.507)	(106.355)	(270.804)	(189.943)	(301.767)		
Ν	862	862	808	862	862	862	808	862		
Spec Test			p =	0.252			p =	0.777		
III. FDI = Out	bound FAS (Levels)		-				-			
New Treaty	-22,339.600***	-8.796.70	-928.791	-7.585.57	1.958.82	4.147.60	527.043	4.239.89		
	(3.537.605)	(6.160.690)	(817.635)	(6.464.825)	(652.0)	(652.0)	(597.0)	(652.0)		
Ν	652	652	597	652	652	652	597	652		
Spec Test			p =	0.305			$\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{p}$	0.377		
IV. FDI = Out	bound Stock (Logs)									
New Treaty	-0.329	0.166	-0.006	0.194	-0.163	0.082	-0.005	0.116		
	(0.237)	(0.278)	(0.128)	(0.255)	(0.260)	(0.350)	(0.124)	(0.352)		
Ν	871	871	820	871	871	871	820	871		
Spec Test			p =	0.536			p =	0.801		
<b>V.</b> $FDI = Outb$	ound Flow (Logs)									
New Treaty	-0.429	-0.436	-1.908	-0.378	-0.601	-0.648	-1.895	-0.717		
	(0.359)	(0.592)	(01.552)	(0.704)	(0.376)	(0.596)	(01.509)	(0.784)		
Ν	862	862	808	862	862	862	808	862		
Spec Test			p =	0.381			$\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{p}$	0.516		
<b>VI.</b> $FDI = Out$	bound FAS (Logs)		-				-			
New Treaty	0.441*	0.525	0.120*	0.537	0.622**	0.446	0.089**	0.441		
	(0.248)	(0.345)	(0.066)	(0.350)	(0.268)	(0.321)	(0.042)	(0.323)		
Ν	652	652	597	652	652	652	597	652		
Spec Test			p =	0.243			p =	0.281		

# Table 4. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI

Notes: See Table 2.

0		FDI S	tock			FDI	Flow		Foreign Affiliate Sales			
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE
I. Levels												
(New Treaty)-1	-452.497	-1.584.768	30.011	159.576	-260.365	-323.995	-125.750	-104.477	40.166	-572.825	1.535.672	3.783.134
	(347.861)	(1.981.188)	(181.527)	(1.026.708)	(186.662)	(324.705)	(170.618)	(180.551)	(1.851.091)	(4.640.540)	(1.646.462)	(3.113.790)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-954.353	-2.586.307	-1.681	164.011	-254.080	-420.701	-74.593	-54.814	-944.645	-640.356	2.420.225	5.354.599
	(705.039)	(2.527.082)	(396.670)	(1.332.280)	(199.556)	(446.427)	(177.323)	(292.249)	(2.749.457)	(5.892.914)	(2.117.716)	(3.943.343)
(New Treaty) <sub>+1</sub>	-1.417.585	-3.122.311	-28.086	95.479	-135.342	-374.473	151.251	24.757	-1.576.492	-1.169.706	3.650.820	7.198.811
	(969.428)	(2.941.577)	(514.950)	(1.579.331)	(303.492)	(622.719)	(247.90)	(450.961)	(3.852.599)	(8.136.705)	(2.961.939)	(5.731.671)
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	-1.794.608	-3.532.768	-115.002	452.418	-129.483	-427.650	181.931	127.756	-3.954.420	-2.557.494	2.045.257	6.257.995
	(1.186.178)	(3.160.344)	(594.669)	(1.639.714)	(317.158)	(565.538)	(239.425)	(318.958)	(3.617.902)	(7.481.116)	(2.474.179)	(5.346.933)
(New Treaty) <sub>+3+</sub>	-2,260.770*	-6.533.865	-484.834	727.494	-681.646*	-1.104.22	-407.356	-89.392	-4.869.929	-6.238.731	1.917.582	8.473.180
	(1.341.265)	(4.433.825)	(716.803)	(2.474.381)	(362.792)	(836.134)	(257.070)	(555.484)	(4.693.189)	(9.580.181)	(3.680.316)	(7.477.991)
<b>Rich Interactions</b>	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Ν	621	670	621	670	601	652	601	652	403	449	403	449
II. Logs												
(New Treaty)-1	0.033	0.287**	0.048	0.394**	-0.187	0.165	-0.035	-0.085	-0.001	0.253	0.009	0.259
	(0.052)	(0.140)	(0.049)	(0.159)	(0.299)	(0.795)	(0.388)	(0.763)	(0.080)	(0.189)	(0.080)	(0.188)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-0.071	0.165	-0.043	0.289	-1.027	-0.924	-0.962	-1.188	0.038	0.223	0.044	0.203
	(0.081)	(0.164)	(0.093)	(0.188)	(1.539)	(1.328)	(1.525)	(1.343)	(0.120)	(0.239)	(0.121)	(0.246)
(New Treaty) <sub>+1</sub>	-0.061	0.181	-0.028	0.298	0.024	0.029	0.332	-0.194	0.063	0.144	0.067	0.080
	(0.087)	(0.162)	(0.102)	(0.182)	(1.395)	(1.299)	(1.331)	(1.384)	(0.145)	(0.268)	(0.149)	(0.284)
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	-0.027	0.253	-0.003	0.378**	-0.051	0.568	-0.032	0.277	0.070	0.140	0.075	0.121
	(0.089)	(0.162)	(0.107)	(0.187)	(1.408)	(0.868)	(1.504)	(0.987)	(0.165)	(0.30)	(0.174)	(0.301)
(New Treaty) <sub>+3+</sub>	-0.094	0.048	-0.090	0.176	-3.129*	-1.458	-3.506*	-1.957	0.199	0.359	0.161	0.323
	(0.107)	(0.241)	(0.123)	(0.290)	(1.856)	(1.363)	(1.868)	(1.560)	(0.226)	(0.408)	(0.244)	(0.405)
<b>Rich Interactions</b>												
Ν	621	670	621	670	601	652	601	652	403	449	403	449

 Table 5. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI

Notes: See Table 4.

Table A1. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI in Levels (No	<b>Rich Countr</b>	v Interactions)
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		FDI Sto	ock			<b>FDI</b> 1	Flow			FA	<b>S</b>	
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE
New Treaty	-9,879.008***	- 8,402.201*** (3051 727)	- 741.404*** (270.829)	-8,569.491**	- 1,626.135*** (293.048)	- 1,508.543** (590.087)	-177.784	-1,576.250**	- 27,581.878*** (3776.081)	-15,899.797**	-1,850.999**	- 15,388.288** (7075,517)
SUMGDP	6.644***	8.354	9.498*	10.117	1.256***	1.476*	2.744*	2.153*	43.647***	11.714	28.047	11.293
GDPDIFSO	(1.483) -0.001***	(5.554) -0.001	(5.551)	(6.695) -0.001	(0.346) -0.000***	(0.779) 0	(1.467)	(1.291)	(9.710) -0.004***	(20.134) -0.003*	(19.267)	(22.543) -0.004*
obi bii bi	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
SKDIFFin	-6,873.133***	-2.125.71	1.533.44	-3.991.40	-388.203	478.971	3.454.41	672.139	- 54,083.625*** (7451.610)	-10.101.21	-6.687.00	-21.177.53
SKDGDPD	0.265*	-0.407	-0.807**	-0.127	-0.043	-0.152**	-0.431**	-0.13	5.544***	-0.485	-0.261	0.733
F_COST	(0.146) -500.086**	(0.382) -271.485	(0.324) -147.329*	(0.498) -344.713	(0.036) -95.154*	(0.071) -58.178	(0.199) 53.318	(0.103) -65.494	(0.788) -3,585.651***	(0.940) 602.718	(1.043) -440.163**	(1.489) 763.466
	(208.748)	(184.518)	(78.552)	(212.283)	(51.162)	(35.619)	(52.166)	(47.709)	(947.944)	(720.266)	(211.453)	(799.468)
T_COSTht	-2,359.716*** (830 575)	-1,986.533** (974 360)	-227.524 (227.753)	-1,950.456** (942 326)	-310.872 (209.818)	-192.124 (211.813)	470.875 (348 288)	-136.08 (208-141)	833.072 (4486 888)	-9,228.485** (3925.038)	-1.708.76 (1448-869)	10,237.062** (4283.076)
HTSKD	4.464***	5.911	5.338	9.89	0.564***	0.496	-0.953	1.218	14.871***	16.294	18.228	32.541*
T_COSThm	(0.808) -45.266***	(4.798) 20.996	(3.316) 3.17	(6.581) 44.539	(0.170) -6.053***	(0.433) -2.317	(1.075) 1.777	(1.084) 5.525	(3.153) -146.277***	(12.012) 68.785	(12.542) 9.781	(19.141) 79.596
Old Treaty	(7.723) 7 172 434***	(25.821) 12.086.007*	(4.855)	(31.485)	(1.468) 1 481 029***	(3.752) 1 927 077**	(2.163)	(5.732)	(21.582) 9 898 462**	(59.649) 34 622 165**	(13.573)	(64.616)
Old Heaty	(1447.497)	(6340.639)			(314.611)	(903.303)			(4475.867)	(14636.887)		
DIST	-1.076*** (0.117)	-0.977** (0.480)			-0.190*** (0.035)	-0.170** (0.079)			-3.680*** (0.420)	-2.316* (1.363)		
_cons	232,327.973***	157.051.77	116.938	133.050.90	27.966.59	11.746.16	45.543	-1.694.38	15.210.85	820,091.529**	90.007	891,778.578*
N	(83137.870) 1470	(100785.864) 1470	1335	1470	(20739.517) 1468	(20518.594) 1468	1326	(22300.413) 1468	(451122.726) 806	(401/32.387) 806	686	(448/11.480) 806

		FDI S	tock			FDI	Flow		FAS			
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE
New Treaty	-413.884***	164.034	104.868	397.283*	11.715	43.087	-54.535	110.631*	-782.477***	307.142	-63.279	641.969
-	(146.169)	(211.520)	(64.130)	(211.395)	(40.999)	(53.558)	(88.063)	(57.698)	(283.697)	(717.502)	(242.780)	(798.905)
SUMGDP	-3.041***	-1.423*	0.569*	-0.003	-0.349	-0.192	0.027	0.037	-1.789	-1.619	2.173	-0.031
	(1.065)	(0.833)	(0.311)	(0.092)	(0.319)	(0.350)	(0.279)	(0.037)	(5.555)	(2.298)	(1.381)	(0.556)
GDPDIFSQ	-0.000***	-0.000*	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
SKDIFFin	-685.996**	-1,934.391*	-1,128.079**	-635.462	-52.823	-35.046	-458.834	25.298	-1,858.512**	-8,300.603**	-9,381.284**	- 13,101.549**
	(307.852)	(1078.265)	(544.920)	(515.498)	(91.297)	(157.812)	(363.125)	(141.720)	(921.800)	(4010.341)	(4338.240)	(5097.396)
SKDGDPD	0.052*	0.082	0.001	-0.002	0.002	-0.001	0.01	-0.006	0.084	0.332**	0.432**	0.610**
	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.008)	(0.087)	(0.149)	(0.216)	(0.241)
F_COST	-82.969***	-42.797*	-24.033***	-3.255	-15.26	-10.713	-8.866	-5.137	97.061	72.494	222.277	-46.855
	(31.723)	(24.303)	(8.183)	(7.010)	(9.634)	(10.305)	(8.250)	(5.058)	(271.457)	(107.701)	(153.194)	(68.941)
T_COSTht	-1,789.169***	-767.088*	-174.450***	-35.111	-210.131	-116.327	-55.727	8.58	-1.377.02	-1.381.93	-1,291.943**	-826.270**
	(601.993)	(420.445)	(54.363)	(40.188)	(180.760)	(191.879)	(63.772)	(15.944)	(2590.262)	(985.718)	(642.511)	(333.874)
HTSKD	0.217*	1.188**	0.043	0.474	0.023	0.033	0.355	0.029	0.951	6.124**	5.527*	9.476**
	(0.124)	(0.595)	(0.403)	(0.306)	(0.034)	(0.070)	(0.357)	(0.078)	(0.631)	(3.052)	(3.182)	(3.787)
T_COSThm	-1.745**	2.313	-0.733	0.61	-0.033	-0.008	-0.646	-0.429	-5.950***	2.055	-0.951	7.443
	(0.784)	(2.760)	(0.739)	(2.604)	(0.195)	(0.314)	(0.515)	(0.543)	(1.970)	(10.251)	(3.605)	(13.363)
rSUMGDP	22.445***	34.413***	30.154***	37.130***	3.709***	4.068***	6.655**	6.308**	71.266***	93.972***	101.041***	114.744***
	(1.473)	(3.983)	(6.772)	(5.301)	(0.611)	(1.361)	(3.106)	(2.605)	(4.520)	(8.339)	(14.992)	(7.460)
rGDPDIFSQ	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.001**	-0.003***	-0.000***	-0.000*	0	0	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.007***	-0.008***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
rSKDIFFin	-4,857.332**	5.441.40	16,901.213**	1.042.96	364.002	850.431	4.004.22	-491.75	51,348.610***	10.443.74	34,196.952***	-2.530.70
	(2221.852)	(9659.782)	(7646.730)	(13533.553)	(621.330)	(1683.403)	(3695.709)	(4353.926)	(13364.391)	(19323.832)	(11862.301)	(23579.365)
rSKDGDPD	0.255	-0.697	594.942***	-0.131	-0.06	-0.143	-134.874	0.063	4.953**	-1.717	1,802.514***	-0.892
	(0.278)	(0.831)	(175.231)	(1.165)	(0.077)	(0.172)	(134.174)	(0.402)	(2.019)	(2.420)	(521.998)	(1.927)
rF_COST	-912.362	1,381.588***	-373.198	1,688.264***	-250.758	-266.148**	1.445.03	-364.046*	-3,335.104*	2,729.279***	-2.007.83	3,353.833***
	(599.632)	(242.939)	(562.999)	(276.761)	(171.463)	(129.649)	(891.755)	(190.304)	(1774.969)	(759.099)	(1347.834)	(768.436)
rT_COSTht	-319.473***	- 1,108.178***	-98.919	-2,348.244**	-69.469*	-87.446	36.037	48.122	-550.007	3,108.610***	-170.966	-1.177.82
	(123.558)	(219.229)	(106.371)	(1162.477)	(35.860)	(55.499)	(77.139)	(624.610)	(389.536)	(364.178)	(188.793)	(1796.588)
rHTSKD	-0.692	2.385	2.064**	14.069	-0.749	-0.518	0.633	4.067	12.646**	8.008	3.349**	56.736
	(2.007)	(8.523)	(0.880)	(17.553)	(0.562)	(1.289)	(0.452)	(5.470)	(6.111)	(15.236)	(1.449)	(46.874)
rT_COSThm	-254.132***	-255.508	-3.07	-142.021	-27.674**	-40.73	-0.589	-45.324	-386.060***	-198.918	-7.015	-139.294
	(61.853)	(195.267)	(4.598)	(160.034)	(13.007)	(35.463)	(2.565)	(57.743)	(110.347)	(281.307)	(14.775)	(278.083)
Old Treaty	308.574	3.659.07			36.411	56.753			-208.347	-2.115.24		
	(238.955)	(4307.099)			(32.140)	(83.900)			(651.586)	(4549.850)		
DIST	-0.049***	-0.066			-0.006**	-0.005			-0.182***	-0.194		
	(0.015)	(0.044)			(0.003)	(0.004)			(0.056)	(0.243)		
rDIST	-2.180***	-1.079			-0.526***	-0.436			-4.544***	-3.883		
	(0.426)	(2.609)			(0.155)	(0.330)			(0.757)	(5.222)		
_cons	182,653.934***	83,444.585*	-350.519**	31.363.20	21.426.16	11.892.02	-13.428	-7.739.25	141.875.09	154.228.72	-1.432.67	6.942.23
	(61415.370)	(45581.331)	(137.962)	(34942.770)	(18445.177)	(19806.586)	(164.744)	(15919.582)	(258204.922)	(102044.895)	(987.713)	(61954.629)
N	1470	1470	1335	1470	1468	1468	1326	1468	806	806	686	806

Table A3	<b>Pogrossion Estimatos</b>	• Inhound FDI in l	logs (No Dich	Country Interactions)
Table A5.	Regression Estimates	s: mbound r Di m i	Logs (no kich	Country Interactions)

		FDI Sto	ock			<b>FDI</b> 1	Flow		FAS			
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE
New Treaty	-0.121	0.306	-0.085	0.299	-0.236	0.255	-0.973	0.481	-1.169***	1.250***	-0.008	1.353***
	(0.273)	(0.427)	(0.060)	(0.445)	(0.254)	(0.316)	(1.200)	(0.381)	(0.316)	(0.399)	(0.164)	(0.422)
ISUMGDP	13.823***	10.354***	0.104	10.010***	8.403***	4.901***	7.888	-1.785	25.896***	11.105***	1.588	10.906***
	(1.157)	(1.665)	(2.222)	(1.710)	(1.178)	(1.873)	(15.434)	(1.680)	(3.942)	(2.044)	(1.322)	(2.332)
IGDPDIFSQ	-0.559	-3.388**	-2.054	-3.294*	-6.530***	-4.225***	17.031**	0.241	1.682	-2.469	0.389	-2.296
	(1.207)	(1.587)	(3.352)	(1.754)	(1.402)	(1.303)	(7.773)	(2.024)	(1.673)	(2.738)	(1.250)	(2.951)
lSKDIFFin	54.777	-30.913	-45.574	-33.478	-89.470**	-58.751	343.485**	-24.383	8.383	12.13	21.861	19.207
	(36.010)	(38.879)	(71.976)	(40.715)	(39.095)	(38.888)	(139.208)	(47.232)	(37.489)	(78.683)	(37.311)	(82.371)
lSKDGDPDin	-3.288**	0.13	1.8	0.231	3.201*	1.475	-17.673***	-0.061	0.701	-0.245	-1.461	-0.609
	(1.570)	(1.803)	(3.157)	(1.875)	(1.720)	(1.669)	(6.417)	(2.018)	(1.678)	(3.964)	(1.726)	(4.123)
IF_COST	-0.924	-0.259	0.361	-0.271	-0.488	0.041	-2.28	0.02	-8.216***	0.226	0.643	0.314
	(1.015)	(0.447)	(0.619)	(0.448)	(0.978)	(0.872)	(1.440)	(0.876)	(2.819)	(1.109)	(1.333)	(1.114)
lT_COSTht	30.153***	-3.671	-19.901	-4.542	-21.905*	-23.097**	61.887*	-17.043	69.851***	11.315	1.643	11.43
	(9.869)	(7.737)	(20.188)	(8.136)	(11.375)	(10.534)	(36.525)	(12.527)	(16.471)	(14.021)	(7.593)	(14.605)
IHTSKD	-3.242	3.271	3.303	3.481	6.805**	5.117*	-21.619**	2.781	-1.901	-1.204	-1.004	-1.625
	(2.633)	(2.701)	(5.074)	(2.834)	(2.888)	(2.810)	(9.704)	(3.410)	(2.871)	(5.041)	(2.706)	(5.300)
lT_COSThm	-0.148***	-0.112**	-0.006	-0.117**	-0.172***	-0.112	0.027	-0.127	-0.02	0.097	0.114**	0.089
	(0.044)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.043)	(0.079)	(0.144)	(0.101)	(0.052)	(0.067)	(0.051)	(0.069)
Old Treaty	3.471***	5.183***			2.702***	3.991***			2.357***	4.623***		
	(0.240)	(0.787)			(0.278)	(0.692)			(0.287)	(0.760)		
IDIST	-0.286**	-0.126			-0.478***	-0.357			-0.344**	-0.569		
	(0.128)	(0.512)			(0.126)	(0.338)			(0.163)	(0.607)		
_cons	-232.531***	-10.793	0.034	-5.042	145.541*	136.496*	-0.472***	88.602	-526.083***	-96.598	0.068	-101.667
	(68.653)	(56.430)	(0.054)	(58.798)	(78.829)	(73.140)	(0.150)	(87.379)	(123.899)	(110.258)	(0.089)	(114.291)
Ν	1470	1470	1335	1470	1468	1468	1326	1468	806	806	686	806

Table A4. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI in Logs (Rich Country Interactions)

		FDI S	tock			FDI I	Flow		FAS			
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE
New Treaty	-0.605**	0.281	-0.048	0.347	-0.27	0.416	-0.924	0.551	-1.542***	1.283***	-0.001	1.422***
	(0.299)	(0.435)	(0.057)	(0.450)	(0.268)	(0.324)	(1.192)	(0.407)	(0.333)	(0.413)	(0.167)	(0.452)
ISUMGDP	12.222***	9.964***	-3.574	9.165***	6.528***	4.072*	4.412	-0.141	24.271***	11.699***	-0.015	9.976***
	(1.462)	(2.193)	(3.306)	(2.062)	(1.397)	(2.134)	(20.519)	(1.778)	(5.079)	(3.004)	(2.062)	(3.307)
IGDPDIFSQ	0.371	-3.358**	-13.025	-3.765	-4.032	-2.859	-10.49	-5.406	-0.134	-3.886	-1.905	-10.615
	(2.123)	(1.668)	(12.596)	(3.710)	(2.645)	(1.941)	(16.168)	(3.930)	(4.451)	(3.329)	(4.216)	(7.213)
lSKDIFFin	103.390**	-30.665	-300.767	-43.746	-16.913	-34.52	-176.152	-140.64	23.253	-4.072	-40.264	-148.599
	(43.243)	(35.746)	(279.830)	(87.726)	(56.333)	(39.085)	(353.660)	(98.212)	(100.113)	(88.945)	(106.414)	(174.967)
lSKDGDPDin	-4.532**	-0.292	13.795	0.354	0.737	0.594	10.097	5.355	2.151	1.559	1.166	8.581
	(2.157)	(1.821)	(12.733)	(4.159)	(2.671)	(1.730)	(16.066)	(4.117)	(5.418)	(4.739)	(4.625)	(8.863)
IF_COST	-0.619	-0.007	0.673	0.04	-1.16	-0.708	-3.774**	-0.634	-7.938**	-0.166	1.187	0.496
	(1.241)	(0.579)	(0.853)	(0.597)	(1.059)	(0.894)	(1.454)	(0.932)	(3.614)	(1.687)	(1.944)	(1.722)
lT_COSTht	41.589***	-5.444	-89.735	-8.926	-3.45	-14.394	-73.204	-44.189	75.930***	14.617	-16.806	-25.27
	(11.361)	(7.428)	(77.943)	(21.691)	(15.116)	(11.620)	(98.524)	(28.528)	(19.820)	(14.778)	(28.007)	(37.261)
IHTSKD	-7.704**	3.437	20.08	4.222	0.935	3.235	9.911	10.668	-5.177	-1.253	3.33	8.198
	(3.050)	(2.584)	(19.161)	(5.962)	(3.945)	(3.025)	(24.505)	(7.183)	(6.393)	(5.689)	(7.865)	(11.236)
lT_COSThm	-0.038	-0.115*	-0.015	-0.130*	-0.129***	-0.176**	-0.099	-0.233***	0.136**	0.134*	0.121**	0.12
	(0.053)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.066)	(0.046)	(0.078)	(0.121)	(0.085)	(0.066)	(0.081)	(0.055)	(0.085)
rSUMGDP	2.389	-2.075	8.673**	-6.732	2.648	1.054	21.056	-9.59	-3.067	-3.986	4.646	-3.634
	(2.128)	(2.611)	(3.470)	(6.947)	(2.434)	(2.745)	(27.830)	(12.671)	(6.405)	(3.857)	(3.205)	(3.651)
rGDPDIFSQ	0.375	0.952	12.098	4.225	-0.492	-0.376	16.945	11.323	3.595	3.053	1.887	13.600*
	(1.336)	(1.459)	(12.678)	(5.105)	(1.551)	(1.676)	(18.516)	(7.144)	(3.248)	(2.170)	(4.300)	(7.452)
rSKDIFFin	-8.972	-17.888	291.556	-1.366	18.823	76.041	187.673	240.016*	132.8	75.743	61.022	271.429
	(53.708)	(39.798)	(281.147)	(100.301)	(71.136)	(50.567)	(408.540)	(123.457)	(115.613)	(68.162)	(107.693)	(189.942)
rSKDGDPDin	-0.558	1.643	-0.815	0.767	-0.603	-2.359	5.587	-9.883*	-7.779	-4.947	-1.46	-14.497
	(2.265)	(1.474)	(0.826)	(4.494)	(3.077)	(2.651)	(3.484)	(5.407)	(5.941)	(3.775)	(1.751)	(9.534)
rF_COST	-1.23	-0.591	88.631	-0.607	2.217	2.452	118.873	2.374	1.435	0.954	23.687	-0.661
	(1.938)	(0.615)	(78.428)	(0.655)	(2.457)	(2.306)	(105.461)	(2.391)	(4.737)	(2.017)	(28.115)	(1.801)
rT_COSTht	-5.292	0.905	0.072	5.553	-4.397	-0.893	0.821	39.614	-8.393	-4.653	-0.097	50.861
	(3.668)	(3.835)	(0.062)	(22.574)	(4.092)	(3.682)	(0.535)	(30.354)	(6.088)	(4.546)	(0.061)	(38.908)
rHTSKD	1.855	0.698	-13.799	-0.244	-1.398	-6.276*	-12.001	-17.549**	-7.134	-3.564	-2.466	-16.307
	(4.273)	(3.663)	(12.779)	(7.239)	(5.483)	(3.518)	(18.115)	(8.824)	(7.794)	(4.383)	(4.743)	(12.266)
rT_COSThm	-0.175**	0.058	-19.05	0.054	0.046	0.412*	-9.505	0.547*	-0.382***	-0.133	-4.352	-0.117
	(0.078)	(0.122)	(19.287)	(0.128)	(0.121)	(0.239)	(28.929)	(0.315)	(0.077)	(0.090)	(7.899)	(0.091)
Old Treaty	2.986***	3.336***			0.674	0.538**			-0.05	0.533		
	(0.219)	(0.516)			(0.445)	(0.260)			(0.354)	(0.668)		
IDIST	-0.105	0.045			-0.322**	-0.205			-0.166	-0.546		
	(0.169)	(0.593)			(0.147)	(0.362)			(0.254)	(0.794)		
rDIST	-0.36	-0.294			-0.312	-0.595			-0.393	0.243		
	(0.230)	(1.115)			(0.291)	(0.731)			(0.290)	(1.204)		
_cons	-284.961***	1.242	0.023	22.576	39.187	83.058	-0.482***	214.359	-507.191***	-89.025	0.06	71.015
	(80.759)	(49.937)	(0.056)	(117.632)	(108.586)	(74.632)	(0.154)	(144.776)	(153.415)	(111.293)	(0.092)	(194.086)
Ν	1470	1470	1335	1470	1468	1468	1326	1468	806	806	686	806

	FDI S	Stock	FDI	Flow	FAS			
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE		
(New Treaty)-1	-792.776**	-3,390.553**	-118.272	-697.575	-1,659.765**	-1.889.33		
	(345.011)	(1602.914)	(129.734)	(442.708)	(724.899)	(2551.893)		
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-1,442.359**	-2.362.26	-324.234	-882.836*	-3,509.657**	-4.804.73		
	(559.676)	(2095.459)	(205.848)	(489.214)	(1395.519)	(3275.731)		
(New Treaty) <sub>+1</sub>	-1,944.282**	-2.853.03	-269.959	-335.563	-4,156.651**	-2.560.05		
	(751.596)	(2275.323)	(329.431)	(494.453)	(1734.346)	(3903.684)		
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	-2,741.414***	-4.195.20	-655.376	-929.017	-6,410.244**	-7,375.583*		
	(963.051)	(2850.485)	(421.250)	(618.067)	(2599.012)	(4308.350)		
(New Treaty)+3+	-3,380.269***	-10,601.061**	-836.643	-2,100.313*	-8,010.765**	-22,414.127**		
	(1198.871)	(4774.681)	(566.099)	(1103.691)	(3179.010)	(9711.917)		
SUMGDP	9.793*	11.165	4.267*	3.807	31.035	22.891		
	(5.815)	(9.590)	(2.414)	(2.483)	(23.731)	(24.583)		
GDPDIFSQ	0	-0.001	0	0	-0.002	-0.004*		
	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.002)	(0.002)		
SKDIFFin	2.658.01	-2.294.32	2.946.28	648.822	-18.775.89	-31.904.97		
	(5053.546)	(8843.580)	(2727.916)	(1751.564)	(25293.271)	(31368.702)		
SKDGDPD	-0.790**	-0.225	-0.475*	-0.142	0.671	1.936		
	(0.355)	(0.521)	(0.285)	(0.120)	(1.684)	(2.433)		
F_COST	21.595	38.016	154.839*	-151.768	-562.798	-1,562.136*		
	(98.361)	(498.098)	(90.606)	(141.368)	(488.785)	(855.773)		
T_COSTht	79.496	-1.578.90	337.255	406.641	-2.695.17	-8,870.403**		
	(244.158)	(1034.911)	(296.299)	(454.544)	(2163.366)	(3736.114)		
HTSKD	4.99	9.681	0.213	1.528	30.331	40.544		
	(3.808)	(6.676)	(1.196)	(1.256)	(20.730)	(25.049)		
T_COSThm	5.132	30.073	0.883	3.854	15.645	73.911		
	(4.934)	(29.363)	(2.394)	(6.771)	(26.929)	(83.059)		
_cons	320.998	79.316.89	-275.397*	-57.849.64	-77.476	793,760.396*		
	(215.821)	(121551.068)	(154.284)	(50817.870)	(1373.097)	(427523.648)		
Ν	908	1002	898	990	402	462		

Table A5. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI in Levels (No Rich Country Interactions)

	FI	DI Stock	FDI	Flow	FAS			
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE		
(New Treaty)-1	119.244	150.615	207.093**	101.114	392.881	468.737		
	(97.306)	(174.131)	(84.192)	(68.785)	(452.051)	(643.487)		
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	141.853	236.397	140.997	44.56	285.034	408.232		
. ,,,,	(85.378)	(146.978)	(118.601)	(51.008)	(746.170)	(852.161)		
(New Treaty)+1	291.125*	468.995**	327.284*	135.512	1.048.68	899.173		
(	(169.045)	(224.750)	(187.813)	(102.458)	(1019.700)	(1265.968)		
(New Treaty).	173.614	406.184**	198.173	-9.177	1.361.36	1.192.51		
(	(130.712)	(177.948)	(177.392)	(37.541)	(1091.721)	(1328.889)		
(New Treaty) 3	208.984	647.114**	319.297*	146.212**	1.708.14	667.951		
(11011 11011))+3+	(128 502)	(274,900)	(190.937)	(59.406)	(1190.428)	(1545,290)		
SUMGDP	-0.021	-0.210*	0.265	-0.004	2.948*	0.906		
Sement	(0.165)	(0.125)	(0.227)	(0.066)	(1.703)	(0.882)		
GDPDIFSO	-0.000*	0	0	0	-0.001**	-0.000***		
obiblisy	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		
SKDIFFin	-990.721***	-594.745	-1.039.485*	-65.273	-18.673.108**	-18.309.683***		
	(337.049)	(622.733)	(574.407)	(102.501)	(8013.348)	(3932.280)		
SKDGDPD	0.022	-0.013	0.038	-0.002	1.025**	0.884***		
	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.007)	(0.481)	(0.277)		
F COST	0.482	27.978*	69.868*	1.572	373.52	180.893		
	(33.391)	(15.810)	(35.503)	(6.081)	(253,403)	(210.741)		
T COSTht	-100.503	-87.482*	-282.786**	2.25	-1.762.345*	-831.829***		
-	(109.949)	(47.662)	(123.526)	(26.335)	(947.134)	(263.629)		
HTSKD	0.724***	0.448	0.481	0.056	10.974**	13.352***		
	(0.196)	(0.368)	(0.356)	(0.057)	(4.985)	(3.082)		
T_COSThm	-0.01	2.025	-0.786	0.671*	-0.029	22.99		
_	(0.528)	(2.957)	(0.629)	(0.398)	(7.597)	(16.737)		
rSUMGDP	30.980***	53.736***	10.127**	14.942*	102.711***	111.093***		
	(7.157)	(4.603)	(4.003)	(7.510)	(16.746)	(12.711)		
rGDPDIFSQ	-0.001**	-0.003***	0	0	-0.007***	-0.009***		
	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.002)	(0.001)		
rSKDIFFin	13.337.60	-12.179.90	3.465.64	-4.601.59	13.441.63	-19.265.31		
	(9558.027)	(14040.827)	(4749.469)	(4211.602)	(21871.068)	(34794.508)		
rSKDGDPD	51.164	0.705	-214.271	0.335	374.082	1.513		
	(189.659)	(1.053)	(214.283)	(0.362)	(1139.519)	(3.069)		
rF_COST	554.14	-2,548.296***	1,602.409*	-1,040.417*	-2,991.951**	-600.898		
	(487.896)	(382.146)	(903.301)	(572.230)	(1485.908)	(1154.283)		
rT_COSTht	-19.824	2,881.095***	19.824	2,629.303*	142.569	-3,019.692*		
	(104.797)	(902.555)	(104.894)	(1530.045)	(233.403)	(1760.510)		
rHTSKD	1.763*	31.404	0.586	9.47	1.102	79.002		
	(1.002)	(25.124)	(0.543)	(6.911)	(1.815)	(65.378)		
rT_COSThm	-1.226	-175.251	1.415	-65.024	23.634	43.235		
	(7.317)	(159.660)	(3.462)	(82.886)	(49.692)	(461.312)		
_cons	-15.234	-122,645.259***	-381.619**	-88,480.417*	-1.876.59	26.321.26		
	(173.831)	(30930.006)	(181.113)	(49314.631)	(1295.125)	(82177.341)		
Ν	908	1002	898	990	402	462		

Table A6. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI in Levels (Rich Country Interactions)

Table A7. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI in Logs (No Rich Country Interactions)

	<b>FDI</b> :	Stock	FDI	Flow	FAS		
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	
(New Treaty).1	0.774	0.164	0.745	0.853	0.029	0.35	
	(0.558)	(0.699)	(0.843)	(0.988)	(0.104)	(0.218)	
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	0.661	0.173	-0.453	-0.147	0.113	0.381	
	(0.577)	(0.573)	(1.567)	(0.988)	(0.227)	(0.372)	
(New Treaty) <sub>+1</sub>	-0.27	-0.072	0.072	0.512	0.171	0.495	
	(0.628)	(0.755)	(1.550)	(0.895)	(0.246)	(0.348)	
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	-0.331	-0.049	-0.682	-0.153	1.070*	1.250***	
	(0.398)	(0.634)	(1.752)	(1.108)	(0.534)	(0.455)	
(New Treaty) <sub>+3+</sub>	0.286	0.584	0.344	0.707	1.219**	1.619***	
	(0.309)	(0.488)	(1.715)	(0.520)	(0.557)	(0.511)	
ISUMGDP	-2.429	6.088***	2.666	3.964	1.041	3.671	
	(3.643)	(2.196)	(12.567)	(4.185)	(1.993)	(3.645)	
IGDPDIFSQ	-2.424	-3.688	11.508	-1.36	1.093	0.562	
	(5.244)	(2.690)	(8.073)	(3.273)	(2.452)	(3.038)	
lSKDIFFin	-79.257	-44.266	100.789	-117.326*	11.041	43.429	
	(113.048)	(56.647)	(146.297)	(67.871)	(60.975)	(85.386)	
lSKDGDPDin	3.019	0.785	-6.812	3.979	-1.153	-1.335	
	(4.900)	(2.544)	(6.358)	(3.175)	(3.232)	(4.494)	
lF_COST	2.187	2.249	-4.33	-5.075*	1.987	2.251	
	(1.645)	(1.625)	(3.471)	(2.610)	(2.129)	(2.689)	
lT_COSTht	-40.234	-14.086	-2	-19.546	2.326	12.704	
	(35.892)	(14.553)	(39.976)	(18.444)	(7.204)	(10.085)	
IHTSKD	5.923	4.167	-4.913	9.302**	-0.122	-3.687	
	(7.995)	(3.975)	(10.490)	(4.581)	(3.983)	(5.284)	
lT_COSThm	-0.048	-0.037	-0.185	0.024	0.096	0.097	
	(0.074)	(0.070)	(0.190)	(0.151)	(0.074)	(0.060)	
_cons	-0.108	70.15	-0.565**	94.483	0.035	-98.497	
	(0.101)	(106.932)	(0.277)	(137.696)	(0.095)	(82.019)	
Ν	908	1002	898	990	402	462	

	FDI	Stock	FDI	Flow	FAS		
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE	
(New Treaty)-1	0.845	0.292	0.817	0.941	0.061	0.462*	
	(0.567)	(0.649)	(0.853)	(0.984)	(0.116)	(0.236)	
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	0.785	0.334	-0.385	0.038	0.171	0.524	
	(0.588)	(0.520)	(1.601)	(1.016)	(0.234)	(0.380)	
(New Treaty)+1	-0.173	0.052	0.066	0.676	0.242	0.650*	
	(0.623)	(0.770)	(1.631)	(0.931)	(0.269)	(0.376)	
(New Treaty) <sub>+2</sub>	-0.261	0.094	-0.744	0.031	1.165**	1.415***	
< <b>3</b> 7.2	(0.450)	(0.630)	(1.851)	(1.127)	(0.569)	(0.513)	
(New Treaty)+3+	0.277	0.715	0.267	0.832	1.311**	1.852***	
	(0.350)	(0.488)	(1.794)	(0.531)	(0.604)	(0.592)	
ISUMGDP	-6.785	4.467	-2.97	4.315	-0.264	2.5	
	(4.415)	(3.548)	(14.955)	(4.575)	(3.194)	(5.274)	
IGDPDIFSQ	-28.127	-6.886	-13.87	-6.891	0.415	-0.279	
	(23.384)	(6.408)	(23.212)	(7.143)	(8.395)	(10.856)	
lSKDIFFin	-675.296	-96.162	-434.894	-214.523	-21.198	44.976	
	(533.438)	(136.787)	(492.333)	(158.513)	(173.108)	(241.164)	
lSKDGDPDin	30.308	3.489	19.221	8.116	-0.139	-0.589	
	(23.781)	(6.554)	(22.182)	(7.266)	(9.269)	(13.044)	
IF_COST	2.25	3.106	-3.993	-2.523	4.181	4.425	
	(2.102)	(2.421)	(3.500)	(2.799)	(3.547)	(4.277)	
IT_COSTht	-198.179	-28.012	-150.37	-47.801	-6.294	17.525	
	(149.974)	(39.524)	(134.917)	(44.620)	(34.191)	(43.037)	
IHTSKD	45.997	6.98	30.114	16.243	2.259	-4.836	
	(37.010)	(9.181)	(34.002)	(10.921)	(11.111)	(14.594)	
lT_COSThm	-0.051	-0.082	-0.330**	-0.161*	0.108	0.126	
	(0.081)	(0.069)	(0.141)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.076)	
rSUMGDP	11.600**	-2.449	25.918	1.917	4.508	0.986	
	(4.935)	(7.015)	(22.824)	(12.166)	(4.618)	(5.528)	
rGDPDIFSQ	28.1	7.234	17.208	11.218	-0.77	1.637	
	(23.333)	(7.011)	(25.344)	(8.169)	(8.637)	(10.907)	
rSKDIFFin	702.031	57.411	280.019	238.935	32.37	29.878	
	(535.442)	(150.992)	(589.597)	(200.804)	(174.303)	(244.194)	
rSKDGDPDin	-0.788	-2.73	-2.062	-9.327	-5.023	-2.122	
	(1.983)	(6.905)	(8.039)	(9.432)	(3.592)	(13.161)	
rF_COST	193.362	-2.82	154.927	-8.431	9.662	-6.036	
	(148.018)	(2.476)	(140.623)	(6.173)	(35.534)	(4.751)	
rT_COSTht	0.055	22.626	1.476	59.464	-0.08	-3.167	
	(0.088)	(40.355)	(0.956)	(50.340)	(0.087)	(43.395)	
rHTSKD	-31.88	-3.37	-13.623	-17.909	-0.104	-1.031	
	(23.867)	(10.567)	(26.372)	(13.580)	(9.410)	(14.838)	
rT_COSThm	-47.491	0.215	-18.327	0.865***	-3.292	-0.118	
	(37.159)	(0.131)	(40.963)	(0.263)	(11.121)	(0.078)	
_cons	-0.107	142.321	-0.538*	163.395	0.009	-101.172	
	(0.088)	(202.649)	(0.286)	(231.249)	(0.096)	(210.242)	
Ν	908	1002	898	990	402	462	

Table A8. Regression Estimates: Inbound FDI in Logs (Rich Country Interactions)

Table A9.	Regression	Estimates:	Outboun	d FDI in ]	Levels (No	Rich (	Country	Interactions)

		FDI Stock				FDI Flow				FAS				
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE		
New Treaty	-7,798.073***	-5,585.681*	-381.71	-5.205.76	-844.018***	-748.083	-70.349	-664.012	-22,339.600***	-8.796.70	-928.791	-7.585.57		
	(1236.821)	(3026.619)	(338.974)	(3133.447)	(183.239)	(487.060)	(185.637)	(503.507)	(3537.605)	(6160.690)	(817.635)	(6464.825)		
SUMGDP	0.531	2.552	4.814*	3.55	-0.174	0.163	0.815	0.424	3.722	6.636	11.616	6.624		
	(1.797)	(2.921)	(2.556)	(3.363)	(0.267)	(0.326)	(0.544)	(0.472)	(6.889)	(9.461)	(8.088)	(9.238)		
GDPDIFSQ	-0.001***	0	0	0	-0.000**	0	0	0	-0.005***	-0.002**	-0.001	-0.002**		
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)		
SKDIFFout	-1.023.30	5,641.008**	6,585.960**	7,191.504**	371.152*	868.384**	1,152.030**	1,201.933**	-23,770.496***	9,233.989*	10,090.922*	11,748.954*		
	(1363.237)	(2447.878)	(2689.868)	(3145.390)	(192.907)	(363.148)	(522.325)	(525.445)	(4756.220)	(4900.026)	(5037.558)	(5874.817)		
SKDGDPD	-0.053	-0.674**	-0.872**	-0.589**	-0.071**	-0.124**	-0.101	-0.109**	3.219***	-1.180*	-0.967	-1.024		
	(0.201)	(0.304)	(0.357)	(0.276)	(0.029)	(0.054)	(0.082)	(0.050)	(0.674)	(0.676)	(0.613)	(0.633)		
F_COST	-65.421	117.714	11.866	177.315	-0.469	24.223	1.056	39.549	-278.339	569.11	-196.518**	808.604*		
	(71.637)	(156.871)	(36.695)	(169.928)	(11.359)	(23.557)	(17.113)	(27.583)	(195.786)	(433.402)	(91.907)	(470.078)		
T_COSThm	-3,693.877***	-2,467.279***	-75.207	-2,356.753**	-541.079***	-406.614**	91.21	-373.043**	-12,617.449***	-6,917.395***	-2,128.434***	-7,034.567***		
	(1082.631)	(935.736)	(184.562)	(900.565)	(166.539)	(182.930)	(162.244)	(172.726)	(3702.193)	(1754.450)	(632.005)	(1701.693)		
HTSKD	0.373	0.845	0.739	2.010*	0.018	0.069	0.295	0.304	-0.549	3.809**	4.055***	6.112**		
	(0.465)	(0.669)	(0.452)	(1.144)	(0.073)	(0.092)	(0.223)	(0.198)	(1.393)	(1.493)	(1.104)	(2.313)		
T_COSTht	-65.286***	-74.798*	-42.176	-100.076*	-8.134**	-12.920**	-21.92	-19.438**	-155.856**	-230.270***	-183.559***	-269.429***		
	(21.553)	(41.763)	(34.863)	(50.697)	(3.242)	(6.265)	(18.083)	(9.451)	(65.379)	(79.794)	(56.641)	(73.866)		
Old Treaty	6,517.870***	19,011.414**			831.424***	1,780.524**			19,696.410***	64,571.337***				
	(1339.421)	(8049.485)			(204.358)	(850.772)			(3727.547)	(21787.702)				
DIST	-2.100***	-2.277*			-0.202***	-0.225**			-5.128***	-4.533				
	(0.277)	(1.316)			(0.035)	(0.107)			(0.743)	(3.254)				
_cons	362,877.401***	199,406.426***	280.463*	167,173.781**	50,655.861***	33,612.453**	105.548	26,035.154*	1300466.477***	575,226.875***	644.355	558,828.195***		
	(105798.668)	(76093.576)	(162.738)	(71182.969)	(16308.293)	(15843.204)	(68.356)	(14091.801)	(371468.249)	(146230.097)	(703.706)	(138661.324)		
N	871	871	820	871	862	862	808	862	652	652	597	652		

Table A10.	Regression	Estimates:	Outbound	FDI in	Levels	(Rich	Country	/ Interactions	)
			0			(			

		FDI Sto	ck			FDI Fle	ow		FAS				
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	
New Treaty	-1,794.917***	-166.38	-3.348	291.158	-205.719*	-7.516	-40.227	76.157	-1.066.35	3.055.96	604.372	4.387.82	
	(648.569)	(1462.261)	(212.923)	(1519.070)	(106.355)	(270.804)	(189.943)	(301.767)	(1958.818)	(4147.603)	(527.043)	(4239.888)	
SUMGDP	-4.163**	-2.748**	0.807*	-1.606	-0.589**	-0.401	0.304	-0.312	-16.169***	-8.389***	1.836	-4.602*	
	(1.734)	(1.402)	(0.476)	(1.054)	(0.289)	(0.297)	(0.241)	(0.277)	(5.341)	(3.249)	(1.358)	(2.459)	
GDPDIFSQ	-0.001***	-0.000**	0	0	-0.000***	-0.000*	0	0	-0.002***	-0.001***	0	0	
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	
SKDIFFout	-865.078	-693.42	-93.898	-1.140.59	-166.961	-159.239	183.335	-278.503	-7,054.795***	-5,039.057**	-1.166.09	-6,572.627*	
	(546.103)	(657.331)	(762.387)	(880.180)	(107.731)	(165.195)	(289.586)	(251.908)	(2065.798)	(2309.173)	(2257.991)	(3498.898)	
SKDGDPD	0.133	0.041	-0.113	-0.035	0.026*	0.02	-0.002	0.008	0.898***	0.328	-0.319	0.048	
	(0.081)	(0.139)	(0.085)	(0.147)	(0.015)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.293)	(0.357)	(0.417)	(0.373)	
F_COST	-33.884	38.237	-24.495	52.363	2.78	9.526	-22.138**	12.586	-333.543***	-109.39	-100.890*	-4.199	
	(32.780)	(66.326)	(14.806)	(63.939)	(5.476)	(12.467)	(8.925)	(13.889)	(108.802)	(194.528)	(54.388)	(184.657)	
T_COSThm	-3,184.119***	-1,986.633***	-189.3	-1,174.249**	-478.133***	-325.442**	17.136	-226.172*	-10,246.442***	-4,856.795***	-773.271*	-2,515.655**	
	(943.039)	(725.316)	(198.654)	(548.216)	(158.167)	(153.371)	(118.807)	(121.883)	(2713.399)	(1484.417)	(435.840)	(962.344)	
HTSKD	0.555**	0.039	0.18	-0.363	0.061	0.027	0.089	-0.056	3.544***	2.519*	1.711**	1.305	
	(0.226)	(0.407)	(0.196)	(0.575)	(0.043)	(0.081)	(0.107)	(0.129)	(0.940)	(1.530)	(0.840)	(2.048)	
T_COSTht	-30.622***	-32.290*	-12.271	-22.566	-5.357***	-6.353**	-2.266	-4.553	-209.068***	-205.182***	-78.515**	-148.993***	
	(10.289)	(17.826)	(13.114)	(19.531)	(2.026)	(3.076)	(8.560)	(3.420)	(41.054)	(45.389)	(31.057)	(50.218)	
rSUMGDP	11.803***	14.964**	12.302**	11.730*	1.072***	1.742*	2.617	1.954	45.629***	52.275***	47.165***	38.936***	
	(1.446)	(6.189)	(5.884)	(6.041)	(0.230)	(0.976)	(2.178)	(1.620)	(3.368)	(11.994)	(13.034)	(10.462)	
rGDPDIFSQ	-0.001***	-0.001*	0	-0.002*	0	0	0	0	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.004***	-0.006***	
	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	
rSKDIFFout	-3.764.41	-1.580.26	14.022.91	-15.597.12	977.464	785.531	6,970.218*	-291.934	-5.951.98	1.286.72	42,965.522***	-42.299.13	
	(6722.907)	(12367.285)	(8599.876)	(24353.036)	(1007.485)	(1700.215)	(3874.034)	(4609.388)	(19853.738)	(23838.484)	(13544.048)	(38729.150)	
rSKDGDPD	0.005	0.326	-61.578	2.474	-0.162	-0.122	-66.763	0.1	0.302	-0.011	595.542**	6.029	
	(0.764)	(1.715)	(86.506)	(3.222)	(0.122)	(0.228)	(48.028)	(0.602)	(2.375)	(3.145)	(293.689)	(4.903)	
rF_COST	405.994**	72.747	-245.46	182.837	35.478	35.218	-72.383	51.828	1,353.664***	191.001	-428.639*	311.223	
	(159.110)	(254.459)	(179.861)	(290.352)	(28.014)	(42.262)	(82.497)	(57.269)	(314.076)	(411.388)	(234.024)	(367.823)	
rT_COSTht	71.854	-419.64	9.071	-646.214*	1.377	-73.517*	270.082	-116.364*	551.822*	-655.821*	-3,907.225***	-1,333.457***	
	(135.107)	(293.814)	(306.227)	(342.444)	(20.554)	(42.611)	(309.710)	(57.812)	(323.164)	(374.979)	(1211.168)	(461.703)	
rHTSKD	-8.593	18.834	1.635	49.111	-1.121	1.819	0.779	5.638	-42.716**	33.693	4.775**	115.517**	
	(8.124)	(19.339)	(1.154)	(38.661)	(1.185)	(2.463)	(0.497)	(6.749)	(20.061)	(31.299)	(1.781)	(56.815)	
rT_COSThm	-214.514	-411.953	1.852	-2.152.91	-63.332*	-81.874	-7.105*	-219.039	-1,551.049***	-1,737.662**	-10.741	-7,287.003*	
	(220.619)	(384.085)	(10.030)	(1808.599)	(33.855)	(55.264)	(3.943)	(374.677)	(509.742)	(764.047)	(13.716)	(3760.485)	
Old Treaty	-4,140.345***	2.035.05			-440.964***	7.329			-7,723.071***	7.981.05			
	(990.558)	(4004.047)			(156.226)	(483.604)			(2692.158)	(11398.125)			
DIST	-0.469***	-0.574			-0.069***	-0.079			-2.106***	-1.954			
	(0.130)	(0.487)			(0.023)	(0.065)			(0.441)	(1.385)			
rDIST	-5.299***	-3.544			-0.356**	-0.081			-11.890***	-8.213			
	(0.964)	(5.780)			(0.138)	(0.525)			(2.295)	(12.620)			
_cons	319,143.582***	200,544.765***	95.041	190,147.079**	47,469.039***	32,363.157**	70.911	27.895.75	1088746.718***	535,549.397***	73.17	543,928.700***	
	(94818.998)	(72823.855)	(151.341)	(77227.711)	(15929.994)	(15504.857)	(79.690)	(17295.190)	(277752.495)	(155352.872)	(665.695)	(163926.141)	
N	871	871	820	871	862	862	808	862	652	652	597	652	

Table A11. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI in Logs (No Rich Countr	v Interactions)
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	FDI Stock					FDI I	low		FAS			
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE
New Treaty	-0.329	0.166	-0.006	0.194	-0.429	-0.436	-1.908	-0.378	0.441*	0.525	0.120*	0.537
	(0.237)	(0.278)	(0.128)	(0.255)	(0.359)	(0.592)	(1.552)	(0.704)	(0.248)	(0.345)	(0.066)	(0.350)
ISUMGDP	3.961***	5.382***	4.568	7.603***	6.304***	5.345**	2.762	5.451	4.129***	3.856**	1.813	4.474*
	(0.845)	(1.348)	(3.179)	(1.883)	(1.718)	(2.360)	(12.905)	(3.508)	(1.300)	(1.556)	(2.845)	(2.252)
IGDPDIFSQ	-0.884	-1.397*	-0.707	-2.231**	0.258	-0.018	3.145	-0.458	-0.704	-1.168	-0.435	-1.399
	(0.576)	(0.779)	(1.716)	(0.890)	(1.217)	(1.706)	(6.522)	(1.926)	(0.777)	(0.942)	(1.659)	(1.131)
lSKDIFFout	-0.852	11.725	20.800*	13.45	15.814*	17.559	40.847	16.843	2.856	14.742	6.441	15.081
	(5.646)	(8.892)	(11.933)	(9.168)	(9.517)	(14.422)	(30.974)	(15.461)	(8.058)	(11.104)	(7.578)	(11.123)
lSKDGDPDout	0.164	-1.234	-2.282*	-1.444	-1.69	-1.857	-4.013	-1.801	-0.19	-1.635	-0.741	-1.684
	(0.623)	(0.945)	(1.296)	(0.972)	(1.032)	(1.541)	(3.401)	(1.619)	(0.894)	(1.194)	(0.855)	(1.194)
IF_COST	-2.157***	-1.255**	-0.386	-0.699	-1.916***	-1.879***	-5.502	-1.415	-2.203***	-0.817	-0.613***	-0.468
	(0.209)	(0.508)	(0.231)	(0.698)	(0.601)	(0.691)	(3.461)	(1.898)	(0.243)	(0.904)	(0.189)	(1.099)
lT_COSThm	0.077	-5.219	0.689	-4.738	-1.655	-7.714	15.823	-9.621	3.061	-6.839***	-6.513***	-6.717***
	(4.365)	(3.398)	(2.429)	(3.718)	(8.780)	(10.454)	(15.139)	(10.684)	(6.521)	(2.299)	(1.210)	(2.427)
IHTSKD	-0.090**	-0.074	-0.075	-0.029	-0.182	-0.203	-0.597	-0.16	-0.176***	-0.005	0.048	0.019
	(0.043)	(0.099)	(0.080)	(0.104)	(0.117)	(0.212)	(0.406)	(0.270)	(0.050)	(0.134)	(0.037)	(0.136)
lT_COSTht	0.173	0.031	0.187	-0.089	0.468	0.503	1.486	0.282	0.388***	-0.214	-0.158	-0.282
	(0.121)	(0.248)	(0.197)	(0.264)	(0.353)	(0.652)	(1.315)	(0.795)	(0.133)	(0.365)	(0.096)	(0.377)
Old Treaty	0.296*	1.153*			-0.134	0.034			0.869***	1.736**		
	(0.161)	(0.639)			(0.355)	(0.703)			(0.184)	(0.787)		
IDIST	-1.056***	-1.263***			-1.058***	-1.122**			-1.098***	-1.104**		
	(0.102)	(0.439)			(0.228)	(0.440)			(0.129)	(0.451)		
_cons	4.445	21.447	0.097**	2.147	-33.84	5.978	0.185	10.568	-12.789	36.831	-0.002	25.136
	(34.301)	(32.123)	(0.045)	(36.719)	(67.531)	(82.506)	(0.255)	(86.676)	(50.036)	(23.650)	(0.035)	(26.664)
Ν	871	871	820	871	862	862	808	862	652	652	597	652

Table A12. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI in Logs (Rich Country Interactions)

	FDI Stock				FDI Flow				FAS			
	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE	Pooled OLS	RE	FD	FE
New Treaty	-0.163	0.082	-0.005	0.116	-0.601	-0.648	-1.895	-0.717	0.622**	0.446	0.089**	0.441
	(0.260)	(0.350)	(0.124)	(0.352)	(0.376)	(0.596)	(1.509)	(0.784)	(0.268)	(0.321)	(0.042)	(0.323)
ISUMGDP	2.112**	6.159***	6.611**	10.781***	5.407***	5.035**	2.837	3.95	1.718	4.102**	2.487	5.974**
	(0.854)	(1.402)	(3.025)	(2.929)	(1.835)	(2.551)	(10.406)	(4.864)	(1.379)	(1.820)	(2.584)	(2.895)
IGDPDIFSQ	2.897**	0.887	1.142	1.51	4.028**	3.336	9.761	3.523	3.604**	1.496	2.516	1.805
	(1.299)	(2.091)	(2.237)	(2.910)	(2.015)	(2.787)	(7.460)	(3.609)	(1.490)	(1.905)	(2.748)	(2.459)
<b>ISKDIFFout</b>	26.327**	36.805*	45.234**	51.184*	45.486**	44.674*	81.576	41.95	34.697**	43.658**	34.986*	49.615*
	(12.610)	(20.725)	(20.613)	(28.245)	(18.542)	(26.374)	(62.607)	(32.653)	(15.159)	(21.849)	(20.106)	(27.584)
lSKDGDPDout	-2.870**	-4.108*	-5.149**	-5.712*	-4.975**	-4.865*	-8.171	-4.549	-3.939**	-4.988**	-3.948*	-5.651*
	(1.416)	(2.275)	(2.327)	(3.068)	(2.060)	(2.895)	(7.103)	(3.527)	(1.707)	(2.453)	(2.222)	(3.085)
IF_COST	-2.743***	-1.611	-0.795**	-0.983	-4.637***	-4.981***	-15.321***	-7.457***	-4.135***	-0.852	-0.772**	-0.266
	(0.467)	(0.983)	(0.384)	(1.312)	(0.952)	(0.970)	(4.978)	(2.734)	(0.547)	(2.183)	(0.340)	(2.692)
lT_COSThm	-0.904	-6.340*	0.215	2.451	-4.114	-8.723	3.146**	-6.714	3.858	-8.866***	-0.199*	-5.588
	(4.457)	(3.797)	(0.218)	(7.554)	(8.959)	(10.435)	(1.365)	(13.626)	(6.673)	(2.895)	(0.114)	(4.925)
IHTSKD	-0.101*	0.001	-0.086	0.054	-0.299*	-0.317	-0.971**	-0.421	-0.059	0.09	0.064	0.115
	(0.059)	(0.105)	(0.086)	(0.106)	(0.156)	(0.288)	(0.392)	(0.332)	(0.081)	(0.113)	(0.047)	(0.113)
lT_COSTht	0.379**	-0.209	2.909	-0.354	1.270**	1.191	28.442	1.173	0.183	-0.591*	-6.006***	-0.656*
	(0.173)	(0.314)	(3.755)	(0.306)	(0.509)	(0.906)	(17.993)	(1.073)	(0.249)	(0.330)	(1.900)	(0.342)
rSUMGDP	3.783***	-0.939	-7.265**	-8.043**	2.238	2.046	-26.32	-10.009	4.883***	1.156	0.676	-2.219
	(0.674)	(1.459)	(3.532)	(3.150)	(1.842)	(3.174)	(36.012)	(9.469)	(1.064)	(1.942)	(2.407)	(2.995)
rGDPDIFSQ	-3.169***	-1.926	-0.837	-3.466	-3.628*	-4.156	7.357	1.818	-3.624***	-3.211**	-4.112	-3.58
	(1.034)	(1.595)	(2.315)	(2.961)	(2.106)	(2.723)	(20.594)	(6.232)	(1.279)	(1.608)	(2.751)	(2.503)
rSKDIFFout	-7.747	-35.124**	-43.334**	-61.078**	-20.267	-36.686	58.52	-49.496	-9.188	-44.224**	-36.497*	-54.696*
	(13.383)	(17.488)	(20.817)	(28.601)	(29.940)	(30.471)	(99.494)	(40.576)	(16.886)	(18.898)	(20.244)	(27.829)
rSKDGDPDout	1.245	3.949**	0.850**	6.714**	2.252	3.611	18.561***	4.447	1.691	5.124**	0.354	6.229*
	(1.446)	(1.909)	(0.407)	(3.099)	(3.108)	(3.203)	(5.598)	(4.268)	(1.838)	(2.137)	(0.375)	(3.105)
rF_COST	1.350**	0.979	-0.453	0.55	4.186***	5.646***	-0.464	12.142***	3.002***	0.555	0.264	0.105
	(0.529)	(1.061)	(0.339)	(1.345)	(1.301)	(1.450)	(3.496)	(3.287)	(0.586)	(2.196)	(0.226)	(2.695)
rT_COSTht	1.042**	0.186	-2.875	-0.095	-0.843	-2.339	-16.735	-4.501***	1.691***	0.698	1.43	0.557
	(0.506)	(0.548)	(3.672)	(0.427)	(1.276)	(1.634)	(29.106)	(1.589)	(0.587)	(0.431)	(2.004)	(0.407)
rHTSKD	-0.534***	-0.024	4.862**	0.112	0.049	0.694	-6.543	1.667***	-0.731***	-0.165	4.143*	-0.102
	(0.196)	(0.213)	(2.341)	(0.162)	(0.500)	(0.615)	(10.735)	(0.601)	(0.223)	(0.156)	(2.232)	(0.141)
rT_COSThm	4.103	8.051	0.193	-10.108	7.716	9.341	-0.415	10.616	-0.103	8.652*	-0.094	2.213
	(3.408)	(5.319)	(0.133)	(7.659)	(6.301)	(7.533)	(1.395)	(19.290)	(3.363)	(4.700)	(0.092)	(5.041)
Old Treaty	-1.243***	-0.436			-1.276*	-0.923			0.192	0.019		
	(0.343)	(1.108)			(0.712)	(0.894)			(0.439)	(1.111)		
IDIST	-0.792***	-1.465*			-0.734*	-1.028			-1.339***	-1.397*		
	(0.223)	(0.809)			(0.388)	(0.791)			(0.287)	(0.820)		
rDIST	-0.259	0.648			-0.235	0.175			0.386	0.75		
	(0.249)	(0.951)			(0.513)	(1.011)			(0.306)	(0.971)		
_cons	-42.742	-17.378	0.097**	-50.523	-75.982	-36.364	0.276	-44.586	-59.724	0.362	-0.003	-20.158
	(39.788)	(48.566)	(0.044)	(62.268)	(72.307)	(81.528)	(0.256)	(91.885)	(51.900)	(36.091)	(0.036)	(47.634)
N	871	871	820	871	862	862	808	862	652	652	597	652

	FDI Stock		<b>FDI Flow</b>		FAS	
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE
(New Treaty)-1	-452.497	-1.584.77	-260.365	-323.995	40.166	-572.825
	(347.861)	(1981.188)	(186.662)	(324.705)	(1851.091)	(4640.540)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-954.353	-2.586.31	-254.08	-420.701	-944.645	-640.356
-	(705.039)	(2527.082)	(199.556)	(446.427)	(2749.457)	(5892.914)
(New Treaty)+1	-1.417.59	-3.122.31	-135.342	-374.473	-1.576.49	-1.169.71
	(969.428)	(2941.577)	(303.492)	(622.719)	(3852.599)	(8136.705)
(New Treaty)+2	-1.794.61	-3.532.77	-129.483	-427.65	-3.954.42	-2.557.49
	(1186.178)	(3160.344)	(317.158)	(565.538)	(3617.902)	(7481.116)
(New Treaty)+3+	-2,260.770*	-6.533.87	-681.646*	-1.104.22	-4.869.93	-6.238.73
	(1341.265)	(4433.825)	(362.792)	(836.134)	(4693.189)	(9580.181)
SUMGDP	4.123	3.467	0.87	0.6	16.641	4.34
	(2.595)	(3.565)	(0.642)	(0.569)	(12.943)	(10.637)
GDPDIFSQ	0	0	0	0	-0.001	-0.001*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.001)
SKDIFFout	7,441.644**	9,073.120**	1,350.033*	1,689.547**	11.936.01	14,036.663*
	(3048.838)	(3734.937)	(750.513)	(670.381)	(7807.226)	(7242.069)
SKDGDPD	-0.904**	-0.672**	-0.125	-0.150**	-0.971	-1.029
	(0.368)	(0.310)	(0.107)	(0.059)	(0.971)	(0.808)
F_COST	40.627	256.854	5.273	43.622	-114.419	914.667**
	(65.531)	(231.686)	(31.766)	(36.040)	(81.290)	(407.681)
T_COSThm	216.736	-2,321.273**	116.679	-306.026*	-2,360.319***	-7,066.672***
	(288.229)	(881.696)	(211.489)	(179.973)	(787.805)	(1982.554)
HTSKD	1.125**	1.93	0.424	0.21	5.211***	6.263***
	(0.531)	(1.296)	(0.317)	(0.282)	(1.291)	(2.238)
T_COSTht	-71.856*	-120.523**	-36.155*	-23.514**	-253.244***	-293.044***
	(38.126)	(53.876)	(20.735)	(10.147)	(66.818)	(94.201)
_cons	839.909**	153,253.198**	164.525	17.289.67	428.946	557,087.068***
	(324.775)	(67729.005)	(121.246)	(14857.649)	(909.354)	(180963.001)
Ν	621	670	601	652	403	449

 Table A13. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI in Levels (No Rich Country Interactions)

	FDI Stock		FDI Flow		FAS	
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE
(New Treaty)-1	30.011	159.576	-125.75	-104.477	1.535.67	3.783.13
	(181.527)	(1026.708)	(170.618)	(180.551)	(1646.462)	(3113.790)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-1.681	164.011	-74.593	-54.814	2.420.23	5.354.60
	(396.670)	(1332.280)	(177.323)	(292.249)	(2117.716)	(3943.343)
(New Treaty)+1	-28.086	95.479	151.251	24.757	3.650.82	7.198.81
(	(514.950)	(1579.331)	(247.900)	(450.961)	(2961.939)	(5731.671)
(New Treaty)	-115.002	452.418	181.931	127.756	2.045.26	6.258.00
(	(594.669)	(1639.714)	(239.425)	(318.958)	(2474,179)	(5346.933)
(New Treaty), 2	-484.834	727 494	-407.356	-89 392	1.917.58	8 473 18
(11011 11011))+3+	(716 803)	(2474.381)	(257,070)	(555 484)	(3680,316)	(7477.991)
SUMGDP	0.119	-1.238	0.318	-0.235	4 462*	0.025
beniebi	(0.569)	(0.913)	(0.259)	(0.238)	(2.297)	(1.148)
GDPDIFSO	0	0	0	0	0	0
obromote	(0,00)	(0.00)	(0,00)	(0,00)	(0,00)	(0,00)
SKDIFFout	324 385	-935.03	3.519	-279 837	-6 613 48	-6.091.18
Sills in Four	(961,769)	(1209.504)	(2.84,541)	(279.361)	(5030.351)	(4734 210)
SKDGDPD	-0.155	-0.071	0.02	0.017	0.48	0.203
5112 021 2	(0.102)	(0.179)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.685)	(0.601)
F COST	-24 484	12.347	-40.765***	1.224	-38,797	129 426
1_0001	(18.608)	(75.076)	(14.827)	(17.169)	(53,533)	(151.399)
T COSThm	-15.811	-921.703*	-5.904	-198.477*	-186.312***	-1.150.557*
	(16.029)	(509.374)	(7.051)	(117.255)	(48,129)	(574.604)
HTSKD	0.23	-0.523	0.13	-0.153	2.804***	2.165
	(0.277)	(0.707)	(0.147)	(0.200)	(0.986)	(2.025)
T COSTht	-39.198	-17.453	18.505	-4.815	-1.029.38	-188.859***
	(280.734)	(20.322)	(145.508)	(3.202)	(636.548)	(61.102)
rSUMGDP	12.169*	13.252*	2.725	2.633	55.219***	42.440***
	(6.338)	(6.719)	(2.548)	(1.906)	(20.309)	(14.981)
rGDPDIFSO	0	-0.002*	0	0	-0.004**	-0.006***
	(0.00)	(0.001)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.002)	(0.002)
rSKDIFFout	12.481.08	-31.980.33	6.072.31	-2.992.84	28.743.16	-58.636.83
	(9131.521)	(31292.844)	(4944.279)	(5427.491)	(25108.061)	(48697.329)
rSKDGDPD	-230.201	4.388	-154.761	0.358	539.760**	7.846
	(224.587)	(3.998)	(99.532)	(0.691)	(252.273)	(6.087)
rF_COST	-311.61	241.845	-140.752	43.87	-381.783	78.324
	(247.893)	(315.503)	(96.721)	(75.203)	(369.008)	(401.980)
rT_COSTht	523.64	-845.965*	305.644	-162.998*	-4,317.927***	-1,431.448**
	(391.836)	(432.953)	(354.866)	(81.095)	(1356.198)	(552.165)
rHTSKD	1.466	74.856	0.792	11.011	3.143	148.192**
	(1.275)	(49.431)	(0.656)	(8.434)	(3.346)	(65.151)
rT_COSThm	2.317	-887.427	-5.091	86.94	20.471	-5,439.902*
	(14.286)	(1259.090)	(5.674)	(299.769)	(23.841)	(2720.900)
_cons	504.642*	125,920.608**	69.403	14.684.12	-767.859	326,558.034**
	(252.096)	(59998.694)	(123.559)	(15183.127)	(959.187)	(135467.363)
Ν	621	670	601	652	403	449

Table A14. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI in Levels (Rich Country Interactions)

	FDI Stock		FDI Flow		FAS	
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE
(New Treaty)-1	0.033	0.287**	-0.187	0.165	-0.001	0.253
	(0.052)	(0.140)	(0.299)	(0.795)	(0.080)	(0.189)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-0.071	0.165	-1.027	-0.924	0.038	0.223
	(0.081)	(0.164)	(1.539)	(1.328)	(0.120)	(0.239)
(New Treaty)+1	-0.061	0.181	0.024	0.029	0.063	0.144
	(0.087)	(0.162)	(1.395)	(1.299)	(0.145)	(0.268)
(New Treaty)+2	-0.027	0.253	-0.051	0.568	0.07	0.14
	(0.089)	(0.162)	(1.408)	(0.868)	(0.165)	(0.300)
(New Treaty)+3+	-0.094	0.048	-3.129*	-1.458	0.199	0.359
	(0.107)	(0.241)	(1.856)	(1.363)	(0.226)	(0.408)
ISUMGDP	1.243	4.177***	-23.847	9.142*	3.070***	4.633***
	(0.995)	(0.644)	(22.185)	(4.928)	(0.499)	(1.105)
IGDPDIFSQ	-0.85	-1.521**	7.603	-0.708	-1.095*	-2.120***
	(0.586)	(0.619)	(11.124)	(2.137)	(0.594)	(0.723)
lSKDIFFout	7.488	7.167	-32.093	3.71	5.044	7.9
	(8.751)	(8.177)	(36.890)	(15.637)	(9.619)	(13.265)
lSKDGDPDout	-0.78	-0.763	4.232	-0.271	-0.599	-0.926
	(0.900)	(0.846)	(4.089)	(1.639)	(1.104)	(1.499)
1F_COST	-0.785***	-0.919	-12.054*	-1.827	-0.567***	0.203
	(0.209)	(0.688)	(6.122)	(2.509)	(0.204)	(1.082)
IT_COSThm	1.35	-6.856***	51.411**	4.064	-5.578***	-7.747***
	(3.379)	(2.291)	(20.904)	(16.147)	(2.004)	(2.813)
IHTSKD	-0.122	-0.058	-0.614**	-0.293	0.037	0.062
	(0.145)	(0.132)	(0.238)	(0.294)	(0.039)	(0.072)
lT_COSTht	0.304	0.053	1.147	0.456	-0.108	-0.246
	(0.371)	(0.319)	(0.800)	(0.864)	(0.111)	(0.220)
_cons	0.160**	30.797	0.830*	-75.743	0.004	38.774**
	(0.078)	(24.517)	(0.431)	(121.222)	(0.025)	(15.479)
Ν	621	670	601	652	403	449

Table A15. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI in Logs (No Rich Country Interactions)

	FDI Stock		FDI I	Flow	FAS	
	FD	FE	FD	FE	FD	FE
(New Treaty).1	0.048	0.394**	-0.035	-0.085	0.009	0.259
•	(0.049)	(0.159)	(0.388)	(0.763)	(0.080)	(0.188)
(New Treaty) <sub>0</sub>	-0.043	0.289	-0.962	-1.188	0.044	0.203
• • • •	(0.093)	(0.188)	(1.525)	(1.343)	(0.121)	(0.246)
(New Treaty)+1	-0.028	0.298	0.332	-0.194	0.067	0.08
	(0.102)	(0.182)	(1.331)	(1.384)	(0.149)	(0.284)
(New Treaty)+2	-0.003	0.378**	-0.032	0.277	0.075	0.121
• • • •	(0.107)	(0.187)	(1.504)	(0.987)	(0.174)	(0.301)
(New Treaty)+3+	-0.09	0.176	-3.506*	-1.957	0.161	0.323
(	(0.123)	(0.290)	(1.868)	(1.560)	(0.244)	(0.405)
ISUMGDP	1.779**	3.737***	-16.447	6.46	2.432***	4.412***
	(0.764)	(1.178)	(11.571)	(7.651)	(0.620)	(1.330)
IGDPDIFSQ	0.045	-0.532	4.143	0.507	1.71	1.398
	(1.350)	(1.264)	(5.839)	(2.590)	(1.927)	(2.655)
ISKDIFFout	16.047	17.573	-58.013	2.617	30.202	44.357
	(16.301)	(14.220)	(49.925)	(26.741)	(22.832)	(33.726)
lSKDGDPDout	-1.951	-2.107	7.23	-0.281	-3.52	-5.118
	(1.846)	(1.583)	(5.561)	(2.910)	(2.604)	(3.854)
IF_COST	-0.999***	-1.115	-26.901***	-5.67	-0.713	0.694
	(0.261)	(1.488)	(7.349)	(5.050)	(0.425)	(2.469)
IT_COSThm	0.558	-7.180*	2.415***	2.603	-0.165	-9.839**
	(0.499)	(4.014)	(0.689)	(21.413)	(0.342)	(4.098)
IHTSKD	-0.201	-0.094	-0.990***	-0.493	0.048	0.091
	(0.184)	(0.121)	(0.223)	(0.369)	(0.097)	(0.115)
IT_COSTht	2.659	0.197	50.016**	1.036	-5.898**	-0.41
	(4.278)	(0.330)	(23.104)	(1.218)	(2.407)	(0.442)
rSUMGDP	-2.38	0.014	-61.001	-8.834	1.517	-0.542
	(1.561)	(1.671)	(36.337)	(15.231)	(1.493)	(1.666)
rGDPDIFSQ	-0.61	-1.544	30.16	5.954	-3.36	-2.809
	(1.356)	(1.365)	(18.822)	(8.485)	(2.056)	(2.723)
rSKDIFFout	-18.972	-29.061*	19.15	9.117	-32.196	-48.601
	(16.763)	(15.355)	(56.942)	(42.897)	(23.231)	(34.092)
rSKDGDPDout	0.616	3.292*	32.243***	-1.823	0.362	5.546
	(0.392)	(1.677)	(9.261)	(4.371)	(0.438)	(3.884)
rF_COST	-0.976	0.781	-11.063***	6.436	0.136	-0.697
	(0.656)	(1.519)	(2.291)	(5.947)	(0.441)	(2.473)
rT_COSTht	-1.909	-0.633	8.331	-3.74	2.92	0.18
	(2.234)	(0.505)	(41.768)	(2.619)	(2.022)	(0.531)
rHTSKD	2.144	0.254	-5.373	1.503	3.739	-0.014
	(1.868)	(0.204)	(6.162)	(1.048)	(2.646)	(0.168)
rT_COSThm	0.376	1.688	4.288***	11.015	-0.038	8.181*
	(0.253)	(4.402)	(0.920)	(31.982)	(0.148)	(4.280)
_cons	0.146*	28.633	0.672	-86.367	0.008	-4.149
	(0.073)	(29.603)	(0.454)	(126.830)	(0.026)	(27.714)
Ν	621	670	601	652	403	449

Table A16. Regression Estimates: Outbound FDI in Logs (Rich Country Interactions)